



ISSUE BRIEF


No. 249

September 2020

Battling Cartographic Aggression against India: A Reality Check



Raghunandan MC is a presently working as Web Manager cum Researcher at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi. The author holds a Graduate degree in Business Management from Bangalore University and a Post Graduate degree in Diplomacy, Law, Management from OP Jindal Global University. His areas of interest include National Security with a special focus on Counter-Terrorism and Internal Security.



Tejusvi Shukla is a Research Assistant at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi. She holds a Bachelor's Degree in BA Programme (Economics and History) from Miranda House, University of Delhi. Her areas of interest include issues concerning Internal Security and Peace and Conflict Studies, with a special focus on Leftwing Extremism in India. She aspires to build a career in peace, conflict, and strategic studies.

Maps are used to influence the way one views and understands the world. They are tools that create and regulate discourses surrounding international relations and have the potential to cause serious implications for the population of the territories depicted. Often, they are used to offer much more than just cartographic information – delivering narratives with a purpose and stories with an agenda. Termed as 'Cartographic Aggression', this phenomenon dates back to as early as the existence of 'Nation States'.

Cartographic Aggression is exercised as a means of intentional misrepresentation of national/international boundaries to claim a larger territorial expanse, and thereby influence public opinion – nationally and internationally. It forms a part of a larger psychological warfare that is waged by States to influence perceptions to their advantage. Of late, a recent spike in such instances globally has brought the subject to the forefront, yet again. Through this paper, the authors aim to trace these instances since their inception (internationally, and with a special focus on India) and examine India's preparedness and reactions against the same. This paper is divided into three sections: tracing the inception of cartographic aggression – internationally and in the Indian context; Indian efforts against such aggression so far; and the way forward.

Key Points

- Cartographic aggression is not a new phenomenon. It dates back to as early as the existence of the Nation States.
- In the early nineteenth and twentieth centuries, countries used postcards maps, giant images of animals, and vicious cartoons as propaganda tools to communicate their idea of territory, identity, and even claim land.
- In the Indian context, cartographic aggression has been furthered since the independence mainly by Pakistan and China (and most recently by Nepal).
- Following the face-off in Eastern Ladakh, in the most recent attempt towards cartographic aggression, China had released another map depicting the LAC far inside the Indian territory – expanding significantly from earlier Chinese claims.
- Cartographic aggression by States is a part of psychological warfare; therefore, the response mechanism should be measured balance of assertive and aggressive optical/symbolic posturing.
- India's responses have largely been reactive in nature. It has often downplayed the relevance of acts of cartographic aggression stating their incapacity to alter ground realities.
- To counter the cartographic aggression/psychological war, India needs to step up its diplomatic approach. It also needs to strengthen and implement the existing provisions, thereby recognising the full potential of digital maps.
- India must face this war to win, and not merely survive.



CENTRE FOR LAND WARFARE STUDIES (CLAWS) ISSUE BRIEF

The Inception

Jeremy Black, a British Historian writes in his book *Maps and Politics*, "Maps as a form, expression, and organisation of information are valuable to those who take decisions, and these are the wielders of power".¹ These maps used by the decision makers in their strategic rooms determine their world view, and in turn, have the power to influence the population that holds the power or acts on behalf of its respective State. Study of cartographic representations across the world, consequentially, holds much significance in the field of international relations.

Figure 1: Vicious Cartoons



Figure 2: Post Card Maps



Image Source: National Geographic Archives

<https://www.nationalgeographic.com/news/2016/10/propaganda-war-maps-gallery/>

Instances of using cartography as a tool in international politics date back to as early as the 19th and the 20th centuries. Countries used postcards, maps, giant images of animals, and vicious cartoons to communicate their idea of territory, identity, even to claim land (as was evident during the Russo-Japanese war)² and strike fear in the minds of their adversaries (Fig1,2).

Maps used during the World Wars stand testimony to this. For instance, the US Naval Map titled "We fight a Global War" indeed mobilised 52 million American workers for overseas duty by the end of 1944. Another map printed by the US printing office in 1944, where an artist placed Japan in the bull's-eye of a target and positioned Chester Nimitz, the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Forces of Pacific Ocean Areas, pointing at Tokyo remarking "That's The Spot to Hit". This single poster played a crucial role in escalating sentiments which finally culminated in the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945.



CENTRE FOR LAND WARFARE STUDIES (CLAWS) ISSUE BRIEF

Figure 3: John Falter's "That's the Spot to Hit! – Give Us the Stuff and We'll Hit it!"³



Cartographic Aggression Against India


India has continued to live with two of its major adversaries (in the west and the north) since its independence. The nature of aggression against the country by these adversaries, however, has been advanced not only on ground, but also in the psychological domain. Reportedly at China's behest, Nepal too has, very recently followed suit. Indian reception and response to such aggression has varied with the aggressor, the act of aggression itself, the timing, and India's contemporary interests as assessed by the respective Indian governments. In a time when such aggression is only growing, especially from Beijing, it becomes pertinent for us to study these instances and the evolution of Indian response in this regard. Here, three aspects of cartographic aggression have been examined: cartographic propaganda, cartographic claims by State officials, and military action followed by cartographic aggression. As manifestations of these aspects, instances of misrepresentation of Indian cartography internationally shall also be highlighted.



CENTRE FOR LAND WARFARE STUDIES (CLAWS)

ISSUE BRIEF

Figure 4: Official Map of India



Source: Press Information Bureau: <http://164.100.117.97/WriteReadData/userfiles/India%20-%20Political1.pdf>

The earliest visible instance of cartographic aggression on India's territory occurred with the inauguration of the highway connecting Tibet and Xingjian by the Chinese in 1957. Recently released documents by the United States' Central Investigation Agency (CIA) claim that the construction of the highway, illegally passing through Aksai Chin in Eastern Ladakh had begun in the early 1950s.⁴ Much to India's despair, it was later accompanied by the release of a map that depicted all of Aksai Chin as part of Chinese territory for the first time. Although the issue of previous Chinese maps depicting incorrect Sino-India boundaries was raised by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru with his Chinese counterpart in 1954, and again in 1956, the Chinese had dismissed India's concerns by terming them as old Kuomintang maps which the Communist regime had no time to revise.⁵ But, in another of China's 'firsts', the Chinese formally claimed over 50,000 sq km of territory in Ladakh and North Eastern Frontier Agency (NEFA, now Arunachal Pradesh) in September 1959.⁶ This was followed by the Chinese aggression of October 1962 which resulted in the illegal occupation of Aksai Chin in Ladakh, and the rest is history. The illegal transfer of the Shaksgam Valley by Pakistan to China in March 1963, only four months after the 1962-aggression, attempted to further alter the existing cartographic realities.

At the western end, besides the occupation of over 13,297 sq km of Pakistan-occupied Jammu Kashmir (PoJK) and over 72,871 sq. km of Gilgit-Baltistan in Northern Jammu and Kashmir⁷, the depiction of the Siachen Glacier as part of Pakistan in the maps issued to certain German mountaineers by the US Defense Mapping Agency revealed another such instance. It came to India's notice when a Colonel of the Indian Army came across one of these distorted maps in the late 1970s. The area was mapped and later retained through Operation Meghdoot in April 1984 when the Indian Army occupied the Siachen Glacier. While Pakistani claims have existed, and thereby protested by India ever since, they have fundamentally differed from those of Beijing.



CENTRE FOR LAND WARFARE STUDIES (CLAWS) ISSUE BRIEF

Owing to the ever-changing in China's perceptions of the LAC, it has been increasingly engaging in distorting narratives through incorrect maps and only more aggressively, in time. What has been a subject debate, rather, is the Indian reaction to such aggression. In 2006, Chinese ambassador Sun Yuxi, explicitly claimed all of Arunachal Pradesh, expanding their earlier traditional claim singularly from the Tawang Tract. Although this resulted in strong verbal protests from New Delhi, the normal diplomatic procedure of summoning a diplomat exceeding his brief was not followed in the event of the then Chinese President Hu Jintao's four-day visit to the country.⁸

Amidst this, extending it from the psychological domain, stapling of visas of Indians from Arunachal Pradesh as well as the then state of J&K since 2008 had raked further controversies. In 2007, an official belonging to Arunachal Pradesh was denied a normal visa by the Chinese Embassy that claimed it to be a violation of Chinese 'sovereignty'.⁹ Similar instances were repeated in 2010 when the then Northern Army Commander serving in the then state of J&K was offered a stapled visa as well as in 2012 when an Indian Air Force Officer hailing from Arunachal Pradesh was subjected to a similar treatment.¹⁰ Subsequently, each of these delegation-visits were called off, except in 2012. Following what most analysts call a 'policy of accommodation', a shrunk delegation – without the IAF officer from Arunachal Pradesh – went ahead with their visit to China.¹¹ Although proper visas have been offered to residents of J&K since PM Manmohan Singh's 2011 BRICS-visit¹², things have remained unchanged in the case of Arunachal Pradesh.

Figure 5. Vertical Atlas released by China: 2014¹³



Image Source: India Today, <https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/china-map-shows-arunachal-pradesh-as-part-of-tibet-198603-2014-06-28>

Beijing's policy of aggressively asserting claims through cartographic adventurism has only been manifested in newer forms since then. In 2012, e-passports being issued by China came with watermarks depicting Arunachal Pradesh and Aksai Chin as part of Chinese territory. It met strong protests from India who instead started stamping the appropriate Indian maps on Chinese visas. The year 2013 saw a major border stand-off between the two countries where Beijing expanded its claims to the Depsang Plains in northern Ladakh. India's response, with both the then PM Manmohan Singh and External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid calling it a 'local incident' on two separate occasions,



CENTRE FOR LAND WARFARE STUDIES (CLAWS) ISSUE BRIEF

was considered rather conciliatory. Following this, the withdrawal of India from the trilateral US-Japan-India naval exercise off the island of Guam later the same year in order to keep Beijing's apprehensions at bay, only added to India's apparently conciliatory stand against Chinese aggression. While this incident did not involve any redrawing of maps, only the following year in 2014, China released its 'Vertical Atlas' yet again depicting Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh as parts of its Xinjiang and South Tibet respectively.

This was repeated in 2015, and quite interestingly, during the State-visit of Prime Minister Narendra Modi to China when a morphed map of India – this time additionally without the entire then state of J&K – was telecasted by the State-owned Chinese Central Television (CCTV). Similar maps in Chinese markets have been sold for quite some time. In a bid to retain growing financial engagements, as some experts believe, New Delhi's reactions to these instances included only little apart from verbal protests.

Figures 6,7. Maps in Chinese markets with mutilated maps of India: 2015



Figure 8. Map released by Peoples' Daily following the on-ground aggression: 2017




Image Source: People's Daily Newspaper



CENTRE FOR LAND WARFARE STUDIES (CLAWS) ISSUE BRIEF

The 2017 Doklam-standoff came as a watershed moment in Sino-India bilateral relations. Following the illegal construction of a road in Bhutanese territory, maps claiming Doklam to be a part of China were widely circulated by Chinese media outlets asserting their claim. The Indian troops engaged with China in the territory of a third country for the first time amidst this standoff as it had huge security implications for India and Bhutan. Subsequently, the *status quo ante* was restored. This incident included one of those instances when cartographic aggression indeed followed an on-ground aggression. While the 2020 Eastern-Ladakh stand-off has been the next major such attempt at expansion of Beijing's territorial claims, it must be recalled that a yet another instance of cartographic adventurism through incorrect maps released by Sky Maps – China's authority on digital maps – in April 2020 went absolutely unnoticed.¹⁴ The issue was raised by a sitting MP from Arunachal Pradesh, which apparently met no major response.

Another new map was released recently in July 2020, following the transgression in Eastern Ladakh, with the Chinese perception of the LAC shifted far westwards when compared to the previous maps. Only following this, on 4 August 2020, Pakistan released its new political map, not only claiming all of the Union Territories of J&K and Ladakh (barring Aksai Chin) for the first time (earlier marked as disputed territory), but also Junagarh in Gujarat as part of its territory.

Figure 9. Map released by China post the transgression in Eastern Ladakh: July 2020



Additionally, in what is being rather perceived as a surprise (and a move allegedly at China's behest), a new map by the Nepalese government including three areas – Limpiyadhura, Lipulekh, and Kalapani – which totals up to 334 sq km of Indian territory was released in June 2020. Protests have been lodged against Nepal's move, but New Delhi has mostly maintained a low profile regarding the issue. Interestingly, voices of discontent are being raised even from within Nepal with regard to the total silence on Chinese occupation of Nepalese territory by the government (as compared with its 'dispute' with respect to India), so as well for the selective amnesia with regard to another India-Nepal dispute in Susta – an area not as strategically important for China as the prior three.



CENTRE FOR LAND WARFARE STUDIES (CLAWS) ISSUE BRIEF

International Perceptions

Figure 10. Official map of India as represented by Australia



Image Source: <https://nationalmap.gov.au/>

Figure 11. Official map of India as represented by Israel



Image Source: MoFA Israel

While cartographic aggression by adversaries is a major concern, as pointed out in this paper, cartographic misrepresentation of the Indian territory emerging out of such narratives/claims internationally could be called an unfortunate fallout of this aggression. Apart from what the 'aggressors' perceive and thereby project, India's cartographic perceptions thereby do not necessarily coincide with international perceptions. While the United Nations cartographic department maps depict India's J&K, Ladakh, and Arunachal Pradesh as disputed territories, it is rather interesting to note that a number of countries including some of our friendly ones, host distorted Indian maps on their official websites.



CENTRE FOR LAND WARFARE STUDIES (CLAWS)

ISSUE BRIEF

Figure 12. Official map of India as represented by Japan: MoFA



Image Source : Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan

On the other hand, incidents of foreign media using maps not coinciding with India's official maps is no rarity. Very recently in April 2015, the Qatar-based Al Jazeera repeatedly used a misrepresented map of India – with missing Andaman & Nicobar Islands, Lakshadweep Islands, and parts of the then state of J&K – and was consequentially taken off-air for five days. In September 2019, a mutilated map of India was shown by FIFA 20 for a third year in a row, to no serious repercussion.¹⁵ BBC, on several occasions has referred to the then state of J&K as 'India-occupied Kashmir', and most recently while reporting Assam floods in July 2020, depicted a map of India minus J&K and Ladakh. Moreover, a map released by WHO amidst the COVID-19 pandemic misrepresented Indian Territory which was protested against by New Delhi.¹⁶

Figure 13. WHO COVID-dashboard represents J&K and Ladakh in a different colour




Image Source: WHO COVID Meter



CENTRE FOR LAND WARFARE STUDIES (CLAWS)

ISSUE BRIEF

Figure 14. EA Sports depicts mutilated map at FIFA




Image Source: EA Sports Twitter

India's Responses

Indian reactions have been quite visibly expressed against such misrepresentations on occasions more than once. In 2011, over 28,000 copies of the *Economist* had stickers applied manually on inappropriate maps to depict officially recognised Indian borders. In 2014, the official survey and mapping organisation of India, the Survey of India (SoI), filed a case against Google for its alleged misrepresentation of the actual coordinates of Indian boundaries.¹⁷ In 2015, Al Jazeera was taken off air for over 5 days for similar reasons. Moreover, protests have been lodged by India time and again against such misrepresentation by international bodies/organisations as well as deliberate aggression by neighbouring States. But there are two points worth noticing amidst this. One, India's response has been mostly reactive. Two, in cases of aggression by States (unlike misrepresentation by international bodies) India has often downplayed the relevance of acts of cartographic aggression stating their incapacity to alter realities on the ground. Moreover, the adoption of such a "conciliatory approach" in a bid to maintain economic ties and ensure the flow of foreign investment (especially in the Chinese context) has been a marked trend. While there could be justifiable reasons for such reactions in the past, whether India is still tied in those economic, diplomatic, or other compulsions is the point of assessment.

Policy Recommendations

Looking into the future, it must be highlighted that cartographic aggression by States is not only a part of their psychological warfare, but also come with an ulterior motive to manipulate the perceptions of the citizens and achieve territorial gains. It is directed at altering and influencing perceptions in their favour through aggressive optical/symbolic posturing. Countering such aggression and propaganda thereby requires a measured balance of assertive and aggressive optical/symbolic posturing – which may or may not necessarily have real-time impacts, other than countering and building narratives. The commencement of the Indian Meteorological Department forecast of PoJK is one of the most recent examples of this assertive symbolic posturing. This could be achieved through a change of approach at handling of the narratives floated by India's adversaries before the international community.

Timely Detection and Reportage. There have been innumerable instances of incorrect maps and contestable terminology at home – either out of ignorance or otherwise – that have surfaced time and again, with little serious repercussions. This has included national and regional media outlets,



CENTRE FOR LAND WARFARE STUDIES (CLAWS) ISSUE BRIEF

academic circles, and even government departments on occasions more than once. Very recently, an advertisement released in May 2020 by the government of Delhi, referring to Sikkim as a separate nation, had stoked a huge controversy.¹⁸ Plus, a Map under “Our Missions Abroad” on the Home Page of the MEA depicts a Part of Eastern Ladakh with a Different Colouration in comparison to the rest of the Indian Territory.¹⁹ In this light a watchdog to monitor, and report cartographic aggression/misrepresentation must be established under the Survey of India. It must recommend immediate necessary actions towards individuals/organisations, who misrepresent the maps.

A relevant aspect that emerges from this is the exploitation of domestic instances of cartographic misrepresentation by third parties. Bhim Acharya, a Standing Committee member of the Nepalese Communist Party in an interview with the Kathmandu Post, in the context of the new political map released by Nepal, mentioned about the potential of engaging with “other sections of the Indian society” to put “pressure” on New Delhi for meeting their objectives.²⁰ While this has come from Nepal, exploiting gaps at home is something that has been and shall continue to be used by our adversaries to advance their agenda. Since these instances occur more out of ignorance or unawareness than motivated designs, due consideration must be paid to avoid such instances. Even otherwise (on instances of deliberate attempts of misrepresentation), the repercussions of cartographically misrepresenting the country must be made a part of this public discourse and be followed upon in practice. It must be ensured that government departments only depict the officially recognised map of India. Further, due emphasis must be laid on spreading awareness among private entities and general public regarding correct commercial and/or non-commercial cartographic representation of the country. The fact that India’s territorial integrity is uncompromisable must be established both “without and within” the boundaries of India.

Maps in the digital world. As digital spaces have evolved, maps and map-making have no more remained a ‘paper-subject’. It needs acknowledgement that the delay in recognising maps as paper and digital entities simultaneously has cost India throughout. Interestingly, many organisations and government departments still consider maps as majorly a ‘paper-subject’. An extended argument to this inaccessibility to official digital maps is manifested in the faulty depiction of Indian maps by various companies/organisations operating in and outside India which indeed boast massive digital footprints across wide swaths of the internet. As a push for digitisation, the Survey of India (Sol) through its official portal ‘Nakshe’, started offering single-user and multi-user licenses for access to official maps in 2017. However, it is worth noticing that these are indeed PDFs and not digital versions of the maps. In 2018, the Sol launched web portals for access to digital maps for various government departments and citizens. As of now, a significant portion of the Indian territory (including Lakshadweep, Andaman and Nicobar Islands, border regions, districts in Central Indian states) remains unmapped. For encouraging commercial as well as non-commercial usage in this direction, the initiatives need to be further built upon.

It is pertinent to note that countries across the globe are providing citizens with free access to satellite data to kindle innovation and inspire entrepreneurship. The United States’ Landsat program and Europe’s Copernicus and INSPIRE offer this access. A similar effort by India through ISRO’s Bhuvan geo-platform – which offers imagery specific to Indian region with spatial resolutions ranging from 1 to 56 metres is a step in the right direction. Also, the awareness among a majority of potential consumers regarding such reforms in progress is severely lacking. In order to ensure accurate cartographic data depiction within and outside the country, such major initiatives need to be given greater publicity for ensuring increased accessibility to correct maps. Awareness must be created among schools, colleges, universities, research institutions, think tanks, government departments,



CENTRE FOR LAND WARFARE STUDIES (CLAWS) ISSUE BRIEF

private organisations to use the officially published map to increase the digital footprint. It needs to be further boosted. Furthermore, to increase the use of geospatial infrastructure the onus must be shared by both government institutions and private organisations.

Proactive Diplomatic Outreach. As mentioned earlier, although official statements have been released as response to the most recent instances of cartographic aggression, New Delhi needs to step up the visibility and reach of its narratives to effectively counter each of these. Proactive, instead of the long-normalised reactive approach needs to be adopted. Diplomatically, territorial integrity of India must be projected as uncompromisable. The issue of inappropriate representation of Indian territory on the official websites needs to be strongly raised at least with friendly countries (QUAD, to begin with). Similarly, protests must be launched against various international organisations in this regard (the World Health Organisation and the World Economic Forum, to begin with) to depict at least “neutral maps with dotted lines representing dispute” instead of the current (mis)representations. Business as usual in circumstances like these shall not be encouraged. Moreover, ensuring that every instance of cartographic misrepresentation is adequately and timely conveyed to the Ministry of External Affairs as well as the responsible authorities in the host countries should be included in the charter of duties of nominated representatives at the various Indian embassies. Time lapse in such issues reflects of our ‘lackadaisical attitude’ and should be avoided.

Secondly, proactive vocal protests at various international fora, especially in the United Nations, need to be upped early on when a development in a third country has Indian interests compromised, regardless of Indian territory or Indian population being immediate parties being impacted. India’s posturing with regard to Hong Kong (housing a sizeable Indian diaspora) and the Sakteng Wildlife Sanctuary (bordering Arunachal Pradesh) are the most recent moves that must be replicated in the future. Passive reaction, or even a delayed response (to balance diplomacy with bilateral/multilateral economic engagement, etc.) will only increment the resultant costs for India. In this context, it is notable that the recent Chinese claims in Tajikistan directly impact New Delhi’s interests in Central Asia, and additionally pose serious implications for India’s territorial concerns due to its proximity with Gilgit-Baltistan in (PoJK). It is in New Delhi’s interest to actively voice its concerns against such developments. Similar posturing in the South China Sea, as well as the Chinese occupation of Nepalese land must be undertaken without much delay.


Engagement with International Media. Furthering the proactive approach, it must be India’s endeavour to ensure that it is Indian narratives, and not those by its adversaries, that must be the most accessible and credible source of information about India for the global community. The volume and reach of these narratives put out for access for the international population, thereby, becomes crucial. Wider interaction with the international media through frequent personal interviews, discussions, write-ups, etc., by representatives of the Government of India (diplomats, Union Ministers, etc.) – registering more proactive participation, unlike merely as reactions to aggressive acts of adversaries – would help build the required volume and reach among the global populations for Indian narratives. Furthermore, the GoI must initiate sponsoring Indian academicians and strategic experts to international institutes of academic repute (RAND, IISS, RUSI, etc.) to widen the reach of Indian narratives among the global academic circles. Among other subjects of national interest, an increased depiction of officially recognised maps of India in papers published by such institutes shall boost the visibility of Indian cartographic stance. Additionally, selected-few Indian Embassies must be encouraged to widen engagement with the Indian diaspora as well as local populations in respective countries through short-term certificate courses or cultural events furthering awareness with regards to India’s territorial integrity.



CENTRE FOR LAND WARFARE STUDIES (CLAWS) ISSUE BRIEF

Exploiting Cartographic Discourse on Social Media. Regarding the social media aspect of cartographic aggression, use of these platforms by States for influencing public discourse is an established fact. While regulating social media platforms comes with its genuine limitations, exploiting these to counter as well as further Indian cartographic understanding – in a measured balance of aggressive and assertive – should be a deliberate and immediate choice. Social media handling will require a comprehensive planning and integrated effort by cartographic scholars, security experts, and social media content curators. In laying the foundation of an adequate social media strategy, a vital role is to be played by the PR wings of the intelligence agencies – offering a sense of understanding of the content that needs to be curated and/or countered time to time. This shall be coordinated by the Survey of India, in collaboration with the Ministry of External Affairs, Ministry of Home Affairs and Ministry of Defence.

Figure 15. A Social Media Strategy to counter cartographic misrepresentation of Indian territory must be formulated. Since limitations exist on its regulation, these must be in turn exploited to further Indian narratives.



Stricter Law Implementation: The National Map Policy (NMP) that was announced by the Central Government on May 19, 2005 assigns Sol (that functions under the Department of Science and Technology) the responsibility of creation and maintenance of database constituting the foundation of all spatial data and its production, maintenance, and dissemination to the end user. It issues various guidelines on the implementation of the NMP from time to time. The Guidelines titled, “Instructions for Publication of Maps by Govt and Private Publishers – 2016”, are published on its official website. With the regard to showing inaccurate boundaries, the exact legal effect depends on the nature of the depiction itself. These range from legal effects such as those under the Official Secrets Act, 1923 (restricting the collection and sharing of information about 'prohibited places'), the Customs Act, 1962 (prohibiting the export and import of certain maps), to the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1990. Publication of maps depicting inaccurate external boundaries and coastlines of India is treated as questioning the territorial integrity of India. Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1990 lays down the



CENTRE FOR LAND WARFARE STUDIES (CLAWS) ISSUE BRIEF

punishment as “six months of imprisonment or fine or both.” Presently, these provisions are highlighted as a part of the Public Awareness dropdown button on the homepage of Sol website. Stricter implementation of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1990 is an urgent requirement. Due emphasis must be laid on generating greater awareness in this respect. The aforementioned legal provisions must be highlighted on the website to gather the attention of the user.

Conclusion

Overall, the cartographic war being waged against India has had a long history of consistency – in terms of gradually expanding claims by the adversaries and a largely reactive Indian response mechanism. As of 2020, India has evolved economically, militarily, as well as diplomatically, with major shake-ups in the existing regional and international political environment. A careful balance of assertion and aggression pro-actively projecting the territorial integrity and sovereignty of India as a strictly non-transactional entity – without and within Indian territory – shall be crucial. India must face this war with an objective to win – and not merely survive.

End Notes

¹ Jeremy Black, *Maps and Politics*, (London: University of Chicago Press. 1998), p. 163. https://books.google.co.in/books/about/Maps_and_Politics.html?id=8qhahzYLWWMC&redir_esc=y Accessed on 05 July 2020

²Jon D. Carlson, “Postcards and Propaganda: Cartographic Postcards as Soft News Images of the Russo-Japanese War”, *Political Communication*, 26,2 (2009). <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10584600902861947> Accessed on 05 July 2020

³ Image Source: Printed by the U.S. Government Printing Office in 1944 on behalf of the U.S.

⁴Claude Arpi, ‘When Nehru hid the truth about China building a road across Indian territory’, Daily O, 18 February 2017.

<https://www.dailyo.in/politics/china-aksai-chin-cia-nehru/story/1/15726.html>

⁵ Government of India, “Chinese Aggression in Maps”, January 1963. <http://www.claudearpi.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/1963-Chinese-Agression-in-Maps.pdf>

⁶ Ibid

⁷Explained Desk, “Explained: PoK and Gilgit Baltistan, parts of J&K under Pak occupation”, The Indian Express, 19 September 2019. <https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/explained-pok-gilgit-baltistan-parts-of-jammu-kashmir-under-pak-occupation-explained-6010351/>

⁸ Saurabh Shukla, No boundary talks during Hu Jintao's India visit, <https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/diplomacy/story/20061127-president-of-china-visits-india-784225-2006-11-27>

⁹Nilova Roy Chaudhary, “Arunachal officer denied China visa”, Hindustan Times, 26 May 2007.

<https://www.hindustantimes.com/india/arunachal-officer-denied-china-visa/story-SsTidy21rJ77RPm1TOnBL.html>

¹⁰ NDTV Correspondent, “Military delegation to China off after visa denied to IAF officer from Arunachal Pradesh”, NDTV, 6 January 2012.



CENTRE FOR LAND WARFARE STUDIES (CLAWS) ISSUE BRIEF

<https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/military-delegation-to-china-off-after-visa-denied-to-iaf-officer-from-arunachal-pradesh-572436>

¹¹Manu Pubby, "India, China rescue military visit, Arunachal officer dropped from list", The Indian Express, 11 January 2012.

<http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/india-china-rescue-military-visit-arunachal-officer-dropped-from-list/897019/>

¹²PTI, 'China gives proper visas to four journalists from J-K', The Economic Times, 11 April 2011.

<https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/nri/visa-and-immigration/china-gives-proper-visas-to-four-journalists-from-j-k/articleshow/7946423.cms?from=mdr>

¹³ Image Source: India Today <https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/china-map-shows-arunachal-pradesh-as-part-of-tibet-198603-2014-06-28>, Accessed on 10 July 2020

¹⁴ANS, "China includes Arunachal in its updated map", National Herald, 21 April 2020.

<https://www.nationalheraldindia.com/national/china-includes-arunachal-in-its-updated-map>

¹⁵News 18 Sports, "Jammu and Kashmir Missing Completely From India Map on FIFA 20 For Third Year in a Row", News 18, 27 September 2019.

<https://www.news18.com/news/football/jammu-and-kashmir-missing-completely-from-india-map-on-fifa-20-for-third-year-in-a-row-2325147.html>

¹⁶Dipanjana Roy Chaudhary, "WHO map shows parts of Ladakh as Chinese territory", The Economic Times, 29 April 2020.

<https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/who-map-shows-parts-of-ladakh-as-chinese-territory/articleshow/75415618.cms?from=mdr>

¹⁷TNN, 'Case Filed Against Google for "Misleading" Maps', *Times of India*, 14 December 2014, available at <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/dehradun/Case-filed-against-Google-for-misleading-maps/articleshow/45514809.cms>,

¹⁸Anil Giri, 'India Refuses to Sit for Talks and There is no Boundary Dispute With China, Foreign Minister Says', *The Kathmandu Post*, 27 June 2020, available at <https://tkpo.st/2YAEB5V>, <https://kathmandupost.com/national/2020/06/27/india-refuses-to-sit-for-talks-and-there-is-no-boundary-dispute-with-china-foreign-ministersays>

¹⁹Ministry of External Affairs, available at <https://www.mea.gov.in/>

²⁰N.18

The views expressed and suggestions made in the article are solely of the author (s) in their personal capacity and do not have any official endorsement. Attributability of the contents lies purely with author(s).



CENTRE FOR LAND WARFARE STUDIES (CLAWS)

RPSO Complex, Parade Road, Delhi Cantt, New Delhi 110010

Tel.: +91-11-25691308, Fax: +91-11-25692347, Email: landwarfare@gmail.com

Website: www.claws.in

CLAWS Army No. 33098