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Nathu La September 1967 and Galwan Valley June 2020: Lessons and Future Strategies for India



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Introduction

China has been India's regional adversary for more than seven decades. The first major statement that the newly formed People's Republic of China (PRC) made on 01 October 1949 at the famous Tiananmen Square was to integrate Tibet with Mainland China.¹ This in itself was harbinger of subsequent relationship between democratic India—that won her freedom from the British through 'non-violent *satyagraha*', and the PRC that came into existence after three decades of violent struggle under Chairman Mao. India's initial assessment of China's intentions and preferred strategy for dealing with the Chinese expansionism, through the instrument of foreign policy, 'only' failed in 1962. After this humiliating failure to safeguard territorial integrity (enshrined in the fundamental principles of the Constitution²—which are non-negotiable) India was successful in 1967 at Nathu La where a determined military commander and his brave men demolished the myth of invincibility of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Major General (later Lt Gen) Sagat Singh and his men achieved this under the unfavorable internal environment and against an overrated enemy.

How did we shape our national security vision and strategies from 1967 to the current détente where we are facing the Chinese again in Ladakh? The impromptu fight that the officers and men of 81 Mountain Brigade had with the Chinese at Patrolling Point (PP) 14 at Galwan on the night of 15/16 June 2020, is another event that can be compared to what happened at Nathu La in mid-September 1967. What

Key Points

- The defining character of vision and strategic leadership in 1967 displayed by the Indians were based on: (i) A perception of India as a weak nation compared to China; (ii) A strategy of avoiding confrontation; (iii) Political control over conduct of military operations.
- The defining characteristics as was shown by India in 2020 was : (i) Perception of a nation confident of defending her territorial claim and ready to use military power if required; (ii) A strategy of staring back and giving no indication of blinking; (iii) Professional freedom to the armed forces.
- India's strategies to improve internal security efficiency needs to identify police, judicial and administrative reforms that are linked to outcomes. There may be a need to bring in constitutional amendments aimed at harmonising authority, accountability and capabilities in all these domains.



have we learnt so far? What have been our vision and strategies for dealing with the Chinese threat all these years? This is the central theme of this paper. The discussions in the article are based on three major domains. First, how have the vision and strategic approach of the apex leadership operationalised or changed during the period. Second, how have we fared in the non-military domain, in relation to China, crucial to national security? This includes knowledge & skills, economy, internal security, information & communications technology (ICT) adaption and international relations? Lastly, our preparation in the military domain should include re-engineering and re-organisation of the armed forces, capability building and quality of leadership.

Nathu La : 11 to 16 September 1967


Background

Nathu La (height 14,140 feet) is a mountain pass located on the Sino- Indian border in Sikkim, about 54 Kilometers East of Gangtok, along the Jawaharlal Nehru Road. The pass is overlooked by raised features (shoulders) to the North and South held by the Indian Army to prevent any ingress across this pass. The Chinese are located East of this pass. It is almost eyeballs to eyeballs situation on the two sides. A similar pass exists South- East of Nathu La known as Jelep La (height 13,999 feet) about 60 kilometers East of Gangtok and four kilometers down south from Nathu La along the watershed. The watershed defines the Sino-Indian border in East Sikkim.

Nathu La was held by 17 Mountain Division and Jelep La by 27 Mountain Division in 1965. Both these divisions were under the 33 Corps based at Siliguri. In 1965 the Chinese wanted to help Pakistan in their war with India. Hence they issued an ultimatum to India to vacate Nathu La and Jelep La. As per 33 Corps operational plan in 1965 both these features were designated observation posts with main defences a few kilometers to the West of these passes. It was around August 1965, when Lt Gen G G Bewoor was the Corps Commander (33 Corps) responsible for Nathu La and Jelep La. Major General Sagat Singh had just joined in August 1965. The first operational briefing he got from the Corps Commander at Siliguri emphasised that in case Chinese threat becomes imminent, 17 Mountain Division will vacate Nathu La and 27 Mountain Division (under Major General Harcharan Singh) will vacate Jelep La. The respective divisional defensive battles will be fought from the main defences around six to nine kilometers due West of these passes. Since Major General Sagat Singh was new to the situation he did not raise any objections to this plan during the briefing.³

However, once Sagat Singh assumed office, he moved around his divisional sector, met his brigade, battalion and company commanders, gauged the level of morale of his troops. Having seen the terrain own troops and the enemy across he refused to vacate the pass. He maintained that since the border runs along the watershed the area belongs to India. Secondly holding Nathu La is important for the defenses of 17 Mountain Division. Most importantly as a divisional commander he was responsible for the defences of 17 Mountain Division and hence he must have the freedom to fight the divisional battle as per his professional judgement. Meanwhile 27 Mountain Division vacated Jelep La. The Chinese occupied this pass. All this happened in 1965.⁴ Thus, from September 1965 to September 1967 status quo remained at Nathu La, though the Chinese continued to use propaganda by means of using loudspeakers for spreading false information among the troops and other modes of psychological war including pushing and jostling with the Indian troops located at Nathu La.⁵ For topography and relative locations please see figure below:

Figure 1: Nathu La and Jelep La



Source: News Laundry

<https://www.newslaundry.com/2017/07/08/panag-india-china-sikkim-bhutan>

Trigger for the Fighting at Nathu La

The Chinese opposite Nathu La were quite agitated that the Indian troops did not vacate Nathu La in spite of their prolonged propaganda for the last two years. They intensified their propaganda and intimidating actions of pushing and jostling during September 1967. However this did not help the Chinese. Moreover, the troops of 2 Grenadiers deployed at Nathu La were more than a match to the Chinese. In August 1967, Indians started laying barbed wire along the watershed at Nathu La, which was not liked by the Chinese and verbal as well as physical scuffles increased. On the fateful morning of 11 September 1967 as the engineers (field company) and Grenadiers were laying the barbed wire, the Chinese troops rushed to the spot along with their political commissar. Lt Col Rai Singh—Commanding Officer (CO) 2 Grenadiers— was also at the watershed. The political commissar asked Rai Singh to stop the work. Heated arguments commenced followed by routine pushing and jostling. In the melee the political commissar got roughed up. The Chinese suddenly left. They got into their bunkers. The Indians were in clear sight at the watershed laying the barbed wire. Unknown to them the Chinese took aim. At 7:30 AM the Indians heard a whistle followed by accurate and devastating small arms and automatic fire on the Indians laying the barbed wire. Within minutes hundreds of Indian troops were dead or wounded at the watershed. The CO was also among the wounded.⁶

Five Days Long Conflict and its impact

When the Grenadiers saw their CO shot by the Chinese, they were enraged. The fire fight commenced. Two young officers from the Indian defences launched daylight uphill attack on to the Chinese. This attack was doomed from the beginning due to poor tactical planning. As the attacking Indian troops were hit, the casualties on the Indian side mounted.

During the night and the next day the fire fight continued. The Chinese opened artillery and mortar fire. The Indian side could not open up artillery since, as per the policy, the orders for opening the artillery fire were to come from the defence ministry. The divisional headquarters



could not contact the right people up the chain. With each passing hour, the situation was becoming untenable for the Indians. At this juncture Sagat Singh took command decision to open Indian artillery fire (later when the Prime Minister was briefed she endorsed the decision). The artillery observation post officer was well positioned and had a clear view of the Chinese positions. As the Indian medium and field artillery boomed, the Chinese positioned were raised to ground. On 13 and 14 September, more than 340 Chinese were killed and around 350 were injured. The Chinese defences lay in tatters. Sagat Singh wanted to launch an attack into the battered Chinese defences. He was not allowed to attack. Ceasefire came into effect on 16 September 1967.

The Chinese could not stomach this defeat. They made another attempt on 28 September 1967 to capture Cho La— located North of Nathu La. This time the 7th battalion of 11 Gorkha Rifles and troops of 11 Jammu and Kashmir Rifles foiled this attempt. This was the last time Chinese attacked the Indian defences in 17 Mountain Division Sector.⁷

Galwan Night 15/16 June 2020

Background

The Galwan River flows from Aksai Chin. This is Indian Territory annexed by China in 1959. India did not contest this annexation militarily. The then Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru in 1959 referred to this area as “not a blade of grass grows there”.⁸ Nevertheless, India has always claimed that Aksai Chin is part of its territory. The entire area measures around 38,000 square kilometers. China has constructed the famous Karakorum Highway through Aksai Chin. The highway links China with Pakistan and goes further to other countries in Asia, Middle East and Europe— an alternative to the maritime access through the South China Sea.

The Galwan valley is located at the confluence of Rivers Galwan and Shyok in Eastern Ladakh. Indian territory is located South of Patrol Point (PP) 14, at the edge of the valley— PP14 lies in ‘No man’s land’. Both Indian and Chinese troops patrol up to PP14. No temporary or permanent structure is to be constructed at PP14 as per the agreement between the two nations. India has constructed Darbuk- Shyok to Daulat Beg Oldi (DSDBO) Road (255 km), that goes right up to the Galwan Valley and links Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO) with Leh by road. This road will eventually link Leh to Karakorum Pass. A branch road is being constructed from this road to PP14. China is sensitive to this road network. India, on the other hand, is determined to secure the DSDBO Axis by occupying all important heights astride the road. Around 6 June 2020, the Indian patrols saw Chinese tents at PP14. This was objected by the Indians. After Major General level talks, the Chinese removed the tents. However, within 10 days of this agreement the Chinese reneged on the treaty and erected two tents at PP14.⁹

The Trigger

On 15 June 2020 in the morning The CO of 16 BIHAR, deployed in the area, went up to the Chinese and reminded them of the agreement. The Chinese agreed to remove the tents. When the tents were not removed till the evening of 15 June 2020 the CO went again with a party of around 40 troops including some officers.¹⁰

By this time the Chinese had deployed troops from a different unit who got aggressive with the CO. The pushing and shoving became more violent. The CO was suddenly struck by the



Chinese and pushed down the steep slope into the ice cold water of River Galwan. The fight started from here.¹¹

Conflict in three waves

In retaliation, the Indians pinned down the Chinese. Meanwhile more Chinese troops came from their main defences behind and inflicted serious casualties on the Indians. On 16 June 2020, the Indians came in good number and fought the Chinese with unprecedented ferocity and determination. The Chinese lost the will to fight and started running towards their defences. They were chased by the Indians. During this chase, some Indian soldiers were captured by the Chinese since in the main defences they outnumbered this small group. At the same time, the Indians too had captured some Chinese soldiers, including one of their Colonels. After two days the captured Chinese and Indian troops were exchanged. The Indian troops injured in the clash were treated by the Chinese and vice versa.¹²

Macro Level Analysis of the two Events

We return to the parameters for comparing the macro environments prevailing during the two events- as listed in the introduction to the paper. This will help us to derive the lessons and identify key factors for formulating the future strategies. As discussed earlier, our framework will include vision and the strategic approach at the highest level (leadership), the non-military and military components of nation building and national security.¹³

Vision and Strategic Leadership

In 1965, the Indian political and military leadership blinked in the face of Chinese intimidation. The Corps Commander's orders and loss of Jelep La without a fight, are evidences of a vision based on fear and pessimism. Sagat Singh's decision to defend Nathu La negated this pessimism. He staked his military reputation and career, while deciding to fight it out with the Chinese. In 1967 when the battle was actually fought the leadership across the upper hierarchy had changed. Instead of Lal Bahadur Shastri, Mrs Indira Gandhi was the Prime Minister, war with Pakistan (1965) was over with positive results for India, Lt General Jagjeet Singh Arora had replaced Lt General GG Bewoor and Lt General (later Field Marshal) Sam Manekshaw was the Army Commander Eastern Command. Even with this changed leadership, the policy for use of own artillery and the denial of an opportunity to launch a counter offensive (to Sagat Singh) displayed excessive caution. The defining character of vision and strategic leadership in 1967 displayed by the Indians were based on:

- A perception of India as a weak nation compared to China.
- A strategy of avoiding confrontation at the cost of compromising territorial integrity.
- Political control over conduct of military operations.

In comparison to this, the Chinese displayed:

- An aura of strong nation whose dictate must be obeyed by the Indians.
- A strategy of threatening confrontation if the 'weak Indian state' does not comply to the wishes of the mighty Chinese.
- Freedom to the PLA in location under close watch of the political commissar to escalate the conflict.

In June 2020, even though the skirmish started with 16 Bihar regiment, as it was an impromptu action, troops from six different regiments and services rallied to the fight (12



Bihar, 3 Punjab, Medium and Field Regiments, Signals, Army Medical Corps- all part of 81 Mountain Brigade). Moreover, the fight was followed by tough political messages and the Indian Prime Minister and the Defence Minister visited the formations and spoke to the soldiers on ground. The Chinese withdrew in Galwan Valley. Talks for Pangong Tso are continuing. India has not scaled down additional deployment of troops in the sector and the Indian Air Force (IAF) is active in the sector. Meanwhile, between 29 August and second week of September, Indian troops occupied six major heights dominating Finger 4 in the Pangong Tso area. The Chinese too have hardened their stand. They have activated their Boldo Garrison and inducted 3000 additional troops.

Additional mechanised forces have also been moved in. India has displayed all advance indicators for use of military force- if the situation demands. In case of India, the defining characteristics in 2020 are:

- Perception of a nation confident of defending her territorial claim and ready to use military power if required.
- A strategy of staring back and giving no indication of blinking.
- Professional freedom to the armed forces.

The Chinese in comparison:

- Have adopted a cautious approach after the Galwan fight.
- Have adopted 'wait and watch policy' without making any outlandish statement as was the case in 1967.
- No propaganda or psychological operations in the tactical combat zone as was done in 1967.

Based on the above, India's strategies for the future must be resolute leadership derived from unflinching faith in the capability of own people and armed forces and a realistic assessment of friends and foes. This needs to be matched by thorough preparation in the non-military as also military domains. It is time that our leadership stops emanating 'soft state' signals to our adversaries.

Comparison in the Non Military Domain: Nation Building

Wars always have been the preserves of the state. Military is just one component that the state uses to avoid war or to fight it, to achieve the desired state of equilibrium. The non-military components of national power insulate the state against war and when war becomes imminent these components enhance the probability of favorable outcome. This domain includes knowledge and skills, economy, internal security, ICT adaption, and international relations. It is here that the Chinese have gone far ahead of India between 1967 and 2020.

Knowledge and Skills: This aspect can be measured in literacy, per capita GDP, investment in Research and Development as percentage of GDP, number of universities among the world's top 100.

Literacy rates: India and China started with literacy rates of 19.3 and 47.5 per cent respectively in 1950.¹⁴ By 2010 India reached literacy rate of 62.6 per cent and China attained 94.3 per cent literacy rate.¹⁵ By 2020, the Chinese literacy rate increased to 97 per cent and that of India to 75 per cent as per the World Bank.¹⁶ However if we go deeper into this aspect, the Chinese indulged in disruptive innovation in this field during Mao's regime by emphasising on skills and primary education at the cost of elitist higher education. Though, in later years, they emphasised on tertiary education also. Thus, the Chinese developed a superior base of skills and vocational education early in their journey that helped their



industries. India too created Industrial Training Institutes (ITIs), Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs), Indian Institutes of Management (IIMs) and so on but these did not help boost productivity and the GDP. The Indian education system has been generally emphasising on theory based higher education.¹⁷ It is only now that the new education policy enunciates higher focus on skills and 'learning by doing'. Its effect will be based on the way the policy is implemented.¹⁸

Higher Education: In 2018/19, the US universities had 34 per cent of all international students from China and 18 percent international students were Indians.¹⁹ As many as 12 Chinese universities are among the top 100 ranked universities globally. Not a single Indian university is among the top 100 as in 2019.²⁰

Investment in Research and Development: The table below will highlight the differences as in 2019.²¹

Table 1: Indian and Chinese Investments in R&D

	India	China
Percentage of GDP	0.7 per cent	2 per cent (China spends three times more percentage of GDP on research. Her GDP itself is six times that of the Indian GDP in 2020)
Universities research	3255.4 million dollars	25692.4 million dollars
Government funded research	29184.8 million dollars	58838.4 million dollars
Businesses funded research	19214.5 million dollars	287795.3 million dollars
Number of researchers per million	156	1089

Source: Data compiled from UNESCO (2019)

Our strategies in knowledge creation and skills development must be linked with enhancing the human capital, linking knowledge creation with achieving global leadership in niche technologies and knowledge base and making education merit based as also affordable to the poor.

Economy: In 1967, the major economic indicators for India and China were almost equal. In 2020 Chinese economy is six times higher in almost all the indicators.²² Please see table below:

Table 2: Indian and Chinese Economy

	India	China	Remarks
GDP	50.13 billion dollars in 1967 increased to 2726.32 billion dollars in 2018	72.88 billion dollars in 1967 increased to 13608 billion dollars in 2018	As per the purchasing power parity (PPP) data for 2018 is 10498 billion dollars for India and 25361 billion dollars for China
Per capita GDP	96 dollars in 1967 increased to 2016 dollars in 2018	97 dollars in 1967 increased to 9771 dollars in 2018	As per the purchasing power parity (PPP) data for 2018 is 7762 dollars for India and 18210 dollars for China

Source: Data compiled from UNESCO (2019)



Similarly, the per capita income in India and China were almost same in 1967. On the contrary, in 2020, the per capita income in China is eight times or nine times that of India. As regards the FDI, though India has registered remarkable growth in FDI inflow by touching half a trillion mark in 2020, it is still one sixth of the Chinese FDI in 2020. It is only since 2015 that Indian GDP growth rate has been higher than that of China. Before this, China had been growing much faster than India. Therefore, our strategies in economic development need complete transformation. There is a need to unshackle the people from archaic rules, bring in transparency, honesty and integrity in our economic activities.

Internal Security and Loss to Businesses due to Crime

In the context of internal security, China does better than India in the business cost of organised crime, and is ranked at 65 whereas India is ranked lower at 90. Similarly, in the incidence of terrorism and homicide, China is ranked at 111 and 15 respectively with India at 137 and 75 respectively. India does better than China in reliability of police and social capital— ranked at 60 and 78 respectively compared to China at 63 and 125 in these parameters. It is interesting to note that countries like Israel and US are ranked 41 and 9 respectively in social capital. These are also the countries among the top 30 as per the World Economic Forum (WEF) report of 2018. All the above rankings are also taken from the WEF rankings of 2018.²³ Our strategies to improve internal security efficiency need to identify police, judicial and administrative reforms that are linked to outcomes. There may be a need to bring in constitutional amendments aimed at harmonising authority, accountability and capabilities in all these domains.

ICT Adaption

This is a critical pillar of national competitiveness since the technologies here are of dual-use nation building and national security. As regards, nation building ICT adaption at advanced levels can enhance the productivity, governance, wealth distribution, transparency by a factor of three to five. Thus, if the GDP for India shows a growth rate of 5 to 6 per cent proper adaption of ICT can ensure exponential growth to 15 or 20 per cent. However ICT adaption involves a large number of tangible and intangible factors. Tangible factors will include as number of mobile subscribers, broadband subscribers, speeds of Internet, fiber internet subscribers, use of Artificial Intelligence, Blockchain, Big Data, ICT enabled quality assurance, ICT enabled supply chain management etc. The intangible factors include organisational culture in terms of commitment, integrity, corporate governance, leadership, empathy, values and so on. As per the World Economic Forum (WEF) (2018) China ranks ahead of India in all the tangible factors of ICT adaption. In the military domain the Chinese have moved to the concept of informationised armed forces from mechanised armed forces.²⁴

The problem with formulating strategies for ICT adaption is that while the authority lays at the top the expertise, knowledge and the will to execute lies at the bottom. The biggest impediment to ICT adaption is lack of knowledge and skills with people who have to actually formalise the strategies. This issue needs to be resolved through debates and willingness to change.

International Relations

In the context of China, international relations are based on the concept of Comprehensive National Power (CNP) to be used for coercion.²⁵ Besides, China does not believe in equality in international relations. Their age old concept of 'Middle Kingdom' is based on the divine sanction to the Chinese rulers to rule all the territories under heaven. Thus, other nations



can at best be tributaries to the Chinese nation.²⁶ Thus, India's quest for ensuring national security against Chinese threat needs to be based on this Chinese mindset. China will not intimidate India if we stare back at her and demonstrate well calibrated proactiveness based on thorough preparation with a resolution to operationalise our bold plans. If we blink, China will be all over us.

We also need to realise that the post COVID-19 world order is not going to be the same. China will not be able to leverage her economic clout and manufacturing bases to her advantage. A number of European countries that were somewhat ambivalent towards China, in spite of the US nudge to oppose China unequivocally, are openly hostile to China today. This has disrupted the Chinese supply chains especially in rolling out of 5G infra and even in other high technology value added products. India needs to enhance her capabilities to fill the gap to counter Chinese hegemony in international trade.

In international relations, we need to realise that a philosophic approach to morality does not help. Once we identify 'friends and foes', then there is a need for a 'give and take approach'. In international policies the national interests are permanent.

Military Domain

We need to avoid counting battle ships, aircrafts and guns for comparing India and China. Nothing much can be inferred from these force level comparisons available in various journals. Starting ratios do not decide the outcome of wars. It is how the forces are employed in actual operations and the caliber of leadership that matters. At Nathu La as also at Galwan we came out much superior to the Chinese in actual tactical battles, though the Chinese had the initiative as they started the conflict. However, we need to make a note of the critical areas where Chinese have professed that they have transformed their armed forces. Firstly, the PLA has come a long way from Mao's armed forces that we encountered in 1967. They have had four to five transformations from that level. From an illiterate and political commissar driven army— PLA transformed to professional army led by good number of officers. Political control was driven to higher echelons and does not exist at the tactical or operational levels. Thereafter the PLA transformed to a mechanised army before finally getting reorganised to an informationised armed forces. The Chinese military was the first to embrace the tenets of information warfare. They claim to possess good capability for computer network attack and electronic warfare. Thus, dominance of electromagnetic space as part of cyber space will be the key in a short war with China. Besides deception, psychological warfare, net war will be the likely domains of IW where the Chinese will focus their attention. However, so far we have not seen the Chinese capabilities in actual combat with an equal adversary. Comparing 1967 with 2020 will clearly bring out the following:

- A bold military commander in 1967 proved that the Chinese can be defeated in combat. In 2020, the Indian Army once again proved their superior fighting capabilities, cohesion among the units of different arms and services at the tactical level of a brigade and an unmistakable will to fight and win.
- In 1967, the political leadership as also the top military leadership were not bold enough to wrest the initiative from the Chinese after winning the battle at Nathu La. Sagat Singh wanted to go on the offensive. He was not allowed. The Chinese went on offensive once again at Cho La within two weeks of Nathu La battle. They lost. Perhaps we missed an opportunity to recapture Jelep La from the Chinese which they had occupied in 1965. In 2020, our military posturing is aggressive. It needs to be seen what actions we take in other areas where the Chinese have not withdrawn so far.



- Our military strategies must be based on bold and effective leadership, high levels of technical skills amongst the troops to fight through cyber attack, very high component of indigenous weapon systems especially those with embedded software and high tech hardware, network centric approach at the operational levels. Traditionally, the Indian Armed Forces have excelled when clear political mandate is given to the armed forces under a unified command of competent military commanders. While dealing with China, synergy among the political leadership and the three services, civilian interface where ever necessary will be of utmost importance. China will endeavour to infiltrate our institutions for perception management and psychological war. Adequate measures in terms of detection and neutralisation of such threats must be built in.

Conclusion

Though we have come a long way from 1962, some of our basic presumption and mindset still ignore the reality of China. The PRC is our sworn and fierce adversary and it is time that we do not concede to its demands rather fight back with military strength and diplomacy whenever needed. Whenever we stared back and fought, the results were much better. Thus, proactive approach and measured aggressiveness with thorough preparation must be the basic tenets of our policy with respect to China. This approach needs to be followed across wide range of domains from political resoluteness to knowledge and skill creation, economy, internal security, ICT adaption and international relations.

Militarily, we were never inferior to China when it came to actual performance on the battle field. Even in 1962, despite some most horrendous political bungling, we still could have pulled off an honourable result had we shown the courage and wisdom to employ our superior air force and allowed good military leaders to conduct military operations in a professional manner. Harbakhsh, Manekshaw and host of other superb military commanders were available to us. They would have done much better to salvage the situation in our favour.

It must also be understood that war with China is winnable but at the same time will be extremely expensive. Hence, there is a need to 'win without fighting'. In 1967, had we not vacated Jelep La and instead sent strong signals to the PLA that any mis adventure will be dealt with, perhaps China would not have dared to attack us at Nathu La. Hence, one of the approaches to 'win without fighting' is to show aggressive military posture (Nathu La , Cho La, Sum Dorong Chu, Doklam, Galwan). The other approach should be to compete in nation building domains. Apparently we have made a beginning. However, we have a large gap to cover in a comparatively short time.

End Notes

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