



# ISSUE BRIEF

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## Unpredictability: A Battle Winning Factor

*“Junior leaders need to have the faith, trust and confidence to take bold, imaginative, innovative and audacious and risky decisions in the battlefield to win decisive victories by unpredictable means.”*



**Major General Yash Mor, SM (Retd)**, was commissioned in the Indian Army in 1985. The officer was involved in counter terrorist operations in South Kashmir and Punjab. He is known for applying 'unconventional tactics' with astounding success. He is credited with many successful operations based on Small Teams in South Kashmir. He has served with the United Nations in Mozambique. In addition to DSSC, Wellington, he is a graduate of Defence Services Command and Staff College, Bangladesh. He commanded his unit 1 GUARDS (2 PUNJAB), and later an Independent Armoured Brigade on the Western Front and was the first GOC of a Sub Area in Ladakh.

### Introduction

Ethos of an army is defined partly by the military doctrine it adopts, and partly by the way time has shaped its professional attitudes. This ethos generates mindsets, customs, traditions and conventions, which ultimately becomes the characteristic of the fighting outfit. As a result, 'Operational Doctrines' practiced by armies, matures over a period of time. . The quest for excellence leads to refinement in various procedures and drills, which results in laying down of elaborate Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs)/Training Notes, covering the minutest of details. This therefore, often leads to the adoption of 'predictable' standard or templated courses of action. The Commander, therefore, does the 'done thing'—just like a robot. It thus leaves very little scope for the original thought and

### Key Points

- The nature and expression of war has always been unpredictable at all levels of warfighting.
- The real challenge is to cope up with this unpredictability by realistic training.
- The junior leaders are to be trained in order to fight and win 'multi-domain operations' involving non-traditional battle spaces.
- Unpredictability combined with uncertainty will increase the fog of war. The ability to react to the changing situation will be a real challenge.
- Peacetime curriculum in schools of military training needs a review. Directive style of command (DSOC) with mission-type orders are required to be inculcated.



creativity. This is further compounded by an existing 'zero error syndrome' wherein no mistakes are allowed. So why should anyone take risks? Since, risk taking is fraught with imponderables, uncertainty and surprise, therefore, there is a possibility that something will go wrong; hence, there will be mistakes, which are considered to be a "taboo" in the present scenario. This leaves little scope for boldness and audacity, which are battle winning factors.

The Indian Army is known for its high ideals and professionalism. This professionalism has stood the test of time in all our past wars. "It is strange but true that as one grows in service, one tends to take fewer chances and deliberately suppresses the innate human desire to be different. This is mostly due to years of training which teaches one to conform".<sup>1</sup> Against this background, with long years of service, this tendency of 'Conformism' becomes irreversible. The need of the hour is to stop, take stock, rethink and change our training ethos and methodology. The aim of this study is to try and generate ideas and recommendations to be implemented, so as to generate 'thinking' and 'dynamic' leaders who will inculcate a flexible, innovative and an ingenious mind, while simultaneously exploiting surprise, boldness, audacity, daring and deception to make sure of victory.

### **Predictability: An Issue**

**Causes of Predictability.** 'Surprise' is an important battle-winning factor and a potent force multiplier—history is replete with examples of victories gained primarily by using the element of 'surprise'. Take for instance the example of Moshe Dayan, the Commander of the Jerusalem Front in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, who captured Lod in 'Operation Dani'. Dayan's jeep mounted with troops broke through the fortified perimeter around Lod, drove across the town at top speed and came out from the other side. This raid shattered the defender's morale, and the town was captured in short order by a follow-up infantry attack.<sup>2</sup> This proves that, when the resources are not abundant, unconventional application of the available resources using ingenuity, innovation, creativity and audacity leads to achieving surprise and deception.

The causes of predictability are intrinsically linked to conventionalism, which can be briefly summarised as under: -

- An underestimation, sometimes bordering on the arrogant, of the enemy.<sup>3</sup>
- Lack of encouragement of unorthodox ideas and originality. Not recognising creativity, innovativeness and improvisation.
- A love of 'bull', smartness, precision and strict preservation of 'the military



pecking order'.<sup>4</sup>

- Admonishing calculated risks, mistakes, failures and authoritarian style of command. This coupled with passivity and indecisiveness in senior commanders.
- Non-availability of sufficient information and intelligence about the enemy i.e. not adequately focusing on the enemy mind.
- Inadequacy of resources, especially Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR).

### **Predictable Mindset and Culture**

***Why are We Predictable?*** To establish and identify the reasons of our 'predictability', we need to first address the tactical growth of an army officer.. The officer gets his first exposure and learns the basics of tactics in the military academy during his pre-commission training. Thereafter, he attends the Young Officer Course (YOs), the Junior Command Course (JC), Defence Services Staff College Course (DSSC), the Senior Command Course (SC) and the Higher Command Course (HC). The learning of tactics is refined in the formations during the Sand Model Discussions (SMDs) and exercises. Apart from this, the officer also learns to apply his tactical knowledge during "on the job training" while being deployed in various operational environment. With such a multi-faceted and all-round learning, the army is expected to 'create' some brilliant tactical commanders! But this is not the case. The reasons for this are quite straightforward:

- **Mindset.** The senior displays a mindset and a visible and apparent lack of belief in non-conventional approaches. This can be gauged from their 'disdainful approach' towards juniors who dare to suggest an offbeat or 'unconventional solution' to a tactical problem —just imagine how incorrect this is in the light of this example from the Yom Kippur War of 1973. The Egyptians were facing problems with crossing sand barriers along the Suez Canal. A young engineer solved the problem by using water jets, which were used to blast away the earth, and enable the tanks to cross over. The Israeli's were taken completely by surprise.<sup>7</sup> From this example one can see clearly that in warfare, it is the element of 'unpredictability' which brings success and not just numbers. The crossing of the Meghna river, para-drop in Tangail, raid at Chachro during the 1971 war with Pakistan were brilliant and unpredictable actions— many such operations have become folklore in the Indian Army.



- **Formalised Courses.** In our training establishments ‘unpredictable’ and ‘unconventional’ approaches to tactical problems are not encouraged. There is perceptibly no change in orientation to tactical issues and students on courses learn to consolidate on a ‘near identical’ tactical approach. It may be true that at the JC course level there is a requirement to bring all officers on a common grid, thus the highly structured format of the course, with little scope for displaying tactical ingenuity or brilliance, is a necessity. However, as the officers grow in service and broaden their horizons, they need not be restrictive in their thinking. The Commander is a crucial factor, since on his decision hinges the outcome of any battle. In the words of Napoleon Bonaparte “The personality of the General is indisputable; he is the head, the ‘all’ of an army”. The Gauls were not conquered by the Roman Legions, but by Caesar. It was not the Macedonian Phalanx that penetrated into India, but Alexander. Prussia was not defeated for seven years against the three most formidable European powers, but by Frederick the Great”.<sup>5</sup>
- **Acceptability of Predictability.** Predictability finds wide spread and unquestioned acceptability for ‘he is a good chap a sensible guy’ if he does so. This is primarily so, because we are not willing to apply ourselves and discuss the threats that an unpredictable solution can bring in, no matter how good it may be. We take recourse to adopting the easy approach or follow the path of least resistance. During the Korean War (1950-1953), General Douglas MacArthur’s decision to land at Inchon was based on subjective factors, such as surprise. Staff at higher headquarters, giving more weightage to topography and weather, disagreed— however, MacArthur had his way, and subsequent events proved him right.<sup>6</sup>
- **Discouraging Dissent.** There is a general tendency to discourage constructive suggestions and dissent in matters military. This is true both on the formalised courses as well as in the units and formations. Constructive suggestions are misconstrued as a ‘zeal to show off’, arrogance or even insubordination! In tactical matters this approach is fraught with the peril of ensuring mediocrity, predictability and straight-from-the-pamphlet solutions.

**Intrinsic Causes.** The malady of predictability, like a disease of the human body, has been caused by a combination of intrinsic and extrinsic factors. We will first examine the



intrinsic causes. These are psychological factors existing within every human being.

Some of these are: -

- 'Careerism' instead of 'professionalism'.
- 'Fear of Failure' instead of 'Hope of success' caused by the 'No Error Syndrome'. There are grounds for thinking that incompetent commanders tend to be those in whom the need to avoid failure exceeds the urge to succeed.<sup>7</sup>
- The more ambitious resort to political connections, or sycophancy, to rise in the profession.
- Low tolerance of ambiguity leading to low risk-taking ability.

**Extrinsic Causes.** These are factors controlled by the environment including the organisational culture. Attempts are made to 'groom' YOs, resulting in impairment of intellect whereby, initiative, creativity, drive and decision-making capability are thwarted. Some of the extrinsic factors are: -

- **Lack of Experience.** To view this in a different light; as a corollary to the 'No Risk Syndrome', the junior leaders always find themselves well protected and guided by their seniors at every step, thereby allowing them no freedom, initiative or imagination; while executing the task. So much for 'Directive Style of Command' and 'Mission Type Orders'!
- **Training.** Our training follows a 'set pattern' where laid down templates are applied irrespective of the peculiarities of a given situation. So, is it not that training borders on conformity? For example, this is what Maj Gen Bernard E Cookie Dixon had to say when giving advice to British officers who wished to prosper- "stick to the rule book, do nothing without explicit approval from the next higher- up. Always conform, never offend your superiors, and you will float serenely, if a trifle slowly, upwards—a blimp in both senses of the word".<sup>8</sup>
- **Anti-Originality.** Originality is generally considered as 'lack of knowledge' and 'non-application of doctrines' and 'basic principles'. It is therefore, seldom encouraged in tactical solutions basically because of the fear of failure. Genghis Khan, never adhered to any established principles. He is perhaps the only general in history who never faced defeat during his military career because of his constant innovation and improvisation— always being unpredictable.
- **Conservatism.** The fundamental concept of conservatism hinges upon a 'dogmatic' application of lessons learnt during the past, without considering the peculiarities of the situation. Pragmatism in combat is the 'worst casualty' of



conservatism. Adhering to the tradition in matters related to the morale of troops is desirable, but it should not impede the evolution of an 'unorthodox operational plan' which may help in unpredictability. To substantiate the point let us see an example from the Israeli 1956 Sinai Campaign. The opening gambit of this campaign was a daring para drop by a battalion group, approximately 70 km from the Suez Canal, at the entrance of the Mitla Pass (Sinai) based on sound evaluation of the likely enemy reaction and his psyche.<sup>9</sup> The Israeli's advanced on the assumption that, the Egyptians would not treat this as commencement of hostilities but merely a reprisal raid and consequently would not move their reserves immediately into the Sinai. To perpetuate this fallacy, even the opening air strike was dispensed with. The surprise was total due to unpredictable and unconventional means adopted.

**Organisational Climate.** As is evident from the preceding paras, in the overall perspective, it is the 'prevailing organisational climate' that has resulted in our becoming predictable. Each organisation has its unique culture, philosophy, policies, practices and procedures which create the cultural ethos. Each and every action of the members of the organisation effects the functioning and goal achievement. Therefore, the organisation attempts to create a conducive climate by moulding the behavioural pattern of its members. But to what extent?<sup>10</sup>

### **Dangers Generated by Predictability**

Predictability verses unpredictability is like attrition verses manoeuvre theory. While attrition theory of warfare propounds the 'obvious' approach, it also leads to more causalities and blood-spilling. Manoeuvre theory, on the other hand, delinks itself from any strict techniques, doctrines or drills and requires a dynamic, flexible and bold frame of mind to exploit fleeting opportunities and hit the enemy at the point of decision, or rather, his center of gravity. This coupled with the fact that modern day battles would primarily focus on the 'mind' of the enemy commander, suggests that manoeuvre is bound to be the first casualty of the 'predictability syndrome'.



### ***Conceptual Fixations***

- **Deployment Patterns.** We blindly get fixated by the previous deployment and take it that this is 'approved.' Therefore, when we appreciate the enemy's deployment, we tend to see a mirror image of our own deployment.
- **Contingency Planning.** Reinforcement plans in defensive operations generally fall within predictable patterns. Thus, it facilitates the attacker to counter contingency planning to a fair extent.
- **Time and Space Planning in Offensive Operations.** 'Reverse Engineering' or 'Working-backwards' from the latest time of completion of an operation, almost stipulates that the operation has to commence latest by a 'particular point in time'. This could be the time to cross the International Border, the H- hour, etc.
- **Selection and Maintenance of Aim.** This is one of the most important 'Principles of War'. The aim once selected, is never changed and military strategists quote many examples to support this view. Modification of the aim in view of the changed circumstances does not necessarily mean the weakening of resolve. In fact, a modified aim may be implemented with greater resolution, because the commander, (if he is unpredictable) is convinced that it will succeed. It may not be possible for a commander to get an accurate picture at the beginning of the battle, thus keeping the aim rigid and inflexible maybe suicidal.





- **Loss of Surprise.** Surprise is a potent psychological weapon. It causes confusion and paralysis in the enemy's chain of command and destroys the cohesion and morale of his units. As Stonewall Jackson adjured to his officers- "Always mystify, mislead and surprise the enemy". The shock may not last long, but while the enemy's equilibrium is upset, the initiative may be seized to destroy his force at the cost of relatively fewer casualties. To achieve surprise, anything 'obvious' has to be discarded at the very outset. Had the German's not employed the tank as an offensive weapon coupled with the incorporation of the powerful Air arm, could they have made a total mockery of the archaic plans of their opponents? In North Africa, unhampered by any inhibition, Rommel, in a succession of feints, outflanking, pincer movements and encirclements, ran rings around his much more powerful, honest, courageous, but stolid and slow adversary.<sup>11</sup>
- **Professional Plagiarism and Stagnation.** In other words, 'literary pilferage' of military thought means that no new thoughts will be generated. Today, if an officer is asked to write an exercise or war game, he straightaway borrows old files, maps and reproduces it with minor variations. Where does this get us? The fallout is professional stagnation, because nothing new is being encouraged or generated. The culture of Previous Course Knowledge 'PCK' to get better grading permeates through most of our courses.

## **Unpredictability: A Necessity to Win Wars of the Future**

### **Training for Unpredictability**

Keeping in mind the changing dynamics of warfare, the element of 'unpredictability' has gain much importance. The future battles will now be fought on a different level, where 'unpredictability' will be one of the battle winning factor.

**Encouragement of Unorthodox Ideas and Originality.** Commanders at all levels, especially at the middle and lower levels, should be encouraged to come up with original and unorthodox ideas/plans and be allowed to put them to test without fear of failure or reprisal. Unorthodox ideas obviously requires high levels of creativity, innovativeness and improvisation. Senior commanders have to realise an important fact i.e. unpredictability on part of their junior commanders will guarantee them greater chances





of success in war today. In other words, originality must never be suppressed. Suggested methods to achieve this are given below: -

- **Participative Decision Making.** Mission- type orders by participative decision making, can employ original and unorthodox ideas generated by subordinate and junior leaders. There are many examples in history where many lives have been unnecessarily lost because of incorrect decisions taken by the commanders without consulting their subordinates— the retreat from Kabul in 1842, battles at Loos and Pyres in World War I and the fall of Singapore in World War II, are but a few of them.
- **Encourage Intellectualism.** Intellectual ability has never been counted for much in the armed forces. “The argument that one does not need brains to be a successful commander is buttressed by the examples of Napoleon and Wellington— both of whom achieved very low grades in school, but were one of the greatest commanders! In modern warfare the successful leaders have to be well read and thus intellectualism must be encouraged. The plethora of high technology and tools available today can only be used by commanders who are well-endowed with knowledge and are well read.
- **Change in Ethos.** There is a need to change the military ethos with its premium on rank and rigid adherence to hierarchy. The long-held view that, only an authoritarian system can lead to an effective fighting machinery has been disproved by the Vietcong, the Boers, the Israelis and our own experiences in Kargil war. If the freedom of thought and action is not given to a junior commander, then how can he act in an unpredictable and responsible manner? In addition, with the present concept of ‘one mistake army’, how can he be bold, daring, and audacious? Ethos must therefore change.
- **Disobedience of Orders? Yes, but, together with Unpredictability.** At the Battle of Zorndorf, in 1758, Fredrick the Great ordered his commander, Friedrich Von Seydlitz to advance with his cavalry against the Russian gun emplacements. Thrice he was ordered, and thrice he refused to obey, saying, “After the battle, the King can do as he likes with my head, but during the battle, will he please allow me to use it”.<sup>12</sup> The battle was won by Seydlitz’s brilliant handling of his cavalry, and, of course, he was allowed to keep his head! Take another example.



During the Arab- Israeli War of 1967, General Asaf Simhoni, disobeyed the orders of the Chief of staff, and prematurely (but unpredictably) launched 7<sup>th</sup> Armoured Brigade, which won a spectacular victory. General Moshe Dayan, the Defence Minister, condoned the disobedience saying- “I regard the problem as serious when a unit fails to fulfil its battle task, and not when it goes beyond the borders of duty, and does more than what is demanded of it”.<sup>13</sup> In the Army today, the ‘fear of failure’, compounded with the ‘fear of reprisal’ prevents the commanders from taking chances, and hence, ‘mistakes of inaction’ are the ones which must not be condoned instead of ‘mistakes of action’.

- **Leadership Styles.** Leadership style plays a crucial role in encouraging unconventionalism and thereby leading to unpredictability. Directive style of command needs to be followed at unit and formation levels to break the habit of following a predictable approach in all situations. Directive style of command, however, does not imply lack of control. Detailed *modus operandi* with respect to what needs to be done for accomplishing the task is to be worked out by the subordinate commander, rather than working on the ways to do it.<sup>14</sup>
- **Organisational Climate.** It is quite obvious that unpredictability cannot be nurtured in the present day environment of the army. It is therefore, imperative that an endeavour is made to change the state of things before it is too late. To do that, the characteristics of an organisational climate, conducive to encourage creativity and new ideas are as follows:
  - Openness.
  - Creativity and Innovation.
  - Trust.
  - Autonomy.
  - Participation.
- **Psychological Preparation.** A familiar saying in the army emphasises the ‘value of sweat to save blood’ in battle. However, view it differently as “Sweat saves blood, blood saves lives, brain saves both!”<sup>15</sup> — there is always resistance to change and it is in human nature to follow routine. There can be numerous examples of building-in the aspect of unpredictability in the daily routine of leaders and men— It follows from the fact that ‘surprise in battle’ must be



cultivated through correct training and psychological preparation.

- **Intuition and Insight.** Intuition is one of the most important cognitive facilities of man. The most audacious plans are conceived intuitively. If unpredictability is not taboo and leaders are allowed to exercise it using their 'inner gut feeling,' then inadvertently confidence will develop among our commanders. For an intuitive decision to have a reasonable chance of success, it needs to be backed by sound professional knowledge.

### ***Ambit of the Training Dimension***

Clauzewitz said "Boldness is the first pre-requisite of a military commander. A bold general may be lucky but no general can be lucky unless he is bold".<sup>16</sup> Maj Gen Keshav Singh, writes, "while dealing with undisciplined troops in one of the headquarters, we appointed an imaginative officer as Officer Commanding troops. The discipline improved overnight. To get to the root cause of this success, I walked into the men's barracks in the evening and asked them the reason for the change. The reply was thought provoking. They said, *Sahib is so unpredictable that we do not know what he would do if we did something wrong*. Their reply seemed to sum up the complete philosophy of military command and that is, to achieve success, keep the other side guessing."<sup>17</sup>

- **Training Initiatives.** A Systems Approach to Training (SAT) is important to inculcate the spirit of unpredictability: -
  - Ability to see things from the enemy's point of view.
  - Capability to generate surprise and unpredictability at doctrinal, strategic, operational and tactical levels.
  - Not laying down standard training policies; delegating to unit commanders to train as per SAT.
  - Adopting manoeuvre warfare as a tactical doctrine.
  - Modifying unit level training to foster closer officer-men relationship and develop junior leadership.
  - Adopting a realistic model for formation level tactical exercises and encouraging risk-taking.



- Psychological training to prepare officers and men to handle unpredictable situations.
- **Training in Human Values.** The fear of superiors and punishment, forces individuals to compromise basic human values — ‘truthfulness and moral courage’ are virtues which must be imbibed as part of the training ethos. Therefore, there is a need to make a clear distinction between ‘tact without loss of moral courage’ and ‘false reporting’. The fear of punishment for minor infringements makes soldiers lie at small pretext, therefore, it is important to encourage honesty and truthful reporting.
- **Training in Academies.** The academies are institutions where ‘Gentlemen Cadets’ learn their first lessons in tactics. It is important that unpredictability is stressed at this nascent stage so that the budding officers know not only ‘what must be done’ but also ‘what can be done’.. For training to promote creativity. it is important to plant the seeds of unpredictability— it is basically using one’s mind imaginatively, innovatively, audaciously and creatively. The training academies are still in colonial hangover and are producing ‘conformist leadership’. The oft quoted, “beg, borrow, manage”, needs to be junked. Emphasis on big- boot drill and physical *ragra* be reduced in favor of academic rigor and intellectual mindset.
- **Training in Units and Formations.** Consider the Israelis, who have evolved a practical method of battle, known as ‘Optional Control’, wherein the battalion and brigade commanders are given full powers to make tactical decisions in battle with their superiors still being able to intervene, where necessary. To develop this skill, they are asked to prepare a plan, and when they are ready to present it, they are told that the situation has changed radically and that fresh orders have to be issued immediately.<sup>25</sup> A unit is a close- knit family and the right place for nurturing professional acumen and team spirit. Therefore, training at this level should be realistic, creative and operational task oriented. The growing tendency to showcase a set piece of drills in formation exercises with troops, must be curbed.



- **Junior Leadership Training.** The training of junior leaders must be broad-based and inculcate a sense of responsibility, creativity and audacity. Unpredictability, as has already been elucidated, requires a robust, flexible and dynamic mindset. It has to be backed by a 'sincerity of purpose' at all levels of the hierarchy! Subordinates must be given the necessary command support to implement their ideas. It must be realised that- "Yes, Risk-Taking is inherently failure prone. Otherwise, it would be called Sure-Taking".<sup>18</sup> The army must inculcate professional dissent and ability to question tactical solutions by junior leaders.
- **Development of Individual Instinct.** Instinct is an in-borne or native tendency to respond to a stimulus. Like every other mental process, instinct also possesses cognitive, affective conative aspects. It is an inherited and innate disposition to pay attention to objects of a certain class (cognitive aspect), to experience an emotional excitement of a particular quality upon receiving such an object (affective aspect) and to act in regard to it in a particular manner (conative aspect).<sup>19</sup> Some relevant stimuli are :-
  - Wide reading.
  - Professional experience.
  - Promote intellectual dissent.
  - Surprise and deception consciousness.
- **Borrowing of Ideas.** Good ideas can be borrowed from one's daily life and applied onto the situation at hand. A little consideration would show that an unusual idea is generally an idea borrowed by a well-informed mind from a similarly unusual historical precedent and adapted to the present situation.<sup>20</sup>
- **Idea Seminars.** These seminars should be conducted at appropriate levels in a free and fair atmosphere. They should preferably be organised in different areas, where one is not affected by fear of appraisal. These seminars will do the army a big service by providing guidance and vision to promote a new culture.



- **New Armaments and Unpredictability.** Future battles will be more intense, non-linear and asymmetrical due to enhanced intelligence acquisition, better battle management, equating of day and night fighting capabilities of systems, rapid manoeuvres, counter-manoevres and greater destructive powers in the hand of adversaries. Innovations in weaponry have influenced critical battles numerous times in history when commanders fully understood complete capabilities of equipment and technology in their hands and were bold and unpredictable enough to exploit it. Thus, aim should be the quick coupling of technological developments with an appropriate strategic or tactical concept and its prompt application in the battle.

## Conclusion

The 'predictability syndrome' which has beset our army today is a serious problem. All right-thinking people need to ponder upon this malady which has sunk into all facets of the army—be it daily routine, regimental centres, academies, units, formations, tactical exercises, junior and senior leadership or planning and preparation for war. Rarely, if at all one's views are not in line with conformity, then anyone who 'steps out of line' with the current 'thinking' is bound to face severe criticism. This is the primary reason why the army has often been accused of 'preparing to fight not the next war, but the last'. This is true of all armies who have inherited a colonial past. The repercussions of such an attitude is mind-boggling as any future war is likely to be short, intense and technology-centric. Will then drills, battle-protrudes, and robot-like reactions to situations win the day? Will stereotyped and pre-determined reactions/actions on part of our commanders confuse and degrade the combat potential of our adversary? Will our junior leaders have the faith, trust and confidence in their senior commanders to take bold, imaginative, innovative, audacious and risky decisions in the battlefield to win decisive victories by unpredictable means?

It is a fact, that when we think about a war, we have a tendency to draw a comfortable vision of it. This vision then is made to suit our strategy and tactics, applied on a canvas whose dimensions and environment are consistent and predictable. Such a vision also supports our beliefs, assumptions, capabilities, ideas and doctrines – all of which are fixed. Greater still, such a war is to be fought on our own terms so much so that even in a reactive scenario, we behave like a pro-active force. This comfortable conceptualisation today has become a way of life. It is therefore time that this issue is



addressed squarely, lest a military disaster stares us in the face to prove it. There is a need to eradicate these features, or at least mitigate their influence, in order to create an environment which is conducive to unpredictability.

## End Notes

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