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The Chabahar Conundrum  
& India's Energy Security

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# *The Chabahar Conundrum & India's Energy Security*

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## **Abstract**

*India's one of the most ambitious overseas strategic projects i.e. Chabahar Port in Iran has witnessed several turning tides since its inception. The project, not only vital for strategic positioning of India as a rising global power, but also critical for its energy security, has run into numerous diplomatic hurdles. With the latest turmoil in middle east and Iran at the epicentre of ongoing global conflicts, India is walking on a tight rope of international relations to safeguard its own interests. The latest attempt to rejuvenate the Chabahar project amidst threats of sanctions by India, is to fulfil its long-term energy requirements. This paper attempts to provide a holistic picture of Chabahar Project, its significance for India and future prospects in current geopolitical scenario.*

Keywords: Chabahar, Iran, India, Energy Security

## **Introduction**

In January 2003, India and Iran collaborated on a shared effort to develop transportation links to Afghanistan. India committed on expanding Chabahar port and constructing a new railway line from Chabahar to Zaranj. This strategic deal was envisioned for accessing Afghanistan but had long term vision of securing India's energy supplies. However, the extensive sanctions by U.S. against Iran hindered any significant progress. After the relaxation of sanctions under the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, India and Iran resumed discussions. In 2016, during a visit by the Indian Prime Minister to Iran, an agreement was signed between the two countries and Afghanistan, which was looking for different route bypassing Pakistan, for the development of the port. (Lawal, 2024).

In 2018, Donald Trump, the former President of US, reinstated "maximum pressure" sanctions on Iran, restricting activities at the Chabahar port. However, New Delhi was able to persuade Washington to grant explicit exclusions to the sanctions concerning Chabahar, arguing that the Chabahar project could assist Afghanistan which was a vital security interest

for US at that time (Lawal, 2024). With the American exit from Afghanistan, this argument could not gather momentum.

### **Reviving Chabahar Deal**

India and Iran's state port organisation signed an agreement on May 13, 2024, to enhance and maintain a terminal of Chabahar port for the next decade. Under the deal, India will manage the Shahid Beheshti terminal and invest \$120 million to prepare it. Additionally, India will provide \$250 million loan credit to Iran for related projects, totalling to \$370 million worth contract value. This marks India's novice attempt to take over an overseas port operation, providing a crucial connectivity to Afghanistan, Central Asia region, and Eurasian region (Shukla, 2024).

However, just days after the agreement, the U.S. State Department issued an official statement targeting India for warning of the possible risks, including sanctions, for contemplating trade deals with Iran (Shukla, 2024). In an era of conflicts, jeopardising the sustainability of global energy supply chain, India's attempts to resurrect Chabahar has met with fresh challenges.

### **Indian Vision in Chabahar**

India was primarily focused on bypassing the arch rival Pakistan from its trading network. Aim was to get direct access to Afghanistan, Central Asian Republics, Russia and Eurasia. It was first conceptualised in 1990s when Iran and India were supporting Northern Alliance for ready access in Afghanistan to counter Taliban backed by Pakistan (Menon & Rajiv, 2019). It was further supplemented by Russia agreement on seamless trade via International North South Trade Corridor (INSTC) and another agreement to extend trade in Central Asian region with Turkmenistan (Menon & Rajiv, 2019).

INSTC provides multimodal connectivity corridor designed to facilitate the goods transit through Iran to Russia and Northern Europe or between India and Central Asia. The concept behind INSTC involves transporting goods from Mumbai to Bandar Abbas or Chabahar, further to various parts of Iran and Russia via multiple modes of transportation. 13 countries have backed the agreement so far including Azerbaijan, Armenia, Bulgaria,

Kazakhstan, India, Iran, Oman and Russia (Shukla, 2024). Although a cheaper and faster route is presented by INSTC for trade between India and Central Asia, the project has been severely affected due to sanctions by US.

### **Turmoil in Global Energy Security**

While clean energy technologies may be the future of energy security, fossil fuels are the current energy security guardians. Fossil fuels contribute more than 84% of our global energy (Jaccard, 2007). Energy security is “the availability of energy, continuously, at reasonable price” as defined by International Energy Agency (IEA) (Ateeq & Alkuwaiti, 2020). Oil and natural gas deposits and coal reserves drive the modern world. Owning fossil fuels is crucial for ensuring energy security. Non-existence of fossil fuel reserves or its non-availability at affordable prices threaten a country’s energy security.

The Ukraine invasion by Russia led to import sanctions, soaring fuel prices and volatility fuelled by strong global demand for gas in the post pandemic economic recoveries. Initially, energy companies have profited from these high prices. However, measures were taken for achieving energy security with increased political intervention across the EU to cap energy costs for households (Besson, 2022).

In 2023, Russia continued to be largest oil producer after United States and Saudi Arabia. It was also the largest oil exporter globally, after the United States, and the largest overall exporter worldwide. Although exports to the European Union, United States, and United Kingdom were significantly reduced, however, shipments increased notably to India, China, Turkey, and Middle East. (Besson, 2022).

Two years later, while energy prices have softened from their peak levels, the situation still varies greatly by region. Many areas around the world continue to face high prices, which impede economic growth, put a burden on household and business finances, and complicate efforts to expand electricity access. Energy markets remain tense, grappling with unusually high levels of geopolitical uncertainty. With these ongoing tides in world energy market, India is required to navigate its way on alternative sources to safeguard its energy security by building new partnerships with Central Asian Republics and reviving old energy trade with Iran.

## **Significance of Iran and Chabahar for India's Energy Needs**

Crude oil continues to be a key component of the Indian energy sector, accounting for about 25 percent of its annual imports. 81 percent of crude oil is imported by India, of which Iran import contribution is limited to 10 percent. Apart from its volume, Iranian oil is crucial for India due to the favourable terms of trade offered, including freight discounts and insurance, 60-day trade credit, and payment in rupee (Zhukov & Reznikova, 2019). Since, other suppliers like Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and U.S., do not offer similar benefits, Iran emerges as a critical strategic partner. The MoU established in 2003 between the two nations on Chabahar port development was also intended to facilitate the oil transport from Iran or Central Asian countries to India and other international markets. (Shukla, 2024).

Iran has 32.1 trillion cubic metres of gas reserves (Shukla, 2024). It establishes the fact that Iran can also play an important role in fulfilling India's natural gas requirements if the present deal includes expansion of Chabahar port with a gas berth in future. Central Asian countries possess abundant energy resources. Kazakhstan is the leading producers of uranium across the globe. Moreover, the fifth-largest natural gas reserves globally, resides in Turkmenistan (Menon & Rajiv, 2019). While the Arab-Gulf region holds the largest energy reserves globally, Central Asia can emerge as a significant alternative due to its substantial energy resources. Hence, it is in India's favour to develop its way to Central Asia, for meeting own energy requirements which is possible through Iran, and more importantly Chabahar.

Located at the tip of Gulf of Oman, Chabahar provides an important base for developing and maintaining India's energy supply from Central Asia, Russia, Caucasus and Middle East. Iran has already constructed a 900 km pipeline from the gas fields of Assaluyeh in the west of the country to Iranshahr, which is approximately 100 km north of Chabahar. (Bhattacharjee, 2018). The development of the gas berth will be the next stage India focuses on. It brings India access to multiple sources for securing its energy supply lines.



## **Global Opportunities Through Chabahar Avenues for Russia**

Russia plays major role in energy markets across the globe, ranking amongst the top three producers of crude oil and the second-largest natural gas producer. It has a substantial crude export pipeline infrastructure that allows it to transport substantial volumes of crude oil to Europe and Asia. The Druzhba pipeline system, the longest pipeline in East and Central Europe, has a capacity of 750,000 barrels per day (bpd) of crude. In 2012, Russia launched the ESPO pipeline, which serves Asian markets like Japan and China, with a capacity of 1.6 million bpd (Shukla, 2024). Russia transports crude oil by tanker ships from several ports, including Ust-Luga and Primorsk in the Northwest, Novorossiysk on the Black Sea, and Kozmino in the Far East.

Russia also operates an extensive gas export pipeline network, with transit through Belarus and Ukraine, including pipelines delivering gas directly to Europe via the Baltic Sea. In late 2019, Russia introduced the Siberia pipeline, a significant eastward gas export route with a capacity of 38 billion cubic meters, specifically designed to supply gas to China. Furthermore, Russia has been enhancing its Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) capacity to better compete with the increasing LNG exports from countries like the United States, Qatar and Australia (Shukla, 2024).

Russia is facing huge export constraints due to high production capacity but limited supply options as all existing supply arrangement are with Europe, which has banned Russian imports. The alternative market of Asia, where global demand is increasing due to non-availability of affordable energy, is not connected with any sustainable transshipment channel to Russia except for China and Japan. China cannot singlehandedly, fill the void created by Europe for Russian gas exports. Hence, Russia is interested in revival of INSTC to open transshipment corridors for South and South East Asia. Chabahar plays a pivotal role in developing a route from India to Russia via Iran through INSTC.

## **Iranian Interest**

Iran has been driven for a long period, under the shadows of US Sanctions. Even after having the fifth largest OPEC oil reservoirs, it has faced the economic crisis and global isolation for an extended duration. After US backed out from Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and applied full pressure on Iran through sanctions, the resultant proactive engagement by India, functions as a “strategic countermeasure” for Iran, intended to protect its national interests and expand its economic and political influence. This deal could strengthen the stature of Iran in Central Asia and the South Caucasus, reinforce its position as a transit hub for the entire region and deepen its trade relationship with Russia. At the same time, strengthening ties between India and Russia will help Iran avoid trade isolation and enhance its economic and diplomatic influence in the region. Chabahar Port, being Iran's prime access point to the Indian Ocean, is vital to India's strategy on Indo-Pacific. The Iranian government plans to develop it as the gateway to a free trade zone, offering 20 years of tax exemptions and duty-free imports, with connections to Central Asia (Bhattacharjee, 2018). Hence, Iran can leverage this project to counter US influence in the gulf and the surrounding region.

## **Afghanistan Dynamics**

Landlocked Afghanistan has been searching for alternative routes to access the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf, in order to reduce its reliance on Pakistani trade routes. The Chabahar route to Kabul, shortens the distance by 700 kilometres as compared to Karachi, potentially saving \$1,000 per container from the Arabian Sea (Bhattacharjee, 2018). These factors elucidate Afghanistan's support for the development of Chabahar port. The Afghan Ministry of Trade also highlighted the anticipation of Afghan investors being involved in the proposed free trade zone at Chabahar port. To support this initiative, India built the \$135 million highway from Delaram to Zaranj. Constructed by India's Border Roads Organisation, the highway was inaugurated for commercial traffic in January 2009 (Bhattacharjee, 2018). The highway facilitates freight traffic from Afghanistan to Zaranj at the Iran border, where the city acts as the gateway between Afghanistan and Iran.

The taking over of Afghanistan by Taliban in August 2021, casts uncertainty over the Chabahar project, raising questions about the involvement of the Afghanistan administration led by Taliban. Despite this, the Taliban has expressed interest in continuing some of the

initiatives from the previous government. From India's viewpoint, the change in leadership in Afghanistan could potentially lead to greater Chinese investments. As China keeps its embassy open and actively engages with Taliban on trade and investment, the development of infrastructure to connect Chabahar with Afghanistan may fall within Chinese influence zone (Ashwarya, 2024).

### **Central Asian Countries**

Central Asia has been aiming to supply energy to rapidly growing Asian nations including China and India. However, the limited connectivity between India and nations of Central Asian region has hindered energy diplomacy. The Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline, was planned in the mid-1990s initially. However, the four countries signed an agreement in 2010, after numerous delays (Menon & Rajiv, 2019). Subsequently, development has been hindered by Afghanistan's internal instability and distrust between neighbouring nations (India and Pakistan).

A significant milestone in the energy sector was reached in 2008 when Kazakhstan assisted India in securing exemptions from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) through civil nuclear cooperation. In the subsequent year, Kazakhstan entered into an agreement to supply India with 2,100 tonnes of uranium, a deal that remained in effect until 2014. Both nations engaged in another treaty for "Cooperation in the Field of Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy". In 2015, both countries extended previous deal to supply another 5,000 tonnes of Uranium till 2019. A third agreement, covering the period from 2020 to 2024, was also signed, under which Kazakhstan agreed to rise its Uranium supplies to 7,500-10,000 tonnes (Menon & Rajiv, 2019). Thus, in addition to supply routes across the region, India has been exploring Iran as a means of connectivity to Central Asia.

### **Opportunities in Eurasia**

Armenia has been showing lots of interest in India – Iran Chabahar Deal. In January 2024, Armenia was granted access to operate at Iran's ports to enhance its bilateral trade with India. Following the recent Artsakh War, Armenia turned to India for defence support and procurement in order to expand its security partnerships. Iran and India have been supporting Armenia's efforts to develop and utilize Iran's ports (Tashjian, 2024). This collaboration



between three nations will improve the transit network of Armenia substantially and enhance the geo-economic relevance, particularly within the Black Sea and Persian Gulf Corridor. Mnatsakan Safaryan, the former Deputy Foreign Minister of Armenia marked the significance of Chabahar port for accessing Asian markets including India. By positioning itself within INSTC for the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and European markets, Armenia's economy is expected to benefit greatly with increased international trade from India and Iran. Additionally, Armenia and Iran have reached an agreement for construction of a 32 km road by Iranian firms in Armenia as part of INSTC.

## **Chabahar Port Deal at A Glance**

### **Layout & Capacity**

Chabahar port is in southeastern part of Sistan-Baluchestan province. It is positioned on the tip of Gulf of Oman. It is located 170 kms west of Gwadar port, Pakistan. Chabahar port consists of two distinct terminals: Shahid Beheshti, where India has concentrated its investments and Shahid Kalantari which was developed in 1980s as a transit port terminal with future expansion and modernization opportunities (Lawal, 2024). The size of harbour is 480 Ha and a total of 10 berths are existing on the port as of 2016. The port handling capacity was 2.1 million tons of cargo, under upgradation to 8.5 million tons.

### **Review of Indian Efforts**

Under the MOU signed in 2018, India Ports Global was tasked with refurbishing a container handling facility which was 640-meter-long and reconstructing another facility, 600-meter-long. This initiative was designed to transform the deep-sea port into a key transit hub. The company plans to upgrade ancillary infrastructure by installing rail-mounted, mobile harbour & rubber-tyre cranes, empty handlers and reach stackers. While the investment from India was projected to be around \$85 million, the total Indian involvement in the project was estimated over \$500 million (Bhattacharjee, 2018).

As per CRS report, the Chabahar project work was largely paused by India in late 2020 due to COVID-19 pandemic and regional issues. Nevertheless, India ramped up its efforts on the project during the second pandemic wave in early 2021. Although a significant investment was pledged, only a fraction has been allocated so far, totalling INR 495 Crores till date.

Despite funding shortfalls, the Indian Shipping Ministry offered concessions upto 40 percent on freight charges related to vessels handled at Indian Ports, to and from the Shahid Beheshti terminal of Chabahar (Bhattacharjee, 2018). Initial efforts to develop infrastructure at Chabahar port have focused on enhancing cargo handling capabilities. Six mobile harbour cranes have been provided by India along with additional equipment worth \$25 million. Of these cranes, two are of 140 tons lifting capacity each, while the other four have 100 tons capacity each (Shukla, 2024). India has started using two of the berths it committed to modernise at the Shahid Beheshti terminal, sending the first consignments of grain to Kabul through them.

### **Events Leading to Resurgence of Chabahar**

Since Ebrahim Raisi was sworn in as eighth President of Iran, concerns have grown about the uncertainties of strict policy shift in Iranian politics affecting its foreign relations. There has been widespread speculation that Iran might move closer to China, potentially leading to the formation of an alliance between China-Russia-Iran including Turkey and North Korea.

China has emerged as a leading oil importer from Iran, continuing to purchase oil despite U.S. sanctions. This has provided vital economic support to Iran, particularly after the re-imposition of strict sanctions in 2018. In 2021, Iran and China signed a strategic cooperation agreement for 25 years, which includes significant investments in energy and infrastructure sectors in Iran, along with military cooperation, despite both nations being under U.S. sanctions (Ashwarya, 2024). Beijing is seeing an opportunity to engage with Iran, to enhance its strategic influence. In early 2023, Chinese vessels operated by Hellenic shipping made a deliberate logistical shift, moving from their usual docking at Bandar Abbas to unloading cargo at Shahid Kalantari, which was then transferred to Chabahar (Ashwarya, 2024). This change points to a strategic shift in regional logistics, potentially benefiting China more than India. Similarly, the BRICS decision to expand its membership by including five new members including Iran, signifying a major shift in the geopolitical landscape.

To refute China's dominance on Iran and address the lack of oil trade due to sanctions, India saw the revival of the Chabahar deal as a way to strengthen commercial ties with Iran. This crucial development was made possible by the mutual agreement to eliminate the clause

of arbitration involving international courts, which had previously hindered the lasting agreement (“India’s counter”, 2024). However, India's choice to forgo commercial arbitration presents risks to its investments in Chabahar, as it lacks legal remedy in the event of disputes concerning constrained investments or other bilateral matters.

India operates, equips, container/ multipurpose terminals at Chabahar Port. Plans are in place for developing Chabahar to Zahedan railroad of about 630 kms to provide connectivity to the port (“India’s counter”, 2024). In April 2024, the Ministry of External Affairs authorized India Ports Global to assume management of Sittwe Port (Myanmar) in Bay of Bengal, becoming the second overseas port operation by India (“India’s counter”, 2024). The timing of the deal is noteworthy given the current crisis in the West and growing influence of China.

### **Iran in Middle of Strategic Storm**

Iran’s increasing alienation from the US, intensified by increased pressure by US through sanctions, Russian harmony with Iran over Ukraine conflict, and its suppression of pro-democracy protests, mirrors the state agendas of China and Russia. The Ukraine war has particularly deepened defence cooperation between Russia and Iran, as demonstrated from the supply of unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) to Russia by Iran (Ashwarya, 2024).

There are concerns that India could unintentionally become entangled in actions that might help Iran circumventing sanctions in the light of its recent aggressive stance against Israel, which also a key regional partner for India. The drone attack by Iran was a response to a Israeli strike which targeted an Iranian consular building in Damascus, resulting in the deaths of 12 people, including a senior general (Roy, 2024). India maintains strategic relationships with both Iran and Israel, but if the conflict escalates, it may find it challenging to sustain a neutral stance. For New Delhi, a probable escalation will have effect on following accounts: -

- With thousands of Indians residing in Israel and Iran, the broader Gulf and West Asia region is home to around 9 million Indians who live and work there. Any escalation of conflict could pose a risk to the substantial Indian community living there.

- India's economic interests are closely linked to the energy securities, as the Middle East supplies nearly 80 percent of its oil (Roy, 2024). Any potential conflict in this region would have a significant impact on India's oil supply.
- India has strategically invested in relationships with key Arab countries, Iran, and Israel. India has been actively working with all relevant parties in the unstable region to advance the India-Middle-East-Europe Economic Corridor, a project of strategic and economic importance to Delhi. A conflict in the region could undermine the carefully built consensus aimed at preserving peace in this volatile area.

### **Way Ahead with Chabahar**

#### **US Iran Relation and Sanctions**

Following the withdrawal, U.S. reimposed rigorous sanctions on Iran, aiming towards its oil exports, financial sectors, and other key sectors. These sanctions had a severe impact on Iran's economy, resulting in high inflation, a devalued currency and significant challenges for the Iranian populace. The economic strain was exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, which further strained Iran's healthcare system and economy. Iran gradually reduced its compliance with the JCPOA terms, enriching Uranium beyond the agreed limits, which raised international concerns about its nuclear ambitions (Taneja et al, 2021). Iran continued to influence the Middle East through proxy groups in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. This ongoing activity, kept regional tensions high and involved indirect confrontations with U.S. interests.

After Trump regime, President Joe Biden expressed willingness to return to the JCPOA, however, several critical issues have hindered Iran from rejoining the agreement. Iran insisted that the U.S. must remove sanctions first before it fully complies with the JCPOA again including those not related to original JCPOA. Tehran argues that since the U.S. was the party that withdrew from the deal, it should take the initial step, while U.S. maintains that Iran must first return to compliance with its nuclear commitments under the JCPOA before sanctions can be lifted and willing to lift only nuclear related sanctions. Iran has also progressively increased its Uranium enrichment levels and stockpiles post 2018, exceeding the limits set by the JCPOA (Taneja et al, 2021). Now, rolling back these advancements to JCPOA limits poses technical and political challenges.

These issues have created significant roadblocks to rejoining the JCPOA. Navigating the complexities of sanctions relief, compliance sequencing, nuclear advancements, and regional security concerns, alongside domestic political pressures and mutual distrust, has posed significant challenges for Iran and the U.S. in finding a mutually acceptable path forward.

### **Impact of Sanctions on Chabahar Deal**

The US Sanctions on Iran post 2018 had severe impact on India Iran trade with India stopped oil trade from Iran due to stringent sanctions. However, India successfully lobbied Washington to exempt the development of the Chabahar port from U.S. sanctions on Iran through a combination of strategic diplomacy, emphasizing the port's significance for regional stability, economic development, and countering terrorism (Taneja et al, 2021).

India highlighted the importance of Chabahar port in providing a critical trade route to Afghanistan and Central Asia which was essential for the economic development and stability of Afghanistan. It emphasized Chabahar's role in facilitating humanitarian aid and economic goods to Afghanistan. India argued that Chabahar port was vital for supporting Afghanistan's government and economy, which was crucial for countering Taliban influence and other extremist groups in the region, aligning its arguments with U.S. interests in Afghanistan (Taneja et al, 2021). India garnered support from other countries and international organizations involved in Afghan reconstruction and regional development.

The exemptions granted for Chabahar Port in 2018 did not include infrastructure projects that would have allowed India to establish connectivity with Central Asian countries, hindering India's strategic goals. Additionally, India's choice to stop purchasing Iranian oil to avoid U.S. sanctions increased its susceptibility to price fluctuations from other suppliers.

### **Impact of Iran Israel Conflict**

India's close ties with Iran are increasingly challenging, especially when Tehran's support for the Palestinian armed group Hamas in Gaza has led to even more U.S. sanctions. Additionally, with the U.S. withdrawing from Afghanistan in 2021, the country is no longer a primary focus of U.S. interests. Indian support to Iran will be limited in the event of escalation



in Iran – Israel conflict. However, Iran has shown diplomatic maturity by launching drone and missile attacks giving strategic signal and later terminating his actions to deescalate the tensions while maintaining cautious stance. India can seek it as a welcoming step to provide some leverage, to maintain its relation and deal amidst the US Sanctions.

## Conclusion

India has very little scope to play Afghanistan card once again post US withdrawal from Afghanistan. Hence, India needs to realign its strategy to revive Chabahar port deal in line with US. Reports indicate that China is not only interested in Chabahar Port but is also planning to connect it with Gwadar. Additionally, China already has a presence in the port area, with its companies established in the surrounding economic zone (Shukla, 2024). Considering the same, India must stress upon the strategic alignment between Indian and U.S. interests in promoting a multipolar Asia where no single country (such as China) dominates regional trade routes and infrastructure projects. India must play along with US strategy of delimiting Chinese hegemony in the region including Iran and possibility of Iran – Russia – China Alliance under the hardline regime started with Ebrahim Raisi and followed by Mohammad Mokhber. However, the unfortunate demise of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi has opened doors of renegotiations between Iran and US.

In another scenario, if US being reluctant to lift sanctions or exempt Chabahar deal out, India must play along its Strategic Autonomy. India can leverage Iran's non-membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO), which exempts it from adhering to the WTO's prescribed tariff rates. As a result, India and Iran's trade is not directly impacted by these sanctions (“India-Iran Trade”). However, indirect effects for Indian traders cannot be ruled out. India must dissuade US sanctions on the lines of China as both the countries pose the biggest markets in the world.

*Carol Moseley Braun once said, “there are no permanent friends or permanent enemies, just permanent interests.”* India’s dilemma in consolidating the Chabahar deal is directly linked to the difficulties in navigating western sanctions. Maintaining strategic autonomy in a world of partisan geo politics, conflicts, energy crisis is extremely challenging specially in a hostile neighbourhood and rising Chinese hegemony in the region. India needs its energy supply chain to remain uninterrupted to continue its journey of development and Iran

along with Chabahar has a crucial role to play for its energy security. India must do all it can to make the Chabahar deal a success.

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