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**MANEKSHAW PAPER**

## **Counter Radicalisation In Defence of Common Sense**

Jaideep Saikia

**CENTRE FOR LAND WARFARE STUDIES**

**Field Marshal Sam Hormusji Framji Jamshedji Manekshaw, MC**, better known as Sam “Bahadur”, was the 8th Chief of the Army Staff (COAS). It was under his command that the Indian forces achieved a spectacular victory in the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971. Starting from 1932, when he joined the first batch at the Indian Military Academy (IMA), his distinguished military career spanned over four decades and five wars, including World War II. He was the first of only two Field Marshals in the Indian Army. Sam Manekshaw’s contributions to the Indian Army are legendary. He was a soldier’s soldier and a General’s General. He was outspoken and stood by his convictions. He was immensely popular within the Services and among civilians of all ages. Boyish charm, wit and humour were other notable qualities of independent India’s best known soldier. Apart from hardcore military affairs, the Field Marshal took immense interest in strategic studies and national security issues. Owing to this unique blend of qualities, a grateful nation honoured him with the Padma Bhushan and Padma Vibhushan in 1968 and 1972 respectively.



*Field Marshal SHFJ Manekshaw, MC  
1914-2008*

CLAWS Occasional Papers are dedicated to the memory of Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw  
**Photographs courtesy:** The Manekshaw family/FORCE.

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# Counter Radicalisation In Defence of Common Sense

## A Neuro-Scientific Prolegomena

Reticent corners of the universe seldom come to light, unobtrusively concealing themselves from gaze and assay. The uncharted neuronal caverns of a Homo Sapiens' brain, heir to countless stealth spaces, are among such quarters. Inhibited by obscure synaptic activity, they are capable of obscuring facets which—if it were to lend itself to revelation—would have exhibited myriad possibilities for humankind.<sup>1,2</sup> The human brain is, after all, the most sophisticated *objet d'art* that creation has shaped. Despite hard evidence about the plasticity of the brain and the occurrence of cortical rewiring which takes place as a response to training, the fact of the matter is that human beings do not come into the world in a “tabula rasa” manner.<sup>3,4,5</sup> Nature ascertains that the behavioural patterns fractionate along genetic boundaries. To that end, a person's mental content is largely in-built, even to the extent that his/her actions are predisposed. Nurture, especially if it suits the sapient architecture that nature has fashioned, encourages innateness.<sup>6</sup> However, inherence—whether or not nurture intervenes in its growth—permits a subject to participate in an attributive manner. Extra-cognitive predispositions too, therefore, cannot be said to be wholly determined by the setting. Although this hypothesis may be accused of being an extension of Chomskyan's “universal innate grammar” theory which describes the extraordinary ability in children to decipher complex concepts from a principally imprecise environment, the fact of the matter is that deviant behaviour, too, is the spawn of a brain that may careen out of control during the process of encephalisation that takes place in the front end of the neural tube in the seventh week of brain development.<sup>7,8,9</sup> It is in this context that the question of radicalisation acquires import and warrants examination in a discourse that has religious fanaticism as a subject of study. The fact that the Manekshaw Paper begins with an account of neuroscience is to construct a background for a counter narrative which in the days to come may receive superior reception.

## Introduction

In all fairness, radicalisation that characterises the present times, has always been deemed to be—shorn of the apologist's banner—confined

to Islam. Recent events around the world brackets ‘acts of terror’ as: (a) one perpetrated by Muslims; (b) in the name of and for the Islamic State or Daesh (Al-Qaeda, too, have of late begun to laud acts of violence that are being attributed to Daesh or Daesh followers);<sup>10</sup> and (c) which is confusing – the State about the real identity of the perpetrators; and (d) even about the motivation for the actions. It does not require imposing imagination to comprehend that almost all the acts of violence, that have been hitherto perpetrated in the name of Islam, are an express result of the “transformative period through which Islam is passing through”.<sup>11</sup> But despite the simplicity of such an explanation the new challenge for the so-called “urbane” world necessitates novelty. After all, some of the incidents that have been termed as Islamist action, with or without Daesh content, might not be as ‘cut-and-dried’ as has been thought of. The important aspect that must be borne in mind is that, until such time there is motivation to kill and maim (especially if it is planned and carried out by determined, violent minds) the brain will always guide aggression—there are plenty of ‘warrior genes’ inside it to steer such action.<sup>12</sup>

## 01 July 2016 ‘Hostage Situation’ in Dhaka

The 01 July 2016 ‘Hostage Situation’ in Dhaka provides an interesting case study about the manner in which an Islamist action was undertaken. An undemanding appraisal of the incident is, therefore, being embarked upon.<sup>13</sup>

Initial investigation informs that almost all the victims were foreigners.<sup>14</sup> The chosen weapon was a machete (even though the terrorists reportedly wielded firearms as well), giving rise, thereby, to the notion that there was a “method in the madness”. While certain experts attributed the recourse to “medieval barbarity” as a “Daesh prescription”, however, almost all the fourteen issues of *Dabiq*, the online propaganda mouthpiece of Daesh\*, published until date, showcases machetes dripping with blood, others tried to trivialise such a theory by providing the flimsiest of explanations—the violent innards that characterises East Bengali society, where conflict and violence are normally resolved by recourse to decapitation or comparable means!<sup>15</sup> There was also considerable speculation and consequently puzzlement about the swiftness with which Daesh exhibited the killers in their propaganda machinery. The terrorists had uploaded their photographs (posing, as they did, in front of a Daesh pennant) from inside the restaurant that they had commandeered (even this last detail has still not been verified with the possibility that the photograph could well have been sent to a Daesh

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\*The author used to, immediately on publication, clinically analyse the same.



ghost-site beforehand. However, it seems to testify the fact that, the terror actors inside the Holey Artisan Bakery had some connection or the other with Daesh. How else were the five terrorists able to send the photograph to the Daesh site?) But, there was<sup>†</sup> no two-way communication. In other words, a Daesh command & control axis was not guiding the terrorists, at least during the hostage-taking exercise, as was the case during the 26/11 Mumbai crisis when the terrorists were being constantly instructed by their minders in Pakistan. Daesh, therefore, in all probability 'grabbed the chance' to showcase to the world that its reach and range extended to Bangladesh, where 'machete-murders' were suddenly proliferating. But, it also meant that there are groups and individuals inside erstwhile East Pakistan who are seeking brand equity (and receiving it) with Daesh. If such is the case, then there should be no confusion about Daesh's presence in Bangladesh. After all, despite the fact that Daesh metamorphosed into its present shape from its earlier manifestation of Jamaat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad in 1999 and eventually Al-Qaeda in Iraq in 2004, its call to Muslims worldwide to undertake the *hijrah* attracted people from all over the world. The argument that the 01 July 2016 attackers were "only Bangladeshis" and consequently could not have had any link with Daesh, is without substance. At any rate, confusion continues till the time of writing in early April 2021 with investigators stating that it was a combined operation by Jamaat-ul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT), and Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT) and that the Gulshan attack was an elaborately planned assault that had been rehearsed for 7 months.

The author visited Dhaka as part of an Indian delegation for Track II Dialogue with Bangladesh in March 2016. He met with senior officials of the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI), the National Security Intelligence (NSI), and the Head of Counter Terrorism and Transnational Crime.<sup>16</sup> Although the 01 July 2016 'Hostage Situation' took place over 3 months after his visit, a sense of *déjà vu*, albeit in an inverted manner had come over the author even before he boarded the flight from Kolkata for Dhaka. The interactions, exclusively arranged for only the author (and not the other members of the Indian delegation), with top intelligence officials (as aforesaid) elicited the reluctant response that there is indeed a Daesh footprint in Bangladesh one which was being "officially" denied because of the apprehension of both pressure and entry by extra-regional powers. Suicide bombings that overran Bangladesh in 2017 proved the presence of Daesh in erstwhile East Pakistan.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>†</sup> As per the knowledge of the author of the Manekshaw Paper.

## Neo Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh

Neo Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh or 'Neo JMB', according to Bangladesh security agencies, is the name for the "offshoot" faction of JMB that has been inspired by the ideologies of Daesh. The phrase had to be coined almost under duress, by the Bangladeshi law-enforcers, as unfolding events showcased that, both radicalisation and attacks were being Daesh motivated. Dhaka had attempted, as aforesaid, its utmost to stave off a Daesh hand in the machete-murders by stating that the perpetrators were "homegrown" Islamists that were either sponsored by Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) or Bangladesh's political opposition that was desperate to oust Sheikh Hasina. While the jury is still out on the ISI connection, there is near unanimity that JMB—in whatever manifestation, "neo" or "original"—has an active link with Daesh.

However, pretence by the Sheikh Hasina Government did not quite work—an attempt that has been made to thwart the entry of extra-regional power(s) (like the United States) which was seeking to enter Bangladesh for reasons besides countering Daesh. In other words, to create a new 'string of pearls' *a la* China. The dilemma that led Sheikh Hasina to refute Daesh's presence is understandable, but sooner or later her government had to pave way to reality. 'Neo JMB'—as aforesaid, a face-saving coinage (there is an anecdotal account which ascribes the name to a journalist who reportedly used the phrase in one of her reportage)—and how it began manifesting itself in the days that followed up to the "appearance" of the Neo JMB in Bangladesh, is a matter of concern.

Suicide bombing was being resolutely introduced in a land that has never been earlier witness to it—certainly not by womenfolk! The author has spent the days, since the suicide bombing occurred, attempting to unearth the reasons for the phenomenon. The factor has become even more worrisome since women and infants on their laps, are pioneering such acts. Serious communication with very senior members of the intelligence community of Bangladesh elicited responses that male counterparts were indoctrinating their wives, sisters, and near ones to undertake suicide bombings. Also that their training area is not concentrated to a hub or one place only but it is diffused and dispersed around many areas, and that they are getting refuge in the neighbourhoods.

The fact that two aspects of importance are being granted by senior Bangladeshi intelligence officials is crucial—the first pertains to Daesh's presence in Bangladesh, and the second that suicide bombing has come to Bangladesh, motivated by 'male counterparts'. The possibility of the

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) component—a group that is in disarray—which is a theory that was also making the rounds) in Bangladesh was completely out-of-place. The prospect of active radicalisation and the likelihood of online technical “explosive” knowledge that has reached Bangladesh was more in line. After all, where did a Bangladeshi housewife—despite the fact that she happened to be the spouse of an Islamist cadre—suddenly construct up a bomb vest to blow herself up along with her infant and in front of security personnel?

There was derision for the author’s analyses. Indeed, he has been steadfastly maintaining that there is only one cohesive JMB and that it swore its allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s “caliphate” almost immediately after Daesh proclaimed its worldwide claim of domination, and as a corollary presence.<sup>18</sup> Indeed, Daesh’s presence was, notwithstanding the fact that it is losing territory that it had once decisively held, being felt in Orlando, Nice, Pakistan, Germany, France, and Bangladesh. It is a matter of time that this alien threat is imported into India, especially into places such as Assam and West Bengal, which strategically abut Bangladesh and provinces that have already felt the hand of the JMB. However, the security managers in India continue to think that (a) JMB is a divided house and that (b) Daesh, is struggling from territorial defeats in the Middle East, would not be able to reach out to the ‘far enemy’ to divert attention and most of all (c) that there aren’t radicalised women inside India who would be similarly motivated as their Bangladeshi counterparts to carry out martyrdom action. The author has also been stating that there could be consideration, other than religious, for indulging in acts that may seem to be as a result of a Daesh call.

## An Academic Caveat

At this juncture, a caveat of sorts must be inserted.<sup>‡</sup> One of the important aspects that came across during the course of the author’s advanced research in the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA is (a) the sophisticated interchangeable manner in which Islamist organisations operate and (b) Analyses that came to the fore in the backdrop of Ayman al-Zawahiri’s 04 September 2014 statement by which he proclaimed the creation of Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, that is loaded with the allusion of the setbacks that Al-Qaeda has faced since its finest hours of 9/11.<sup>19</sup> Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (according to most accounts) was created to counter the discernible accomplishments of what was once its surrogate that is

<sup>‡</sup> The author has spent over two decades studying the phenomenon of radical Islam and the terror that it manifests itself in.

Al-Qaeda in Iraq, now Daesh. However, the author has always maintained that the dissonance that appeared apparent between Al-Qaeda and Daesh to most was in reality only a ruse.<sup>20</sup> But, continual counsel to the effect did not prevail, and the counter terrorism establishment “lost the plot”, and in the bargain, was not able to think-out-of-the box, and lives were lost. In reality, there has always been a strategic convergence of objectives.<sup>21</sup> To that end, whereas Al-Qaeda concentrated on the far enemy, the immediate goal of Daesh, a veritable metrics-driven military command and control machinery, was that of holding and expanding territory, which indeed it was doing in Iraq and Syria and according to the *Sharia*, in certain situations, deception—also known as *taqiyya*, based on Quranic expression—is reportedly not only permitted but sometimes obligatory. *Tawriya*, yet another form that allows Muslims to lie to non-believers, is the intentional creation of a false impression.

However, setbacks in the field that Daesh has experienced have led it to change tactics, a stratagem that it is undertaking in concert with Al-Qaeda.<sup>22</sup> Having created and established the myth that there is a difference between the two and thereby generating considerable confusion in *Op Inherent Resolve*, Daesh has now begun to motivationally concentrate on the far enemy as well. The objective is clear. Although there was always a convergence between Al-Qaeda and Daesh, homegrown Islamist outfits that were mushrooming in every nook and cranny (and who, in their narrow, regional confusion, were piggy-backing either Al-Qaeda or Daesh) had to be correctly aligned as franchises, albeit at this time in the ‘either-or’ fashion that they had already affiliated themselves to. Therefore, even as JMB swore its allegiance to Daesh, the ABT attributed its loyalty to Al-Qaeda.<sup>23</sup> Indeed, the compartmentalisation of agenda and action continues till the time of writing with different groups claiming responsibility for acts of violence, albeit this time around by way of a novel method of “democratic protests” by Islamist outfits such as the Hifazat-e-Islam Bangladesh across the erstwhile East Pakistan.<sup>24,25</sup> A calibrated, comprehensive, and integrated drive against one distinct threat has dissipated into a multiplicity of disarray as a result of non-comprehension of the minimalism of a simple case by which a far enemy has striven to traverse the distance from the Middle East to South Asia. Paul Von Hindenburg probably had even such plainness of analyses in mind when he sought to wed the words “simple” and “war,” when he said *in war, only the simple succeeds*.

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<sup>§</sup> Notwithstanding the perplexity of the situation, it is the considered opinion of the author that it has not only furthered the ingress of a united Salafi agenda into the region but has succeeded in proliferating “Op Confusion” in the security establishment.

In any event, the official admission (whatever else it might be indicative of) proves that (a) Islamist organisations in Bangladesh are acting in unison; (b) since at least JMB and ABT have sworn allegiance to Daesh and Al-Qaeda respectively, there must be a unity of agenda and objective between the latter two—a theory that at least the author has been propagating since the coming into existence of the “caliphate” on 29 June 2014; and (c) the inter-subjectivity of design attests to the fact that an encompassing Islamist agenda that is global in intent and purpose had prior knowledge of the 01 July 2016 attack.<sup>26</sup> The genuine lament should be about the absence of high-order analyses by agencies dedicated to such exercise and their failure to comprehend the earlier mentioned aspects. Indeed, the bewilderment is compounded by the fact that there has been no robust post-crisis situational activity. State exercise—and by those in its payroll—seems content with the denial of a Daesh hand, and naysayers of the State opposing it. “Expertise”, therefore, is as divided as Bangladesh. The author had earlier written about the divide thus:

Bangladesh—even though it was formed on the basis of Bengali nationalism (jettisoning the commonality of religion that had linked it to Pakistan in 1947)—is not (in the opinion of the author) a homogenous entity. In reality, there are two Bangladesh. One is devoted to Bengali culture, language, and the ethos that is the hallmark of Bengalihood. Religion is not paramount for this group. The other identifies itself with the Islamic world and finds comfort in the “transformative moment” that Islam is passing through (Jaideep Saikia, *Circle of Treason: Bangladesh Beyond the Threat of Illegal Migration*, Manekshaw Paper, No. 41, Centre for land Warfare Studies, New Delhi, 2013)

Therefore, the plot was lost in a tempest of inanity. The contesting objectives were either to support the denials by Dhaka of Daesh’s presence in erstwhile East Pakistan and shore up the assertion that both Dhaka and Delhi subscribed to or attack it. The dispute revolved around official Bangladesh claim that it is homegrown Islamists (primarily ABT and JMB, both of which had, as aforesaid, sworn affiliations to Al-Qaeda and Daesh, respectively) with aid from the ISI of Pakistan or even the Israeli Mossad that is teaming up with the political opposition of Bangladesh that is responsible for the violence. The fact that it could be fear of economic and political repercussions (and the apprehension that extra-regional powers could intervene if Daesh’s presence is admitted) that drove the denial was pointed out by a few experts, but such accounts were conveniently swept under the carpet of exigency.

The Manekshaw Paper—notwithstanding the forthrightness with which it is examining a global event—is aware that national or (even) regional security might well allow, as indeed ‘it should’, for circumspection. But, the aspects that must not be missed are the two distinct levels in which a State must relate to and act upon to address such dilemma. At the *vyavaharika* level, (for want of a more apt description about the duality of stages) correctness comprehends that the entrails are read correctly and responded to in a manner that aids the larger picture, one that has guardedness in mind. However, at the *paramarthika* level, description and action must be driven by realism. If therefore, the *Shastras* had ordained *na bruyatsatyam apriyam* (don’t give tongue to unpalatable truths) for the defence of a larger objective, then it is a counsel that is in accord with pragmatism, permissible in certain circumstances at the *vyavaharika* level. But such practice should be confined to the sphere of the several. It is the considered opinion of the author that privileged information is the prerogative of the few and, to that end, the *paramarthika* level (meant for the chosen few) have to decide and decree on the strength of absolute validity, shorn of narrow considerations.<sup>27</sup>

If the earlier mentioned caveats are sound, the questions that should have been asked (about the violence in Bangladesh which peaked on 01 July 2016) are when did violence (of this genre) begin and when did Daesh begin to claim responsibility for the acts of violence? If official reports are anything to go by the first victim, Asif Mohiuddin, a self-confessed “militant atheist blogger” was attacked on 15 January 2013 by ABT, an Al-Qaeda franchise. Mohiuddin survived the attack, but exactly a month later (on 15 February 2013) Ahmed Rajib Haider, another “atheist blogger” and who is being termed as the “First Shahbag Martyr” (the frequency of attacks by Islamist increased after the Shahbag Protest of 2013) was killed. There is adequate analysis to show that the rate of recurrence of the attacks increased after the 2013 Shahbag Protest and when the secular half of Bangladesh gathered in the Square to protest the “life-imprisonment” of Abdul Quader Molla by the International Crimes Tribunal (the sentence was converted to execution as a direct result of the protest). The radical half that makes up Bangladesh was, therefore, hitting back, “piggy-backing” onto Al-Qaeda or Daesh simply because it wanted international attention—which indeed it was able to garner. However, Daesh, too, had been watching, and only from 21 February 2016 with the killing of Jogeswar Roy did the “Fanatics from Ar-Raqqah” started claiming responsibility (although there is some confusion about Ansar Bangla 7 having killed Avijit Roy—a naturalised US citizen—on 26 February 2015 in response to the American bombing of Daesh held territory in the Middle East). It was convenient for Daesh to do



so. Groups such as JMB that were carrying out the attacks (it had entered West Bengal and Assam as well) had already sworn their allegiance to Daesh and the latter found that such a *modus operandi* suited their purpose about the construction of ‘Nizammiyah for the Caliphate’ in an expanse that was far away from their traditional area of operation. It quickly made contact with JMB and even devoted pages of the 12th and 14th issues of *Dabiq* to proclaim the “Revival of Jihad in Bengal” and the “martyrdom” of one Abu Jandal al-Bangali who reportedly undertook the *hijrah*. *Dabiq* also spoke of the “blessed operations” of “Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen (who) tried its best to awaken the Muslim masses of Bengal to the importance of ruling by Shari’ah and the fundamentals of wala and bara” and published an extensive interview with the “Amir of Khilafah’s Soldiers in Bengal,” “Shaykh Abu Ibrahim al-Hanif”. It is, therefore, of little or no bearing whether Daesh entered Bangladesh by proxy or at a later stage. The fact that it has should be the theme of concern.

But are the “machete-murderers”, radicalised by Daesh propaganda? Or is it simply convenient to cloak themselves in Daesh garb to conceal their political objectives? If this argument has even a shred of truth, then it can be said that others are resorting to killings not because they subscribe to the Daesh agenda, but because they have discovered a paradigm in the Daesh discourse which allows them to give vent to their deviant behaviour. It is in this context that the author sought to invoke (and devote) much of the opening narrative to neuroscience, a decidedly strange plot for a paper on radicalisation and ways to counter it.

## Counter Radicalisation versus De-Radicalisation

The “Tale of Two Bangladesh”, the Daesh-veiled political conspiracy that Dhaka has ‘uncovered’ and even Daesh’s need for affiliates and consequently distraction (from defeat in the battlefield, the most important of which—at the time—was the fall of Fallujah) is understandable. Indeed, it explains quite a lot. But, what if similarity of violence were to take place in India where there is no visible political conflict? Or, if there are networks that are veiled in secrecy at this time awaiting activation.<sup>28</sup> Even if it were to be granted that the “missing” youths (small in number) undertook the *hijrah* from India because they are religious zealots, it would not explain the phenomenon of the hidden few who would imitate the ‘Cackle of Hyenas’<sup>¶</sup> that are breeding across the globe as well as in the neighbourhood? What if the authorities were to suddenly stumble upon the perpetuation of violence that is being

<sup>¶</sup> The author of the Manekshaw Paper would rather use a phrase attributing the killers to hyenas than to wolves, the latter, a dignified, but much-maligned creature.

witnessed by neo-converts—people from other faiths converting to Islam because how the religion is being interpreted permits canonical inviolability and conduct of activities that have been hitherto proscribed. Would a psycho-profiling (in the manner that closely examines every killing across the globe, but has been written off as religion-driven radicalisation) be then accepted? It is, therefore, of utmost importance to elegantly script the various radicalisation typologies and provide counter-measure prescription. A sound comprehension of Islam and how certain practitioners of the faith interpret its tenets to promote terror is unique, not because the counter terrorism specialist makes a distinction between Islam and terrorism, but because he has understood the imperatives of radicalisation and the need to counter it. This, if achieved, would stand out as a remarkable out-of-the-box thought and would be in stark opposition to the doggedness with which a non-existent de-radicalisation programme continues to be pursued in a terror-torn world that is only beginning to get wind of the first whiff of the aforesaid “third wave”.

Research has shown that a number of Saudi Guantanamo detainees that were “de-radicalised” have returned to terrorism upon release. Although there have been arguments that de-radicalisation creates a barrier to recidivism, there is no way to fathom or evaluate whether a thorough ‘cauterisation’ has taken place. Or are there de-radicalised terrorists—disengaging because of purely instrumental reasons—who continue to harbour a radical worldview? Who determines whether the law-enforcer is erring or not by arranging theological correction of “radicalised minds” that have never actually read the Quran? Answers to such questions can only come to the fore where a science that “looks inside the brain” is employed. This theory applies to so-called de-radicalised terrorists as well as ones who have been thought to have been radicalised by religious injunction. After all, is it not conceivable that there are extra-religious reasons or considerations that could have propelled perpetrators of crimes to adopt a nihilistic *weltanschauung* that led to the death and gore that have been witnessed since the “baying” from Ar-Raqqah began? Has a neurological study been ever conducted on an Islamist radical who has attempted to undertake the *hijrah* and has been apprehended midway? Shrunken Amygdala or smaller ventromedial prefrontal cortex (which is indicative of a brain that propels aggressive conduct disorder) cannot be said to be any less intelligent. No less innovative are suppressed homosexuals and loners such as Omar Mateen and Mohamed Lahouaiej Bouhlel—the only way to appreciate what they did is to read deeper into what Byron might have understood in his immortal work *Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage* as the “wandering outlaw of his own dark mind”. The so-called



'thought virus' that is reportedly being spread by people such as Zakir Naik only enforces the call of the wild. One of the convenient explanations which the sole survivor of the 01 July 2016 attack in Dhaka's Holey Artisan Bakery gave was that he was inspired by Naik's speeches.

Therefore, the "radical" not only finds an outlet which is sanctioned by an "establishment" (in this case, Daesh) but deceives the counter terrorism apparatus and the world that it is the call of an Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi that drove her into a killing frenzy. Therefore, even as a counter radicalisation programme is set in motion, the most important (initial) examination that must be conducted is to 'clinically unearth' the real motivation of the perpetrator. The simplest explanation that abounds (particularly in media) is to term a killer "a bad Muslim" because she has misinterpreted the Qur'an or the *Sharia*.<sup>29</sup> The acceptable explanation could well have been to call them psychopaths who found a universe of discourse and a clear, unambiguous, audible paradigm where her behaviour not only is encouraged but one which is glorified by recourse to prophetic injunctions. After all (as was proffered earlier) in *Dabiq*, almost all acts of barbarism have instant "endorsement" by recourse to a *Shura*. For instance, the burning alive of the Jordanian pilot Mu'adh Safi Yusuf al-Kasasibah—according to Daesh—is called "equivalent response". It quotes an *Ayat* from An-Nahl thus: "and if you punish (an enemy), punish with an equivalent of that with which you were harmed". In other words, it says that in burning the Jordanian pilot alive and burying him under a pile of debris, Daesh carried out a just form of retaliation for his involvement in the bombing campaign which resulted in the killing of countless Muslims who, as a result of these airstrikes, are burned alive and buried under mountains of wreckage. Daesh cleverly makes use of the Qur'an to justify its ghastly acts, utilises such acts to deter other pilots, and as the Manekshaw Paper seeks to put forward appeal to minds on the prowl for dark passageways. It is, therefore, in the realm of the mind that the final *fitnah* is to be waged.<sup>30</sup>

## Conclusion

But, even as counter radicalisation methods are fine-tuned and put into practice, what cannot be dismissed is the deviant brain factor, the possibility that a killer acts in the name of Islam to access a 'psychological sanctuary' which suddenly came into existence with the declaration of a "caliphate". The awareness that her act of barbarism has the sanction of a divine authority only propels her forward. To that end, the battle to overcome deviant thought has to be preceded by a correct comprehension of the fundamentals. It does not require the cogitation of a "Grand Zedi Order", but at the same time,

it is too serious a matter to be left to the conventional. The devotion of the opening remarks of the Manekshaw Paper to neuro-psychology may, therefore, be viewed as a custom that should not be honoured in its breach, but by recourse to quiet observance.

## Notes

1. The species *Homo sapiens*, to which modern humans belong, has an average brain size of about 1400 cubic centimetre. The human brain is almost double the size of early *Homo habilis* or *handyman* which is a species of the archaic human form from the Early Pleistocene of East and South Africa about 2.3–1.65 million years ago. The brain size is almost three times the size of early *australopithecines*. The *australopiths*, on the other hand, occurred in the Plio-Pleistocene era or epoch which is typically defined as the period that began about 2.6 million years ago and lasted until about 11,700 years ago. The most recent Ice Age occurred then, as glaciers covered huge parts of the Earth. The inhabitants were bipedal and dentally similar to humans but with a brain size not much larger than that of modern apes, with lesser encephalisation than in the genus *Homo*.
2. In a chemical synapse, electrical activity in the pre-synaptic neuron is converted (via the activation of voltage-gated calcium channels) into the release of a chemical called a neurotransmitter that binds to receptors located in the plasma membrane of the post-synaptic cell.
3. Brain plasticity, also known as neuroplasticity, is a term that refers to the brain's ability to change and adapt as a result of experience. When people say that the brain possesses plasticity, they are not suggesting that the brain is similar to plastic.
4. Rewiring is a structural change to the brain's wiring diagram. This could occur in multiple ways ranging from changes in synapses through alterations to whole connections between neurons and on to large-scale modifications of the axonal tracts between brain regions. The cortex receives its major sensory input from the thalamus via thalamocortical axons, and cortical neurons are interconnected in complex networks by corticocortical and callosal axons.
5. A blank slate or the absence of pre-conceived ideas or pre-determined goals.
6. There is a rather interesting and ongoing debate in the context of nature versus nurture. "Nature" pertains to biological pre-dispositions that have an impact on human traits. Nurture, on the other hand, describes the influence of learning from one's surroundings. The debate over whether the strengths and weaknesses of people are the results of nature or nurture continues to rage on between scholars and ordinary people alike. The debate has had significant social implications, particularly concerning what is thought to determine people's ability to learn and acquire intelligence. The initial use of Nature versus Nurture Theory is credited to Psychologist Francis Galton. However, it is unclear who initially described the impact of genes and biology versus environmental influences. Scientists, doctors, researchers, psychologists, behaviourists, and many others have debated these theories since the days of Hippocrates.
7. Noam Chomsky is an American linguist, philosopher, cognitive scientist, historian, social critic, and political activist. Sometimes called "the Father of Modern Linguistics", Chomsky is also a major figure in analytic philosophy and one of the founders of

the field of cognitive science. Universal Grammar (UG) in modern linguistics is the theory of the genetic component of the language faculty, usually credited to Noam Chomsky. The basic postulate of UG is that a certain set of structural rules are innate to humans, independent of sensory experience. UG, then, consists of a set of unconscious constraints that let us decide whether a sentence is correctly formed. This mental grammar is not necessarily the same for all languages. But according to Chomskyan theorists, the process by which, in any given language, certain sentences are perceived as correct while others are not and are universal and independent of meaning. Thus, humans immediately perceive that the sentence “Shreya book reads the” is incorrect English, even though we have a pretty good idea of what it means. Conversely, we recognise that a sentence such as “Colourless green ideas sleep furiously” is grammatically correct English, even though it is drivel. A pair of dice offers a useful metaphor to explain what Chomsky means when he refers to UG as a “set of constraints”. Before we throw the pair of dice, we know that the result will be a number from 2 to 12, but nobody would take a bet on its being 3.121. Similarly, a newborn baby has the potential to speak any number of languages, depending on what country it is born in, but it will not just speak them anyway it likes. It will adopt certain preferred, innate structures. One way to describe these structures would be that they are not things that babies and children learn, but rather things that happen to them. Just as babies naturally develop arms and not wings while they are still in the womb, once they are born they naturally learn to speak, and not to quack or bleat.

8. Encephalisation refers to the human brain's evolution and one which is marked by a significant increase in the total brain size relative to body size. Increased encephalisation is a clear hallmark of human cognitive and cultural evolution. Therefore, larger olfactory bulbs, relatively wider orbitofrontal cortex, and relatively increased and forward projecting temporal lobe poles are unique to modern human beings.
9. Seven weeks into pregnancy, or five weeks after conception, a baby's brain and face begin to grow. Depressions that will give rise to nostrils become visible, and the beginnings of the retinas appear and form.
10. Daesh is fundamentally an Arabic short form of the opening letters of the Islamic State's previous name in Arabic, i.e. “al-Dawla al-Islamiya fil Iraq wa al-Sham” or the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. The Levant approximates to a geographical expression referring to a large swath of land area in the Eastern Mediterranean region of Western Asia. In its narrowest sense, it is comparable to the historical region of Syria, which included present-day Israel, Syria, Palestine, Lebanon, Jordan, and parts of Turkey that is situated in the south-east of the middle Euphrates. In its widest historical sense, the Levant included all of the Eastern Mediterranean including its islands, ones that extend from Greece to Cyrenaica in eastern Libya. The term entered English in the late fifteenth century from French. It derives from the Italian *Levante*, meaning “rising”, implying the rising of the Sun in the east, and is broadly equivalent to the term *al-Mashriq* meaning “the eastern place, where the Sun rises”. The name Daesh came into currency as a result of its detractors—especially in the West—usage of the word which sounds akin to an Arabic verb that means to “tread underfoot”, “trample upon”, or “crush something or somebody”. Supporters of the Islamic State reject the nomenclature considering it to be derogatory.

11. One of the world's pre-eminent Islamic scholars, Khaled Abou El Fadl argues that Islam is currently passing through a "transformative period" which is no less dramatic than the movements that swept through Europe during the Reformation. He opines that there are two completely opposed world views within Islam competing to define this world religion. Fadl states that stakes have never been higher, and the future of the Muslim world hangs in the balance. (Khaled Abou El Fadl, *The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam From the Extremists*, HarperCollins Publishers, 2006).
12. The purported 'warrior gene' encompasses exacting variations in the X chromosome gene that produces Monoamine Oxidase A (MAO-A), an enzyme that affects the neurotransmitters dopamine, norepinephrine, and serotonin. The variants, known collectively as Monoamine oxidase-A (MAO-A)-L, produce human MAO-A "sensation" with a low intensity of the enzyme. MAO-A is an enzyme encoded by the MAO-A gene in human beings. This gene is one of the two neighbouring gene family members that encode mitochondrial enzymes which catalyze the oxidative deamination of amines, such as dopamine, norepinephrine, and serotonin. A mutation of this gene results in what is known as the Brunner syndrome which is a rare genetic disorder associated with a mutation in the MAO-A gene. It is characterised by lower than average Intelligence Quotient (IQ) (on an average about 85), problematic impulsive behaviour (such as pyromania, hypersexuality, and violence), sleep disorders, and mood swings. This gene has also been associated with a variety of other psychiatric disorders, including anti-social behaviour.
13. On the night of 01 July 2016, at 21:20 hours local time, five militants took hostages and opened fire on the Holey Artisan Bakery in Gulshan Thana. The assailants entered the bakery with crude bombs, machetes, pistols, and took several dozen hostages—foreigners and from the local populace. In the immediate response, while Dhaka Metropolitan Police tried to regain control of the bakery, two police officers were shot dead by the assailants. Twenty-nine people were killed, including twenty hostages (seventeen foreigners and three local persons), two police officers, five gunmen, and two bakery staff. As the police were unsuccessful in breaching the bakery and securing the hostages, they set up a perimeter along with the Rapid Action Battalion and Border Guards Bangladesh. Very early on 2 July (around 03:00 hours), it was decided that the Bangladesh Armed Forces would launch a counter assault code-named *Operation Thunderbolt*. The assault was led by the 1st Para-commando Battalion, an elite force in the Bangladesh Army. The Special Forces began their raid in the wee hours of the morning. According to Bangladesh's Inspector General of Police, all the attackers were Bangladeshi citizens. An initial report from *Amaq News Agency*, which is affiliated with the Islamic State or the Daesh, said the Group claimed it had killed twenty-four people and wounded forty others. A second report, issued directly by Daesh a few hours later, said the Group had killed "22 crusaders" and was accompanied by photos of the attackers, standing in front of Islamic State banners. The attackers were named Akash, Badhon, Bikash, Don, and Ripon. The Islamic State referred to the five men by their *kunya* which were Abu Omar al-Bengali, Abu Salmah al-Bengali, Abu Rahim al-Bengali, Abu Muslim al-Bengali, and Abu Muharib al-Bengali. (*Kunya* is a name that is honourably accorded to the mother or father of an Arabic child. Married people (especially women) are addressed by their *Kunya*, which is *Abu* (father), or *Umma* (mother) plus the name of their first son). However, the Home Minister of Bangladesh, Asaduzzaman Khan, stated that the perpetrators belonged to

Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen and were not affiliated with Daesh. They were well-educated and hailed from rich families. Bangladeshi politicians also blamed opposition groups, like those within the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, for plotting to destabilise the country by supporting Islamists like the Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen. The opposition denied such claims. The attackers, all in their late teens or early twenties, were identified as wealthy men from Bangladesh's elite, having attended top private schools and universities in Bangladesh and abroad. It was revealed that three of the attackers came from a privileged background, educated with western curricula. Police named the five gunmen who attacked the restaurant as Nibras Islam, Rohan Imtiaz, Meer Saameh Mubasheer, Khairul Islam, and Shafiqul Islam. One of them Nibras Islam was known as "fun-loving, in and out of love, and keen on sport". He attended Monash University in Malaysia and returned because "he didn't like it in Monash". Nibras' father was a businessman with two houses in Dhaka, and one of his uncles was a Deputy Secretary in the Bangladesh government. It was revealed that Nibras was following a Twitter account belonging to an Islamic State propagandist named Mehdi Masroor Biswas, who was arrested in Bangalore in 2015.

14. Seventeen foreigners including nine Italian, seven Japanese, and one Indian were the foreign nationals killed by the Holey Artisan Bakery terror actors.
15. *Dabiq* was an online magazine used by Daesh for Islamic radicalisation and recruitment. It was first published in July 2014 in a number of different languages (including English). The stated objective of *Dabiq* was purportedly for promoting and aiding unitarianism (*tawhid*), truth-seeking (*manhaj*), migration (*hijrah*), holy war (*jihad*), and community (*jama'ah*). *Dabiq* was published by Daesh via a deep web, although it was widely available online through other sources. The first issue carried the date "Ramadan 1435" in the Islamic Hijri calendar. According to the Magazine, its name was taken from the town of *Dabiq* in northern Syria, which is mentioned in a hadith about Armageddon. Daesh believes *Dabiq* is where Muslim and infidel forces will ultimately face each other. After the defeat of the crusader forces, the apocalypse will begin. Almost every issue of *Dabiq* contained a quote attributed to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the founder of Al-Qaeda in Iraq who was later killed on 7 June 2006 in a United States Air Force airstrike. Analyst of the Institute for the Study of War in Washington DC states that while Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's magazine *Inspire* focuses on encouraging its readers to carry out lone-wolf attacks on the West, *Dabiq* was more concerned with establishing the religious legitimacy of Daesh and its self-proclaimed caliphate, as also encouraging Muslims to emigrate there. In its October 2014 issue, an article outlined religious justifications for slavery and lauded its revival. In September 2016, Daesh replaced *Dabiq* with another online magazine, *Rumiyah* (Arabic for *Rome*), published in English and other languages. Observers speculated this was due to Daesh being driven out of the town of *Dabiq* by the Turkish army and the Syrian Rebels in October 2016. The new title refers to an Islamic prophecy about the fall of Rome.
16. Even though the Indian delegation for Track II Dialogue with Bangladesh constituted two retired three-star Indian Army Generals, a retired IAS Officer, a National Professor, and a former Indian Envoy to Bangladesh, exclusive meetings (without the presence of other members of the Indian delegation) with top officials of the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI), National Security Intelligence (NSI), the Counter Terrorism and Transnational Crime Chief and the Bangladesh army as



also with the International Affairs Adviser to the Bangladesh Prime Minister, Gowher Rizvi were organised by the former Foreign Secretary of Bangladesh, Farooq Sobhan's think tank *Bangladesh Enterprise Institute*.

17. Although inaccurate characterisation of political Islam at the global level may influence the future course of Islamism in Bangladesh, the citizens and the civil society of Bangladesh remain the deciding factors. Whether its citizens and the civil society want to have a share based on a totalising understanding of Islamic law and a monopolistic fusion of religious and political authority will determine the nature and the extent of the Islamist peril. The accommodation of political Islam, as the history of Bangladesh demonstrates, has created a context within which political radicalism and social intolerance are increasing and soon may become the mainstay of politics. The trend will gain in strength if the present inclination to appease, co-opt, and integrate Islamists and appropriate their rhetoric to gain immediate public support persists. The existence of militant organisations is instructive in this regard. Their links with transnational groups, suggested by some international media, have not been proven yet, and at present militants are small in number and have a narrow support base; but one should not dismiss the possibility of a future understanding between these homegrown militants and transnational groups. Furthermore, in their absence of effective counter measures, militants may be able to co-opt the "moderates" and in certain circumstances, a radical fringe may exercise influence out of all proportion to its support in society. Ali Riaz *God Willing: The Politics of Islamism in Bangladesh*, United States of America Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2004.
18. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was the "First Caliph" of Daesh. He killed himself by detonating a suicide vest on 27 October 2018 along with his two children to pre-empt capture by the United States' Delta Force and such other US armed forces elements in an Operation codenamed Kayla Mueller in North-Western Syria's Idlib province. Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi succeeded Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as the "Caliph" of "al-Dawla al-Islamiya fil Iraq wa al-Sham" or Daesh.
19. A unique concept of "sleepers cells" working independently of one another has been initiated in the realm of Islamist terror. The uniqueness of the Movement is that no conventional command and control exists, and each *tanzeem*/module/cell follows a set of general ideological motivation, and not instruction. The coordination system between the groups (even though they are all subservient to the ISI of Pakistan) is untenable—groups have their agenda and have their system of functioning. Say, a module of Khudam-ul-Ansar wants to bomb a mass transit system, it does not have to take the aid of another *tanzeem* (or, even the clearance of its *salat-e-allah*, Masood Azhar), but can act independently, seeking assistance from even non-traditional underground organisations, or the *criminal elements among the Bangladeshi migrants in the State* (which incidentally is on the rise). However, the umbrella alliance to ISI is real. It may have different ways of manifesting itself, whether it is Lashkar-e-Toiba in Kashmir and Pakistan, Jemaah Islamiyah in Indonesia, Hifazat-e-Islam or HUJI in Bangladesh or Hizb-ul-Mujahideen in Assam and, of course, Kashmir. The grand strategy is to wage a war against the non-believers and institute *dar-ul-aman* throughout the world. Also, there is inter-changeability among these groups. A member of one *tanzeem* can operate under the banner of another *tanzeem*, and there are no longer strict compartments from which a puritan operates. With the deconstruction of the Islamist paradigm, boundaries have ceased to exist not only

between countries but also between *tanzeems*. Only the methods are different, and individual puritans innovate their methods of operation. There are no patterns of discovery, apart from a decisively anti-India agenda. It would, therefore, be prudent to institute non-orthodox methodologies and analyses when the action and motivation of such groups are taken into consideration. The accent should be to avoid patterns and search for unorthodox links. The non-comprehension of the new paradigm and the driving force of the ISI is perhaps one of the reasons why the authorities have not been able to unearth many an Islamist terror agenda in the past and have stumbled upon a few only as a matter of chance, for instance, the Burdwan Blast and Uttar Pradesh Anti Terrorist Squad actions are pointers in the direction. Qamar-uz-Zaman, a Hizb ul Mujahideen terrorist arrested in Uttar Pradesh by the Anti Terrorist Squad in September 2018 was brought to his home district of Hojai in central Assam for interrogation and extracting details about activities of the Islamic terrorist group in Assam. The Assam Police took Zaman on a transit remand from the Uttar Pradesh police. He was produced before the Lucknow court on 11 October 2018. See <https://www.sentinelassam.com/top-headlines/hizbul-mujahideen-terrorist-brought-to-hojai/?infinitescroll=1>, accessed on 18 March 2021.

19. The deception was so well-grounded that a former US Army General and CIA Director, David Petraeus even advised that "less extreme" Al-Qaeda affiliates such as ones in Jabhat al-Nusra should be utilised to fight Daesh in Syria. Such an opinion is being proffered in this paper even though there is a disagreement between Al-Qaeda and Daesh, especially about the barbarity with which it acts as also the latter's actions against Shias.
20. Whether it is about the establishment of the Caliphate or Nizam-e-Mustafa.
21. Including a tacit encouragement of "lone wolf" attacks across the globe as it has realised that the undertaking of the *hijrah* (journey to Iraq and Syria) may no longer be as easy as earlier.
22. Headed by Ejaz Hussain @ Sajjad @ Kargil the organisation has been renamed Ansar al-Islam in March 2016. Tipu Sultan, *Natun Netritwo Natun Naame Sokrio Ansarullah* (Ansarullah active with a new leader and a new name), Prothom Alo, Dhaka, 10 April 2016.
23. Hifazat-e-Islam Bangladesh is an Islamic Advocacy group of Madrassa teachers and students. In 2013, it submitted to the Government of Bangladesh a 13-point charter, which included the demand for the enactment of (a) blasphemy law. It has protested the erection of statues that they consider un-Islamic and have been blamed for the defacement of the statue of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in Bangladesh's western city of Kushtia on 5 December 2020. Rohan Gunaratna writes in his seminal book *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror* that "given the increased threat to Islamist terrorist groups, Al-Qaeda is enlisting the support of the underground groups as well as legitimate political parties. Instead of Islamist terrorist groups shouldering the burden of politicising, radicalising, and mobilising Muslims, Al-Qaeda has called upon political parties to shoulder the duties of propaganda, recruitment, fundraising, and mobilising Muslims, thus freeing Islamist terrorist groups to concentrate on planning, preparing, and conducting attacks".
24. Al-Qaeda calls upon them to "expose" the "rulers" who fight Islam; highlights the "importance of loyalty to the faithful and relinquishing of the infidels in the Muslim creed"; hold "every Muslim responsible for defending Islam, its sanctities, nation, and

homeland”; caution against the “ulema” of the sultan and reminding the nation of the virtues of the ulema of the jihad and the imams of the sacrifice and the need for the nation to defend, protect, honour, and follow them” and expose “the extent of aggression against our creed and sanctities and the plundering of our wealth”. Gunaratna quotes Ayman al-Zawahiri in *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*, New Delhi: Roli Books Pvt Ltd, 2002.

25. It is the considered opinion of the author that there is a discernible timeline in every act of sequential advancement especially as it moves outward towards progression. The lull that is being experienced in the Islamist agenda by way of a quieted-down in its violent expression is both a deliberate and a motivated ploy. Under tremendous pressure from the security forces, the Islamist stratagem for the moment is to “prop-up” existing overground organisations such as the Hifazat-e-Islam Bangladesh and Islami Andolan Bangladesh and engage the State with demands such as the enactment of a Blasphemy Law and protestations against aspects such as the erection of statues which such groups consider un-Islamic. For instance, the Hifazat-e-Islam Bangladesh protested against *Charlie Hebdo*, a French satirical weekly magazine that features cartoons and jokes among other aspects for depicting Prophet Muhammad in extremely poor light. The aspect that needs underscoring at this juncture is that the Islamists are attempting a different strategy before they embark upon what the author terms as the “third wave” which would coincide with the complete territorial ouster of Daesh., the “first wave” being the violent radicalisation between 1999 and 2005 and the “second wave” being attributed to the oath of allegiance or the *Bay’ah* of the JMB-ABT to Daesh. In this context, it must be also comprehended that there would be perforce a spillover effect into India via Assam and West Bengal by way of the mechanism of the “Gateway Theory” which the author has both coined and has been propagating since he first penned his best-selling book *Terror Sans Frontiers: Islamist Militancy in North East India* (New Delhi: Vision Books, second edition, 2004 and 2008). The “Gateway Theory” is primarily the concept that the Islamists utilise the expanse as a launching detachment for anti-India operations against the rest of India, especially economic hubs such as Mumbai, Delhi, Hyderabad, and Bangalore. One of the reasons for the non-availability of data pertaining to engagements with the security forces in Assam, etc., (the Burdwan Blast of 2 October 2014 was an accidental blast which led to both National Investigation Agency and consequently apprehension of JMB activists from Barpeta district of Assam) is because the Islamists do not want to “attract the attention” of the security forces operating in lower Assam districts as also utilise the area and the “demographic jungle” that it is peopled with as pull-back area after operation in the rest of India. Although not documented most anti-India action in the Indian heartland that has been attributed to *tanzeems* such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba or the Jaish-e-Mohammad had robust franchise support and aid from groups from inside Bangladesh that had made their way into various target areas inside India via Assam and Bangladesh. However, with the unfolding of the “third wave” there is a strong possibility that subterfuge and consequently large-scale violence (including suicide bombings) would take place inside Assam as well.
26. Jaideep Saikia, “Shadow of Daesh: Islamic State’s Design in “Bengal”, *The War College Journal*, Mhow, Summer 2016.
27. There are three levels in *Advaita Vedanta* regarding reality. They are *Pratibhasika*, *Vyavaharika*, and *Paramarthika*. Of these *Pratibhasika* is the most unreal. The dream



is in *Pratibhasika* level. In dreams we perceive different things. But in a strict sense, the dream is not completely unreal because those things, which we see, in dreams, have external substratum in the phenomenal world. Take the example of a sky-flower. Even though no sky-flower exists in the world and thus it is unreal, yet, sky and flower, taken separately, are real things that we have seen in the external world prior to dreaming. That is, we can dream of only those things which we have seen in the phenomenal world. But in dreams, these real things get combined in strange and different proportions, making quite new unreal objects. Thus, what we call a dream is not the opposite of the Ultimate Reality because even in a dream, elements, which have substratum outside the dream, are present. To say that the dream is unreal, we should be in a waking state. We can know the unreality of dreams only from the waking state. As long as we are dreaming, we won't understand that dream is unreal, i.e. when we get a "higher waking knowledge" we will understand that dream is not real and a little below the common waking experience. But to conclude this, we must have waking experience. As long as we remain in the dream state, we cannot comprehend the unreality of a dream. While being in a dream we will continue to think of it as real and ultimate. But waking experience will shatter this conclusion. In the same way, in the waking state we will consider the external, phenomenal world as real and ultimate. But when we get the "higher knowledge about Brahman" (*Brahma-vidya*) we will realise that the phenomenal world is not ultimately real. *Vyavaharika* level, on the other hand, is the relative plane of reality. This is the realm of cause-effect and human intellect works here. The phenomenal world is at this level. Everything that exists at this level depends on each other and we cannot say what their essence is. The things in *Vyavaharika* world can be said to exist by itself from the phenomenal, relative point of view. However, when a person gets *Brahma-vidya*, the higher knowledge, then phenomenal world things are said to be an appearance. In this condition, we can say that phenomenal world exists because we see them. It can also be said to be non-existing because it has no essence and it depends on Brahman for existence. Thus, since, the phenomenal objects exist and non-exist, from the ultimate viewpoint, their state of existence is said to be "indescribable or *maya*". In short for the one who has realised Brahman, the external world is indescribable or *maya*. And for those who had not realised Brahman (because of *Avidya* in them), external world is real, existing, and ultimate, i.e. not indescribable or *maya*. The dream world and the phenomenal world are not at the same level of reality in *Advaita Vedanta*. The phenomenal world has more reality. We can comprehend the relative nature of the phenomenal world only when we reach the *Paramarthika* level. Otherwise, we will continue to think that the phenomenal world is ultimate and real. *Paramarthika* is the ultimate truth level. It only is ultimately real. It can exist by itself without depending on anything. This is spiritual in experience and subject-object duality, cause-effect formula, etc., do not exist here. This is beyond the realm of human intellect. Human intellect cannot comprehend this ultimate level of reality. This can be realised only by direct experience with the help of *Brahma-vidya*. The Upanishads states that the nature of the Ultimate Reality, *paramartha satya*, can be expressed only by the word *Neti, Neti*. This is an attempt to define something by rejecting all other possibilities on what it can possibly be. Since the ultimate should be beyond human intellect, one can refer to it only by negation. When we negate a particular thing, stating it is not akin to Brahman, then we are a step ahead in our attempt to define Brahman. The

analogy is akin to the negation, for instance, of all non-blue colours to reach the true, unadulterated blue colour, i.e. every negation inherits an affirmation. *Paramarthika* is the ultimate level that everyone can realise. There is no higher level than this. At this level, all plurality vanishes. Only pure monism exists. It is one without a second.

28. Small-world networks have interesting properties. Unlike a hierarchical network that can be eliminated through decapitation of its leadership, a small-world network resists fragmentation because of its dense interconnectivity. A significant fraction of nodes can be randomly removed without much impact on their integrity. Random attacks, such as stopping terrorists arbitrarily at the borders, will not affect the network's structure. The evidence so far is that such short-term improvised operations have failed. But the survival of potential brokers to the cause of Islam may in the longer term allow the rebuilding on the site of an incompletely destroyed one. Therefore, a complete cauterisation is possible only when the state apparatus prevents radicalisation and does not await one to take root. Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks*, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004.
29. The fundamental principle underlying all laws was known to the pre-Islamic Arabs as *Sharia*, or "right way". It is derived from a term signifying *the assigned path or beaten track leading to a watering-place*. This is the path that people have to follow in the regulation of their lives, both as individuals and members of the society to which they belong. From the general principle of *Sharia* flows the *sunna* meaning custom, another term used by the pre-Islamic Arabs to denote the ancestral usage or model pattern of behaviour established by the forefathers of the tribe and the consensus *ijma* of the tribal assembly, and thus embodying the beliefs and practices of the whole community. Benjamin Walker, *Foundations of Islam: The Making of a World Faith*, Great Britain, Peter Owen Publishers, 1998.
30. *Fitnah* is an Arabic word with extensive connotations of trial, affliction, or distress. A word with important historical implications, it is also widely used in modern Arabic. One might distinguish between the meanings of *Fitnah* as used in Classical Arabic and the meanings of *Fitnah* as used in Modern Standard Arabic and various colloquial dialects. Due to the conceptual importance of *Fitnah* in the Qur'an, its use in that work may need to be considered separately from, though in addition to, the word's general lexical meaning in Classical Arabic. Aside from its use in the Qur'an, *Fitnah* is used as a term for the four heavy civil wars within the Islamic Caliphate from AD seventh to the ninth century.



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Reticent corners of the universe seldom come to light, unobtrusively concealing themselves from gaze and assay. The uncharted neuronal caverns of a Homo Sapiens' brain, heir to countless stealth space, are among such quarters. Inhibited by the obscure synaptic activity, they are capable of obscuring facets which—if it were to lend itself to revelation—would have exhibited myriad possibilities for humankind. The human brain is, after all, the most sophisticated *objet d'art* that creation has shaped. Despite hard evidence about the plasticity of the brain and the occurrence of cortical rewiring which takes place as a response to training, the fact of the matter is that human beings do not come into the world in a “tabula rasa” manner. Nature ascertains that the behavioural patterns fractionate along genetic boundaries. To that end, a person's mental content is largely in-built, even to the extent that his/her actions are predisposed. Nurture—especially if it suits the sapient architecture that nature has fashioned—encourages innateness. However, inherence—whether or not nurture intervenes in its growth—permits a subject to participate in an attributive manner. Extra-cognitive predispositions too, therefore, cannot be said to be wholly determined by the setting. The Manekshaw Paper aims at changing some of the pre-conceived notions about radicalisation with the help of a case study of Bangladesh.

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