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MANEKSHAW PAPER

The Nature of Military Intervention in Pakistan

An Inquiry into Causal Factors

Roye Ganju

CENTRE FOR LAND WARFARE STUDIES

Field Marshal Sam Hormusji Framji Jamshedji Manekshaw, better known as Sam "Bahadur", was the 8th Chief of the Army Staff (COAS). It was under his command that the Indian forces achieved a spectacular victory in the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971. Starting from 1932, when he joined the first batch at the Indian Military Academy (IMA), his distinguished military career spanned over four decades and five wars, including World War II. He was the first of only two Field Marshals in the Indian Army. Sam Manekshaw's contributions to the Indian Army are legendary. He was a soldier's soldier and a General's General. He was outspoken and stood by his convictions. He was immensely popular within the Services and among civilians of all ages. Boyish charm, wit and humour were other notable qualities of independent India's best known soldier. Apart from hardcore military affairs, the Field Marshal took immense interest in strategic studies and national security issues. Owing to this unique blend of qualities, a grateful nation honoured him with the Padma Bhushan and Padma Vibhushan in 1968 and 1972 respectively.

Photographs courtesy: The Manekshaw family/FORCE

Field Marshal SHFJ Manekshaw, MC
1914-2008

CLAWS Occasional Papers are dedicated to the memory of Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw

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Abstract

As Pakistan traverses through a period of crisis, its military's role in politics has come under greater scrutiny. With fears of possible interference, developing an understanding of the nature of military interventions is critical. This paper analyses Pakistan's state of civil-military relations through the Huntingtonian framework and subsequently uses the case studies of the five most recent interventions, both direct and indirect, to create a Four-Factor Model. This Model finds that explicit interventions are only likely when the military can legitimise its intervention in the eyes of its officer corps and important civilian actors such as the judiciary.

KEYWORDS: Military Intervention in Pakistan, Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan, Military Coups, Politics of Pakistan, Pakistan Army

Introduction

Despite credible allegations of widespread rigging (The Economist, 2024) and open horse-trading, Pakistan's recently concluded general elections gave independents affiliated with the imprisoned former Prime Minister Imran Khan's *Tehreek-i-Insaf* (PTI) a plurality of seats in the National Assembly. While the establishmentarian Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) (PML(N)) and the relatively pro-military Pakistan People's Party (PPP), have formed a coalition, these results do not augur well for Pakistan's military establishment, against whom Khan and his associates have campaigned aggressively. With the country already in stasis and a state of economic crisis, there are worries that the Army, led by General Asim Munir, will be emboldened to wrest direct control of the levers of the state if a political crisis intensifies. Hence, it becomes imperative to understand the incentive structure and fellow actors

of the military and to define the necessary conditions for military intervention for observers concerned with the country's deteriorating situation.

This paper theorises that military intervention in Pakistan can be placed into two distinct categories: 'explicit intervention' and 'implicit intervention'. The former deals with regime change through direct means such as coups d'etat; whereas, the latter involves regime change through indirect means such as, but not limited to, legal manoeuvring and the intervention of a rubber stamp executive.

By analysing the actions and circumstances around the explicit interventions of Generals Zia ul Haq and Pervez Musharraf and the three implicit interventions seen during the tenures of Generals Mirza Aslam Beg, Abdul Waheed Kakar and Jehangir Karamat, this paper seeks to illustrate that the Pakistan Army plays the role of an ideologically fluid actor, beholden to the public opinion yet capable of manipulating it, that acts to protect its interests vis-à-vis the maintenance of economic and political capital. Only when civilian governments and movements challenge the 'very existence' of military power does the officer corps acquiesce to direct action. The military can only use covert and underhanded measures to undermine civil opposition due to officerial apathy without this necessary shove.

The Military's Role and Interests in Civilian Affairs

In his seminal work 'The Soldier and the State,' Samuel P. Huntington (1957) proposed that the civil-military relations of most if not all, states would depend on three variables: state ideology, the political power of the military and military professionalism (p. 96). Pakistan's fiery birth and troubled infancy laid the foundation for a praetorian state that followed a pattern of civil-military relations that Huntington (Ibid.) would interestingly describe as occurring only in 'the most unusual circumstances' (p. 96). That is unsurprising, given that the case of Pakistan is unique in many regards. Further analysis of these three variables would assist in finding the key actors who impact the military's decision-making regarding military intervention.

Ideology

Pakistan's state ideology falls into the broad category of religious nationalism but separates itself from its Islamic nationalist peers by embracing markedly Western (or even modern) institutions. Although those peers have gone down a path of liberalisation, specific characteristics of Pakistan's situation have led it to a state of compounding Islamisation. Firstly, while other majority-Muslim states in the Levant and the Maghreb built their nations with a secular, pan-Arab mythology in mind, the experiment of Pakistan was

based on a solely Islamic identity, rooted in fears of subcontinental strifes. As a result, religion ended up at the heart of Pakistan's political affairs. It pushed its establishment towards wholeheartedly embracing political Islam, unlike the Arab states where the tussle between secular pan-Arabism, in the vein of Nasser, and Islamist tendencies, promoted by the Muslim Brotherhood and its associates, was, and still is, a significant source of political conflict. Secondly, while Pakistan's closest analogue, Saudi Arabia, and other majority-Muslim states had the benefit of being ethnically homogenous, Pakistan had to grapple with balancing the interests of different ethnic groups and a refugee population, which made up an estimated 20.9 percent of the population of its Western half (Bharadwaj et al., 2008, p. 06), while going through the early nation-building process. This demographic challenge gave the state a unique task to unite vastly different indigenous groups under a single national identity while simultaneously solving problems of allocating resources to a vast body of ideologically motivated and/or thoroughly scarred migrants. Lastly, unlike other explicitly Islamic states such as post-revolution Iran or Afghanistan under the Taliban, which have institutionalised the clergy, Pakistan borrowed its nominally secular and fairly entrenched civil institutions from the British, leading to professional, albeit paternalistic, governance as noted by former Minister of Finance Shahid Javed Burki (1980, p. 15).

Although this mix of post-colonial nationalism and political Islam would not necessarily be considered pro-military, congenital insecurity (Ispahani & International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1988) created the grounds for its metamorphosis into a firmly pro-military ideology. This insecurity stemmed from historical and geographical considerations. Before independence, the Muslim League, the vanguard of the Pakistan movement, had rarely seen success in the Muslim-majority provinces that made up Pakistan, with both Sindh and Punjab being dominated by unionist parties representing the interests of rural *zamindars* until 1946. Instead, the League found success in pockets of provincial India from where its leaders, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Liaquat Ali Khan and Chaudhary Khaliquzzaman, hailed. The party's ideology, which arguably defined the ideology of Pakistan, was built on a fear of Hindu domination, with Jinnah seeing himself as a protector of the Muslim '*salariat*' of urban India from the spectre of Hindu hegemony (Zafar, 2023). When Jinnah and the League's machinations did lead to the formation of Pakistan, its elites felt that their nation was split down the middle by a secular, Hindu-majority India. Hence, these considerations, coupled with a war in Kashmir from 1947 to 1948 (Faruqui, 2003), exacerbated the fears of the civil rulers and pushed them to embolden the military in what Mazhar Aziz (2007) explains was the "pursuance of self-defence and state survival as the prime

objective of national policy," (p. 04). C. Christine Fair (2014) argues that this religious aspect of this state ideology has likewise had as much of an impact on the military as the militaristic aspect has had on the state. She likens the military's relationship to insecurity driven by religion as being the military's defence of the 'ideological frontier' (p. 66). Citing examples from the various military regimes, Fair's analysis details how this process has taken place on both a pragmatic and philosophical level, with military rulers leveraging *pirs* to increase their power while attempting to simultaneously decrease the power of those same *pirs* (p. 73) or invoking Islamic principles when legitimising actions ranging from the institution of the policy of Islamisation under Zia (p. 76) to supporting American operations during Operation Enduring Freedom (pp. 77-78).

Professionalism

The concept of military professionalism relies on the idea of treating the military as a profession, i.e., that the role of an officer in the military is, as Allan Millett (as cited in Moten, 2011) puts it, "the accumulation and systematic exploitation of specialised knowledge applied to specialised problems," in the management of violence (p. 15). Pakistan's military inherited its institutions and heritage from the British, who had shaped the early officer corps of the military in the decades prior to independence. This is not sufficient to posit that Pakistan's military is professional. Given its interests in the control of economic and political capital, it can be noted that Pakistan's military veers out of the sphere of professionalism as defined by Huntington himself.

Huntington's (1957) view of professionalism is constructed out of three values: expertise, responsibility and corporateness (p. 08). By involving itself in affairs that are not concerned with the management of violence, but rather with the entrenchment of itself as a force that can dominate civilian governments, Pakistan's military eschews *responsibility* for raw power. Its *expertise* over the last few decades has been influenced less by inter-state conflict and the management of external violence and more by controlling intra-state conflict and internal violence. Within this role, Tariq Khosa (2018) writes that the military's Operation Zarb-e-Azb in the erstwhile Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the accompanying Protection of Pakistan Act, 2014, saw the political establishment bend over backwards to accommodate the interests of the military while reducing judicial oversight on the military's actions (pp. 187-190). Huntington mentions technical competence and the transferability of standards being key components of *expertise* in a profession (pp. 12-13), however, Khosa's view of the Pakistan Army's outsized ability to influence the bounds within which its officers can operate undercuts a

claim of expertise. Even though they do not have free rein to do whatever they wish, the lack of restraints on officers challenges the transferability of standards and impacts the technical competence of the officer corps in the management of violence. The Pakistan Army's *corporateness* is perhaps the only value to which it has a legitimate claim. While the baseline necessities of distinguishing officers from laymen by explicitly using "uniforms and insignia of rank" (Huntington, 1957, p. 16) or more implicitly through separating the class of officers from "non-professional men" (Huntington, 1957, p. 16) are fulfilled, Pakistan's military goes a step further in cultivating its distinct identity. The plush Defence Housing Authority (DHA) colonies and other privileges bestowed upon officers, distinguish them, in the eyes of the corps, from laymen and create a closed community of elites, who thereby use their status for unprofessional ends.

That being said, when it comes to the question of the military's own perception of its professionalism, military-aligned thinkers in Pakistan tend to believe that the military is not only limited to the management of violence abroad but is also embroiled in the management of violence at home and the process of nation-building, seeing their role as being similar to what Morris Janowitz (1971) refers to in his seminal work 'The Professional Soldier', as a "constabulary force," which is based on the precepts of "seeking viable international relations," being "committed to the minimum use of force," all based on a "protective military posture" (p. 418). Janowitz's analysis here forms the basis of the Convergence Theory of civil-military relations which posits that over time militaries become civilianised and civilian society become militarised and is contextualised upon liberal democracies. Setting aside Pakistan's lack of sufficient democratic institutions and its military's lack of commitment to building democratic institutions, the military's constant meddling in the affairs of its neighbours does not resemble a 'protective military posture' but instead an aggressive one which seeks to provoke instability to protect its own domestic position vis-à-vis the control of political and economic capital. Its commitment to viable international relations is also challenged by this aggressive position. Regardless of whether Pakistan's military is viewed through a Classical lens or a Janowitzian one, it fails to live up to the standards of professionalism.

Historically, many of Pakistan's early flag officers, like Ayub Khan, were Sandhurst-trained, while others like Zia ul Haq and Yahya Khan, had been commissioned through the Indian Military Academy in Dehradun. Today, the National Defense University (NDU), which offers a prestigious program that allows Brigadiers to attain a promotion to the rank of Major General, fulfils the role of the Pakistan Military's intellectual centre. The

NDU's research journal, the Green Book, though rightly derided as a propaganda piece in some instances (Ramanujam, 2020), offers some insight into the thoughts of Pakistan's true ruling class, which allows for a greater understanding of the military's own view of its obligation as a 'professional' force.

The Green Book shows how the military's self-perception of professionalism has led to the development of a particular paternalism, whereby officers have been sceptical of the effectiveness and use of democratic institutions and have not hesitated to make that clear in their writings. In 'The Army and Democracy', Aqil Shah (2014) notes several instances of an almost "messianic" belief system (p. 203) prevalent among senior officers writing in the 2000's Green Book. Among other things, they uncharitably described democratically elected politicians as being "'fickle-minded', 'decadent', 'irresponsible' and 'corrupt'" (Shah, 2014, p. 204) while also considering political partisanship to be "inherently antistate" (Shah, 2014, p. 203) all while arguing that the only solution to the ills of parliamentary democracy was the creation of undemocratic checks and balances such as the National Security Council (NSC) (Shah, 2014, p. 205). While some of these views could be construed as contextual, seeing the turmoil of the 1990s, they are sometimes only a rephrase of the ideas of military elites before them. One Brigadier's opinion that a "political structure based on democratic norms is best served by educated masses, which is lacking in Pakistan" (Shah, 2014, p. 193) is strikingly similar to the Sandhurst-trained officer and first President of Pakistan, Iskander Mirza's statements that, "[The] masses of this country are overwhelming[ly] illiterate. They are not interested in politics. They are bound to act foolishly sometimes" (Callard, 1957, p. 142) and "[the people of Pakistan] need controlled democracy for some time to come." (Callard, 1957, p. 142) Despite these views being expressed close to half a century apart, the military's view of its role as a protector has hardly changed, and it still plays an important role in how the military justifies its actions in subverting democratic processes to generations of officers time and again.

Political Power

The military's hold on political power in Pakistan can be understood through a precise examination of how political power is concentrated and how the various political actors interact. Only with this contextualisation and grounding in historical analysis can there be a clear understanding of the military's strengths, limitations and motivations in its pursuit of power at the expense of other stakeholders.

The Judiciary and the Law

Although the judiciary is ostensibly apolitical, like most institutions in Pakistan, it exists in a state of symbiosis with the military, where both groups rely on each other for patronage and power. The judiciary's relationship with the military has often been fraught; however, both parties have recognised their shared interests in the past and have worked for each other's gain even before the first invocation of Martial Law in 1958. In 1953, with his powers severely curtailed by the Constitution, Governor General Malik Ghulam Muhammad ordered a constitutional coup by dissolving the Constituent Assembly and calling upon Muhammad Ali Bogra to form a cabinet that would go on to include the then Major General Iskander Mirza and General Ayub Khan. While this cabinet would become the first to include military members (Khan, 2019, p. 102), it would also face a legal challenge in the landmark case of *Federation of Pakistan v. Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan*. Maulvi Tamizuddin, the President of the Constituent Assembly, had filed a writ petition in the Chief Court of Sindh, asking for the Governor General's proclamation to be struck down as "unconstitutional" (Khan, 2019, p. 105). While the Sindh Court ruled in favour of Maulvi Tamizuddin, the Bogra government's successful appeal in the Federal Court laid the grounds of the legal basis for future military intervention. In a 4-1 decision, with only Justice A.R. Cornelius in dissent, the majority led by Chief Justice Muhammad Munir, who had been an associate of Iskander Mirza, had ruled that the actions of the Governor General had been valid citing the doctrine of the law of necessity. Legal scholar and Advocate Hamid Khan (2019) considers Munir's decision to be a case of "judicial jugglery" (p. 118) that laid the groundwork for "potential mischief" (p. 118) in the future course of Pakistan's legal history. Khan's observations are true when considering the use of this doctrine in the legal justification of the coups of Zia ul Haq and Pervez Musharraf, as examined later in this paper.

Justice Munir's role in promoting military rule was not only limited to the Tamizuddin case but was also important in the 1958 imposition of Martial Law and the Dosso case. He advised Ayub Khan and Iskandar Mirza in their campaign to promulgate a new constitution and his role in expounding the doctrine of necessity in the Dosso case was one that scholars describe as being unnecessarily hasty, based on the writings of a relatively unknown scholar and also flaky in that it referred to what was a coup d'etat as a "revolution" (Khan, 2019, p. 162).

Overall, the impermanence of Pakistan's early constitutions and the impulsive moves of both civilian quasi-authoritarians like Bhutto and the various military dictators led to the codification of laws that centralised

power in the hands of whoever seemed to control the reins at a certain point in time. General Zia's infamous Eighth Amendment shifted power away from the Parliament to the executive President in 1985, further bolstering his power as he promised free and fair elections that were never to come. While the 13th Amendment, passed in 1997, managed to shift some powers back to the Parliament, the passing of the 17th Amendment reversed these changes and shifted the country back to a semi-presidential form of government. With the resumption of democratic rule, the 17th Amendment was nullified by the 18th Amendment in 2010, only seven years after its promulgation in 2003. Although this is only one example, many such instances of legal impermanence in Pakistan further weakened its institutions by rendering them tools in the kit of antagonistic forces, i.e., the civilian government and the military. When these bodies become tools, the military's raw power and institutional control allow it to claim victory over civilian governments that come in its way, thus giving it more opportunities to intervene.

Political Elites and the Civil Service

While the military may be the most important factor in Pakistan's politics and governance, its elites and civil service play a unique role, being influenced by the power of the military while also influencing the military's actions. The military's praetorian impulses force it to stay out of the limelight to maintain an image suitable to the general public. This creates a system where the political elites do the military's bidding in return for economic spoils. At the same time, the bureaucrats deal with the obligations of running the state due to military mistrust of partisan politics.

Pakistan's political elite consist of not only urban thought-leaders and ideologues who partake in partisan politics but also the feudal lords of the rural hinterlands of Punjab and Sindh, for whom political power as a birthright is a consequence of vastly entrenched economic power. From the 1950s to the 1970s successive administrations sought land reforms that would reduce the power and influence of feudal lords. However, these reforms were superficial and had political ends that diluted their main economic aims (Siddiqa, 2017, p. 157). In 1970, 42 percent of MPs were feudal lords and that number and their influence only declined marginally over the next 54 years. Across the political spectrum, these landowners played a pivotal role in the formation of governments and the direction of policy in the civilian sphere of governance continuing even today. After independence, the first and foremost incentive of these feudal lords was maintaining their power at a time when their country was rapidly industrialising, a time when there were signs of a divide between the urban industrialists and the feudal lords who controlled

the rural economy (Burki, 1980, p. 17). While early civilian governments prioritised industrialisation in the face of economic challenges, the military's approach to feudal lords has been far more caring. By understanding the immense political power of the feudal lords, the military has often forfeited some of its interests in agricultural business in a precarious balancing act between its interests, the interests of the feudal lords and the interests of the captains of industry, all key players in Pakistan's political economy.

Despite challenges from time to time, Pakistan's civil service has enjoyed good relations with the military and has been its partner in governance. Both groups have recognised each other's paternalistic, technocratic and anti-partisan tendencies and have cooperated in pushing their agenda over that of several democratically-elected governments. Ilhan Niaz (2010) proposes that the role played by Pakistan's civil service in governance can be placed into four distinct categories: periods when the civilian executive was in charge of policymaking, periods when the military was in charge of policymaking, periods where the civil servants were in charge of policymaking and a period where nobody was really in charge (p. 128). Both periods when the civil service experienced primacy in policymaking were under military rule, the first being during the regime of Ayub Khan and the latter being during the latter half of the regime of Zia ul Haq. The only periods of military rule when the military had the greatest decision-making power were in the direct aftermath of explicit interventions, as seen in the cases of Yahya Khan's regime, the first half of Zia ul Haq's rule and that of Pervez Musharraf. This was not without reason, as the military's paternalistic ideas on democracy and a general preoccupation with the management of violence pushed them to see the civil service as a nonpartisan body best suited to formulate public policy instead of one that simply assisted in the implementation of public policy as formulated by incompetent, self-serving politicians. In a semi-vindication of the military's stance, Niaz (2010) notes that under unstable civilian rule in the 1990s, the civil service was thoroughly weakened, with politically motivated appointments to lower- and mid-level positions by parliamentarians and state-level legislators and abrupt transfers being the norm (pp. 145-147). While the comparatively high level of respect given to the civil service by the military may seem like the main reason civil servants would be willing participants in military regimes, post-military periods of consolidated civilian rule and executive oversight have been the bane of the civil service's existence. The two civilian leaders who were able to exercise control over the civil service, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, both disciplined the civil service for their complicity in military rule by taking away their powers of formulation and rendering them mere enforcers of executive

diktats. Bhutto went further by capitalising on the unpopularity of the civil service to cut down their constitutional protections (Burki et al., 1991, p. 105). Thus, the civil service's comfort with the military rule resulted from their mutual respect and common disdain for a powerful partisan executive.

Economic Capital

A military's incentives for intervention are shaped by an instinct to protect their interests in government. In the context of Pakistan, these interests also include the protection of the economic holdings of the officer corps. In her seminal work, 'Military Inc.', Ayesha Siddiqa (2017) offers several explanations for these interests. The first claim refers to institutional self-interest and the welfare of soldiers as key motivators in these economic pursuits, and the second claims that the military pursued its economic goals to power economic growth and commit to nation-building. At the same time, a third claim cynically states that the primary motivation of the officers involved in these economic pursuits is greed and self-enrichment. The closest answer to why the military wishes to engage in business is probably a mix of these factors.

The military's interests in business are primarily propagated through the foundations of its various branches, such as the Army Welfare Trust for the Army, the Bahria Foundation for the Navy, the Shaheen Foundation for the Air Force and the tri-service Fauji Foundation (Siddiqa, 2017). The stated goal of these foundations is to provide employment for former servicemen and to look after their welfare. In reality, the existence of these foundations vis-à-vis the military is somewhat analogous to the relationship between *bonyads* and clerics in Iran. They are both variants of organisations devoted to welfare that end up acting as slush funds for the ruling class. These organisations do not limit their economic activities to any single sector but rather diversify their interests to all sectors of the economy. Although their activities were restrained during Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's time in power, these foundations grew in size and influence during Zia ul Haq's tenure, when he used their funding and health to placate the officer corps. Over this time, these groups multiplied in number and size, opening subsidiaries and spreading their wings throughout Pakistan's economic landscape. From controlling large swathes of industrial capital in the fertiliser industry to controlling the distribution of fishing licences in the lakes of Sindh, the military's foundations facilitated the accumulation of capital in the hands of officers, enriching them and giving them a vested interest in the protection of their economic power.

Apart from the welfare foundations and their subsidiaries, the military's economic interests led them to land acquisition. According to Siddiqa's

research, the military is the single largest landholder in Pakistan and the only public owner of land with the capability and right to transfer land to its members, thanks to laws passed during Zia ul Haq's tenure. Out of the 6.9 million acres of rural land controlled by the military, 6.8 million acres are owned by individual members (Siddiqa, 2017, p. 323). Although this might seem problematic on a legal and institutional level, on a socio-political level, it has far worse effects. Land allotments in the impoverished Cholistan region of Southern Punjab have led to large outflows of income and unfair distribution of water resources due to the prioritisation of the enrichment of officer-landlords, who tend to hail from the northern reaches of Punjab, by the government (Siddiqa, 2017, p. 312). In urban areas, a nexus of politicians and officers (both retired and serving) forces the legal bodies to turn a blind eye to possible corrupt practices. Together, the welfare foundations and land acquisition schemes pose institutional challenges that hurt the power of the government and embolden the military to act for self-preservation.

Case Studies

To create a clear model of the conditions for military intervention in Pakistan, one cannot rely on just an understanding of the actors and the general state of the civil-military relations. Careful attention must be paid to and a thorough examination must be conducted of previous interventions to accurately identify how the various actors have behaved during interventions and how they are more generally incentivised to act. Although several theoretical frameworks for intervention, such as the Concordance Theory and the Corporate Interests Hypothesis, exist, the unique features of the context of Pakistan call for the development of a model that has greater contextualisation to the nature of Pakistan's military and its place in the state machinery. Any such model must also acknowledge the subtle differences between explicit and implicit intervention as a focus on traditional coups d'etat ignores the true extent of the military's power to engage in regime change.

Examining Explicit Intervention

Zia: Fair Play?

On the 5th of July, 1977, the Pakistan Army, led by General Zia-ul-Haq, deposed the government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, took him into protective custody and appointed the General as the Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA). The military's actions brought about the end of six years of democratic rule and the start of eleven consequential years of military rule. This explicit intervention came at the heels of a disputed election where the

Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) lost to Bhutto's PPP. The military prevented a continuation of Bhutto's rule by restoring order after months of violent protests. However, some sources claim that the military's intervention was not on such altruistic grounds. To explain this intervention, one can identify a long-term cause and short-term trigger that gave initiative to the military to intervene.

Long-Term Cause: Consolidation of Power under Bhutto

During Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's PPP government, power was consolidated under the civilian executive, a move that had never been seen before in Pakistan's history. After the military's catastrophic failure in the war of 1971 against India, they were forced to retreat from government, and civilian leadership under Bhutto was instrumental in negotiating the Shimla Agreement with India to end the war. Although Bhutto had been democratically elected, his tendencies have been described as Machiavellian in some cases (Siddiqa, 2017, p. 157), mostly due to his urge to centralise power in the hands of his own office and, most importantly, away from the military.

Through the 1973 constitution, the idea of civilian supremacy over the military had been institutionalised, and serious suggestions to alter the command structure of the military to include civilians were made, as seen in the recommendations of the PPP's White Paper on Higher Defense Organisation (Shah, 2014, p. 125). The appointment of the inoffensive and devout Zia ul Haq was also a political move meant to weaken the cohesiveness of the military by appointing an *Arain*, a caste excluded from the 'martial races' that dominated much of the military's senior officer corps, to the post of Chief of Army Staff (COAS) (Burki et al., 1991, p. 08). However, in the eyes of the officer corps, Bhutto crossed the Rubicon by forming the Federal Security Force (FSF). A paramilitary force, the FSF served as Bhutto's praetorian guard and was meant to dilute the army's influence in maintaining law and order. While Shah (2014) notes that they were not a physical threat to the military, the fear they caused among the officer corps created fissures between the Army and the civilian government (p. 131). Fissures that would only be filled by Bhutto's removal.

Short-Term Trigger: Negotiations with the PNA

Although Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's tendency to cling to power did not evolve much between 1971 and 1977, it did cause significant changes as to how his political movement was structured. What was once a statist, left-wing movement that had run on the slogan of '*Roti, Kapra aur Makaan*' ('Food, Clothes and a Home' in Urdu) had become one that the elite landlords of

rural Punjab and Sindh dominated. In the elections of 1977, Burki (1980) notes that the PPP ran "the Noons and Tiwanas of Sargodha, the Qureshis of Multan… the Legharis and Mazaris of Dera Ghazi Khan" in a shift from the activists and left-wing candidates it had run previously in 1970 (p. 192). The electoral contest in 1977 was fierce. However, the PPP came out on top and was the clear winner, a fact that drew great consternation from the PNA. As protests gripped the country, leaders from the PNA and the PPP met to discuss a way out. It is at this point that a divergence in narratives takes place. Although Burki's (1980) roughly contemporaneous account claims that the talks were at an impasse when the Army decided to intervene (p. 199), Husain Haqqani (2010) notes that not only were the talks between the parties ongoing with a compromise at hand but also that General Jilani of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) had forewarned Bhutto about the impending declaration of martial law by his COAS on the 3rd of July 1977, two days before the coup (p. 126). That being said, both Burki and Haqqani do concur that Bhutto's survival as prime minister and a peaceful resolution to the crisis would have strengthened his hold on power. As such, it is fair to infer that the military's power would have been diminished in such a situation too.

Musharraf: Spontaneous Order or Premeditation?

On the 12th of October, 1999, the then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif signed an order to dismiss General Pervez Musharraf from the role of COAS and to have him replaced by Lieutenant General Ziauddin Butt while Musharraf was returning from Sri Lanka. This order started a chain of events that led to the arrest of the premier and his cabinet within 17 hours of the order's release and a declaration of a state of emergency, with General Musharraf appointing himself to the position of Chief Executive of the state. The causes of Musharraf's coup are steeped in intrigue, with some sources claiming that his coup was spontaneous, while others point to the speed with which it took place to suggest it was planned much in advance. In his memoir, 'In the Line of Fire', Musharraf (2008) expressed surprise at Sharif's plan to dismiss him and force his landing in either India or Oman, calling it nothing short of "diabolical" (p. 103). Regardless, this intervention's long-term cause and short-term trigger are clear to observers and key to formulating a set of conditions for explicit interventions.

Long-Term Cause: Consolidation of Power under Nawaz

Nawaz Sharif was initially elected to the position of prime minister as the leader of the *Islami Jamhoori Ittehad* (IJI), a collection of conservative political parties united in opposition to Benazir Bhutto's resurgent PPP in 1990. However, he was forced to resign three years later due to a tussle between

him and President Ghulam Ishaq Khan. His party, the PML(N), came out as the largest party after the elections of 1997 and formed a government with Sharif as the prime minister. In this capacity, he exerted great control over the military, which had initially helped him gain power in 1990, as explored later in the paper. Sharif repealed the Eighth Amendment through the passage of the 13th Amendment and returned the power of appointing the Chiefs of Staff to the prime minister. Using these powers, he shocked the military by sacking the then COAS, General Jehangir Karamat in 1998 due to the latter's stinging public rebuke of the government (Shah, 2014, p. 176). Karamat was replaced by General Musharraf, who superseded the Pashtun Lieutenant General Ali Kuli Khan, a move that Haqqani (2010) ascribes to Musharraf's Muhajir background, which Sharif thought would restrict the General's reach in the event of an attempted intervention (p. 377).

On the civil front, Sharif displayed great political acumen in dealing with President Farooq Leghari and the civil service. Niaz (2010) states that Sharif's second premiership was one of only two periods that saw civilian primacy in policymaking (p. 128), and his overwhelming mandate forced the military to intervene in his favour when Justice Sajjad Ali Shah and President Leghari attempted to remove him when he did not appoint the judges recommended to him by Justice Shah (Shah, 2014, p. 176). He had certainly cemented his place as a solid force to be reckoned with. Nevertheless, the year 1999 was to bring with it new challenges that he could have hardly expected.

Short-Term Trigger: Civil-Military Relations in 1999

The year 1999 marked a dark turn for civil-military relations in Pakistan. It saw the military undertake haphazard actions in the Kargil War, with Sharif claiming he was unaware of the military's actions until four months after the operation had allegedly begun. With massive international condemnation and a bloodied nose, Pakistan had to withdraw from the heights they had occupied in Kargil, much to the chagrin of the Chiefs of Staff who, according to Clinton-era Director of Near East and South Asian Affairs, Bruce Riedel, "were pressing for a tough[er] stand" (Shah, 2014, p. 181). Admiral Fasih Bokhari claimed that the Kargil episode had shaken the then prime minister to the extent that he sought to investigate and court martial Musharraf. However, Musharraf claimed that Sharif had maintained cordial, if not "unduly friendly" relations with him even after the events in Kargil, with Sharif reacting positively to Musharraf's suggestion to dismiss Corps Commander Tariq Pervez, who had taken a stance against Musharraf's actions in Kargil (Nawaz, 2008, p. 525). Regardless of whether Sharif bore any animosity towards Musharraf, he

had grossly overestimated the Army's loyalty to Musharraf's proposed replacement, ISI Chief Lieutenant General Ziauddin.

By attempting to dismiss Musharraf in such an unceremonious fashion, Sharif overplayed his hand, precipitating the actions of the Corps Commanders that led to his fall. Informed by their experience with Karamat, the officer corps felt that enough bridges had been burned by Sharif when it came to his relationship with the chain of command. This, coupled with General Ziauddin's leadership of the ISI over a conventional branch of the Army and his perceived proximity to Sharif, both politically and due to their shared ethnic origin, engendered support for Musharraf among the officers. Thus, the spontaneity of this intervention can be explained through the undercurrents of anti-Sharif sentiment that had permeated throughout the military over the year 1999.

Setting the Conditions for Explicit Intervention

Keeping these two case studies in mind, there emerges a pattern that underlies explicit interventions by the military. It relates directly to the actions of the key political actors and their incentives and depends on the military's perception of the distribution of political power explored in the paper's first section.

Long-Term Cause: Consolidation

The act of diluting military power in a praetorian state takes time and great caution not to foment intervention. For partisan leaders, who are aware of this, this goal requires a level of *realpolitik* in alliance-building. In Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif's cases, they both had to attract the support of the landholding elite in order to wield the significant political power that gave them the ability to amend the constitution and enforce their control over the civil service. Political consolidation, thus, allowed them to engage in their goal of consolidating their supremacy over the military.

These leaders also considered the military's cohesiveness in the event of intervention. However, an evaluation of their choices shows that, in hindsight, they misjudged the key factors driving the officer corps. These leaders attempted to divide the force based on considerations of caste and ethnicity instead of appointing political loyalists to the position of COAS. By putting an *Arain* in charge of a force made up of mainly *Jats* and *Rajputs*, or a *Muhajir* in charge of a force made up of mainly Punjabis and Pashtuns, they believed that they would have been able to stop the corps from rallying around their leader. This thought process discounted the paternalistic instinct and economic incentive of the corps, both of which would be negatively affected by the concentration of power in the hands of civilian authority, and

the political incentive of a loyalist general, whose own well-being and security would rely on his patron remaining in government. The corps' respect for the chain of command is a key part of its military profession, which would keep such a loyalist in charge. However, the corps' recognition of their insecurity at the hands of partisan leaders would embolden their support for explicit intervention against the government when the right opportunity presented itself.

Short-Term Trigger: Crisis

To legitimate their actions in the eyes of the judiciary and other civilian actors, the military must commit to explicit intervention at the right time and against the right government. Analysis of the earlier case studies shows that when an opportunity for intervention presents itself, the military, and its officer corps, must rely on their assessment of four key factors:

- Over the course of its term, has the government undertaken a policy of consolidating its political power over that of the military in a way that has alienated the officer corps?
- Is there a crisis?
- Is the civilian government likely to come out stronger due to solving the crisis?
- Is the opposition likely to stay on the sidelines in the case of intervention?

Suppose the answers to these four questions are firmly affirmative. In that case, the military, especially its officer corps, all have sufficient reason to support explicit intervention and the declaration of martial law as seen in the case studies.

While the answer to the first question and its implications concerning the military and the opinion of the officer corps has been explained in detail earlier, the answers to the latter three questions all play important roles in determining the army's course of action through their implications on the actors introduced in the component of political power in the Huntingtonian framework explored in the first section of the paper.

The question of whether there is a crisis or not is important as it determines the course of the judiciary's legitimisation of the intervention. As explained earlier in the paper, the doctrine of necessity plays an important role in the *post facto* legitimisation of explicit intervention, and a crisis allows the military to argue in favour of their coup and thus cement their rule. While the judiciary has, in the past, collaborated with military governments, as seen during the tenure of Chief Justice Muhammad Munir, it cannot always be

relied upon to stay by the military's side. In this case, the judiciary's reliance on precedent allows the military to seize upon the crises and legally conduct explicit interventions. It should be noted that one caveat this creates is that it forces the incoming military administration to make its willingness to return power to a civilian executive clear.

The question of whether or not a government would come out stronger from a crisis is also of utmost importance as it determines the threat posed to the military by the civilian government. Although the military is not averse to stability on the whole, it is averse to stability under civilian governments and cohesion between different political groups. This is a consequence of its claim to relevance, and thus, its claim to economic resources, being dependent on its role as a guardian and arbiter in the civil sphere of governance. If a government is likely to gain strength due to a crisis, the military's insecurity would likely translate to the acceptance of direct action among officers.

Lastly, the question of civil opposition staying on the sidelines in the case of intervention is important to note. An unwanted consequence of provoking anti-military sentiment through explicit intervention among partisans of all stripes would be a definite way to lose power and sympathy. In both case studies, the PNA and PPP were ambivalent to, if not supportive of, military intervention. The PNA's public calls for the military's arbitration also helped legitimise Operation Fair Play in the public's eyes. The extractive political system in Pakistan incentivises its politicians to operate with a personal economic aim in mind, as noted by Siddiqa, instead of an altruistic devotion to preserving institutions. This opportunism pushes politicians to endear themselves to the military in hopes of continuing their extraction and accumulation of wealth while presenting themselves as viable alternatives to the civilian government that has run afoul of the military. Although this is explored in greater detail while examining implicit intervention, it still plays a key role in the military's explicit intervention calculus.

Examining Implicit Intervention

Beg, Kakar, Karamat: Lawgivers or Lawbreakers?

After General Zia-ul-Haq died in a mysterious plane crash in August 1988, President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, and Zia's successor as COAS, General Mirza Aslam Beg, were greeted with the question of determining the course of Pakistan's governance. Contrary to conventional wisdom, they reinstated democracy and called for elections in November 1988. Despite the military's willingness to hand over power on paper, they were unwilling to dedicate themselves to being the foot soldiers of a civilian leader. A range of domestic

and external factors forced the military into the background. However, the military's pull and ability to influence regime change in 1990, 1993 and 1996 warrant a close examination of the factors that allowed it to retain its influence.

A Menagerie of Puppets

The elections of 1988 returned the PPP, under Benazir Bhutto, to power after an 11-year hiatus, with the party gaining a plurality of seats in the National Assembly. Against the PPP stood the IJI, an alliance of establishmentarian conservative parties that united for the sole cause of denying the Bhuttos a chance at the premiership. While Nawaz Sharif was at the helm of the IJI, its formation, leadership and direction were in the hands of Lieutenant General Hameed Gul and the ISI that he led (Shah, 2014, p. 167). In this early period, the army's power was so pronounced that even after its pet parties lost the election, the military augmented the victorious Benazir's cabinet to reflect its interests by forcing her to appoint the retired Lieutenant General Sahibzada Yaqub Khan to the position of Foreign Minister and binding her to a pledge of non-interference in military spending (Haqqani, 2010, p. 203).

Such guarantees were only temporary as Benazir's government began to take increasingly independent stances against the military's interests. Bhutto's moderation on the Afghanistan question and receptiveness to calls for peace with India both went directly against the principles of the pro-military ideology in Pakistan, as explained in the first section of the paper and, thus, numbered her days in power. Although she had removed Lieutenant General Gul from his position in the ISI, the zeal with which General Beg and his instruments, the IJI and President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, opposed Benazir was soon to cause the fall of her government. By promising patronage and exploiting the Muttahida Qaumi Movement's (MQM) rivalry with the PPP, the military was able to remove Bhutto from power through a vote of no confidence and safeguard its interests after a close call where Benazir had almost appointed a loyalist, Lieutenant General Ahmed Kamal, to the chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (JCSC) (Nawaz, 2008, p. 426).

With national elections around the corner, the military decided to go all-in on the IJI. It engaged in a campaign that saw it distribute close to PNR 60 million from a fund in the Mehran Bank to the IJI's candidates (Khan, 2019, p.767). Despite this, by 1993, the military's displeasure with Sharif's actions after Beg's retirement and the pursuit of operations that weakened the IJI's coalition partner, the MQM, all contributed to Sharif's wish to return power to the office of prime minister from that of the president. This angered Ghulam Ishaq Khan, who, with military approval, sacked Sharif on charges

of alleged corruption. The Supreme Court's reversal of this move further intensified the conflict, as noted by Shah (2014, p. 173). However, Siddiqa (2017) claims that the straw that broke the camel's back and forced COAS Abdul Waheed Kakar to broker a compromise was Benazir Bhutto's threat to march onto Islamabad (p. 157). Ultimately, Kakar applied enough pressure to convince Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Sharif to resign from their respective posts and allow free and fair elections. The elections returned Benazir to the post of prime minister, but not long before she was forced out at the behest of the military.

Despite recognising the military's demands concerning the Afghan situation, Shah (2014) records that President Farooq Leghari dismissed Benazir's government on similar charges to those levelled against Sharif in 1993, but also clarifies that Leghari was motivated by murmurs that the officer corps was unhappy with Benazir's conduct (p. 174). In the aftermath of Benazir's brother Murtaza's killing, Nawaz (2008) further goes on to state that Jehangir Karamat had attempted to reconcile the two leaders; however, it was Leghari who decided that he had reached a "point of no return" with Benazir (pp. 485-486). With Benazir's unceremonious removal and historic unpopularity, Nawaz Sharif returned to power with a historic mandate, and a fractious period in civil-military relations ended as rare civilian control was asserted, albeit for only two short years.

Setting the Conditions for Implicit Intervention

On the surface, the turmoil of the 1990s would seem to be a consequence of civilian fragility and presidential overreach; however, the military's paralysis, its often-conflicting approach to the goals of civilian governments, and its tendency to implicitly intervene in the civil sphere of government when it felt its concerns and its interests were ignored could be seen as causes, instead of consequences, of the turmoil. Once again, an informed understanding of why the military engaged in implicit intervention can only come through using the Four-Factor Model developed earlier in the paper.

- Over the course of its term, has the government undertaken a policy of consolidating its political power over that of the military in a way that has alienated the officer corps?
    - Are there underlying geopolitical factors that are causing friction between the military establishment and the civilian government?
- Is there a crisis?
    - Are there underlying geopolitical factors that are causing friction between the military establishment and the civilian government?

- Is the civilian government likely to come out stronger due to solving the crisis?
- Is the opposition likely to stay on the sidelines in the case of intervention?

Although the questions remain the same across both intervention categories, the answers vary for implicit intervention. The answer to the first question must be in the negative; the answers to the second and third questions may either be in the negative or the affirmative, while the answer to the fourth question must be in the affirmative. This selection of answers can be explained through further analysis of the military's actions in the case study of the 1990s and a closer look at the actors explored in the first section of the paper.

Firstly, when it comes to whether a civilian government has sufficiently alienated the officer corps of the military for an implicit intervention, the junior and senior officers must both be largely apathetic to the government's political consolidation. While Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's FSF diluted the power of officers across the board and took from their right to the management of internal violence, and Sharif's sacking of General Karamat sent shockwaves through all parts of the military establishment and challenged their infallibility across the board, Benazir's disagreements with the military establishment primarily concerned disagreements with flag officers such as Gul and Beg, and were often on geopolitical and ideological issues that did not affect the self-enrichment prospects of most officers. As this was the case, Gul and Beg were forced to use underhanded tactics to remove Benazir through political pawns, given that most officers would not have acquiesced to an explicit intervention seeing no harm to their influence on a micro-level.

Secondly, when it comes to the necessity of a crisis to force the military to intervene, there is no need for a specific answer to predict an implicit intervention. While a crisis could make them more likely to intervene, a pre-existing crisis is unnecessary. In Benazir Bhutto's first removal from power, the military exploited existing divides within the coalition to punish Benazir for attempting to appoint a loyalist to the JCSC and for going against the military's view on handling the war in Afghanistan. When General Kakar intervened in the conflict between Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Nawaz Sharif, one could argue that there was a constitutional crisis, given the Supreme Court's intervention in Sharif's favour. In the case of Benazir's second removal from power, the circumstances of the intervention are fascinating as some factions in the military sought to weaken the government while others tried to strengthen it. Despite that, the military united to enforce the president's order and forced Benazir out of office for the last time when push came to

shove. Without a need to satisfy judicial precedent and a cover of plausible deniability to the President and the members of the National Assembly, the military and its leaders do not necessarily need a crisis to intervene implicitly. However, a crisis would certainly speed up the process of intervention.

A common sub-factor that can be noted and thus added to both the first and second factors is the importance of geopolitical factors. In 'The Faltering State', Tariq Khosa (2018) argues that the military's defence of its 'primacy' over issues related to national security was the primary cause of its implicitly intervening to topple the government of Nawaz Sharif (pp. 191-192). When taking into account the implicit intervention against Benazir Bhutto's government and the disagreements between her administration and Generals Gul and Beg over the policy toward Afghanistan, this theory begins to gain credence. While it cannot supplant the first two factors completely, given the comparative lack of importance it has to them in fomenting explicit interventions where those factors are necessary, it definitely plays an important role in giving flag officers a *casus belli* to try and work with other political elites to depose governments from the shadows. Hence, if this sub-factor is fulfilled, it vastly increases the likelihood of implicit intervention over explicit intervention, when there is no major crisis or mobilisation within the officer corps.

The question of whether a government's response to a crisis would strengthen its position does not necessarily require an answer, as it depends upon whether there is a crisis in the first place. Keeping that in mind, in a crisis, an implicit intervention is only possible when the answer to this question is affirmative. During the 1990s, the key conflict that forced the military to intervene was the tussle between the usually military-aligned president and the prime minister. A prime minister's victory in such a tussle would precipitate a cession of power from the presidency to the office of prime minister. This cession would cause discontent among officers due to the consolidation of power in the hands of the civilian executive. The earlier case studies show that in both cases of conflict between the president and prime minister, the military assumed the role of an arbiter to solve these constitutional crises. No altruistic urge caused such moves. Instead, they could be characterised as a balancing act where the military appeased the dismissed civilian government enough and kept power in an office over which it had greater control, which in the case studies was the presidency.

Lastly, the fourth question is the only one that shares the same analysis between explicit and implicit interventions. The self-interest of politicians and the necessity of power to further the said self-interest usually tend to defeat their will to take a vehemently anti-military stance. As stated earlier,

by endearing themselves to the military, these political elites ensure they can continue their extraction and accumulation of wealth. A unique case of a politician's use of the military's wish to reduce anti-military sentiment was Benazir Bhutto's manipulation of General Abdul Waheed Kakar. By threatening to march to Islamabad during a period of instability, Kakar's, and by extension the military's, fears that public opinion would swing towards Benazir and weaken the military pushed him to intervene in the conflict between Prime Minister Sharif and President Khan. While this was only one case, throughout the 1990s, parties of all stripes, from members of the IJI to the PPP, were all willing to, at some point, call for military intervention in their favour. The promotion of self-interest and self-enrichment among politicians was, hence, a key reason why the implicit interventions were pursued. When officers felt that they were not threatened enough to put their boots on the ground, politicians were more than willing to act as conduits for the will of several Chiefs of Army Staff.

The Four-Factor Model and the Huntingtonian Framework

The Four-Factor Model, established earlier, sets four conditions that determine whether the military would be likely to pursue implicit and explicit intervention. All four of these conditions tie into the paper's first section, which analyses the state of Pakistan's civil-military relations through a Huntingtonian framework.

The first condition of the Model concerns the component of political power and, more specifically, the interaction of the military's economic interests with the aspirations of political elites. The second condition also concerns the component of political power and is based on the legal context within which the military legitimates its intervention. The third condition concerns both the components of political power and professionalism. While it mainly looks at how political power is concentrated away from pliable actors such as the civil service and is gradually placed in the hands of a civilian executive, it also reflects the paternalistic view that the military takes of its profession and how it treats power in the hands of civilian governments as a failure of sorts. The fourth condition involves both political power and ideology. It sees how public opposition to a state ideology that lionises the military and treats it as an integral part of the state's nation-building apparatus affects the military's approach to intervention. In sum, the Four-Factor Model uses the Huntingtonian framework and case studies of the five most recent interventions to be an accurate predictive model that allows policymakers and observers to judge the likelihood of military intervention in Pakistan.

The Four-Factor Model and Civil-Military Relations after Musharraf

As of 2023, no military rulers have succeeded General Musharraf in taking the reins of power. In the 15 years that have transpired since he left office, Siddiqa (2017) has described the military's policy with regard to civilian affairs as moving from "military government to military governance," with the military moving away from direct control of government but not necessarily from holding power over certain areas such as strategic decision-making (p. 455). The Four-Factor Model is in some ways untested in such a political environment, considering the context in which previous interventions have taken place. That being said, the variables defined in the Model are likely to hold up, even in the face of these changes.

The first condition of the Model is unlikely to be challenged in the post-Musharraf era of civil-military relations as any impact on its core analysis, focused on civilian consolidation and the views of the officer corps, is implausible. In fact, Siddiqa's (2017) evaluation of the way in which the army maintains its unity of purpose, primarily through the Generals' prioritisation of the views of "mid-ranking officers" (p. 463), further strengthens this as an important condition in defining whether or not the military chooses to explicitly intervene as it provides more evidence for the importance placed on the views of the officer corps before the military undertakes an explicit intervention. The second and third conditions are unlikely to be either strengthened or weakened as variables in the Model by this shift in civil-military relations as the legal conditions for explicit interventions do not change and thus the adherence to the doctrine of necessity must be maintained. Lastly, the fourth condition, like the first, is also strengthened given the close relations shared between political parties, elites, and the military in the post-Musharraf system. Thus, even if the chance of explicit intervention is lower in the present system of civil-military relations, the conditions of the Four-Factor Model will likely hold up. In the case of implicit intervention, these conditions are still likely to be reliable, as evidenced by the fact that over the last 15 years, no prime minister has been able to complete a full term in office. While claiming that these resignations have been caused by the military may be speculative at present, future analysis of these potential implicit interventions could help strengthen the Model and its conditions further.

Conclusion

As mentioned in the introduction to the paper, Pakistan is currently in a state of great tumult. With widespread protests against high electricity levies and

terrorist attacks at a nine-year high as of August 2023, the country's internal security situation is quickly evolving. If the Four-Factor Model is used to predict whether the military is likely to explicitly or implicitly intervene to remove the incoming government from power, it would indicate that it is unlikely that they are considering intervention at this time. Despite there being a crisis-like situation in Pakistan right now, the incoming government's proximity to the military and its weakness would not inspire enough discontent to fulfil the conditions set out for an explicit intervention. As for the prospects of an implicit intervention, the government's alignment with military interests would logically defeat the military's purpose to implicitly intervene and the Model would yield the same result. Should the pro-military coalition be unable to come to power, it would be highly likely that the military intervenes, clamping down on dissent from a marginalised anti-military opposition while keeping the pro-military opposition at arms' length, with a perfect legal justification, citing the fractious internal security situation at present.

Keeping these predictions in mind, future analysis of military action and inaction using the Four-Factor Model can refine it and add nuance to its conditions due to the unique nature of the present situation in Pakistan. Prior to the elections, the military had already shown signs of resorting to its old 'Divide and Rule' tactics, as seen with the formation of the pro-military *Istehkam-e-Pakistan Party* (IPP) by defectors from the PTI in an attempt to contend with the challenge of the first large and serious anti-military force in the opposition, a factor that has been lacking in the case studies examined. The PPP's role as another pro-military, opposition-aligned party also adds the possibility of the addition of a new variable: the sympathetic opposition. The presence of a sympathetic opposition, which acts as a substitute for the anti-military opposition (in this case the PTI), allows the military power to further exploit the electoral process and, as a result, reduces the likelihood of intervention due to a lesser mismatch between the interests of the military and civilian governments. The results of the recent elections seem to have dashed the military's hopes of being able to employ these sympathetic opposition parties. Parties formed by PTI defectors such as the IPP, and the PTI-Parliamentarians (PTI-P), have been drubbed in the polls by PTI-affiliated independents. Meanwhile, the PPP and the PML(N), traditional rivals within Pakistan's politics, have been forced to work together due to the plurality won by the independents. Now that the military has to face a large anti-military opposition, the Model can certainly be strengthened through an analysis of the events that will transpire throughout 2024.

While some old habits die hard and new habits begin to form nevertheless, the Model's assumption that a weak civilian executive would translate to a stronger military is also challenged when the present government is widely seen as a vehicle of the military's interests. Past explicit interventions have not been centred around geopolitical events, but the increasing conflict with groups operating across the Durand Line and in Balochistan might prompt the military to exercise more force with regard to decision-making, potentially increasing the chances of explicit intervention due to an internal security crisis. While the Model does not necessarily accommodate this specific possibility at present, future developments could influence the conditions to better reflect possible realities. With the country and its institutions in a state of flux, only time will tell if the Pakistan army sticks to old habits or if it decides to change its ways to preserve its hold on power. Whether it remains stubbornly praetorian or becomes willingly subordinate, the Army's battle for relevance may be its most consequential one so far.

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

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As Pakistan emerges from an election tainted by allegations of rigging, the eyes of observers around the world turn to its military. With old foes patching up to form a coalition in the face of a parliamentary plurality won by an explicitly anti-military political opposition, the threat of military intervention has receded to the background. However, the volatile nature of the state ensures that the spectre of intervention looms over Pakistan's civilian government at all times.

This paper seeks to understand the nature and causes of military intervention in Pakistan through an analysis of the state of Pakistan's civil-military relations utilising the framework proposed by Samuel P. Huntington in his seminal work, 'The Soldier and the State' and a thorough and critical examination of the five most recent interventions by the military. The result is a model that sets out four factors that govern the military's willingness and ability to intervene.

Roye Ganju is a Grade 11 student at the United World College of South East Asia's Dover Campus in Singapore. With a keen interest in international relations and history, his research encompasses several issues related to politics and international security, focusing especially at civil-military relations and Middle Eastern affairs. He has previously been a member of the Princeton Gerrymandering Project's Mapping Corps and has been recognised as a Spotlight Scholar by the Cambridge Centre for International Research for his continuing work on ethnic politics in Israel. An incisive debater and avid quizzer, he has won several accolades at the international level.

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