

# Issue Brief

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Hybrid Schwerpunkt  
&  
the Indian Challenge:  
A Strategic Assessment  
of  
Capability Gaps

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# *Hybrid Schwerpunkt and the Indian Challenge: A Strategic Assessment of Capability Gaps*

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## **Abstract**

*Hybrid Schwerpunkt reframes conflict from ‘massed force to timed convergence’, where information pressure, cyber disruption and calibrated coercion stack, at a decisive moment, to break an opponent’s will. For India, this threat is no theory; both China and Pakistan already blend grey-zone manoeuvres, narrative shaping, digital intrusion and proxy leverage to bend India’s decision cycles. This assessment maps the capability gaps that limit India’s ability to counter such tempo-driven coercion: fragmented information response, shallow cyber resilience, slow grey-zone posture, economic exposure, internal vulnerability and incomplete jointness. Closing these gaps is essential for building a counter-hybrid Schwerpunkt posture.*

**Keywords:** Hybrid Schwerpunkt, India, Capability Gaps, Grey Zone, Cyber Resilience, Synergy

## **Introduction**

The idea of ‘Schwerpunkt’ has usually been boxed into the vocabulary of fast-moving armoured manoeuvres or concentrated blows intended to fracture an adversary’s defensive geometry; however, this is an outdated reading. The modern interpretation is ‘less about mass and more about convergence’, bringing different forms of pressure to a decisive point in time, rather than a single point in space. States, today, looks for the seam wherein information, disruption, coercion and calibrated violence can be layered so tightly that the opponent loses political will before military strength is even tested. This is the essence of a “Hybrid Schwerpunkt Doctrine”; the weight of effort concentrates not in one domain but across several, all timed to collapse decision-making, overwhelm bandwidth and paralyse response cycles.

For India, the relevance is obvious. The country sits in a neighbourhood where both adversaries have demonstrated a preference for actions that falls short of the threshold of declared conflict. The PLA has combined salami- slicing, psychological warfare, lawfare, cyber probing and political messaging into a combined strategy. The Pakistani Deep State, has

perfected the art of deniable proxy war in conjunction with information distortion, diplomatic theatre and internal subversion. They are different strategies, but the aim behind them remains unchanged: weaken India at numerous points simultaneously, maintain the pressure on it without relent and deprive it of the opportunity to rise in its trajectory. Hybrid Schwerpunkt is simply the doctrinal vocabulary that captures this convergence.

## **The Nature of Hybrid Schwerpunkt**

Unlike traditional hybrid warfare, which spreads effort across many channels to create strategic exhaustion, hybrid Schwerpunkt selects only a few decisive channels and saturates them to create a strategic break. It is about tempo rather than volume, and timing rather than dispersion. The doctrine demands three things:

- **Control over narrative space**, so that the adversary's interpretation of events is contested before events even occur.
- **A blended multi-domain toolkit**, capable of synchronising cyber effects, kinetic probes, economic levers, political shaping, grey-zone manoeuvres and psychological strikes.
- **Pre-emption through a cold strike** to deter, dissuade, deny and defeat hybrid threats through a state-of-the-art integrated C5ISR architecture.

This approach is already visible in the Indo-Pacific. The PLA has used coast guard fleets, maritime militia groups, influence networks, economic penalties, cyber units and political pressure in sequenced waves. The point is 'not to fire the first shot'; rather, it is 'to make the opponent feel that any shot fired will worsen their position'.

## **Hybrid Schwerpunkt in the Indian Context**

India is entering a decade in which its military posture must shift away from attrition and reactive planning. The country is too large, too varied, and too politically open to absorb hybrid blows casually. A modern Schwerpunkt doctrinal posture for India would require:

- An intelligence architecture able to sense converging coercive patterns early.
- Force structures are able to respond across multiple theatres without waiting for political clearance at every stage.
- Legal and information systems that can defend the country's narrative space.

- Digital resilience that can absorb sharp cyber blows without cascading failures.
- Political coherence across states, ministries and public institutions so that the adversary cannot exploit internal divides.
- Denial of space for radicalisation and subversion of institutions and society.
- An empowered society through a National Citizens Security Culture.

The challenge is that India's current capability mix does not fully align with the demands of such a doctrine.

### Capability Gaps: India's Current Posture vs What Hybrid Schwerpunkt Requires

A dispassionate, critical multi-domain analysis and assessment of each critical gap aims to identify where the mismatch in soft and hard power presently exists.

#### Information and Narrative Dominance

##### *What the Doctrine Requires*

Hybrid Schwerpunkt assumes that, the attacker will contest the opponent's interpretation of events before the events unfold. That means:

- Centralised narrative response capability.
- Rapid attribution structures.
- High-fidelity OSINT fusion.
- High-tempo digital diplomacy cells.
- “Always-on” information command posts.

##### *Where India Stands*

India's information ecosystem is massive but fragmented. The country's domestic political noise crowds out strategic communication during crisis. Ministries often release information in uncoordinated bursts; by the time a coherent line is formed, hostile narratives have already migrated into newsrooms, student circles, social media ecosystems and global commentary.

##### *Core Gaps*

- **No unified information operations command**, despite periodic discussions.

- **Crisis communication lacks doctrinal rehearsal**, and responses often originate from multiple voices, diluting strategic clarity.
- **Fact-checking and attribution timelines are slow**, enabling hostile influence to settle before rebuttal.
- **Public diplomacy tools (especially in multilateral settings) lag behind rival state-media ecosystems.**

### ***Net Impact***

India enters most crisis already fighting uphill in the information domain, giving adversaries the room to define ambiguity in their favour.

### **Cyber Power and Digital Resilience**

#### ***What the Doctrine Requires***

A hybrid Schwerpunkt strike relies heavily on cyber effects viz. disabling logistics temporarily, scrambling communications, probing critical infrastructure and feeding psychological pressure.

To survive this, India would need:

- Hardened civilian infrastructure.
- Offensive cyber squadrons integrated with military planning.
- Red-team stress testing of national banking, power and telecom networks.
- Clear escalation protocols for cyber-to-kinetic retaliation.

#### ***Where India Stands***

India has immense IT expertise and skilled defensive cyber teams, but offensive cyber organisations, at the state tier, remain sub-optimal. Cascading vulnerabilities in civilian amenities, particularly the power grid and financial institutions, require cyber resilience and hardening.

## Core Gaps

- **No public doctrine linking cyber events to escalation ladders**, leaving ambiguity about India's thresholds.
- **Cyber Integration across ministries** remains suboptimal, slowing coordinated defence.
- **Critical infrastructure testing protocols** against an intense threat matrix environment.
- **Limited integration of cyber in a multi-domain architecture** with just a suboptimal defence cyber agency.

## Net Impact

India can defend against everyday cyber probes, but a concentrated hybrid cyber strike, synced with hybrid multi-domain pressure, could generate real friction inside command loops.

## Grey Zone Deterrence and Forward Posture

### What the Doctrine Requires

Hybrid Schwerpunkt thrives when the defender is predictable and slow to mobilise. To deny this space, India would need:

- Pre-authorised grey zone response options.
- Integrated tri-service theatre commands.
- High-availability ISR along sensitive fronts.
- Vanguard units capable of rapid, localised counter-pressure.

### Where India Stands

Reforms have begun, but theatre commands remain under negotiation. Logistics on the LAC have improved significantly, yet grey zone power remains heavily tied to political clearance.

## Core Gaps

- **Grey-zone counter-moves lack a codified playbook**, leading to episodic responses.

- **Intelligence coordination remains slower than ideal**, especially across domestic and external agencies.
- **ISR density is growing**, but still thin compared to adversaries' persistent surveillance networks.
- **Heavy reliance on post-incident reinforcement**, rather than pre-emptive posture shaping.

### ***Net Impact***

India responds effectively once a situation escalates, but a hybrid Schwerpunkt requires the ability to shape escalation, rather than just managing it.

### **Economic Statecraft**

#### ***What the Doctrine Requires***

Economic Levers: trade pressure, supply chain manipulation, and financial signalling are central to hybrid coercion; a defender needs robust economic counter-levers.

#### ***Where India Stands***

India's economy is large but deeply interconnected with global networks. Its economic retaliation toolkit is limited, especially against China, with which trade dependence remains high.

#### ***Core Gaps***

- **No dedicated economic deterrence cell** to map cross-border vulnerabilities.
- **Limited diversification of critical imports**, especially electronics, APIs, rare earth processing and industrial machinery.
- **Inconsistent use of regulatory and market tools**, to project cost onto hostile actors.
- **Financial cyber resilience**, remains fragile.

### ***Net Impact***

Economic asymmetries constrain India's escalation space in crisis.

### **Cognitive Security and Internal Cohesion**

## ***What the Doctrine Requires***

Hybrid Schwerpunkt aims to fracture internal cohesion. A defender must have:

- Public trust in institutions.
- High immunity to online manipulation.
- Clear crisis communication pipelines.
- Political restraint during external crisis.

## ***Where India Stands***

India's political contestation is vibrant but often spills into national-security narratives. That creates an opening for hostile actors to seed confusion and polarisation.

## ***Core Gaps***

- **No bipartisan code of conduct**, during external crisis.
- **Fragmented public information flows**, allowing rumours to outpace facts.
- **Low strategic literacy among political actors**, leads to avoidable narrative traps.
- **Inadequate media hygiene**, and an uneven investigative fact-checking culture.

## ***Net Impact***

The adversary does not require to manufacture new division—it only needs to exploit what already exists.

## ***Military Readiness and Jointness***

## ***What the Doctrine Requires***

Hybrid Schwerpunkt demands forces that can operate jointly, shift tempo fast and compensate when other domains (cyber, information, economic) are under pressure.

## ***Where India Stands***

Indian forces are experienced, professional and battle-tested, but institutional momentum favours service-wise approaches. Jointness reforms have begun but remain incomplete.

### ***Core Gaps***

- **Pending theatre command implementation**, leaving planning stovepiped without integrating battlespace assets.
- **Delays in procurement cycles** are restricting rapid capability insertion.
- **Limited integration, of AI-enabled decision systems.**
- **Insufficient indigenous inventory depth**, especially in high-end ISR, UCAVs, and electronic warfare.

### ***Net Impact***

India's military excels in sustained operations but needs more modular, cross-domain flexibility for hybrid scenarios.

### **Strategic Implications**

India's adversaries are already operating with hybrid Schwerpunkt logic. In the Himalayas, salami- slicing is backed by selective disclosure, media shaping, diplomatic ambiguity and cyber probing. In the maritime domain, grey zone manoeuvres are paired with lawfare and signalling through third-party proxies. Pakistan's ecosystem remains built around deniable violence, political manipulation and external lobbying.

If India does not adopt a counter-Schwerpunkt posture, crisis will continue to unfold on adversarial timelines rather than on India's. The country risks fighting the symptoms instead of the design.

### **A Framework for India: Towards a Counter-Hybrid Schwerpunkt Posture**

The solution is not to mirror adversaries but to build a centred, resilient, fast-responding system that denies them the advantage of tempo.

#### ***National Information Command (NIC)***

A dedicated command integrating:

- Strategic communications

- Counter-disinformation
- Digital diplomacy
- Psychological operations
- Crisis communication

### ***Cyber Strategic Authority***

A unified cyber entity that aligns civilian and military capabilities, codifies thresholds and integrates cyber planning with operational commands.

### ***Economic Deterrence Cell***

A multidisciplinary group mapping dependencies, stress-testing supply chains and designing economic response ladders.

### ***Intelligence Fusion Renewal***

Upgraded fusion between internal and external agencies, with real-time LAC and LOC ISR integration and automated alerting pipelines.

### ***Political Cohesion Protocols***

A crisis-time code of conduct that prevents hostile exploitation of domestic political competition.

### ***Rapid-Action Grey Zone Playbook***

A pre-authorised menu of responses across domains:

- Maritime swarms
- Forward kinetic signalling
- Digital counter-pressure
- Legal and diplomatic counter-moves
- External partnerships

### ***Joint Force Enhancement***

Full transition to theatre commands, integrated logistics, AI-decision support and expanded unmanned systems.

## Conclusion

Hybrid Schwerpunkt is the strategic grammar of the 21<sup>st</sup> century; it compresses time, blends domains and manipulates the seams that open societies naturally possess. India cannot afford to fight on the timelines of its adversaries. Hence, the country must build a deterrence structure that fuses information, cyber, economic, political and military power into a single, coherent response architecture.

This is not about borrowing someone else's doctrine; it is about building a posture that reflects India's geography, its political structure, its economic ambitions and its democratic fabric. A counter-hybrid Schwerpunkt strategy would give India the ability to 'anticipate rather than react', 'shape rather than absorb', and 'impose costs rather than merely endure them'.

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Lieutenant General A B Shivane, is an NDA alumnus and a decorated Armoured Corps officer with over 39 years of distinguished military service. He is the former Strike Corps Commander and Director General of Mechanised Forces. As a scholar warrior, he has authored over 200 publications on national security and matters defence, besides four books and is an internationally renowned keynote speaker. The General was a Consultant to the Ministry of Defence (Ordnance Factory Board) post-superannuation. He was the Distinguished Fellow and held COAS Chair of Excellence at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies 2021-2022. He is also the Senior Strategic Advisor Board Member to several organisations and Think Tanks.



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