

Issue Brief

July 2026
No: 520

Ensuring the Relevance
of the United Nations In
Peacekeeping Operations

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Abstract

Regional wars of Russia-Ukraine, Israel-Gaza, and the US-Israel-Iran have global ramifications. These conflicts have paralysed the permanent five members (P5) of the United Nations (UN) Security Council, impeding the Council's ability to forge consensus and take effective measures to maintain international peace and security. The UN continues to be sidelined in many conflicts, and acts only as an observer to raging violent conflicts with large-scale civilian suffering and casualties. The UN needs to redefine and reorient UN Peace Operations with an immediate inclusion of the actual Troop Contributing Countries. These nations provide the boots on the ground and are sent into harm's way in conflict zones with little input from them. Besides, democratisation and expansion of the UN Security Council, greater proactive engagement with host nations, regional organisations, and troop contributing countries during mandate planning can yield better results. The UN Peace Operations must have a clearly defined exit strategy in place before deploying in a contested environment. To make peace work, the world urgently needs a dispassionate UN body that truly reflects broader interests in maintaining global peace and stability. The UN must move towards a better future with the vision, focus, and commitment of all member states, shedding the baggage of legacy, ego, and vested self-interests.

Keywords: UN Peace Operations, UN Security Council, TCC, UN Mandate, Exit Strategy

Introduction

The horrors of World War II saw the world again looking urgently for an institution and a guaranteed global mechanism to prevent such a catastrophe from ever engulfing the world again. The UN was born of this universal felt need with the adoption of its charter on 24 October 1945 (Britannica, 2023).¹ It aimed to prevent future wars, safeguard international law, maintain global peace and security and protect human rights among other charter objectives (Britannica, 2023).² From humble beginnings with 51 member states, the institution now has 193 member states, which reflects almost the entire world community of sovereign states (UN, 2023).³

The Year 2023 marked the historic 75th year of UN peacekeeping operations, with the first such operation—the UN Truce Supervisory Organisation- commencing in the Middle East on 29 May 1948 (UNPK, 2023).⁴ The UN has been involved in 72 peacekeeping operations

since then, with 12 active operations presently. UN Peacekeeping Operations (UNPK Ops) remain relevant yet ever so challenging, due to myriad factors that often operate at cross-purposes. Differences within the Security Council, the retention of the parties' consent to the conflict, and the evolving dynamics of conflicts on the ground are among the many challenges that must be overcome to make peacekeeping enduring in the days and years ahead.

Objective

The objective of this paper is to examine the structure of UN decision-making and its efficacy in ensuring the UN's continued relevance in Peace Operations.

UN Peacekeeping Operations Today

The Article 1 of the UN Charter (Charter)⁵ states the purpose of the UN right in the beginning, “To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace”. Therefore, the biggest manifestation of the UN organisation remains UN peacekeeping, which is a ‘shared global responsibility’(UNPK).⁶ The UN is engaged in 11 missions as of 31 March 2026, with over 45,890 uniformed peacekeepers deployed in volatile global conflict hotspots across Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East (Better World Campaign).⁷ Many of these missions are Chapter VII missions, which authorise the use of force, if necessary, to fulfil their mandates. Peacekeeping missions evolve around political processes requiring consent of the host nation and legitimate warring factions, sanction of the UN Security Council and translate to a wide variety of tasks beyond just peacekeeping to include strengthening political systems, safeguarding the local populace, disarming, demobilising, and reintegrating former armed elements and providing a conducive climate for restoration of institutionalised law and order (Better World Campaign).⁸

Over the years, the UN has had a measured degree of success. It has made a visible difference in countries including Cambodia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mozambique, Namibia, Angola, and Tajikistan. At the same time, it has played an important role in several other conflict-ridden places, including Kosovo, Haiti, Côte d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Burundi, Timor-Leste, and Liberia. These have helped ensure political transitions, provided support to fragile, fledgling institutions, and helped end conflict and move towards peacebuilding as part of the normalisation process (Better World Campaign).⁹ The UN has also endured less than optimal

results in several other places, such as Somalia, Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, where UN Peacekeeping and the response of the world community have been somewhat wanting (Better World Campaign).¹⁰

The 11 active UN missions are facing their own challenges in ensuring continuity of purpose. There is ongoing unrest in the Democratic Republic of Congo, wherein the M23 and other armed militants have made considerable operational inroads in the heart of the country. Anti-MONUSCO violent protests have been going on sporadically. The President of the country, Mr Felix Tshisekedi, has told the UN General Assembly that it was time for his country to take full control of its destiny and called for the speedy withdrawal of the key UN peacekeeping operation there (The East African, 2023).¹¹ Security Council Resolution for MONUSCO, promulgated on 20 December 2023, says there will be a progressive drawdown of the mission starting in 2024 (UN Press Release, 2023).¹² Meanwhile, the transition government in Mali has revoked its decision to continue MINUSMA— the decade-long UN peacekeeping operation in the country- in a statement by the Foreign Minister at a UN Security Council meeting in June 2023, citing a lack of trust between the UN Mission and the Government (UNPK from Mali, 2023).¹³ UNIFIL in Lebanon and UNDOF in Syria, some of the longest ongoing missions in the Middle East, are facing their own issues of local relevance with the ongoing Israel-Gaza war spilling over the borders, which sees these missions as passive spectators to the ongoing conflict.

Permanent Security Council Members' Influence in Modern Conflicts

The P5 of the Security Council are an enduring legacy of the UN's very birth after World War II. There are urgent calls for reforms to embrace members here from a more realistic modern world order, which thus far remains unrealised. Countries such as the G4 coalition of India, Brazil, Germany and Japan have long been strong contenders for inclusion; representation is sought from the African continent, among others (UNSC Reforms, 2003).¹⁴ Former US President, Joe Biden, also alluded to this urgent need for the Security Council's expansion in his September 2022 speech to the UN General Assembly (UNSC Reforms, 2003).¹⁵

The veto power held by the permanent members of the Security Council has made critical, objective decision-making in responding to crisis around the world very complex. By and large, the permanent body has to strive for consensus in arriving at pragmatic solutions to resolving global conflicts. However, Russia has used the veto 152 times while the US has blocked 87 resolutions, with China increasingly using the veto in recent years (cfr.org).¹⁶

UN response to the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict, the Israel-Gaza and US-Israel-Iran wars has been muted due to direct/influential involvement of some of the P5 members in these conflicts. The erstwhile US invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan has also been a unilateral action without UN approval sought or given. These grave aberrations have profoundly challenged the world order and made the global community at large wonder whether the world's peace and justice are selectively confined to the preordained few.

The frustration of the General Assembly members regarding Russia's stand in its war with Ukraine saw other council members invoking the rarely used 'Uniting for Peace' resolution, invoking a General Assembly resolution that overwhelmingly approved its own resolution deploring Russia's actions (cfr.org).¹⁷

Challenges Faced in UN Peacekeeping Operations

The UN continues to be one of the largest peacekeeping forces in the 21st century, comparable to the US, which, unlike the latter, has global approval and acceptability through the Security Council and General Assembly for its onerous actions in missions around the world. As highlighted in some of the examples above, certain challenges affect the conduct of peacekeeping operations as desired. Some of these are elucidated in succeeding paragraphs.

Consent of the Host Nation and Parties to the Conflict. One of the most important pre-conditions of a UN Peacekeeping mission is consent of the host country and key parties to the conflict. An absence or reduction in this trust quotient adversely affects the mission's functional effectiveness. It could translate to restriction in freedom of movement, hostility by the local population, delayed visa and flight rotation approvals, obstruction in human rights investigations and even possible violent targeting of peacekeepers (stimson.org, 2022).¹⁸ Consent from the Security Council, with the host nation at the strategic apex level, may not trickle down smoothly to the functional elements of local governance and the population at large (stimson.org, 2022).¹⁹ Situations that exacerbate the withdrawal of consent include elections, actions by the mission that challenge government authority, human rights violations that cast the government in a poor light, and so on (stimson.org, 2018).²⁰

Intrastate vs Interstate Conflicts. Traditional Peacekeeping was centred around interstate conflicts. Post the Cold War, there has been a rise in international terrorism and the number and scale of intrastate conflicts. As a reference, 58 of the 72 UN Peacekeeping operations have been deployed post-1990 (researchgate.net, 2019).²¹ Over a period of time, these conflicts, particularly in Chapter VII missions on the African continent have become very complex, translating to intrastate friction, rivalry and violent tribal, ethnic and other clashes. UN missions find themselves increasingly inadvertently drawn into the heart of these conflicts

where on the one hand consent, impartiality and neutrality of purpose remains challenging and unclear and peacekeepers themselves find themselves to be the targets on the other hand (peacekeeping.un.org).²²

Shrinking Budgets. Peacekeeping is a costly effort, and the UN is strapped for resources. The Peacekeeping budget for the fiscal year 2021-22 was US\$ 6.8 billion, 2.1 per cent lower than the previous fiscal year (peacekeeping.un.org).²³ The US contributes around 25 per cent to the UN peacekeeping budget today— a share that came under strain during the Trump administration's focus on sovereignty over globalism. In comparison, China contributes nearly 15 per cent (cfr.org, 2023).²⁴ All 193 members are legally required to contribute to some parts of the UN organisation to support their membership. However, modest contributions to UN peacekeeping budgets by most countries, except the West, China, and Japan, are a source of concern for the UN in ensuring the continuity of the peacekeeping journey ahead as intended, year on year. Budgets for the ensuing year (2022-23), have seen a partial increase, though they largely cover only the operational costs of the existing missions.

Protection of Civilians (PoC). Since 1999, every new mission established by the Security Council has a PoC mandate (reliefweb.int, 2023).²⁵ PoC mandates are very difficult to achieve when the host government becomes hostile to the mission's stated purpose and acts as an obstacle to both ensuring compliance with such mandate requirements and engaging in human rights (HR) violations itself, which binds the UN in a spot on the ground. This must also be viewed because PoC is primarily the responsibility of the host nation (peacekeeping.un.org, 2023).²⁶

Elusive Political Solutions. An essential component of peacekeeping is facilitating the return to normalcy after the termination of conflict. However, many states where UN peacekeeping operations are underway are witnesses to elusive political solutions within the host nation itself, resulting in weak political agreements, a lack of conviction in purpose, and, therefore, an inability to plan and implement clear exit strategies (Action for Peacekeeping).²⁷

Non-Involvement of Developed Countries in Peacekeeping Missions. A major sore point for developing countries, which largely contribute UN troops, is the lack of interest by developed countries in peacekeeping missions that do not affect their national interests. They are largely unwilling to risk troops there, while their contribution to NATO interests continued unabated. This lack of involvement also led to reduced contributions to UN budgets and corresponding delays in processing mission reimbursements, among other issues. (press.un.org, 2000).²⁸

Non-Involvement of Troop Contributing Countries (TCC) in Mandate Formulation and Higher UN Representation. While financing UN peacekeeping is one of the most important building blocks of the process, lack of TCC involvement in mandate formulation is disconcerting. The Brahimi report saw two major recommendations: clear mandate formulation on the one hand, and greater involvement through consultation and contribution with TCCs on the other (jstor.org, 2001).²⁹ However, major TCCs, particularly from Asia and Africa, are not actively engaged by the UN's higher decision-making forum in mandate formulation and other permission requirements. Another worrisome factor is the dominance of the West in high-level UN posts that matter at the Department of Peacekeeping, wherein certain countries provide most of the key staff. At the same time, the developing world is vastly underrepresented (jstor.org, 2001).³⁰

Defining the Way Forward

Consent of Host Nation and Other Players. Host nation consent must be seen as a baseline, not an apex, for continued cooperation (Stimson, 2022).³¹ Such consent must be viewed as a dynamic continuum of effort rather than a static, one-time approval for deployment in the prescribed manner (Stimson, 2022).³² Consent must be understood as a multi-faceted approach that includes acquiescence to the mission at the outset, acceptance of the mandate, and commitment to the political process that the mission sets out to achieve thereafter (Allard Duursma, Sara Lindberg Bromley, Aditi Gaur, 2023).³³ This requires effort from both—the host nation and the UN to maintain trust and a shared vision and focus in achieving the desired end states. A wholesome approach could also be pursued by engaging with the host population through various outreach activities, quick-impact programs, and public relations endeavours to counter potential misinformation and disinformation.

Greater Involvement of TCC in Mandate Formulation. TCC must be fully involved at all stages of mission planning and formulation (pminewyork.gov.in).³⁴ They must be an integral part of the consultative mechanism in mandate formulation, as they are responsible for ensuring adherence to these mandates on the ground. The then External Affairs Minister of India, Sushma Swaraj, in her address to the UN General Assembly on 01 October 2015, had unequivocally stated that it was a matter of concern that “TCC had no role in mandate formulation, which was also amended often without consultation” (Deshpande, 2016).³⁵ It goes against common logic for TCC to execute complex mission mandates created by external players without tapping into its own domain expertise and on-the-ground experience, or to shape them with its valuable inputs on how to successfully implement these mandates. It is akin to TCC being treated as mere mercenaries for causes they are fully

committed to achieving on the ground; however, they are only dictated by external powers that direct them to deliver there (Deshpande, 2016).³⁶

Larger Representation in the Security Council. As alluded to earlier in this paper, there is a broader, global need for greater representation in the Security Council. India has a strong claim to a permanent seat on the Security Council, being the world's largest democracy, a leading global economy, a champion of global peace, and one of the largest troop-contributing countries, having supported this endeavour for the last 73 of the 75 years of the UN peacekeeping journey. The other members of the G4 alliance, including Japan, Germany and Brazil, also have strong claims for such permanent inclusion (Deshpande, 2016).³⁷ Alongside representations from Africa and other important regions around the world, this high altar must also include collective, representative voices for the global community, beyond the legacy of the established P5 nations. Speaking at a 75-year UN Peacekeeping Commemorative Seminar on 13 June 2023, Shri Rajnath Singh, the Defence Minister of India, alluded to these contentious issues at hand when he mentioned that "there was a necessity for UN decision-making bodies, including the Security Council, to be more reflective of the demographic realities of the world" (PIB, 2023).³⁸ Misuse of the veto power for narrow interests, the lack of global governance, and the lack of unanimity to address global issues of concern necessitate an urgent revamp of the Security Council; otherwise, it will be found wanting and irrelevant in the days and years to come (PIB, 2023).³⁹

Involvement of Regional Players. Regional players, such as the African Union, can play an important role in fostering greater trust and a cooperative framework between the host nation and the UN Peacekeeping mission deployed there (pib.gov.in, 2023).⁴⁰ Additionally, they can take forward the efforts of the Security Council in facilitating direct regional engagement, such as that between the UN and the African Union, for engaging proactively under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, which authorises such regional arrangements to facilitate peace and security, needing explicit authorisation of the Security Council for undertaking enforcement action, however (un.org).⁴¹ This effort has been strengthened by UNSC Resolution 1631 (2005) - Cooperation between the UN and regional and sub-regional organisations in maintaining international peace and security, Multipronged engagement approaches are being witnessed through such regional initiatives on the African continent by the African Union, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the strife torn Democratic Republic of Congo, wherein the East African Community (EAC) sent troops to the conflict region from Kenya, Burundi and Uganda who operated alongside the FARDC

throughout 2023, distinct from MONUSCO, engaging directly with the host nation which is itself a member state of the regional grouping since March 2022. This force, directly controlled by the EAC, is a follow-up to the previously established and still-functioning largely African-contributed Force Intervention Brigade (operating within the MONUSCO framework) and is being wound up, commencing in December 2023. Such local regional arrangements help take the pressure off traditional UN peacekeeping missions in troubled regions with complex mandates, trust deficits with the host government and warring factions, and on-the-ground mandate implementation challenges (Russo J, 2022).⁴²

Addressing Ground Realities of Conflict. Intra-state conflicts, which have become more pronounced in recent years, necessitate a change in the UN's approach to peacekeeping missions in such trouble spots. Traditional UN principles, such as the consent of various parties and the principle of impartiality, may need to be reviewed if the UN Peacekeeping force is to intervene proactively to restore desired peace/create an environment conducive to doing so (Duke S, 2007).⁴³ Venturing peacekeeping forces into modern interstate areas of conflict, on the other hand, would require greater leverage by the General Assembly over recalcitrant P5 members with a personal stake in these conflicts. An expanded Security Council, as outlined above, could have the moral persuasion to put pressure on global interests of peace and harmony.

Reforming Peacekeeping Mechanisms. The disharmony between the finance-contributing countries and TCC is clearly evident in their approaches to peacekeeping. While the former wants robust execution of Chapter VII mandates and early closure of missions, the latter are at times comfortable engaging as arbitrators between the conflicting parties to minimise human cost (Duke S, 2007).⁴⁴ More collective and distributed responsibility among all peacekeeping stakeholders at the General Assembly would translate into a more nuanced approach to meeting collective best interests in mission planning and execution. Moving forward, the UN peacekeeping fabric must evolve dynamically to meet present ground realities. Recommendations from the erstwhile Brahimi report, the Capstone document, and the HIPPO reports of 2000, 2008, and 2014 need to be pursued objectively to facilitate peacekeeping reforms (peacekeeping.un.org).⁴⁵ The Action for Peace (A4P), launched by the Secretary General in 2018, rightly seeks to renew mutual political commitment to peacekeeping operations and remains the central framework for peacekeeping policy and reform (peacekeeping.un.org).⁴⁶ UN Peacekeeping reforms are a continual process and must be shaped pragmatically through a shared vision and focused, time-bound implementation by all stakeholders involved.

Clear Mandates and Exit Strategies. In today's challenging conflict zones, UN peacekeepers need to operate with clearly defined and enforceable mandates, adequate resources to support mission effectiveness, and greater cooperation with local governance mechanisms and the populace, as well as with the various regional groupings aligned with the common cause (press.un.org).⁴⁷ Geopolitical tensions and differences among the permanent members of the UN Security Council need to be overcome through broader, more collaborative, and inclusive engagement mechanisms among them, as well as through greater involvement of TCCs and the broader General Assembly membership, as highlighted earlier. The existing 'Penholder mechanism' for controlling resolution drafting rights by the P5 members of the Security Council, and the non-involvement of the other elected members therein until almost the finalisation and promulgation stages, also needs to change to improve transparency, inclusiveness, and mission effectiveness. Viable exit strategies need to be developed in consultation with all stakeholders, and not driven solely by the narrow, vested interests of high-dollar-contributing states. Missions need to evolve progressively to facilitate political solutions that enable time-bound exits through the concerted effort of all the stakeholders involved. These exit strategies need to be defined from the very inception (Chaudhury D R, 2022)⁴⁸ and may be restructured dynamically along the way; however, in keeping with the ground realities.

Need for Larger Budget Allocation and Clear Fiscal Planning. Security Council mandates need to be supported by corresponding budgets to facilitate the deployment of necessary boots on the ground, the establishment of essential mission fabric, and the availability of the resources needed to enable mandate fulfilment (India and UNPK).⁴⁹ As mentioned earlier, the peacekeeping budget for 2022-23 saw only a modest increase over the previous year, with a shrinkage compared to the year before. In real terms, it works out to US \$6.45 billion (a 1.16 per cent increase of US \$74 million, covering increased operational costs and civilian salaries). In comparison, the present budget for 2023-24 was reduced to US\$ 6.1 billion. Of concern here is the inadequate funding for the ongoing six-month drawdown mission in Mali, MINUSMA, as well as the parallel lack of adequate funding for the UN Peacebuilding Fund (UN Meetings coverage and press releases).⁵⁰ It is, however, pertinent to mention that the cross-cutting policy resolution adopted by the Fifth Committee, while framing the budget for 2022-23, is a welcome step that reflects both— the evolution of peacekeeping and concerns. Mission planning and performance essentials, gender mainstreaming and Women for Peace (WPS) agenda, draw down and transition processes were

the outcome of this important resolution, reflecting clear policy guidelines from the Committee, thus, providing a concrete set of recommendations for the Secretary General and member states, as well as enabling UN stakeholders to build on common priorities for the ensuing year (reliefweb.int, 2022).⁵¹ These need to be taken forward year on year to ensure clear top-down directives for the holistic planning and execution of peacekeeping. Budgets also need to be sufficiently expansive and generously funded by the relevant stakeholders, so that peacekeeping missions can achieve their stated objectives without compromising due to fiscal strain.

Leveraging UN Ministerials for Responsive Peacekeeping. The biennial UN Ministerial is an important global forum for discussion, debate, and the pledging of concrete financial, troop-contribution, and other resource commitments by member states to the UN Peacekeeping cause. These assume added relevance due to the top-level political, diplomatic, and military representation by member states at such forums, facilitating purposeful, results-oriented bilateral and multilateral dialogues, thematic discussions with tangible takeaways, and a common understanding of the world community's concerns on contemporary issues. The recent UN Peacekeeping Ministerial held in Accra, Ghana, on 05-06 December 2023, and in Berlin, Germany, on 13-14 May 2025, are such important events in this context. Besides financial commitments from the top donor contributing states, Ghana saw tangible pledges by the TCC covering a swathe of resources, including infantry units at RDL 60 readiness levels, force multipliers such as engineering, medical, and aviation assets, counter-IED resources, training support mechanisms, gender-responsive initiatives, and so on. In Berlin, member states reaffirmed their support for UN peacekeeping and pledged to enhance the effectiveness and adaptability of peace operations in the face of evolving global challenges. What perhaps needs to be taken further here is the need for a more responsive, agile, and leaner resources by the TCC, including quick-reaction companies, special forces entities, attack helicopter elements, surveillance and intelligence resources, and technology-enabled operating structures.

Enhancing the Use of Digital Technology. Digital technology has come of age and can be a game-changer when harnessed correctly for the better conduct of UN peacekeeping operations, where inherent risks need to be minimised and its productive potential leveraged to good effect (peacekeeping.un.org).⁵² A strategy for digital transformation of UN Peacekeeping was initiated by the UN Headquarters in November 2020, targeting areas such as peacekeeping intelligence, performance assessment for planning and decision-making, as well as addressing challenges such as safety and security of UN peacekeepers, misinformation and disinformation campaigns, weaponisation of technologies by non-state actors and so on

(peacekeeping.un.org).⁵³ The Situational Awareness Global Enterprise (SAGE) has been implemented in most UN peacekeeping missions and several political missions (peacekeeping.un.org).⁵⁴ It is a useful central mechanism for incident and event information. The *Unite Aware* platform was launched by India in collaboration with the UN in August 2021 (thehindubusinessline.com, 2021).⁵⁵ The platform is specifically tailored for the dissemination of situational awareness and peacekeeping intelligence analysis (peacekeeping.un.org).⁵⁶ Technological developments in diverse areas such as data exploitation, digitisation and AI were also a major theme at the recent UN Ministerial held at Accra, Ghana, during December 2024. These efforts and initiatives need to be taken to the next level on a fast-track basis to ensure greater relevance and focused application of the desired efforts to enhance operational effectiveness on the one hand and the safety of UN peacekeepers on the other, as they face ever-increasing challenges in peacekeeping missions around the world.

Conclusion

The world today is in a state of flux. Ongoing regional wars such as the Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Gaza, and now US-Israel-Iran, crises have global ramifications that have sucked in elements of the P5 Security Council members and other nations directly/indirectly into these conflicts, thus greatly compromising their impartiality/neutrality to achieve the earliest transparent and objective peaceful end states. The UN has unfortunately been reduced to being a benign observer to these violent conflicts, with large-scale civilian suffering and casualties.

Control of planning, defining and manner of executing UN peacekeeping operations, by the five permanent security council members, and large donor nations to the exclusion of the actual TCC nations who actually provide the boots on ground and the General Assembly members at large, who are given the final script for information almost as a fait accompli when deadlines approach, is not healthy for ensuring the collective wisdom, responsibility and accountability of the world community represented at the high altar of the UN headquarters. Increased permanent membership to the Security Council, greater proactive engagement with host nations through the UN and regional forms at the time of mandate planning and execution of peacekeeping operations, greater say by the TCC in mandate planning and delivery, larger budget allocations through greater commitments by all member states factoring ground reality operational and functional requirements of all the UN missions without need for compromise, together with clearly defined mandates and focussed time bound exit strategies, as highlighted in this paper, would all contribute to enabling a better framework for planning and executing

UN peacekeeping operations in the days and years ahead. The world is urgently in need of a dispassionate UN body that truly reflects the broader interests of the world community in striving to maintain global peace and stability, and that must move towards that end with the vision, focus, and commitment of all member states, shedding the baggage of legacy, ego, and vested self-interests.

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