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**21st Century World
Embroided in Endless
Conflict**

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Abstract

The twenty-first century has challenged the post-Cold War expectation that globalisation, economic interdependence and technological connectivity would produce a more peaceful and stable world. Instead, strategic competition has expanded across military, economic, technological, informational, cyber and societal domains. The same interconnected systems that enabled unprecedented prosperity have also created new vulnerabilities and instruments of coercion. This paper examines how technology, resource competition, geopolitical rivalry, terrorism, migration and global interdependence have transformed the strategic environment. It argues that military success alone no longer constitutes strategic success. The enduring objective of strategy must therefore be to preserve and enhance comprehensive national power over the long term.

Keywords: Strategic Competition, Geopolitical Rivalry, Economic Interdependence, Technological Connectivity, Endless Conflict


Introduction: Illusion of a Peaceful World in the Twenty-First Century

This paper advances five propositions. First, the twenty-first century is characterised by persistent strategic competition rather than episodic conflict. Second, technology has expanded competition across every domain of national power. Third, military success no longer guarantees strategic success. Fourth, contemporary competition is increasingly centred on securing technological, economic, and informational advantage rather than territory alone. Finally, the foremost objective of strategy in this environment is the preservation and enhancement of comprehensive national power.

The twenty-first century was ushered in by the terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers on 11 September 2001 (Huiskes, K.). The attacks triggered a series of wars and geopolitical confrontations that gradually expanded into multiple domains of persistent strategic competition. As emerging technologies have become the newest arena of rivalry, the race to secure energy resources and rare earth minerals has intensified into indirect yet equally consequential contests among states. Simultaneously, rapid population growth, climate-induced displacement, and migration driven by economic opportunity have placed increasing pressures on states and societies, hence, creating new sources of instability. Moreover, transnational extremist and religious ideologies have added another layer of violence and

societal polarisation across regions. In an interconnected world linked through digital technologies, financial systems, and global infrastructure, even a localised confrontation can rapidly produce global consequences.

Figure 1: Flight Paths of the Hijacked Planes



Source: Wikimedia Commons

However, the last quarter of the twentieth century was comparatively stable. The rapid expansion of the internet, telecommunications, aviation, and global shipping transformed the world into an increasingly interconnected economic system. Except for a limited number of regional wars and crises that were largely contained through interventions by major powers or international institutions, there was a growing confidence that ‘globalisation would foster peace, stability, and shared prosperity’. International trade expanded at an unprecedented pace, supply chains became deeply integrated, and economic interdependence was increasingly viewed as a powerful deterrent against major wars.

With the end of the Cold War, a widespread belief emerged that interdependence in global supply chains and the shared use of the global commons would ‘encourage cooperation rather than confrontation’. Several countries reduced the size of their armed forces and nuclear arsenals in anticipation of a more peaceful international order (Miller, S.E. 2019). Manufacturing hubs across China and other parts of Asia became engines of global economic growth (Amodio, F., Huang, H., Lei, Y.H. and Poschke, M. 2026). Europe and the United States increasingly focused on technological innovation while benefiting from lower-cost manufacturing in Asia. It was widely assumed that political and economic compulsions would encourage nations to avoid major wars, enabling humanity to prosper collectively while meeting the aspirations of rapidly expanding populations.

The expectation was that an interconnected and interdependent world would make peace, prosperity, equality, and stability the defining characteristics of the new millennium. Theorists like Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye postulated ideas like "Complex Interdependence" wherein a 'connected and dependent world would bring peace and wealth' a major concept called Liberalism in international relations. The liberals believed that trade and global networks make war too costly and cooperation necessary (Arkin, S.M. 2022).

Instead, the twenty-first century began with a profound strategic shock. The attacks on the Twin Towers (11 September 2001) demonstrated how the very technologies and systems that connected the world could be exploited by transnational terrorist organisations. Subsequently, the internet, digital communications, and emerging technologies became powerful instruments for radicalisation, recruitment, propaganda, and influence operations (Council of Europe Report, 2025). The expectation that the third millennium would be characterised primarily by peace and expanding global cooperation was therefore short-lived. Instead, the world entered an era in which strategic competition increasingly transcended traditional battlefields and extended across military, economic, technological, informational, cyber and societal domains.

A World Without Effective Arbitrator

The international system in the twenty-first century is characterised by growing complexity, uncertainty, and rapidly shifting alignments driven by national interests, domestic political compulsions, and socioeconomic pressures. Traditional distinctions between friends, allies, partners, and competitors have become increasingly fluid as states recalibrate their relationships in response to evolving strategic realities.

The defining geopolitical contest of the century is the strategic rivalry between the United States, the pre-eminent global power of the post-Cold War era, and China, a civilisational state (Singh, A. K., Kondapalli, S., Mahapatra. C. 2023) determined to restore what it views as its historic centrality in the international system. Leveraging economic integration, technological advancement, industrial capacity, and expanding military capabilities, China has altered the global balance of power. The strategic opening between the United States and China in the early 1970s, facilitated through Pakistan (Khalid, M. 2021), undoubtedly transformed the international order. Whether its long-term consequences were fully anticipated remains a matter of continuing strategic debate.

Europe presents an equally complex picture. Demographic changes (Bosch, P., Walravens, S. 2025), prolonged economic stagnation in several economies, energy insecurity (Svazas, M., Navickas, V., Paskevicius, R., Bilan, Y. and Shahzad, U. 2025), political polarisation, and the social challenges associated with large-scale migration have combined to test the resilience of many European societies. The continuing war in Ukraine has further strained economic resources, altered security priorities, and accelerated political realignments across the continent. The cumulative effect gave birth to a Europe that is increasingly preoccupied with internal cohesion while simultaneously confronting an evolving external security environment.

Elsewhere, the strategic landscape is equally unsettled. West Asia remains in prolonged instability (Agarwal, R. Col. 2026); Eurasia continues to experience geopolitical competition; the Indo-Pacific has emerged as the principal theatre of strategic rivalry; and the Indian subcontinent continues to face enduring security challenges. Africa, despite receiving comparatively limited global attention, is witnessing a convergence of insurgencies, fragile governance, military coups, humanitarian crises, and intense competition for critical resources.

With governments increasingly focused on domestic political survival, economic resilience, and rising public expectations, few states possess either the willingness or the capacity to assume the role of impartial global stabilisers. The influence of traditional great powers is increasingly exercised through sanctions, export controls, technology restrictions, economic leverage, and selective military interventions rather than through sustained international consensus (Falkner, R. 2026).

Equally significant is the diminishing effectiveness of many international institutions established after the Second World War. Strategic rivalry among major powers has constrained collective decision-making, while competing national interests have weakened the ability of multilateral organisations to prevent or resolve major crises. Consequently, the international system today lacks universally accepted mechanisms capable of managing escalating geopolitical rivalries before they evolve into prolonged strategic confrontations (Milanovic, B. 2022).

Technology: The Principal Enabler of Persistent Strategic Competition

Technology, once viewed primarily as an instrument for advancing human welfare and economic progress, has also become the principal enabler of persistent strategic competition. It has expanded the arenas of rivalry beyond the traditional military domain and has lowered

the barriers to entry for both smaller states and non-state actors. Consequently, relatively weak actors can now impose disproportionate strategic, economic, and political costs on far more powerful adversaries.

The effects are evident across multiple theatres. The Houthis have repeatedly disrupted one of the world's busiest maritime trade routes, compelling major shipping companies to alter routes and increasing global transportation costs through the use of relatively inexpensive missiles and drones (Salisbury, P., Thompson, H. and Ali-Khan, V. 2026). Hamas and Hezbollah have continued to challenge Israel's military superiority through asymmetric methods (Mizrahi, O. 2025). In Pakistan, the insurgency in Balochistan has imposed persistent security and economic costs, including on major Chinese investments under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). These examples illustrate how technology, geography, and local dynamics increasingly enable smaller actors to challenge established powers without matching their conventional military capabilities.

Cyber operations have emerged as one of the most significant instruments of statecraft in the twenty-first century. States increasingly seek strategic advantage by targeting critical infrastructure while maintaining plausible deniability. Rather than declaring war, adversaries employ cyber capabilities to disrupt power grids, financial systems, transport networks, communications, and other essential services with the objective of creating economic disruption, eroding public confidence, and imposing political costs.

During Operation Sindoor in May 2025, the Government of India reported a significant increase in cyber-attacks targeting critical infrastructure, particularly the power sector (Bhardwaj, S. 2025). Similar cyber operations have been witnessed during the recent Iran-Israel confrontation, demonstrating that cyber capabilities are now employed both during armed hostilities and in peacetime as instruments of strategic competition. The coordinated cyber incidents affecting aviation and other critical infrastructure across several countries further indicates that cyberspace has become a domain of continuous contestation rather than episodic warfare. As artificial intelligence and quantum technologies mature, both offensive and defensive cyber capabilities will become increasingly sophisticated and resource-intensive, compelling nations to invest continuously in cyber resilience.

Information has emerged as another decisive domain of strategic competition. States and non-state actors increasingly exploit digital platforms, artificial intelligence, and social

media to influence public opinion, deepen societal divisions, shape international narratives, and advance geopolitical objectives. The colour revolutions, online radicalisation by terrorist organisations such as ISIS and Al-Qaeda, the extensive use of information operations during the Russia-Ukraine war, and the sophisticated digital campaigns accompanying conflicts in West Asia - all demonstrates that influence has become as important as military capability. The widespread availability of smartphones and inexpensive digital connectivity has enabled strategic narratives to transcend national borders, allowing external actors to shape domestic political discourse thousands of kilometres away. Technology has therefore provided both states and extremist organisations with inexpensive yet highly effective instruments for influence, recruitment, and coercion while preserving plausible deniability.

Unmanned systems and precision-guided missiles have further transformed the character of military competition. Their relatively low acquisition costs, ease of production, and growing accuracy have significantly reduced the traditional advantages enjoyed by larger military powers. The widespread employment of inexpensive drones against high-value military and economic targets has fundamentally altered the economics of warfare. The Houthis' sustained attacks on shipping, Ukraine's deep strikes into Russian territory during Operation Spider Web (Sharma, V. 2025), Pakistan's continued use of drones for smuggling weapons and narcotics across the Indian border (Bajwa, H. 2026), and the growing employment of drones in regional conflicts all illustrate that technology has compressed geography and expanded the scope for military action below the threshold of declared war.

The cumulative effect of these technological transformations is profound. Technology has not replaced conventional warfare; rather, it has expanded strategic competition into cyberspace, the information domain, global supply chains, financial systems, and critical infrastructure. It has enabled states to pursue national objectives through continuous competition without necessarily crossing the threshold of conventional war, thus making persistent strategic competition the defining characteristic of the contemporary international system.

Global Consequences of Localised Strategic Competition

Minor confrontations today often generate strategic consequences far beyond their immediate geographical boundaries. The interconnected nature of the global economy ensures that disruption in one region rapidly cascades across energy markets, supply chains, financial

systems, trade routes, and migration patterns. The distinction between local and global crises has therefore become increasingly blurred.

Population displacement resulting from prolonged instability in Africa, driven by terrorism, fragile governance, civil wars, and economic distress, has placed sustained demographic, political, and economic pressures on Europe. The challenge extends beyond humanitarian assistance to questions of social integration, political polarisation, border security, and economic sustainability. Likewise, displacement of the Rohingya population following the conflict in Myanmar has imposed long-term security, economic, and humanitarian burdens on Bangladesh, India, and other regional countries.

The confrontation surrounding the Strait of Hormuz demonstrated the vulnerability of the global economy to disruptions in a single maritime choke point. Tensions involving Iran, the United States, and regional actors affected global energy supplies, increased shipping costs, and contributed to inflationary pressures, particularly for energy-importing economies (Mehlum, E. 2026). The involvement of Iranian proxies further expanded the geographical scope of the confrontation, illustrating how regional rivalries can rapidly acquire wider strategic dimensions. Even after the cessation of hostilities, economic recovery and the restoration of investor confidence often runs into many years, before normalcy is achieved.

The modern international system has entered an era in which competition extends well beyond the traditional battlefield. Cyber operations, economic coercion, information campaigns, sanctions, lawfare, technological restrictions, and proxy warfare have become integral instruments of national strategy. These tools enable calibrated escalation, limited retaliation, and sustained strategic pressure without necessarily crossing the threshold of conventional war. Consequently, rivalry between states increasingly unfolds through a combination of military and non-military means across multiple domains simultaneously.

The defining geopolitical characteristic of the twenty-first century is not the frequency of major wars alone but the persistence of instability. States increasingly seek to avoid large-scale conventional wars because of their prohibitive economic, political, and military costs. Yet they continue to pursue national objectives through sustained strategic competition conducted below the threshold of decisive armed conflict. This has created an international environment in which instability has become enduring even when conventional wars remain limited.

Easy to Enter, Difficult to Exit: The New Character of the Twenty-First Century Competition

The twenty-first century has demonstrated that while states may enter military confrontations with expectations of rapid and decisive outcomes, disengagement has become increasingly complex. Military superiority, technological dominance, and precision strike capabilities no longer guarantee favourable political outcomes or a stable end state. Once initiated, modern conflicts tend to expand across multiple domains, draw in additional state and non-state actors, disrupt the global economy, and become progressively more difficult to terminate.

The recent confrontation involving the United States and Iran illustrates this emerging reality (Kinatas, E. 2026). Conceived as a limited military operation employing precision strikes against strategic targets, the objective was to degrade Iran's nuclear and missile capabilities while restoring deterrence. However, the confrontation quickly acquired wider regional dimensions. Threats to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, the activation of Iranian proxies, cyber operations, and heightened instability across West Asia imposed costs far beyond the immediate battlefield. The strategic challenge thereafter shifted from conducting military operations to disengaging without compromising credibility or regional stability (ICG Statement. 2026).

The Israel-Hamas conflict presents another example of the diminishing relationship between military success and strategic resolution. Despite Israel's overwhelming military superiority, the conflict has evolved into a prolonged contest involving Hezbollah, Iran, regional powers, international institutions, and global public opinion. Military operations have increasingly been accompanied by information campaigns, diplomatic initiatives, legal challenges, and humanitarian pressures. The proceedings before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) illustrate how lawfare has become an additional instrument of strategic competition alongside conventional military operations (UN News. 2024).

The civil wars in Yemen and Syria further demonstrate how internal instability can evolve into prolonged regional contests involving multiple external powers and non-state actors. What began as domestic political crises gradually transformed into theatres of proxy competition, drawing in regional and global stakeholders while affecting maritime security, energy markets, migration, and regional stability. Even where the intensity of military operations has fluctuated, strategic competition has persisted.

The Russia-Ukraine war has similarly challenged many long-held assumptions about modern warfare. Initial expectations of a short military campaign have given way to a prolonged war of attrition extending across military, economic, technological, cyber, informational, and diplomatic domains. Sanctions, energy security, drone warfare, cyber operations, strategic communications, and industrial mobilisation have become as consequential as battlefield operations. Neither side has achieved decisive strategic success, yet neither possesses the political or military incentives for complete disengagement. The conflict has fundamentally altered Europe's security architecture while reshaping global energy flows, defence spending, and geopolitical alignments.

The Indo-Pacific reflects a different manifestation of persistent strategic competition. China has pursued incremental expansion of its strategic influence through maritime coercion, military modernisation, economic leverage, technological competition, and sustained pressure in the South China Sea and around Taiwan without escalating to full-scale war. This calibrated approach has enabled Beijing to alter strategic realities while remaining below the threshold of conventional armed conflict.

Africa presents another dimension of the same phenomenon. Across the Sahel, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, and parts of the Horn of Africa, fragile governance, insurgencies, terrorism, competition over natural resources, and external interventions have produced prolonged instability without decisive military resolution (Devlin-Foltz, Z. 2010). These situations increasingly affect migration, food security, critical mineral supply chains, and international investment far beyond the continent, particularly for Europe (Giehler, N. 2026).

The experiences of Afghanistan and Iraq further demonstrate that overwhelming military superiority does not necessarily translate into enduring political success. While conventional military campaigns achieved their immediate operational objectives, establishing sustainable political stability proved considerably more difficult. These campaigns reinforced an enduring lesson of modern strategy: winning battles is often easier than securing a favourable and lasting peace.

The defining lesson of the twenty-first century is therefore not merely that wars have become more destructive, but that they have become increasingly difficult to conclude on favourable political terms. Modern military operations rapidly expand into economic,

technological, informational, cyber, legal, and diplomatic domains, making strategic disengagement as challenging as military intervention itself. The central challenge for states is no longer simply how to win wars, but how to preserve national power while pursuing political objectives in an era of persistent strategic competition.

Strategic Competition for Resources, Technology, and Markets

The defining contests of the twenty-first century are no longer centred solely on the acquisition of territory. While geography continues to retain enduring strategic significance, competition has increasingly shifted towards securing technological superiority, critical resources, global markets, and resilient supply chains. Data, semiconductors, artificial intelligence, rare earth minerals, energy networks, maritime trade routes, digital infrastructure, and even human attention have emerged as strategic assets essential for national power.

Therefore, competition is no longer confined to the possession of territory. It is increasingly conducted through the control of technology, critical resources, supply chains, financial systems, information networks, and global markets.

Control over critical technologies and supply chains has become an instrument of geopolitical influence. Restrictions on semiconductor exports, competition for rare earth minerals, economic sanctions, technology denial regimes, cyber espionage, and strategic investments in critical infrastructure increasingly serve as instruments of national policy (Mansoor, S. 2026). Economic interdependence, once regarded as a guarantor of peace, is now frequently leveraged to influence political decisions and alter strategic behaviour.

The vulnerability of global digital infrastructure has introduced another important dimension of competition. Threats to undersea communication cables (Inskit Group. 2025), satellite networks, and digital financial systems have demonstrated that the functioning of the global economy depends as much on secure information networks as on traditional sea lanes and energy routes. Consequently, cyberspace and outer space have become indispensable domains of strategic competition, requiring continuous investment in resilience, redundancy, and deterrence.

Among contemporary powers, China has demonstrated a particularly comprehensive approach to long-term strategic competition. Through sustained investments in manufacturing, technological innovation, critical infrastructure, maritime capabilities, and economic connectivity, including the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing has sought to expand its strategic

influence without resorting to large-scale conventional war. The integration of economic leverage, technological advancement, diplomatic engagement, military modernisation, and information operations reflects an approach that seeks to shape the strategic environment gradually rather than through decisive military campaigns (Hammes, T. X. 2025).

The emerging international order therefore reflects a broader understanding of power. Military capability remains indispensable, but it is no longer sufficient by itself. Nations capable of securing technological leadership, resilient supply chains, energy security, industrial capacity, financial stability, and social cohesion will possess greater strategic resilience during prolonged periods of competition. The central objective of statecraft is increasingly to preserve and enhance comprehensive national power while competing across multiple domains simultaneously.

The Trump Factor: Accelerator Rather Than Originator

Many analysts have argued that Donald Trump accelerated global instability through his “Make America Great Again” (MAGA) agenda, trade wars, tariff policies, and a more confrontational style of diplomacy. In the short term, this assessment appears plausible. Trump's willingness to challenge allies, competitors, and international institutions alike marked a significant departure from the traditional language of American global leadership (Bremmer, I. 2026).

However, the deeper structural trends that define the twenty-first century predated his presidency. The growing strategic rivalry between the United States and China, concerns over technological dependence, efforts to secure critical supply chains, competition for rare earth minerals, and the increasing use of economic instruments for geopolitical purposes had already begun before Trump's arrival on the American political stage (Schindler, S., Alami, I., DiCarlo, J., Jepson, N., Rolf, S. and Bayırbağ, M. K. 2023). What his administration did was to expose these trends more openly and accelerate policy responses that were already emerging within the American strategic establishment.

Across the world, nations were increasingly moving away from the idealism of unrestricted globalisation towards a greater emphasis on sovereignty, resilience, economic security, and strategic autonomy. India had already begun this transition after 2014 through initiatives such as ‘Make in India’ and ‘Atmanirbhar Bharat’, which sought to strengthen domestic manufacturing, reduce critical dependencies, and enhance national resilience (Kumar,

K. 2023). Similar tendencies towards economic nationalism and transactional geopolitics were becoming visible in many other countries.

The international system was also evolving from a largely unipolar order towards a fragmented multipolar environment. China sought to consolidate its rise through economic expansion, technological advancement, military modernisation, and global infrastructure initiatives, while the United States increasingly viewed the preservation of its technological and strategic advantages as a national security imperative.

In this context, Trump should be viewed less as the creator of a new era and more as a catalyst who accelerated an existing transition. His policies openly prioritised American national interests, challenged assumptions about globalisation, and highlighted the return of great-power competition. The strategic shift towards a more competitive international order was already underway; the Trump presidency merely made that transformation more explicit and more rapid.

Implications for the World and India

The international community must recognise that the emerging strategic environment is not a temporary disruption but a structural transformation. The pursuit of national interests, economic resilience, and strategic autonomy is likely to remain the defining feature of international relations for the foreseeable future. Consequently, governments must prepare for prolonged periods of instability rather than anticipate a return to the relatively benign security environment of the post-Cold War era.

The international system must simultaneously strengthen cooperation in areas where collective action remains indispensable. Cyber governance, maritime security, artificial intelligence, critical infrastructure protection, resilient supply chains, migration management, energy security, and climate adaptation require stronger international frameworks despite intensifying geopolitical competition. The challenge before policymakers is to manage strategic rivalry without allowing it to escalate into uncontrolled military confrontation.

Economic resilience has become as important as military capability. Nations that can secure critical technologies, diversify supply chains, strengthen industrial capacity, ensure food and energy security, and protect critical infrastructure will be better positioned to withstand prolonged strategic competition. The preservation of national power increasingly depends upon

maintaining a balanced relationship between economic strength, technological innovation, social cohesion, and military preparedness.

For India, these changes carry even greater significance. Situated in one of the world's most densely populated and strategically contested regions, India must continue to preserve its strategic autonomy while strengthening comprehensive national power. Investments in cyber capabilities, space technologies, artificial intelligence, advanced manufacturing, semiconductor ecosystems, energy security, maritime power, and assured access to critical minerals will become increasingly important. Equally vital will be the strengthening of domestic social cohesion, institutional resilience, and economic competitiveness, which together constitute the foundations of enduring national power.

India's objective should not merely be to respond to crises as they emerge but to shape a strategic environment that protects its long-term interests. Success in the twenty-first century will increasingly depend upon the ability to integrate diplomatic, economic, technological, informational, military, and societal instruments of national power into a coherent national strategy capable of sustaining prolonged strategic competition.

Conclusion: Persistent Competition is Future

The twenty-first century has fundamentally altered the character of international relations. The expectation that globalisation, economic interdependence, and technological advancement would usher in an era of enduring peace has given way to a far more competitive and uncertain strategic environment. Military confrontation remains an important instrument of statecraft, but it is increasingly complemented by competition in the economic, technological, cyber, informational, legal, maritime, and space domains. The distinction between war and peace has become progressively blurred as states pursue national objectives through continuous competition below the threshold of conventional war.

The defining characteristic of the contemporary international system is therefore not perpetual warfare but persistent strategic competition. Military superiority alone no longer guarantees strategic success, nor does battlefield victory necessarily secure favourable political outcomes. Nations that fail to integrate economic resilience, technological innovation, industrial capacity, diplomatic influence, information superiority, social cohesion, and military capability into a coherent national strategy risk exhausting their national power even when they achieve tactical or operational success.

The principal lesson for policymakers is that the objective of strategy must extend beyond winning wars or managing crises. In an era of prolonged strategic competition, the foremost responsibility of statecraft is to preserve, strengthen, and expand comprehensive national power while protecting the nation's long-term interests. Military operations, economic policies, technological investments, diplomatic engagement, and information campaigns must therefore serve a common political purpose rather than function as isolated instruments of national policy.

For India, situated at the intersection of major geopolitical fault lines and emerging centres of economic growth, this transformation demands strategic clarity and sustained national resolve. Preserving strategic autonomy, strengthening technological and industrial capabilities, securing critical resources, maintaining social cohesion, and integrating all instruments of national power will determine India's ability not merely to withstand prolonged competition but to shape the emerging international order.

The era of expecting permanent peace has passed. The twenty-first century belongs to nations that can compete continuously without exhausting their national strength. In this new strategic environment, the ultimate measure of success will not be the number of battles won or crises managed, but the ability of the state to emerge stronger, more resilient, and more influential after every phase of competition.

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About the Author

Lieutenant General Devendra Pratap Pandey, UYSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd) carries experience across various terrain and operational environments. Commissioned into the 9th Battalion, The Sikh Light Infantry Regiment, he has showcased exemplary leadership in diverse roles, including participation in Operation Vijay (Kargil) in 1999. With notable commands at Siachen Glacier, Chushul Sector in Eastern Ladakh, and prestigious appointments such as GOC of the 15 Corps in Kashmir valley, he has demonstrated exceptional proficiency in challenging scenarios. His illustrious career encompasses instructional roles at the National Defence Academy, service as a Military Observer in UNTAC, Cambodia, and pivotal staff appointments along the Line of Control and in Army Command Holding two postgraduate degrees from esteemed institutions like the Defence Services Staff College, Wellington, and the National War College at National Defence University, Washington D.C. as well as an M.Phil from the National Defence College, New Delhi, he is renowned for his strategic acumen and expertise.



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