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Home External Publications

Drone-age warfare: Why Indian Army must command the air littoral battlespace

Lt Gen Dushyant Singh PVSM, AVSM (Retd).byLt Gen Dushyant Singh PVSM, AVSM (Retd).
December 10, 2025
in External Publications
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Originally Published: https://www.firstpost.com/opinion/drone-age-warfare-why-indian-army-must-command-the-air-littoral-battlespace-13958553.html

The air littoral is no longer the exclusive domain of air forces. It is a shared battlespace where ground forces must lead in areas of direct contact.

In the evolving landscape of modern warfare, the air littoral—the vertical battlespace from ground level up to approximately 3,000 metres—has become the most contested zone. Saturated with drones, loitering munitions, and short-range air defence systems, it is the layer where ground forces are most vulnerable. For India, with the Army already engaged in active deployments along the Line of Control (LoC) and Line of Actual Control (LAC), the case for Army-led control of this battlespace is not just doctrinal—it is existential.

The Proximity Argument

Indian Army units deployed in forward areas are the first exposed to hostile drone swarms, loitering munitions, and aerial reconnaissance. These threats can materialise within seconds of escalation—often without a formal declaration of hostilities. Waiting for centralized airspace clearance or inter-service coordination could prove fatal.

  • Force preservation becomes the first casualty if soldiers cannot respond instantly.
  • A surprise ground thrust, supported by aerial ISR, could overwhelm defensive positions before countermeasures are authorised.
  • Example: Along the LAC, a swarm of loitering munitions launched across the ridge could devastate Indian bunkers. If the Army lacks authority to engage autonomously, delays in clearance could result in catastrophic losses.

Tactical Autonomy: Decision at the Edge

Today’s soldier is not just a combatant but a node in a sensor–shooter network. Infantrymen and armoured crews are increasingly equipped with handheld or vehicle-mounted counter-UAV systems—jammers, kinetic interceptors, and drone-on-drone capabilities.

This distributed battlespace demands real-time classification of aerial threats:

  • A quadcopter hovering over a tank column may be a spotter drone for artillery → it must be neutralized immediately.
  • A high-altitude UAV flying beyond engagement range may be part of strategic ISR → engagement may be withheld.
  • Such decisions cannot be outsourced to distant command centres. They must be made by commanders at the edge, based on proximity, mission criticality, and rules of engagement.

International Precedents: A Shifting Milieu

Globally, militaries are rethinking airspace control in the tactical zone:

  • Ukraine Conflict: Ukrainian ground units routinely engage Russian drones without centralized clearance, using MANPADS and EW kits.
  • Israel: The IDF empowers ground commanders to autonomously engage low-altitude threats in urban and border operations.
  • US Army: The Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) concept explicitly includes Army-led control of the air littoral for force protection and manoeuvre.

These examples underscore a growing recognition: the air littoral is no longer the exclusive domain of air forces. It is a shared battlespace where ground forces must lead in areas of direct contact.

Toward Integrated Theatre Commands

While the Army’s case for air littoral control is compelling, the long-term solution lies in integrated theatre commands. These structures dissolve inter-service silos and empower joint commanders with domain-specific control based on mission needs.

  • Army: Controls the air littoral over land-based operations.
  • Navy: Manages the air littoral over littoral waters and carrier groups.
  • Air Force: Retains strategic airspace control and deep-strike capabilities.

This model ensures unity of command, rapid decision-making, and seamless integration of sensors and shooters across domains.

Conclusion

India’s security environment demands agility, autonomy, and integration. The Army, being the first responder and primary stakeholder in land-based operations, must command the air littoral battlespace. This is not a turf war—it is a doctrinal necessity rooted in operational logic.

As hybrid threats proliferate and the grey zone expands, India must evolve a joint doctrine that empowers the Army to defend its troops, preserve its force, and dominate the vertical battlespace it inhabits. The air littoral is tomorrow’s Kurukshetra—and the Army must hold the reins.

Tags: AIWarfareCounterDroneDroneDominanceElectronicWarfareLoiteringMunitionsMilitary TechnologySHORADUAVs
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