Ahead of the finalisation of the India–European Union (EU) Free Trade Agreement by the end of this month, both sides have agreed to move forward with the signing of a new Security and Defence Partnership, as highlighted by the EU’s Foreign Policy Chief, Kaja Kallas, in her address to the European Parliament on 21st January 2026. This comprehensive agreement is expected to be concluded during the visit of the President of the European Commission and the President of the European Council to New Delhi for the 16th India–EU Summit.
Alongside trade negotiations, Europe is also seeking to strengthen its defence partnership with India, as both sides increasingly view their relationship as strategic and multidimensional, extending well beyond just economic cooperation. This development reflects deepening of strategic ties, underscoring that security considerations are now as central as trade interests.
The proposed pact aims to enhance cooperation in areas such as maritime security, counterterrorism, cyber defence, and maritime domain awareness, with the broader objective of contributing to stability in the Indo-Pacific region.
Mutual Strategic Gains
Maritime security being one of the main focuses of this pact, highlights that maritime routes are less about military posturing and more about ensuring continuity, predictability and balance in an increasingly uncertain geopolitical environment.
For the EU, maritime security is closely tied to economic well-being. Europe depends on open and stable sea lanes for trade, energy flows, and connectivity with partners across Asia and the Indo-Pacific. Any disruption in key maritime regions can quickly translate into economic and political consequences at home. As a result, the EU has steadily expanded its attention beyond its immediate neighbourhood, recognising that developments in distant maritime spaces directly affect its own security and prosperity.
India’s view is shaped by its geography and by the fact that it is assuming greater responsibilities in the region. It believes that stability at sea is important for its national security and economic goals. India’s strategy is also affected by the broader strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific, where shifts in naval power and unilateral actions have raised concerns about long-term stability.
India and the EU are on the same level when it comes to the idea that agreed rules, not force, should govern the maritime domain. Disputes in regions like the South China Sea have shown how quickly tensions at sea can rise when legal norms are ignored. India and the EU have always supported freedom of navigation and peaceful ways to settle disputes. They see these principles as necessary to maintain order and trust in international waters.
Bridging the Gaps through Stronger Cooperation
For much of the past decade, India–EU counterterrorism cooperation has remained constrained by structural and political gaps. Differences in threat perception, EU’s complex multilateral decision-making process, and hesitancy to address state-sponsored terrorism directly impacted the progress in the partnership. However, the strengthening of the India–EU security and defence partnership signals a shift towards more outcome-oriented engagement.
The first joint counterterrorism training in October 2025, which focused on countering drone-based threats, reflected this change. In the past, exchanges solely focused on policy dialogue, but this exercise focused on operational coordination, sharing technology, and ensuring that Indian and European security forces could work together. Both sides face similar risks when it comes to drone and counter-drone threats, allowing cooperation to move forward without being held back by long-standing geopolitical disagreements. Such initiatives can help bridge the gaps that exist by bringing together India’s operational experience with Europe’s technological and institutional strengths.
Similarly, the India–EU cyber defence partnership has become stronger in the past few years, but there are some gaps that make the practical implementation difficult. One major obstacle is that cybersecurity governance is fragmented across EU member states. Each one retains its primary authority on how to deal with threats, cyber capabilities, and response mechanisms. This internal problem makes it challenging for each state to work as a bloc and to collaborate with external partners like India, which has a more centralised cybersecurity framework.
At the bilateral level, cooperation has so far remained largely dialogue-driven. Regular cyber dialogues and consultations have helped align threat perceptions and norms, but these engagements have yet to translate into robust operational cooperation. Joint cyber exercises, coordinated incident response, and real-time information sharing remain limited, reducing the ability of both sides to respond collectively to fast-evolving cyber threats.
Focusing on cybersecurity through this partnership will make India and the EU move beyond dialogue towards practical collaboration, gradually addressing regulatory and institutional mismatches, leading to a more resilient, secure, and rules-based digital environment.
Looking ahead, many of the structural and operational challenges that continue to shape the India–EU security partnership can be addressed through deeper institutional integration. One such pathway is India’s potential association with the EU’s Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) framework. Participation in PESCO would enable India to engage directly in joint capability development, defence innovation, and operational preparedness alongside its European partners. For the EU, India offers a reliable and cost-effective manufacturing base that can strengthen defence supply chains at a time of rapid modernisation. For India, closer involvement would facilitate access to advanced technologies, best practices, and long-term industrial collaboration. Together, this could anchor the partnership in tangible outcomes and shared strategic interests.
