Introduction
The development of the Burevestnik (nuclear-powered nuclear-armed cruise missile) and Poseidon (nuclear-powered uncrewed underwater vehicle) by Russia has renewed the debates on the arms race and nuclear strategic stability. The NATO and other states are seeing this development with awe and caution. Whether these developments are merely political stunts or genuine threats, they have warranted closer attention from security experts. The Burevestnik (also known as SSC-X-9 Skyfall) cruise missile, powered by a miniature nuclear reactor, is said to have an unlimited range, according to Russia. Theoretically, at least, this would make the missile remain airborne for extended periods, thereby avoiding being hit by an anti-missile weapon. This low-flying missile, while evading detection, can approach the target from unpredictable directions.
Moreover, nuclear-powered Poseidon can, like nuclear submarines, remain underwater for an extended period. It can deliver both conventional and nuclear warheads. These weapons, taken on their face value, pose a challenge to easy detection and interception. While the US and its allies view these developments as destabilising, Russia argues that they ensure strategic deterrence through an assured first strike. They can inflict unmanageable damage on the adversary, as per the Kremlin.
The implications of these weapons can be double-edged for strategic stability. Strategic stability is seen as a state of equilibrium where ‘nuclear-armed states lack the incentive to conduct a nuclear first strike.’ As long as states believe that they cannot benefit from striking first and a nuclear second strike is possible, stability is maintained. While the development of the above-mentioned ‘disruptive’ weapons appears to incentivise first-strike and push strategic stability to the edge, the same weapons can assure strategic deterrence. The following section looks at the two lines of argument arising from the implications of such weapons for strategic stability.
Two Lines of Argument for Strategic Stability
The first line of argument is that the development of such disruptive weapons undermines global strategic stability. This argument is based on several factors. First, they lead to the erosion of the early warning systems, thereby leading to crisis instability. Such weapons bypass the pathway followed by traditional intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), which provide the adversary with almost half an hour to respond. The low-flying stealth hypersonic cruise missiles, by providing only a few minutes to the adversary to respond, create panic. To avoid their command centre being hit, states can ‘launch on warning’ or pre-emptively use nuclear warheads. This is exacerbated by the ambiguity of warheads, which can lead to a nuclear accident. Moreover, the shorter time and unpredictable path of the missiles encourage first-strike propensity.
Second, this type of ‘new’ weapon, not discussed in earlier arms control treaties, can fuel an international arms race. By reifying the security dilemma, this would lead states to outspend each other. To stay ahead of each other, states would experiment with ‘exotic’ weapons that would keep the world on the verge of inadvertent escalation. In a gun-versus-butter trade-off, guns would keep getting an ever-bigger pie with subsequent cycles within the arms race.
Third, environmental risks are concerning. Most strategic weapons are dangerous when used in war. Due to nuclear-powered mechanisms, Burevestnik and Poseidon pose environmental risks even during the test phase or when kept in silos. During the testing phase, they risk inadvertent spread of nuclear radiation. In case of a crash, such weapons can create a radioactive disaster in populated or ecologically fragile areas. Likewise, Poseidon is called a ‘doomsday’ weapon for its tsunamigenic capacity, which can submerge coastal cities.
However, the second line of argument, countering the former, states that these ‘disruptive’ weapons maintain strategic stability by ensuring uncertainty. Thomas Schelling, in his work Arms and Influence, has associated uncertainty with the observance of deterrence. Schelling argues that a crisis, no matter how disastrous, is no crisis if all associated events are completely foreseeable and entail no suspense. A ‘crisis that the participants are not fully in control of events’ ensures deterrence. It is the ‘threat that leaves something to chance’ that makes adversaries believe that they cannot confidently control the escalation, and events may get out of hand.
This line of argument has several implications. First, the development of these disruptive weapons assures mutually assured destruction (MAD), thereby ensuring strategic stability. If one side develops an air- and space-based defence system, such as the Golden Dome, that can intercept all varieties of missiles, one can be confident enough to launch a first strike. By being ‘invincible’, the Burevestnik ensures American vulnerability. While one can argue that the development of Burevestnik preceded the announcement of the Golden Dome, the concerns and complaints of Russia (and China, lately) about the possible buildup of an anti-ballistic defence system by the US have been consistent since the American withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 2002. In this sense, the missile simply restores the ‘uncertainty’ and fear that neither side can safely control the escalation.
Second, it aids in Russia’s second-strike capability. Since these weapons can take a low-flying, circuitous, yet unpredictable path and can evade missile defence systems, the adversary (the US, in this case) would not attempt a decapitating strike on Russia. Poseidon’s underwater deployment would further enhance the second-strike survivability. This provides Russia with an assured second-strike capability, thus enhancing strategic stability.
Third, these convince the adversary that building a costly missile shield would be futile. By establishing the futility of defence, it can, paradoxically, push adversaries to the negotiating table for arms limitation and control talks. Fourth, since deterrence is largely based on psychology, these reinforce credible capability without frequent and provocative deployment. Finally, from the Russian perspective, these developments rebalance deterrence in light of American superiority in missile defence and precision-strike capabilities. Russia had been concerned about the possibility of an American ‘prompt global strike’. These developments ensure that Russia is not vulnerable to technological asymmetry.
Conclusion
There is more to strategic stability than just one perspective. Although it remains to be seen to what extent Russia’s ‘disruptive’ technological developments can be translated into practical applications on a large scale, it is nevertheless significant to discuss the impact of these technologies on strategic stability. These technologies are like a double-edged sword with dual implications. While such developments can cause disruption and instability in the world by reinforcing an arms race, paradoxically, there is more to it. They can reify the uncertainty, which is necessary for a stable deterrence. While one cannot soon wish a world to be without nuclear weapons, strategic stability is ensured through uncertainty. During the Cold War, MAD served as the cornerstone of stability, albeit an uncertain and perilous one. The ‘balance of terror’ ensured stability. Stability is preserved in this case by evolution, not stagnation. States continue to invest in the readiness of their nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles, which ensure their survival in an anarchic world. As long as nukes are there, mutual vulnerability is there to stay. While the development of nuclear weapons and associated technologies poses risks, stability is carved out of instability.
