In late 2025, two American soldiers and their interpreter were shot dead in Palmyra, Syria. Their deaths, at the hands of a Syrian police officer allegedly linked to ISIS, marked the first US combat fatalities in Syria since the fall of the Assad regime. The incident triggered one of the largest US air campaigns in the country since the Caliphate’s zenith.
A New War in a New Syria
On 19 December 2025, President Donald Trump announced that the US had launched large-scale attacks on ISIS targets in Syria. Under Operation Hawkeye Strike, US forces hit around 70 ISIS‑linked facilities, from command posts, weapons depots, and tunnels, to training sites across central Syria, dropping more than 100 precision munitions in the campaign’s first major wave. A‑10s and F‑16s flew low over the desert, Apache helicopters prowled for moving targets, and HIMARS batteries fired GPS‑guided rockets into suspected ISIS strongholds, joined by Jordanian F‑16s in a display of regional cooperation.
This was followed by another US escalation on 10 January 2026, striking 35 additional targets with more than 90 precision weapons in what CENTCOM called a “large‑scale, deliberate operation aimed at degrading ISIS’s ability to plan and conduct attacks.”
What makes this campaign different from earlier phases of the anti‑ISIS war is the political landscape beneath the bombs. Syria is now led by Ahmed al‑Sharaa, a former jihadist ideologue who broke with ISIS and al‑Qaeda, and built his own faction (Hayat Tahrir al‑Sham or HTS). Thanks to this change at the top, for the first time in decades, Damascus is aligned, at least rhetorically, with the West against a common enemy: ISIS.
The New ISIS-Washington-Damascus Triangle
The relationship between the al‑Sharaa government and ISIS is one of bitter rivalry layered over murky insurgent history. Al‑Sharaa’s movement fought ISIS in Idlib years ago, and his personal ideological feud with Abu Bakr al‑Baghdadi and ISIS leadership predates his current role as head of state. Today, his government frames ISIS as an existential threat that must be contained if Syria is to have any chance at normalcy, and if Damascus is to be accepted as a legitimate partner by the West.
For the US, the airstrikes serve multiple purposes. First, the airstrikes are meant to punish ISIS for killing American personnel, deter further attacks on US troops, and protect the roughly 2,000 US forces still in Syria supporting the Kurdish‑led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Def Sec Pete Hegseth captured the mood in Washington: “This is not the beginning of a war, it is a declaration of vengeance.” Second, Trump has expressed frustration with the 2,000 troops stationed in Syria. He aims to use overwhelming airpower to “finish the job” so he can justify a total withdrawal of ground forces by the end of 2026. Third, by de-listing HTS as a terror group, the Trump administration has positioned the al-Sharaa transition government as a strategic partner. U.S. airstrikes now serve to fill the security vacuum left by Assad’s fall, specifically targeting ISIS cells that have exploited the chaos to regroup in the lawless Badiya Desert. Fourth, more than 10,000 ISIS fighters are held in around 28 detention facilities (like Al-Hol) run by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). With the SDF under pressure from both the new central government and Turkey, the risk of a “mass breakout” has forced the U.S. to use airpower as a tactical solution. Fifth, by including the Royal Jordanian Air Force in Operation Hawkeye Strike, Trump is signalling that regional allies must lead the kinetic fight, with the U.S. providing the high-end tech and intelligence.
Despite the Strikes, ISIS Persists
In the period around Assad’s fall, the ISIS presence saw major fluctuations. In the last year of Assad’s rule, ISIS attacks were surging, averaging around 59 per month nationwide. After his ouster in December 2024 and the initial stabilisation efforts by the new authorities and their partners, those numbers dropped sharply: one study estimates an 80 per cent fall to about 12 attacks per month, while the lethality of attacks dropped by roughly 97 per cent, from some 63 killed per month to about 2. For a time, ISIS seemed genuinely on the ropes.
But “weaker” did not mean “defeated.” Analysts estimate that more than 2,500 ISIS fighters still operate in Syria and Iraq. Their core sanctuaries are the vast Badiya desert, which covers more than half the country, and the Jazira region in the northeast, an area of complex control involving Kurdish forces, Arab militias, and the central state.
As Syria’s transition has faltered, ISIS has found new cracks to exploit. In zones administered by the SDF, for example, attack numbers have started climbing again. The post‑Assad Syria is fragmented: Kurdish authorities, Turkish‑backed factions, remnants of former opposition groups, and the central government all jostle for space. That fragmentation is fertile ground for a patient insurgency. The transition from the Assad regime has triggered new ethnic and religious clashes. ISIS thrives on this “grievance politics,” presenting itself as the only protector of disenfranchised Sunnis in certain rural areas.
Crucially, ISIS no longer needs territory to function in 2026. Its operations are decentralised, relying on encrypted communications and local “sleeper cells” that only activate for high-profile strikes.
Conclusion
Without a long-term political deal, stronger local institutions, and a credible plan for the detention sites, the likely future is continued episodic US airstrikes that limit but do not eradicate ISIS, alongside a persistent risk of resurgence through prison breaks or renewed local support if foreign forces pull back. The future of the region now hinges on a high-stakes gamble: whether U.S. airpower can provide enough of a “security floor” for the al-Sharaa government to consolidate state power and integrate the SDF, or if a premature American exit will allow ISIS to turn the Syrian Desert into a springboard for a second territorial caliphate.
