Introduction
When over 2,500 Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel set out on NH-44 in a convoy of 78 vehicles on the morning of February 14, 2019, it was meant to be a routine and unsuspecting movement from Jammu to Srinagar. However, by the afternoon, the day would be marked by one of the deadliest terror attacks in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) in years. At 1315 hours, a suicide bomber (fidayeen) rammed an explosives-laden vehicle into the convoy at Lethpora, Pulwama, in South Kashmir. The devastating blast cost the lives of forty soldiers of the 76th Battalion, and the Pakistan-based and aided militant group Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) swiftly claimed responsibility for the attack.
The 14th of February 2025, marks six years since the Pulwama suicide attack. From the immediate responses then to the structural changes ever since, much has unfolded in Kashmir and the broader geopolitical landscape. The attack sparked groundbreaking military, diplomatic, and political shifts, with India vowing to respond with strength. It catalysed swift counterterrorism (CT) operations, heightened tensions between India and Pakistan, and, most significantly, set the stage for one of the most historic developments in the region’s recent history–the abrogation of Article 370. Since then, Kashmir has witnessed significant shifts–politically, economically, and in its security landscape. CT measures have intensified, grassroots democratic processes have seen renewed efforts, and economic investments have surged, yet the conflict’s deeper roots remain unresolved.
As we reflect on six years since Pulwama, it becomes crucial to examine the lasting impact of the attack, the trajectory of Kashmir post-2019, and whether the region stands closer to peace or further entrenched in uncertainty.
Dissecting the Attack and its Aftermath
Mere minutes after the incident occurred, JeM released a pre-recorded video of the assailant–a 22-year-old radical Kashmiri named Adil Ahmad Dar who was a resident of Gundibagh village, just 10 kilometres away from the point of attack. In the footage, Dar speaks without hesitation about his impending act, believing that by the time the video is seen by the public, he will be in jannat (Singh, 2020).
A school dropout reported missing since March 2018, Dar’s descent into radicalisation highlighted the larger conundrum of increasing radicalisation amongst Kashmiri youth. Those who were killed in CT operations were pedestalised and lionised as ‘hero-militants,’ martyrs whose actions would embolden the next wave of recruits (Siyech, 2019).
The Pulwama attack was not just a devastating security breach—it became an inflection point in India’s socio-political landscape. Within hours of the attack, prime-time debates amplified a narrative of national outrage. The attack was catapulted into civil society as a rallying cry for retribution, with major news outlets framing it as a direct assault on India’s sovereignty that demanded immediate and decisive action. The media’s coverage not only intensified nationalist sentiment but also set the stage for the Indian government’s swift and decisive diplomatic and military actions. Six years on, the memory of Pulwama is prevalent is deeply embedded in digital discourse. On Instagram alone, hashtags like #PulwamaTerror Attack and #Pulwama have accumulated over 7,05,000 posts and #Balakot has over 65,000 posts–a testament to the attack’s lasting impact on India’s collective consciousness.
In the aftermath of the Pulwama attack, India swiftly implemented diplomatic and economic measures to isolate Pakistan. On 15 February 2019, following a Cabinet Committee on Security meeting chaired by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, India revoked Pakistan’s Most Favored Nation (MFN) status and imposed a 200% customs duty on all imports from Pakistan (@arunjaitley on X, 2019), reinforcing its commitment to holding Pakistan accountable on the global stage. Simultaneously, India launched a successful diplomatic offensive, successfully securing a strong condemnation from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), which underscored the need to hold perpetrators, organisers, and sponsors of terrorism accountable (Satpathy, 2019). As part of this broader strategy, India also intensified its efforts to designate Jaish-e-Mohammed chief Masood Azhar as a global terrorist under the United Nations sanctions regime–a move that ultimately succeeded later that year (Haidar & Lakshman, 2021).
On February 26, 2019, India swiftly retaliated with surgical airstrikes on Balakot, reportedly eliminating 250-300 militants in targeted areas that had the ‘biggest JeM training camp.’ Pakistan immediately refuted these figures, with locals claiming instead that the Indian warplanes had damaged nothing but an uninhabited forest and a wheat field (Hashim, 2019). In response, Pakistan F-16s entered Indian airspace, and in the dogfight that followed, Indian Air Force pilot Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman’s aircraft was shot down in PoK. Tensions grew tenfold after this incident, which sent shockwaves across the nation and the world alike (Haidar & Peri, 2021), eventually subsiding with his return on March 01, 2019.
The most significant political development in Kashmir came barely six months after the Pulwama attack on August 05, 2019, when the Government of India revoked Article 370 of the Constitution through a presidential order and a parliamentary resolution, effectively removing J&K from its special status and reorganising it into two Union Territories (UTs)–J&K and Ladakh. For decades, Article 370 had granted J&K autonomy over its affairs, including its own Constitution, flag, and decision-making powers in all areas except defence, foreign affairs, communications, and finance. The abrogation nullified these provisions, bringing J&K fully under the ambit of the Indian Constitution. The government said that the move was a long-overdue measure to integrate Kashmir with the rest of India and curb separatism and militancy (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2019).
The removal of Article 370 was, in many ways, a direct consequence of Pulwama, reinforcing the government’s stance on tackling militancy and separatism with an iron hand. It fundamentally altered governance in J&K, setting the stage for sweeping political and security reforms. But what has truly changed in the Valley since then? Has the removal of special status led to greater stability and development, or has it deepened political alienation? The next section delves into the realities on the ground, six years after Pulwama and the revocation of J&K’s autonomy.
Jammu and Kashmir Post-2019
- Political Participation
The 2024 elections in J&K marked the first major electoral exercise since 2019, when the Lok Sabha elections were largely boycotted due to unrest, witnessing an unprecedented surge in voter participation at 63.88% for the Legislative Assembly (JKLA) elections (Election Commission, 2024a) and 58.46% for the General elections (Election Commission, 2024b). About 8.7 million eligible citizens participated in the voting process, with 4.45 million males and 4.26 million females. Interestingly, in some of the 90 JKLA constituencies, the turnout of female voters’ turnout was higher than that of males.
While these elections have been touted as a turning point in the contemporary politics of the UT, the turnout figures have sparked mixed responses. On one hand, many interpret the high voter participation as an indicator of a return to normalcy and a Kashmir more integrated with India. The smooth conduct of the elections without any major security issues projects continued stability in the region, reinforcing the narrative that democratic governance has strengthened post-Article 370 abrogation. Additionally, the victory of regional parties and the reinstatement of the provincial legislative assembly could help improve stability in Kashmir (Anfrel, 2024).
On the other hand, critics argue that voter turnout does not necessarily indicate acceptance of the abrogation of Article 370 in the Valley (Tahir, 2024a). While regional parties retained significant support, their ideological stance has undergone a visible shift. Previously, many championed the call for an autonomous Kashmir, but since the abrogation, that rhetoric has faded, with parties now largely focused on governance and local representation rather than reversing the central government’s decision. Despite losing their ideological standing, regional parties remain important to the political landscape of J&K; they are still at the seat of the table and must be recognised accordingly. Furthermore, despite its electoral loss, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) secured the highest vote share in the JKLA elections (Mint, 2024), underscoring its political relevance in the region even as the Congress-National Conference (NC) alliance emerged victorious (Election Commission of India, 2024). These developments indicate a transformed political landscape, where electoral success no longer hinges on the once-dominant autonomy discourse, but rather on broader governance issues.
Despite these debates, one undeniable reality stands out: since 2019, political awareness and participation in Kashmir have surged. More people now feel empowered to voice their aspirations through the ballot, engage in mainstream politics, and reclaim their agency within the democratic framework, marking a profound shift in the region’s political landscape.
- Economic Revival and Human Development
Post-2019, a concerted push for infrastructure development and economic investment has reshaped South Kashmir’s socio-economic landscape, unlocking new opportunities for investment, industrial growth, and infrastructure development. With the application of 890 central laws and the removal of 250 outdated state legislations, the region has become increasingly attractive to both foreign and domestic investors.
Several major corporations have announced significant investment plans. LuLu Group has committed ₹200 crore to food processing and logistics, aiming to enhance supply chain infrastructure in the region (The Hindu, 2022). Dubai-based EMAAR, which made the first foreign investment in J&K with a $60 million shopping and office complex (Bukhari, 2023) has now acquired land for its upcoming multipurpose towers, with construction expected to begin soon (ETV, 2025). Jindal Group has unveiled plans for a world-class ski resort in Gulmarg (Kashmir Observer, 2025), building on its existing investment in the region, which includes the first-ever steel plant in Pulwama, where the foundation stone was laid on February 17, 2023 (Ashiq, 2023). In addition to these commitments, global firms–including Al Maya Group, MATU Investments LLC, GL Employment Brokerage LLC, Century Financial, and Noon E-commerce–have signed Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) to explore further opportunities in J&K. The region’s economic potential continues to grow, with investments reaching $2.5 billion in 2021 alone (ANI, 2022).
Tourism, a key pillar of the region’s economy, has witnessed unprecedented growth. Previously unexplored areas such as Gurez, Keran, Teetwal, and R.S. Pura have been opened for border tourism, while the region is emerging as a hub for adventure and golf tourism (Economic Times, 2024). Popular destinations like Dal Lake and Gulmarg attract thousands of visitors daily, spurring the development of hotels, markets, and adventure activities. The successful hosting of the 3rd G-20 Tourism Working Group Meeting in May 2023 further reinforced J&K’s position as a potential global tourist hub. However, sustaining this momentum will require investment in sustainable tourism infrastructure and policies that balance economic gains with aspects like local aspirations and environmental preservation.
Infrastructure expansion has played a crucial role in this economic transformation, boosted further by the government’s new industrial development scheme with an outlay of ₹28,400 crore. A major milestone is the completion of the Qazigund-Banihal tunnel, which has significantly reduced travel time between Jammu and Srinagar. Road connectivity has improved under schemes like the Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana, while enhanced air travel facilities, including night landing operations in Srinagar and Jammu, have strengthened regional accessibility (PIB, 2023a). Yet, challenges remain, particularly in rural connectivity, where last-mile infrastructure development needs acceleration.
Energy security has also been a focus, with hydropower projects such as Sawlakote, Kirthai and Rattle promising to boost local industries and reduce dependency on external power sources. Meanwhile, the introduction of smart metering aims to address transmission losses, though its success will depend on efficient implementation and public acceptance.
Beyond economic growth, human development indicators in Jammu & Kashmir are gradually improving. Increased investment in health, education, and digital connectivity has widened access to public services (Table 1). The expansion of higher education institutions and skill development initiatives suggests a long-term vision for capacity building, yet concerns persist over equitable access, particularly in remote areas. Bridging this gap will be key to ensuring that economic progress translates into sustainable social development.
Table 1: Synopsis of Development in J&K post-2019
| SECTOR | INITIATIVE | DETAILS |
| EDUCATION | New Medical Colleges | 7 operationalised |
| MBBS Seats | Increased by 800 (Total: 1300) | |
| B.Sc. Nursing and Paramedic | 28 Nursing and 19 Paramedic colleges added | |
| PG Medical Seats | 664 available (297 added after 2019) | |
| AIIMS | AIIMS Jammu operational, AIIMS Kashmir in progress | |
| IIT/IIM | IIT Jammu and IIM Jammu functional | |
| New Degree Colleges | 50 established | |
| HEALTHCARE | Health Insurance | AB-PMJAY-SEHAT covers up to ₹5 lakh per family; 82.22 lakh beneficiaries registered |
| Claims Paid | ₹1,325 Cr paid to 8.87 lakh beneficiaries | |
| WATER SUPPLY | Jal Jeevan Mission | 13.54 lakh rural households provided tap water connections (5.75 lakh pre-2019) |
| AGRICULTURE | High-Density Plantation | 2,900 hectares covered (320 for apples, 2,400 for sub-tropical fruits) |
| PM Kisan Scheme | ₹2,517.08 Cr credited to 12.55 lakh farmers | |
| Kisan Credit Cards (KCC) | 12.83 lakh farmers benefited | |
| Kashmiri Saffron | GI Tagged; promoted nationally & internationally; Saffron Park at Dusoo Pampore | |
| EMPLOYMENT | Government Job | 31,830 selections (Gazetted & Non-Gazetted) since 2019 |
| Self-Employment | 7.4 lakh livelihood opportunities generated since 2021-22 | |
| YOUTH DEVELOPMENT | Sports Participation | Increased from <2 lakh (2018-19) to 62 lakh (2022-23) |
| Mission Youth | 5 lakh+ youth engaged; awarded PM Award for Innovation | |
| TRIBAL DEVELOPMENT | Scholarships | 46,000 tribal students benefited |
| Infrastructure | 8 new hostels, 200 smart schools, 6 Eklavya Model Schools | |
| Skill Development | Training for 2,000 tribals | |
| CULTURAL AND DIGITAL | Digital Governance | M-Seva, e-UNNAT, Digital Village Centre launched |
| Arts and Culture | Focus on preserving heritage, literature, & artistic values |
Source: Ministry of Home Affairs (PIB, 2023a)
- Diminished Influence of Radical Organisations and Militancy
The Indian government has adopted a zero-tolerance policy towards terrorism, employing a comprehensive, multi-pronged strategy to dismantle the terror ecosystem in J&K. In 2023, the Union Home Minister identified Article 370 as a key driver of radicalism and terrorism in the Valley (PIB, 2023b). A subsequent press release in 2024 outlined the security measures undertaken to disrupt militant networks which include sustained counterterrorism operations, stringent clampdown on terror financing networks through property seizures and legal action, and intensified intelligence-sharing among security agencies. Additionally, the modernisation of security infrastructure, round-the-clock surveillance, and reinforcement of counter-insurgency grids have bolstered stability in the region.
As a result, terror-related activities have declined sharply, most notably with organised stone-pelting and hartals, which saw 1,328 and 52 incidents, respectively, in 2018, which were completely eliminated by 2023 and 2024 (PIB, 2024a). Since August 2019, security forces have also been able to significantly curtail militant activities, particularly in South Kashmir and have successfully neutralised several high-profile militants, including HM’s Riyaz Naikoo in 2020 (Ashiq, 2020a). This increased vigilance along the LoC has significantly disrupted the smuggling of arms, leading to a shortage of weapons among militant groups (Shah, 2020).
The Indian government’s renewed crackdown on militant networks, marked by the five-year extension of the ban on Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) on February 27, 2024, has further weakened Kashmir’s militant infrastructure. JeI, a socio-religious organisation linked to Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM), was first designated an ‘Unlawful Organisation’ on February 28, 2019 (PIB, 2024b). Supplementary measures have been introduced to further weaken militant factions in the region. In June 2020, authorities banned funeral processions for slain militants to prevent these gatherings from being exploited as recruitment platforms for extremist groups (Iqbal, 2024). Internet restrictions, including temporary limitations to 2G speeds, have been periodically imposed in response to security concerns, particularly to curb the spread of radical propaganda and misinformation. These measures, aimed at disrupting communication networks used for mobilisation and indoctrination, have been implemented during times of heightened threat (Sharma, 2020). Such prohibition orders underscore the government’s commitment to dismantling terror support structures in the region, exacerbated by the Pulwama attack.
While their success has made tangible impacts, a few aspects remain worrisome. The introduction of new domicile laws on 31 March 2020, for instance, which grant residency rights to those who have lived in J&K for 15 years or completed schooling there, sparked criticism from both Kashmir and Jammu and raised concerns that the policy might limit local representation in higher-tier jobs while reserving only lower-level employment opportunities for residents (Hebber, 2020).
Meanwhile, Pakistan continues to pursue strategic avenues to retain its influence in J&K. In October 2019, military leadership in Rawalpindi facilitated the formation of The Resistance Front (TRF), an offshoot of the jihadistLashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) (Firstpost, 2023). Created in the wake of the abrogation of Article 370, TRF aimed to escalate attacks against Indian security personnel. Drawing its cadres from groups like LeT and HM, TRF adopts non-religious terminology and symbols to project a ‘secular image’, TRF’s operations and rhetoric continue to reflect an agenda aligned with religious extremism, particularly through its track record of targeted killings against religious minorities (Basak, 2021).
The setbacks suffered in South Kashmir forced militant groups to alter their strategies and relocate their operations to the dense forests south of the Pir Panjal range and the rugged terrain of Jammu. Encrypted communication methods, emerging technologies like social media, and AI-driven propaganda are being leveraged to evade security forces and radicalise youth online. The long-term impact of CT measures remains to be seen, as the broader political landscape and Pakistan’s involvement continue to shape the region’s security challenges.
Is dialogue the way forward with Pakistan?
The attack made clear that India’s threshold for tolerating such acts has significantly diminished, and it will continue to take decisive measures to counter the persistent habit of its neighbour of meddling where it doesn’t belong. In many ways, Pulwama became a breaking point. India’s response, particularly the Balakot airstrike, sent an unambiguous message: the era of passive endurance was over. It also marked a historic first–India became the only country to retaliate with military force while keeping the conflict under the nuclear threshold, demonstrating that deterrence could be maintained without inaction. The attack shattered Pakistan’s long-held assumption that it could continue its proxy war with calibrated levels of violence without provoking a strong Indian response. Instead, Pulwama set off a chain of events that fundamentally altered the dynamics of the India-Pakistan conflict.
The revocation of Article 370 and the bifurcation of Jammu and Kashmir into Union Territories were direct consequences of this shift (Sareen, 2020). With this move, India took separatism off the table, reducing the complexity of the conflict and asserting full constitutional integration of the region. Today, India and Pakistan maintain a fragile yet largely intact ceasefire agreement, though occasional skirmishes and tensions continue to test its durability. While the absence of large-scale hostilities is a relief, the underlying fault lines remain unresolved, making the truce more of a temporary pause than a lasting peace.
India has consistently maintained that dialogue with Pakistan is welcome, but it hinges on a fundamental prerequisite: Islamabad must cease its support for cross-border terrorism and militant factions. Historically, leaders like Nawaz Sharif have called for improved ties with India (UN News, 2015), but Pakistan’s actions have never aligned with such overtures. Without a meaningful shift in Pakistan’s policies, engagement remains a non-starter. Adding to the challenge, Pakistan today lacks a cohesive government, raising a fundamental question—who does India even engage with? The civilian leadership has little control over security policy, and internal instability has further eroded the central authority’s capacity to commit to any diplomatic framework. Given this reality, military-to-military engagements, even at the level of retired personnel, may not be amiss as a backchannel avenue to prevent miscalculations.
At the same time, safeguarding national security requires both defensive and strategic recalibration. India must refine its Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), particularly in transporting security personnel, to prevent vulnerabilities like those exposed in Pulwama. Additionally, its counterterrorism strategy must strike a balance between robust military action and deeper engagement with Kashmiri civilians, ensuring they are not alienated but rather empowered as stakeholders in peace. Otherwise, the cycle of marginalisation risks playing into the hands of militant recruiters. The path ahead demands vigilance, adaptability, and a nuanced understanding of South Asian geopolitics. No diplomatic relationship exists in linearity or isolation, and India must leverage its influence in the Indian subcontinent to forge stronger security alliances. Deepening CT cooperation with key partners–including the United States and Gulf nations, where terror networks often seek financial lifelines–will be crucial in disrupting these threats at their source.
In hindsight, Pulwama may well have been Pakistan’s greatest strategic blunder. Rather than weakening India, it shattered old paradigms, compelling New Delhi to redefine its approach. The attack did not just expose Pakistan’s vulnerabilities–it permanently altered the rules of engagement. If Islamabad miscalculates again, it may find itself facing consequences far beyond what it ever anticipated.
