This article originally published at: https://www.eurasiareview.com/09062025-pakistan-navy-a-littoral-force-in-a-blue-water-world-analysis/
he Pakistan Navy (PN) has long sought to project an image of maritime relevance, but a sober assessment of its operational reach, logistical infrastructure, and strategic doctrine reveals a force confined to coastal waters, incapable of sustained power projection beyond the Arabian Sea.
While India’s navy ascends as a blue-water power with global ambitions, Pakistan’s maritime capabilities remain tethered to regional deterrence, anti-piracy patrols, and coastal defence, hallmarks of a brown-water navy.
Limited Operational Reach: Confined to Littoral Zones
The PN’s fleet composition underscores its littoral focus. Its submarine force, comprising five ageing Agosta-class diesel-electric submarines and three Cosmos-class midget submarines, is optimised for shallow-water operations near Pakistan’s coast. These platforms lack the endurance for prolonged oceanic deployments, unlike India’s nuclear-powered INS Arihant-class submarines, which can patrol submerged for months.
Similarly, the PN’s surface fleet- four Tughril-class frigates and four Damen-built offshore patrol vessels (OPVs)-prioritises coastal surveillance and anti-piracy missions rather than deep-sea combat. The OPV 2600-class ships, despite their modular mission capabilities, are limited to 22 knots and lack the armament for high-intensity naval warfare. By contrast, India’s Visakhapatnam-class guided-missile destroyers, displacing 7,400 tons, boast a 4,000-nautical-mile range and advanced anti-air warfare systems.
The PN’s amphibious capabilities further highlight its regional constraints. With four Griffon 2000TD hovercraft and two LCM vessels, it can conduct beach assaults but lacks India’s INS Jalashwa, a 17,000-ton dock landing ship capable of deploying battalion-sized forces overseas. This disparity confines the PN to the Arabian Sea.
Capability Constraints: Logistical Fragility
A blue-water navy requires robust logistical networks, including at-sea replenishment ships and overseas bases. The PN’s replenishment fleet, led by the 27,500-ton PNS Moawin, pales in comparison to India’s Deepak-class fleet tankers, which displace 35,900 tons and support extended deployments. India’s access to strategic bases in Duqm (Oman) and Agaléga (Mauritius) provides forward deployment hubs, while Pakistan relies solely on Karachi and Ormara. The PN’s recent visit to Comoros with PNS Moawin-a rare overseas deployment- emphasised medical diplomacy rather than combat readiness, underscoring its limited power-projection toolkit.
The PN’s aviation wing exacerbates these shortcomings. Outdated Atlantique patrol aircraft and Z-9EC helicopters offer minimal over-the-horizon targeting capabilities, while India’s P-8I Poseidons and carrier-based MiG-29Ks provide unmatched maritime domain awareness. Without aerial refuelling or advanced reconnaissance assets, the PN’s operational radius remains shackled to coastal radar coverage.
Strategic Depth Deficiency: Doctrine and Force Structuring
The PN’s 2018 maritime doctrine, Preserving Freedom of Seas, prioritises anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategies, focusing on coastal defence and deterring Indian naval incursions. Investments in Harbah cruise missiles and Agosta-90B submarines reflect this reactive posture, which contrasts sharply with India’s proactive blue-water doctrine,emphasising “distant operations” and carrier strike groups. The PN has no aircraft carriers, no nuclear submarines, and no plans to acquire either, ceding power projection to India’s dual carriers (INS Vikramaditya and INS Vikrant) and Arihant-class SSBNs.
Pakistan’s much-touted Hangor-class submarine program, involving eight Chinese-designed Yuan-class boats, will not alter this calculus. While these submarines may enhance A2/AD capabilities, their diesel-electric propulsion and reliance on foreign technology limit their strategic impact. India’s Project-75, meanwhile, delivers Kalvari-class submarines with air-independent propulsion (AIP), while its nuclear triad-bolstered by INS Arighat-secures second-strike capabilities.
Comparative Analysis: India’s Ascent vs. Pakistan’s Stagnation
India’s naval modernisation highlights the chasm between the two forces. The Indian Navy operates two aircraft carriers, including the 45,000-ton INS Vikrant, which accommodates 30 fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters, while Pakistan lacks even a single carrier. India’s nuclear submarine fleet, featuring the INS Arihant and INS Arighat, provides undersea strategic deterrence, whereas Pakistan’s submarine force remains entirely conventional. India’s overseas bases in Duqm and Agaléga enable power projection across the Indian Ocean, while Pakistan’s naval infrastructure is confined to domestic ports.
Logistical disparities are equally stark. India’s Deepak-class fleet tankers displace 35,900 tons and support global deployments, while Pakistan’s PNS Moawin, at 27,500 tons, is limited to regional refuelling. India’s P-8I Poseidons offer unmatched maritime surveillance, whereas Pakistan’s Atlantiques patrol aircraft are outdated and lack endurance. Even the PN’s flagship Tughril-class frigates, armed with HHQ-16 SAMs, are outgunned by India’s Project-15B destroyers equipped with BrahMos supersonic missiles.
A Coast-Hugging Force
The Pakistan Navy’s operational reach, logistical fragility, and coastal-defence doctrine firmly place it in the brown-water category. While it has tried to modernise to counter India regionally, it lacks the strategic vision, assets, and infrastructure for sustained blue-water operations. India’s maritime expansion-marked by carrier groups, nuclear submarines, and overseas bases-reflects a mature blue-water doctrine. For Pakistan, bridging this gap would require unprecedented budgetary outlays and doctrinal shifts, neither of which are feasible amid economic crises and geopolitical isolation. Until then, the PN remains a littoral force, tethered to the shores of the Arabian Sea.
