Introduction –
The present violence on the streets of Dhaka has pushed the country to the edge of a political breaking point. The shooting and death of Sharif Osman Hadi, the mass demonstration at the Central Shaheed Minar, and the subsequent diplomatic escalation between Dhaka and Delhi, has ignited a nationwide wave of anger that has spread beyond the capital to Rajshahi, Chattogram, and Khulna.
This article therefore talks about the series of events happened in December 2025 and examines how the intersection of generational mobilisation, violent suppression, mass protests, and bilateral diplomacy produced a transformation in Bangladesh’s internal and external identity.
This analysis argues that the trajectory leading to these escalation cannot be understood simply as a diplomatic dispute but an inflection point in Bangladesh’s national political evolution. The core research question here is threefold : First, how a sequence of domestic events—from the shooting of Hadi on 12 December to mass rallies and marches—fed into India’s decision to summon Bangladesh’s High Commissioner. Second, what roles youth led platforms, especially Inquilab Mancha, July Oikya, and NCP, played in constructing a new anti-hegemony narratives into mainstream politics and challenged India’s historic position within Bangladesh’s public consciousness. Third, what these developments reveal about Bangladesh’s evolving political identity as it does points toward a future in which foreign policy is no longer monopolised by the government but shaped by public mobilisation and popular sentiment.
The Emergence of New Political Actors –
In the post‑July order, a set of new actors emerged as central players, such as July Oikya, or the July Unity, NCP developed into a structured electoral vehicle for sovereignty-driven politics, and Inquilab Mancha emerged as the most influential post-uprising movement, representing a fusion of revolutionary identity, civic mobilisation, and electoral aspiration. All these groups entered the political space through different operational pathways, but all shared a common ideological thread and hence are youth driven, digitally organised, ideologically decentralised, and accountable to public sentiment rather than party hierarchy.
- Inquila Mancha
Inquila Mancha, born out of July Revolution is one of the most influential movement because it does not adhere to the ideological boundaries associated with left or right politics, but it is rooted in the uprising’s narrative of generational justice and resistance to entrenched elites. Electorally too, Inquilab Mancha, popularity has surged in 2025 as Inquilab Mancha’s spokesperson Sharif Osman Hadi became an independent candidate for Dhaka-8. News reporting confirms that on 12 December 2025, Hadi was critically wounded in a broad-daylight shooting in Dhaka, transforming Inquilab Mancha from an aspirational force into a national rallying point. Previously, Hadi has frequently spoken against Indian Influence on Bangladesh’s affairs, and has also criticised major political parties in Bangladesh, including both the Awami League.
In the wake of the attack on Hadi, political parties and civic organisations—including the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami—joined Inquilab Mancha in organising protest marches and rallies accusing pro-establishment forces of attempting to sabotage Bangladesh’s democratic transition. A video circulating widely on social media platforms through unofficial channels of Musaddique Ali Ibn Mohammad, one of the spokesperson of July Unity and DUCSU’s Secy, where he is seen addressing a group shortly after the protest was broken up. He is heard making inflammatory remarks, stating: “Next time we will come, everyone will have axes and pickaxes in their hands. Not a single brick will be left here. Everything belonging to the Indian High Commission in Bangladesh will be uprooted and expelled from the country,”. Protesters have also bulldozed Awami league office in Rajshahi on 19 December around 1:30 am, and have ransacked Prothom Alo and daily star office following the death of leader Osman Hadi. The protesters are chanting slogan ‘ousted fascist regime’ and are demanding the immediate removal of the Indian Assistant high commissioner in Rajshahi.
- July Oikya
July Oikya framed itself as “July Unity,” brought together student organisations, protest networks, civil society actors, retired servicemen, and allied political groups under a shared motto of national sovereignty and resistance to external influence. Unlike Inquilab Mancha, which embodied ideological energy, July Oikya played a central role in organising post-uprising street campaigns, including commemorative marches, demonstrations demanding justice for victims of state violence, and most notably, the protest pathway on 17 December 2025, toward the Indian High Commission in Gulshan, Dhaka, demanding accountability for the shooting of Hadi and the repatriation of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, who remained in India after fleeing following the July Revolution.
- National Citizen Party
NCP formed in the aftermath of the uprising , embodies institutional ambition. Officially launched by young leaders and led by figures such as Hasnat Abdullah, who has used the platform to challenge legacy policy directly. He was the one who recently issued stark geopolitical warnings, asserting that attempts to destabilise Bangladesh could produce consequences in India’s Northeast. These remarks by the NCP leader were widely reported as threatening to “isolate” or “detach” the Northeast, directly touching India’s core territorial sensitivities.
All these events and emergence of new actors represents ideological energy, mobilisation infrastructure, and institutional ambition. Prominent student figures such as Sharif Osman Hadi, Musaddique Ali Ibn Mohammad, AB Zubair (a DUCSU leader seen prominently during the march toward the Indian High Commission), and Hasnat Abdullah are not politicians by title, but by function. They have evolved into national personalities through their leadership roles in rallies, public statements, organisational work, and symbolic representation of generational values.
Role of Social Media –
The speed at which information travels across Twitter, Telegram, Facebook has bypassed the traditional journalistic filters by showing real time responses. Within hours of 12 December attack in Bijoynagar on Hadi, CCTV clips circulated widely on Instagram Reels and Facebook showing masked assailants trailing Hadi’s autorickshaw before firing at close range. These videos were shared by accounts linked to Inquilab Mancha and student networks, who are the actual producers and distributors of the narrative. The aftermath of Hadi’s death has triggered immediate protests in Dhaka, where demonstrators torched government and Awami League properties and surrounded media offices, reflecting a volatile environment where frustration and political activism are blending with aggressive narratives. Videos and photographs of street clashes, stone-throwing, are also documented as the protesters gather outside the residence of India’s Deputy High Commissioner in Chattogram, hurling stones and shouting anti-India slogans. The prominence of slogans such as “Demolish Indian aggression!”, and statements by NCP leaders—such as Sarjis Alam declaring, “We are in a war! The Indian High Commission will remain closed until Hadi’s assassins are returned” have spread across digital platforms within hours of the news, accelerating the speed of public reaction before traditional media could fully contextualise events. The youth of Bangladesh has consumed these clips as expressions of heroic sovereignty rather than disruptive demonstration.
In contrast the mainstream media bounded by editorial responsibilities is slower and cautious. Before they even publish the event, the public interpretation had already solidified online. With respect to Hadi’s death, mainstream outlets initially framed the incident in procedural terms: as an ongoing investigation, an electoral security concern, and after the public anger escalated, mainstream media reporting increasingly diverged from the emotional narratives circulating online. The December escalation therefore shows that the digital media no longer reflect the political reality, it produces it.
India’s Diplomatic Response –
India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) summoned Bangladesh High Commissioner M. Riaz Hamidullah, amid reports of highly charged anti-India rallies, online threats directed at Indian personnel, and attempts by protesters—especially under the “July Oikya” banner—to march toward the Indian High Commission in the Gulshan diplomatic enclave. India rejected what “false and misleading narratives” that linked India to the Hadi shooting or to efforts to subvert the post‑uprising transition. All this has led to protests and rallies that further led to temporary closure of India’s visa centre at Jamuna Future Park. The atmosphere sharpened between 15 to 17 December, as social media footage from Shaheed Minar and satellite rallies showed protesters denouncing India as an obstacle to Bangladesh’s revolutionary transition.
Against this backdrop, Foreign Affairs Adviser Md Touhid Hossain declared publicly that Bangladesh did not seek “advice” from India on how to conduct its elections and mentioned that India remained silent during the fifteen years of disputed elections under the Hasina administration. Previously, on 6 February 2025, after Sheikh Hasina, accused the Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus, of orchestrating a “meticulous plan” to assassinate her, and based on this Dhaka summoned the Head of Mission of the Indian High Commission in Bangladesh.
The paradox here is stark as this dynamic shows nation-building through opposition, where external conflict substitutes for internal coherence. Bangladesh’s post-uprising movements claim sovereignty, political maturity and demands autonomy, but their mobilisation relies heavily on external antagonism to generate ideological cohesion. Thus, India’s response has pushed the crisis back into Bangladesh’s domestic arena, signalling that the answer to Bangladesh’s violence, fragmentation, and mobilisation lies within Dhaka—not Delhi.
Conclusion –
The capital, Dhaka, since July 2024 uprising has witnessed multiple waves of demonstrations and protests, from nationwide student strikes and sit-ins against institutional discrimination to mass political rallies demanding accountability and structural reforms. These protests and marches centred on university campuses, has kept the city in near-constant political ferment for months. One notable episode was in early 2025 were we saw a controversial “Bulldozer March” that resulted in the demolition of the former Bangabandhu Memorial Museum at Dhanmondi in February, and now in December 2025, thousands have taken to the capital’s road again.
December 2025 represents deeper shifts in Bangladesh’s internal power structure. The Youth‑led platforms of Bangladesh now operate as a de facto power centre capable of convening broad coalitions. All these chain of events from the attempted assassination of a youth leader, the mass rally at Shaheed Minar, the march to the Indian High Commission, the NCP’s Northeast rhetoric, India’s summoning of the Bangladeshi envoy and visa shutdown, statement by Touhid Hossain, and representation by the digital platforms, reveals that – the internal actors are treating India as a political symbol, the power has shifted from traditional elites to decentralised social movements and digital platforms are now shaping public perception faster than the government statements. The present violence therefore, has exposed the reality that Bangladesh’s political transition remains incomplete and these new actors have been given unprecedented power, visibility, and popular legitimacy leading to a national narrative constructed against external mirrors rather than internal cohesion. At this point, Bangladesh’s future depends not on the intensity of its street politics, but on its ability to stabilise its inner landscape.
