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Beyond the Political Rhetoric: Operation Sindoor – A Clinical Victory Separating Facts from Fiction

Lt Gen Devendra Pratap Pandey, PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd)byLt Gen Devendra Pratap Pandey, PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd)
December 18, 2025
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Political environment was always polarised in India, but the Indian Military had retained unquestioned loyalty across the spectrum of polity and population. Due to the shift in today’s complex political posturing  the military finds itself in the centre of detraction for mileage— not a  healthy sign but cannot be avoided. In the eyes of the doting population, fortunately, the  Indian Armed Forces continue to remain far ahead of other verticals, including politicians, in terms or respect and belief.

With an important political figure making ridiculous negative assertions on the success of “Operation Sindoor” and questioning the relevance of 12 Lakh strong Army, it becomes imperative to reinforce what Indian population and the world knows and few partisans within the country try to ignore. What was distressing truly was that this statement came on Vijay Diwas, the very date on which the Indian Military gave the resounding 14 days blitzkrieg type of operational success creating a new country, capturing 93,000 prisoners of war— a record of sorts since World Wars, unbroken till date, and a place on honour in the comity of Nations when the most powerful country of that time was allied against India. It is pertinent to see how the Indian Armed Forces have grown through the ages and through the complex challenges, sometimes posed by the changing political dynamics. Before 1971 and since then the Indian Armed Forces have continued to correct political failures in National Security realms, both externally and internal, through denial of necessary military equipment or delaying the upgradations required in human resource additions or changes.

Recent discussion of ‘Operation Sindoor’ demonstrates this concerning pattern, with detractors characterising India’s coordinated military action as either an ‘emotional response or a complete tactical failure’. The said, political figure made the puzzling claim that ‘India had lost the combat operation in the first two days of Operation Sindoor and has no need for its 12-lakh strong Army in the modern warfighting environment’. Such  misrepresentations fundamentally distorts what actually occurred and undermines the dedication and expertise of the India’s Armed Forces, who carried out an exceptionally complex multi-domain military campaign.

Understanding the Strategic Context

The civilian attack in Pahalgam on 22 April  2025, resulting in 26 deaths, constituted more than an isolated terrorist incident; it represented a calculated provocation aimed at testing India’s willingness to respond. Decision-makers faced a pivotal choice: launch a measured restraint that characterised past responses of dossiers, or make clear that terrorism originating across  border would trigger substantial military retaliation.

Operation Sindoor embodied this second approach; a measured yet forceful military action designed to destroy terrorist capabilities while demonstrating India’s determination to exact consequences for state-supported terrorism. The operation took its name from the “vermillion” signifying an oath to the victims and their loved ones that, accountability would be relentlessly pursued.

Deconstructing the ‘First Day Defeat’ Narrative

 The most common criticism levelled at Operation Sindoor claims that the Indian Forces experienced defeat during the operation’s initial days. This argument falls apart when examined against the mission’s genuine goals and results showcased by the Pakistanis themselves and the world commercial satellites and news networks.

Before dawn on May 7, the Indian Armed Forces conducted military operations with specific instructions: eliminate identified high-priority terrorist locations using precise strikes while avoiding civilian harm. Planners designated nine main targets, including the Jaish-e-Mohammed facility in Bahawalpur and the Lashkar-e-Taiba command centre in Muridke, both operating openly for many years.

The operation utilised a complex multi-layered strategy drawing on India’s range of precision weapons. Cruise missiles enabled Indian aircraft to strike targets while remaining beyond Pakistani air defence range. For objectives needing tactical flexibility, the IAF used guided weapons, which can adjust course during flight and minimise unintended damage.

The active combat portion spanned roughly 23 minutes from initial weapon deployment to operational closure on targets at Bahawalpur and Muridke by the Airforce while the Indian Army’s continued pounding on the remaining objectives for longer periods. The Indian Airforce successfully manoeuvred through Pakistan’s comprehensive air defence network during this period, using advanced electronic countermeasures including radar disruption and decoy drones that overwhelmed enemy detection systems.

Analysis after the strikes verified that all nine main targets experienced substantial or total destruction. The Bahawalpur compound was completely demolished. Comparable devastation occurred at Muridke and the remaining seven locations.

Measured by standard military benchmarks,target elimination, mission success percentage, aircraft attrition, civilian harm, the May 7 operation accomplished their designated purpose. Labelling a mission that achieved complete kinetic success as a ‘defeat’ demonstrates either profound misunderstanding of military doctrine or deliberate factual manipulation for political gain. The mission assigned by the highest authority satisfied the desire  ofIndian population. There was enough exhilaration on ground to be seen by the doubters and the fear was palpable across in the terrorist establishments and their masters viz. the Pakistani Military establishment.

The Unsung Heroes: India’s Air Defence Network

 Though offensive operations dominated news coverage, India’s military readiness truly faced testing in the subsequent hours and days. Pakistan’s counter-response, described by officials as an integrated assault using drones, missiles and artillery, offered the initial combat verification of India’s domestically-produced air defence systems.

India’s Air Defence infrastructure functioned as a layered network, with individual components addressing threats at varying altitudes and distances. The Akash surface-to-air system, created by DRDO, formed the core of medium-altitude defence. Throughout Operation Sindoor, Akash installations exhibited strong dependability and precision, engaging threats with success rates surpassing peacetime test results.

Working alongside Akash, the jointly developed Indo-Israeli MRSAM system delivered protection against aircraft and missiles extending to 70 kilometres. MRSAM installations achieved numerous successful interceptions across the three-day period, including against evasive targets using terrain for concealment.

Yet the most remarkable performance involved counter-drone operations by Army Air Defence personnel. The confrontation represented what defence analysts consider the first significant drone combat between nuclear-capable nations. Pakistan deployed dozens of unmanned systems, including Turkish-manufactured models configured for intelligence gathering and strike missions.

Indian Air Defence crews used both physical and electronic methods against the drone formations. Modernised L-70 anti-aircraft weapons with contemporary targeting systems proved unexpectedly effective against slower drones. Concurrently, electronic warfare teams used jamming technology that severed communication between drone operators and their aircraft, forcing many drones to malfunction/or either crash or abort.

The data presents a clear picture— from approximately 80-plus drones launched by Pakistani forces throughout the three days, less than twelve could penetrate sufficiently into Indian territory or pose any threat to vital infrastructure, but  none were able to strike any civilian or military installation. They are significant part of the 12 Lakh Indian Army.

The Line of Control: Where Resolve Met Reality

While aerial operations captured media attention, troops stationed along the Line of Control and International Border endured the operation’s most prolonged pressure. The destruction on seven terrorists launchpads and bases in Pakistan Punjab and Pakistan occupied Jammu and Kashmir was complete. Thereafter,  these personnel confronted sustained artillery attacks and infiltration attempts throughout the campaign’s duration due to scaled up retaliation from the Pakistani Army.

The Indian forces answered with ‘measured escalation’; precision counter-battery strikes aimed exclusively at military installations conducting attacks rather than widespread retaliation. This surgical approach reduced Pakistani civilian casualties, denying opponents propaganda value while showcasing India’s capability to pinpoint and engage specific military objectives.

The Border Security Force and Army personnel also defeated numerous infiltration efforts during the three-day span. Vigilant Indian troops, equipped with thermal detection and unmanned surveillance, identified and stopped these attempts. Multiple militants died in exchanges of fire, while others withdrew across the border.

Tri-Service Integration in Action

 Perhaps Operation Sindoor’s most important dimension involved the exceptional coordination between India’s three military branches. The Army Chief’sdescription of the operation as a ‘trusted orchestra’ accurately captured how the Army, Air Force, and Navy operated as a unified instrument of national capability.

Intelligence flowed between services almost instantaneously, with satellite analysis from Air Force resources becoming immediately accessible to Army strike planning teams. Naval aviation conducted ocean surveillance that shaped both offensive planning and defensive positioning. Electronic warfare resources were shared across services, generating a complete electromagnetic awareness picture.

The Indian Navy’s contribution proved strategically vital. Through assuming an assertive stance in the Arabian Sea, the Navy successfully prevented any Pakistani effort to establish a maritime battlefront. Naval forces maintained elevated readiness and assertive patrol operations, compelling the Pakistan Navy to remain mostly within its own waters. The ocean component also encompassed protecting India’s offshore energy assets, particularly natural gas installations in the Bombay High area.

The Final Closure

The Pakistan military decided to publicly showcase the brotherhood and camaraderie with the dead and alive terrorists and followed up with drone and attempted missile attacks— all of which failed to cause any damages. They were able to kill civilians, destroy homes, a Temple and Gurudwara, through deliberate attacks. The response was then escalated by the Indian Armed Forces on 10 May early hours, wherein key Pakistan military installations including airbases and strategic military assets were destroyed in 25 minutes— thus shocking Pakistan and assistance providers. Key military equipment and network provided by the world’s best were breached and destroyed.

The Strategic Aftermath

Military campaigns require assessment not merely by tactical performance but by strategic results. Operation Sindoor was paused on 10 May  at 1700 hours even though there was a ceasefire request by the Pakistani Directors General of Military Operation. The ceasefire circumstances reveal much about operational success.

Pakistani representatives-initiated ceasefire negotiations—an important detail largely ignored by political critics looking for letting down the government of the day. It is for their knowledge that when nuclear-armed adversaries confront each other, the side pursuing de-escalation typically recognises it ‘has depleted viable military alternatives or determined that ongoing confrontation presents unacceptable dangers’.

Ceasefire conditions reportedly incorporated Pakistani commitments toward addressing terrorist infrastructure within their borders— a concession earlier India failed to obtain. International responses to Operation Sindoor also demonstrated India’s effective narrative and diplomatic management. Major nations, while advocating de-escalation, generally avoided condemning India’s actions or equating the initial terrorist attack with India’s military reply.

Measuring Success: Beyond Body Counts

Operation Sindoor’s final tally includes sobering figures: more than 100 terrorists eliminated, nine major terrorist facilities destroyed, numerous launchers and training sites disabled. The death and injuries of Pakistani military personnel is not being counted. However, concentrating solely on these combat statistics risks overlooking the wider strategic context. Operation Sindoor’s achievements warrant evaluation across multiple dimensions:

  • Deterrence Enhancement. Did the operation raise perceived consequences of enabling cross-border terrorism? The rapidity, accuracy and scope of India’s response revealed capabilities not previously demonstrated operationally.
  • Capability Demonstration. Did the operation display military proficiency that modifies adversary thinking? The combination of precision strikes, air defence and inter-service coordination showed operational sophistication demanding respect and caution.
  • Domestic Credibility. Did the operation satisfy public expectations for accountability after Pahalgam? The substantial public backing for the operation and government indicates success in assuring citizens that their government would respond decisively to terrorism.
  • International Positioning. Did the operation enhance or diminish India’s global standing? The limited international criticism and ongoing defence partnerships with key allies suggests no meaningful diplomatic harm.
  • Operational Learning.Did the operation produce insights that strengthen future military performance? Ongoing after-action assessments will pinpoint improvement areas, but successful combat execution supplies invaluable information.

The Strategic Imperative: Why India Needs Its 12 Lakh Strong Force?

The dismissive claim that India does not require its 12-lakh strong military force reveals a profound ignorance of the nation’s strategic realities and security challenges. India’s geographical position and threat environment demand precisely this level of military capability; if anything, the force is stretched thin given its responsibilities.

Consider the sheer scale of India’s security requirements: the nation maintains a 15,106-kilometer land border, the fifth longest in the world, spanning diverse and challenging terrain from the Himalayan heights to desert expanses. The Line of Actual Control with China alone extends 3,488 kilometres across some of the planet’s most inhospitable territory, requiring constant vigilance and substantial troop deployments at extreme altitudes. The Line of Control and International Border with Pakistan spans 3,323 kilometres, much of it actively contested and requiring continuous military presence to prevent infiltration and respond to ceasefire violations.

India’s maritime responsibilities are equally demanding, with a 7,516-kilometer coastline and island territories extending India’s Exclusive Economic Zone to approximately 2.3 million square kilometres. Securing these waters against traditional naval threats, piracy, terrorism and illegal trafficking requires substantial naval and coast guard capabilities operating continuously across the Indian Ocean Region.

Beyond external borders, India faces persistent internal security challenges. Left-wing extremism affects multiple states, requiring deployment of security forces for counter-insurgency operations. The northeastern states present complex security situations involving multiple insurgent groups. Kashmir continues to witness terrorist infiltration attempts and requires significant military presence for counter-terrorism operations. Natural disasters, from Himalayan floods to coastal cyclones, regularly necessitates large-scale military deployment for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

India’s strategic environment compounds these challenges. The nation faces a two-front threat scenario, with both Pakistan and China as adversarial neighbours, occasionally coordinating their policies to India’s disadvantage. China’s military modernisation and aggressive posturing along the LAC, demonstrated during the 2020 Galwan crisis and subsequent standoffs, necessitates maintaining credible deterrence along the northern borders. Pakistan’s persistent support for cross-border terrorism requires constant counter-terrorism readiness and periodic punitive capabilities, as Operation Sindoor itself demonstrated.

Furthermore, India’s growing global responsibilities and interests demand expeditionary capabilities. As the world’s fifth-largest economy with expanding trade networks and diaspora populations worldwide, India requires the ability to protect its citizens and interests abroad, conduct evacuation operations, participate in international peacekeeping and contribute to regional stability.

The 12-lakh figure, representing approximately 1.2 million active personnel across the Army, Navy and Air Force—a modest figure compared to many nations facing similar security challenges. When distributed across the vast geographical expanse, multiple operational theatres, reserve formations, training establishments and support echelons, this force provides barely adequate coverage for India’s security needs.

Critics who question this force size often fail to understand that military strength isn’t measured merely in numbers but in the capability to simultaneously defend multiple borders, maintain strategic reserves, sustain operations over extended periods and deter adversaries from miscalculation. Operation Sindoor itself required coordination across multiple commands, services and formations— a task impossible without substantial force structure.

Suggesting India could manage with significantly fewer forces demonstrates either strategic naivety or deliberate political mischief. The 12-lakh strong military is not a luxury or political indulgence; it’s a strategic necessity dictated by geography, threat environment and national interests. If anything, ongoing modernisation and capability enhancement programs suggest that India’s security establishment recognises that quality and capability matter as much as quantity in contemporary warfare.

Conclusion: The Truth in  Details

Operation Sindoor represented neither an emotional gesture nor a tactical failure. It constituted a methodically planned, expertly executed military campaign that realised its declared goals while controlling escalation dangers and preserving international legitimacy. The defeat narrative, advanced by political opponents, dissolves when confronted with verified facts— targets eliminated, defences confirmed effective, integration accomplished and ceasefire obtained on advantageous terms.

For the air defence personnel who remained at their positions for 72 hours; for the aviators who entered hostile airspace to execute precision attacks; for the troops who defended isolated positions under artillery bombardment; for the naval crews who sustained alertness in the Arabian Sea, Operation Sindoor represented no failure. It demonstrated their expertise, the military’s competence and the nation’s determination.

The ‘sindoor’ referenced in Operation Sindoor’s designation represented a profound commitment to Pahalgam’s victims. The subsequent military implementation proved deliberate, systematic and clinical; precisely how contemporary military operations should function. Claiming otherwise will not only misrepresent the  reality, but will also dishonour the personnel who converted strategic objectives into operational accomplishment under the most challenging conditions.

As India continues managing a complicated security landscape, Operation Sindoor’s insights will shape future responses to provocation. The operation created a framework for multi-domain campaigns, confirmed indigenous defence capabilities and proved that India maintains both capability and determination to impose penalties on those threatening its people. Ultimately, that defines exactly what military forces exist to accomplish and exactly what Operation Sindoor achieved.

The only desire as a retired soldier remains that those critics must live in trenches and operate along the world’s best Armed Forces in the operational areas, atleast a month before passing comments and judgements.

The Article was first published in News 18 digital on 17 December 2025. The views expressed are personal.

Tags: CLAWSIndian MilitaryMisinformationNarrative WarfareOPERATION SINDOOR
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