At the 2nd China-Central Asia Summit in Astana, on 17 June 2025, China sealed a new treaty amid a turbulent global landscape—marked by growing instability, ongoing conflicts, and economic slowdown. Even in the week leading up to the Summit—dominated by the Israel-Iran escalation and the G7 meetings—China quietly secured its strategic interests in Central Asia, while the US and the West remained preoccupied with conflict management, diplomatic mediation, and redrawing geostrategic priorities elsewhere.
The agreement highlights China’s deepening strategic engagement in Central Asia, with a clear tilt towards enhanced security cooperation. Coming less than a month after the release of China’s White Paper on the “National Security Concept”, Beijing’s security doctrine now finds a home and institutional space in Central Asia. This move marks a reasonable shift in China’s grand strategy and foreign policy thinking—where development is increasingly tied to security imperatives in a dynamic world order.
Treaty in the Storm
What makes this treaty headline-worthy now? The remarks by China’s President Xi Jinping echoed across mainland Chinese media, signalling the significance of the current gentle storm. China’s approach contrasts global instability with a strategic bet on diplomacy—indeed a smart move to keep one part of its neighbourhood stable from the spillover effect of conflicts elsewhere and external influence. It aims to present an image of a country that is stable, invested in long-term interests, and a symbol of consistent, peaceful partnership—especially when viewed against the US’s episodic and reactive engagement in Central Asia.
The anxiety over the current transition phase to a fully diverse multipolar world order is evident in Xi’s keynote address. The targeted comments of “There is no winner in tariff wars or trade wars” … “Humanity must not regress to the law of the jungle. Instead, we should build a community with a shared future for mankind” reflect the same. The notes further state, “support the growing role of Central Asia in international affairs”, adding that it is ready to work with all partners to “build international justice and oppose hegemonism and power politics”. A multipolar world is not a favourable condition particularly when two great powers are keen on a G2 format. China’s messaging through the Summit is clear: it seeks to inject a stabilising force into an increasingly unstable world without directly targeting the aspirations of major countries.
From Development to Deterrence: China Rewrites the Rules in Central Asia
It’s equally important to examine what lies behind the headlines. Beyond the obvious economic security alignment of “mutual” economic interests; China has significantly deepened collaboration with C5 on a wide range of security threats—“extremism, terrorism, separatism, drug trafficking, illegal arms trade, irregular migration, and human trafficking”. In this context, Xi’s comment about “modernizing their national defense, law enforcement and security capacities” in the region stands out and requires close monitoring. The stated priority: “combating terrorism, transnational organized crime, and ensuring cybersecurity”.
China sees itself as encircled and facing flashpoints across its entire eastern seaboard. In contrast, Central Asia offers relatively subtle points of contention. Stability here becomes essential, especially as part of Beijing’s broader development-to-deterrence approach. The country that aligns closely with China tends to receive the most economic and security benefits—and in this calculus, Kazakhstan emerges as the first line of both defence and opportunity. This reflects the deepening strategic nature of China’s engagement in the region—where development and deterrence are no longer separate paths but part of an integrated foreign policy playbook.
Insecurity as Strategy: Reimagines Influence Through Partnership
China relies on partnerships in the absence of formal alliances. Forming alliances, especially in today’s landscape is unfeasible and strategically unwise. Due to overwhelming interests in the multipolar order, there’s little appetite in the region for hard blocs or ideological camps. On top of that, China still depends on the US in several critical domains—from trade to investment and resources to technology, while the power gap between them remains significant. Given these constraints, the most thoughtful option Beijing has chosen institutionalising security partnerships with welcoming and neutral countries. This model was further consolidated last year with the establishment of a China-Central Asia Secretariat in Xi’an.
What stands out is the clear pattern of mutual articulation of aspirations. The Central Asian Republics have not just shown interest—they’ve voiced specific expectations. Kyrgyz President Sadyr Zhaparov outlined six strategic priorities for deepening ties with China: “transport and transit connectivity, energy, finance and e-commerce, education and science, tourism, and security”.
China’s response was prompt and tailored. China responded positively to Kazakhstan President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s proposal for “high-tech, fourth-stage production facilities focused on high-value products” ….. also emphasised cooperation in agriculture, particularly in developing “advanced agricultural technologies and effective water-saving” methods. To mark this new phase, 2025–2026 has been declared the “Years of High-Quality Development of China-Central Asia Cooperation”.
On logistics, a tangible outcome is the newly launched “Tianfu” cross-border transport route connecting Sichuan to Central Asia—cutting delivery times down to 12–18 days. In parallel, China, together with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, will accelerate the modernisation of existing port infrastructure and assess the need for new ports. Beijing looks to further deepen cooperation on trade, energy and infrastructure with the resource-rich region. A key signal lies in the inclusion of aspects of the Global Security Initiative (GSI), with the treaty reaffirming firm support for “each country’s independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity”—along with principles such as “sovereign equality and the inviolability of borders”.
China’s Silent Surge: “New Great Game” of Numbers
It appears that China is playing a quiet but calculated game—the “New Great Game” of numbers. The treaty signed amid global turbulence subtly underscores security, strategy, and China’s steady rise. A total of 55 cooperation documents, 55 measures and initiatives were agreed upon—marking tangible progress across sectors including “politics, economy, law, and the humanities”. Several new institutional platforms were launched: the China-Central Asia Poverty Reduction Cooperation Centre, the Education Exchange Cooperation Centre, and the Desertification Control Cooperation Centre. These were complemented by the China-Central Asia Smooth Trade Cooperation Platform, further anchoring China’s long-term development footprint in the region.
Beijing also emphasised Central Asia’s emerging role as a key logistics hub connecting Asia and Europe. The trade numbers reflect this rise. In 2024, 40 per cent of Central Asia’s foreign trade, a record USD 95 billion from China—with Kazakhstan trading alone USD 44 billion. Notably, Kazakhstan handles 85 per cent of all land-based transportation from China to Europe. In terms of transported cargo volume from China through Central Asian corridors exceeded 211,000 containers.
China also committed to improving connectivity by land and air—with plans to enhance road and railway links and to expand direct flights. Subsequently, efforts are being made to simplify visa procedures and open new consular offices with the five countries. This quiet surge—grounded in agreements, infrastructure, and institutional architecture—shows how China is shaping influence not through headlines or hard power, but through steady, data-driven diplomacy.
New Stakes, New Players: The C5+1’s Expanding Appeal
China’s deepening engagement with Central Asia has triggered a new wave of similar arrangements from other powers. What’s unfolding is a replication of the C5+1 format—almost identical in structure and ambition—across multiple actors. China’s strategy for Central Asia is fanke weizhu meaning fanke weizhu (reverse the position of the host and the guest) equations—also prominent in Deng Xiaoping’s “Western Development” [西部大开发: xībùdàkāifā]. Xi Jinping hosted the first China-Central Asia Summit in Xi’an in 2023. The following year, he attended the 2024 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit, and this year China became the guest at the second Central Asia Summit—underlining China’s sustained visibility in the region. The format of alternative summits in China and Central Asia, and the frequency of China hosting it is interesting to note here.
The C5+1 format is clearly gaining momentum. Russia has a similar setup with Central Asia, such as the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), reflecting its own ambitions to retain influence in the region. Both China and Russia are competing for strategic space, navigating the same geography but through different models of engagement. India’s C5+1 also mirrors China’s structure at multiple levels, though its activity has been limited by geographic and logistical constraints.
The US entered the scene with its first Central Asia-US Leaders’ Summit in 2023, adding to the growing list of stakeholders, but its influence has waned due to strategic disengagement—marked by successive budget cuts, including to USAID under Trump’s second term—leaving limited US presence and declining investment, and giving China greater freedom to shape the region’s economic and security agenda.
However, the C5+1 formats were adopted by Italy and the EU further confirms the aim to counterbalance regional reliance on China and Russia—using trade, energy, and institutional partnerships as entry points. This shifting dynamic reveals a “New Great Game” now defined not by conquest but by formats, forums, and frameworks. The region is attracting competition from the EU, Turkey, Iran, and the Gulf Arab monarchies, each seeking influence through tailored diplomatic and economic tools. Central Asia is playing all sides—balancing between major powers’ newfound interests, while cautiously accommodating China’s expansive push. In this crowded field, flexibility is strategy, and alignment is measured by what each power brings to the table.
China’s Regional Pivot Winning?
The Summit reveals a recurring theme in Beijing’s regional playbook: stability by design. At the heart of China’s engagement lie two consistent priorities—connectivity (for trade, transport, and economic security) and exchanges (both political and people-to-people). These align closely with Beijing’s broader foreign policy objectives: building “strategic mutual trust,” supporting partners on “core interests such as sovereignty, independence, national dignity, and long-term development”, and reinforcing its flagship Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), now part of the Global Development Initiative (GDI).
The language of “common security”, as framed through the Global Security Initiative (GSI), continues to feature prominently. Both sides have been working on mutual interests such as the opposition to “external forces”, “colour revolutions” and stressed joint resistance to the “three evil forces” of terrorism, separatism, and extremism. Beijing emphasised the aspiration of “everlasting friendship,” reflecting its long-term investment in the region’s political continuity.
Clues to China’s expanding strategic footprint were evident leading to the Summit. The coordination can be seen in a series of dialogues last few months, the sixth China-Central Asia Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Almaty (April 2025), followed by the Vice Foreign Minister-level consultation in Beijing (May 2025), workshop and Media dialogue. All along China laid out five core proposals: mutual trust, mutually beneficial cooperation, institutional deepening, fairness and justice, and everlasting friendship. Looking ahead, China has already announced the third China-Central Asia Summit for 2027, reinforcing its long-game approach. By comparison, other players are still adjusting their formats and frequency. While multipolarity in Central Asia is real, China appears to be outpacing others in consistency, responsiveness, and scale.
Russia held its own ministerial meeting with Central Asian states in Almaty (March 2025), underlining its ongoing interest in shaping the region’s power dynamics. The visible presence of Central Asian young leaders in Moscow has also fed speculation over political succession in several republics—a sign of the Kremlin’s still-potent informal influence.
The recalibrating interest of major players in C5+1 engagement reflects a balancing strategy—aimed at reducing the region’s dependency on both China and Russia. Yet these remain nascent efforts when compared to Beijing’s multilayered institutional and logistical integration. In this competitive and fragmented regional landscape, China’s pivot is not just active—it is strategic and sustained. Where others juggle presence and perception, China is quietly shaping architecture, agenda, and alignment.
India has steadily built its C5+1 engagement. The first (virtual) India-Central Asia Summit was held on 27 January 2022, with the upcoming 2nd Summit in 2025 supported by External Affairs Minister Dr S. Jaishankar, who also hosted the 4th Dialogue and Business Council meeting in Delhi on 06 June 2025. Momentum continues with events across the region: Uzbekistan will host the 1st Digital Partnership Forum, Tajikistan the 2nd Culture Ministers’ meeting, and Kyrgyzstan the 3rd National Security Council meeting on counter-terrorism. Making the summit an annual event may institutionalise project oversight. India’s engagement is visible but still limited by geography and delivery speed.
Beneath the Summit’s headline-grabbing announcements lies a deeper shift: the institutionalisation of China-Central Asia ties in the absence of formal alliances, a recalibration of influence in the emerging ‘New Great Game of Numbers’, and a growing interest from new players in the C5+1 format—raising the question of whether China’s primacy in the region is now firmly established.
