Originally published : https://www.eurasiareview.com/22112025-chinas-push-to-become-a-peace-mediator-in-horn-of-africa-is-less-about-peace-and-more-about-power-analysis/
The Horn of Africa has rarely enjoyed a quiet decade, and China has closely monitored that instability. Beijing’s presence here is often described in its own language of “development partnership” and “win–win cooperation,” but the pattern is clearer when you step back: periods of conflict have repeatedly given China room to secure strategic footholds, expand its security presence, and position itself as a diplomatic actor.
China talks frequently about peace in the region. Yet the timing and the way it has moved suggest something more deliberate. Instability doesn’t push China out. It creates the conditions for China to embed itself even deeper.
Where conflict becomes opportunity
When Ethiopia’s civil war erupted, the immediate discussion in Chinese policy circles was not ideological—it was practical. Billions of dollars in Chinese-built infrastructure, from energy grids to industrial parks, were suddenly at risk. The situation forced Beijing to drift away from its long-claimed policy of non-interference. Officials argued that the safety of their workers and the continuity of these investments required a stronger security posture in the region.
This logic sits behind the PLA Support Base in Djibouti. When it opened in 2017, it was introduced as a logistics node for anti-piracy and peacekeeping missions. Over the years, the base has expanded far beyond its original profile, with a pier capable of hosting larger naval vessels, possibly even carriers. Its location near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait gives the PLA Navy a front-row seat to one of the world’s busiest maritime chokepoints. Sitting alongside facilities run by the United States, France, and Japan, the base marks China’s entry into a crowded but strategically crucial neighbourhood.
Meanwhile, conflicts have also provided China with a way to lock in long-term partnerships. In resource-rich but fragile environments, Beijing has consistently used financing and political support to secure access to oil in South Sudan and mineral resources—including gold, iron ore, and natural gas—in Ethiopia. Its approach, which avoids Western-style conditions on governance or human rights, appeals to governments under pressure from Washington or Brussels.
Trying to wear the mediator’s hat
Over the past few years, China has made a noticeable attempt to cast itself as a diplomatic problem-solver. This shift is partly self-interested: without a basic level of stability, Chinese investments remain exposed. But it is also about positioning China as a global actor operating outside Western political structures.
One of the clearest expressions of this ambition is the International Organisation for Mediation (IOMed), launched in Hong Kong in 2025. Beijing presents it as a venue for resolving disputes without reliance on Western judicial systems, and many countries from the Global South have backed it for that reason.
The mediation attempts themselves have been mixed
China’s 2022 Horn of Africa peace conference, led by Special Envoy Xue Bing, was meant to be a showcase of Beijing’s growing diplomatic weight. It didn’t quite unfold that way. Several stakeholders stayed away, and those who attended offered polite but restrained engagement. The meeting produced very little, but the fact that China attempted it at all was significant.
In Ethiopia, China offered support for post-war reconstruction after the fighting in Tigray. Yet its longstanding closeness to the federal government made opposition factions wary of any Chinese role in political dialogue.
In Sudan, China’s involvement in 2025 was driven by necessity. Fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces threatened Chinese oil investments. Beijing attempted to engage both sides, hoping the violence would not spill into areas where Chinese companies operate.
The pattern extends further back. In 2017, China tried to ease the border standoff between Djibouti and Eritrea, using the leverage it had built through financing Djibouti’s strategic port. The effort produced no lasting breakthrough, but again, it showed Beijing’s willingness to insert itself into regional disputes.
And in South Sudan, China has deployed peacekeepers under the UN mission and sat in on peace talks. Even here, its motivation runs parallel to its interests in oil production.
Across all these cases, the challenge is the same: China wants to be seen as an impartial mediator, but its deep financial and political ties with incumbent governments make neutrality difficult to claim.
Ports, leverage, and the politics of dependence
There is another quiet way China increases its influence: investing in major ports on both sides of regional rivalries. This is not accidental. It creates a situation in which China becomes indispensable to all stakeholders.
The strategy is visible worldwide. Chinese firms operate ports on both ends of the Panama Canal. They are present in Pakistan and Sri Lanka, positioned across the Indian Ocean. In each case, the port may be commercial today, but the strategic potential is clear.
In the Horn of Africa, this approach creates a kind of diplomatic inevitability. Countries reliant on Chinese loans and construction expertise often have little choice but to keep Beijing close when crises erupt. It becomes harder to block China from playing the role of mediator—whether or not it is truly neutral—because China holds the economic levers that keep infrastructure functioning.
China as the alternative power centre
As Western influence in parts of the Horn has receded, Beijing has moved in to fill the space. It does not prevent governments from finding themselves isolated by the US or Europe. In fact, its willingness to deal with regimes that face international criticism is part of its appeal. Initiatives such as the Global Security Initiative (GSI) and the China-Africa Peace and Security Forum are meant to underline China’s position as a provider of security and an advocate of an international order where the West does not set the terms.
But China’s interventions tend not to tackle the deeper political issues that drive conflict. Instead, they often stabilise the situation just enough to protect Chinese interests and maintain Beijing’s relevance to all sides.
Crisis management as a pathway to influence
In the end, China’s growing involvement in the Horn of Africa is not simply about conflict resolution. It is about using moments of crisis to expand its footprint. Beijing’s mediation efforts, its military presence in Djibouti, its resource partnerships, and its port investments all reinforce one another.
What emerges is a model of engagement built on leverage rather than long-term stability. China does not retreat from conflict zones. It carefully steps in, protects its exposures, and presents itself as the indispensable partner when governments need money, infrastructure, diplomatic cover — or, in the case of the Horn, a mediator.
It is a role China wants the world to recognise. But it is also a role grounded in strategic calculation far more than in peacebuilding.
