The article was first published at: https://newsable.asianetnews.com/india/indian-defence-military-theaterisation-does-it-stand-ground-against-its-critics-articleshow-0gyd0xn
The Indian military today faces a paradox. It has some of the largest standing forces in the world, spread across every terrain imaginable—from the icy Himalayan passes to the Indian Ocean’s island chains—yet it continues to organise itself in a way that fragments rather than unifies. Seventeen single-service commands govern the Army, Navy and Air Force. Each has grown into a formidable institution in its own right, but the overall system locks India into a structure designed for an earlier age.
That system served the country in the decades following independence, when the immediate task was to build professional service branches and establish institutional autonomy. It also worked during conventional conflicts where the principal challenges were territorial defence and gradual mobilisation. But for at least twenty-five years, since the Kargil conflict of 1999 exposed the absence of joint planning, successive committees and review panels have argued for integration. Theaterisation—the idea of unified regional commands where all services operate under one commander—has become the centrepiece of reform proposals.
Why the benefits matter more now
The case for theaterisation rests first on operational efficiency. Future wars will not be confined to one domain. A cyberattack on logistics software could stall supply convoys in Ladakh. Electronic jamming could disrupt communications during a maritime skirmish in the Andaman Sea.
Reconnaissance drones may identify targets for long-range rocket systems, which in turn rely on satellite signals for accuracy. These connections demand command structures capable of integrating land, sea, air, cyber, space and electronic assets at speed. Single-service silos, no matter how capable, cannot deliver that level of fusion.
The second benefit lies in rational use of resources. India’s defence budget, though substantial, competes with enormous development needs. Multiple independent commands maintain parallel logistics chains, academies, and headquarters. This duplication diverts funds from investment in drones, satellites, and electronic warfare systems. Integrated theatre commands can cut this overhead. By consolidating logistics and training institutions, India can free resources for modernisation. The United States did this decades ago by creating unified combatant commands, and China demonstrated the speed of reform by establishing five theatre commands within two years of its 2015 overhaul.
The third advantage is strategic flexibility. A theatre commander with authority over all local assets can shift forces swiftly in response to crises. This agility is particularly important for India, which faces the dual challenge of a hostile Pakistan and a rising China that are increasingly aligned militarily. The possibility of simultaneous conflict across the Himalayas, deserts and the Indian Ocean requires a command system that can adapt quickly, rather than one dependent on multiple headquarters negotiating control.
Addressing the arguments against theaterisation
The most consistent opposition has come from the Air Force, which raises two concerns. The first is that India’s limited fleet of fighter and transport aircraft will be diluted if divided among theatres. Yet evidence from other militaries suggests the opposite. In the United States, air assets are assigned to theatre commands but remain subject to dynamic tasking, allowing concentration of force whenever needed. China’s Western Theatre Command, which covers the entire Himalayan frontier, integrates ground, air and rocket units without compromising the autonomy of the air arm. Scarcity of assets is in fact an argument for integration, since competition between separate service commands only increases inefficiency.
The second objection is the fear of losing doctrinal autonomy. Air power, critics argue, risks being subordinated to ground or maritime priorities under a theatre system. But doctrine does not vanish within integrated commands. The U.S. Air Force has continued to develop its doctrine independently, even while operating inside joint commands. In practice, joint structures have made air power more relevant, ensuring that it is applied where it matters most on the battlefield rather than held back by inter-service rivalry. Far from eroding identity, theaterisation can increase the visibility of air power’s contribution.
There are also institutional anxieties about erosion of authority and budgets. Each service has cultivated its own command culture, and integration inevitably disrupts established hierarchies. Yet this disruption is precisely what reform requires. The creation of the Chief of Defence Staff in 2019 was intended to drive this process. Without theaterisation, that office risks becoming largely symbolic, unable to translate coordination into genuine jointness.
A future already visible
The Kargil conflict showed what happens when integration is absent: delays in employing air power, gaps in intelligence-sharing, and complications in coordinating responses. That was a limited war fought a generation ago. The next conflict will be faster, fought across domains that extend into cyber space and orbit. Without theaterisation, decision-making will lag and resources will be squandered.
India already has the legislative framework in place with the Inter-Services Organisations Act of 2023, which provides joint organisations with authority across services. What remains is the determination to act. Theatres are not simply administrative rearrangements; they are instruments for fighting wars that have become multi-front and multi-domain.
The cost of waiting
China has restructured. The United States operates globally through unified commands. Russia, despite its military difficulties, has embraced combined arms formations that stress integration. India stands alone among major powers in retaining a model built for the mid-20th century. Every year of delay carries risks, not only of battlefield inefficiency but also of diminished deterrence credibility. Adversaries can see whether a military speaks with one voice or three competing ones.
The benefits of theaterisation—operational efficiency, economic rationalisation, and strategic agility—outweigh the objections. The counterarguments raised by the Air Force and other institutions are not trivial, but they are surmountable. Other nations have managed the transition without losing service identity. India can too. The question is no longer whether theatreisation is desirable, but how quickly it can be realised.
