This article was originally published at: https://newsable.asianetnews.com/world/analysis-china-naval-exports-cheap-to-buy-costly-to-keep-strategy-explained-articleshow-g7ifae2
China’s defence industry has found a profitable lane in selling naval platforms to countries that sit outside the usual buyer lists of the US and France. More than 53 states have made big-ticket investments in Chinese export variants of boats in recent years, tempted by sticker prices that look thrifty and delivery schedules that appear brisk.
The result is a global footprint for Beijing and a flotilla of clients.
Scratch the paint and another picture appears: Export variants are downgraded by design when it comes to quality of sensors, propulsion and weapons.
This is a pattern that keeps buyers reliant on Chinese maintenance, spares, and technicians, while ensuring the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) retains the sharper blade.
China’s strategy when it comes to naval and other big-ticket military exports can simply be conveyed as such: Cheap to buy. Costly to keep. Convenient for Beijing.
Grand Show And Hollow Ships
Chinese shipyards market familiar boats— those in use by PLAN— with unfamiliar internals. Radar and infrared suites arrive in lower-spec trims, combat systems are constrained, and propulsion packages are less lively than those fitted to PLAN ships.
Pakistan’s F-22P frigates are a case in point. Delivered between 2009 and 2013, they struggled with missile employment and were hobbled by defective IR17 infrared sensors and SR60 radars, which reduced threat detection and target lock.
Bangladesh acquired two Ming-class submarines in 2017 that were billed as modern; the boats proved dated, fussy to maintain and hungry for dockyard time instead of sea missions.
Sri Lanka’s P625 frigate, gifted in 2019, suffered frequent breakdowns and tired diesel engines, with low engine speed and worn critical parts reported.
Even when a platform looks contemporary on paper, integration choices create quiet limits. Pakistan’s Type 054A frigates advertise advanced specifications, yet their compatibility with Western systems is tenuous, fencing off future upgrades and mixed-fleet operations.
Deliberate Downgrading Ensures Dependence
Hardware is only one half of the (bad) bargain. The other part is life-cycle control. Chinese manufacturers often display little accountability for maintenance and repair, as noted by independent analysis in 2023, which leaves operators funnelling requests back to the original vendor.
Spare parts arrive late or at steeper prices. Beijing knowingly omits from deals the know-how that would let local yards perform deeper repairs domestically. Software updates are gated, too.
The supply chain becomes a turnstile, and the client must squeeze out the amount they thought they saved on the original acquisition deal.
This is intentional. Export variants are kept a step behind PLAN standards, so parity never arrives. When a customer nation goes against Chinese interests or courts another supplier, delays in spares or pauses in servicing can be used as leverage to nudge them away from that course of action.
Savings Or Scam?
Upfront savings look attractive. Over the long run, the math frays. Defective subsystems trigger repeat visits by foreign technicians, prolonged refits that keep frigates and submarines docked, and opportunistic price adjustments.
Native defence industries often cannot bridge the gap because the necessary drawings, diagnostic tools and training are withheld. What began as a low-cost acquisition becomes a stop-start programme that drains budgets and morale.
Market signals reflect the reputational drag. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), in a 2024 report, estimated that the volume of Chinese major arms exports fell by 7.8 per cent between 2016 and 2020, with market share slipping from 5.6 per cent to 5.2 per cent. Crews have noticed what works and what withers.
Implications For Regional Security
Downgraded exports go beyond just frustrating engineers. They shape power balances. Neighbours armed with hobbled sensors, less powerful engines, and constrained missile fits remain less capable in blue water and coastal defence. That suits Beijing.
The PLAN keeps the superior kit. Clients stay tethered through logistics and training contracts. Strategic autonomy is promised tomorrow and invoiced today.
