Founded in 1982 as a welfare body for retired Bangladeshi commissioned officers, the Retired Armed Forces Officers’ Welfare Association (RAOWA) once operated comfortably within the boundaries of professional representation.
Founded in 1982 as a welfare body for retired Bangladeshi commissioned officers, the Retired Armed Forces Officers’ Welfare Association (RAOWA) once operated comfortably within the boundaries of professional representation.
it offered a sense of community to veterans and kept its attention largely on welfare issues. Over the past few years, however, that identity has undergone a visible shift.
The association now speaks in a political register, and its interventions increasingly echo the language of national security commentary rather than veteran support.
RAOWA’s public messaging has taken on a tone that questions Bangladesh’s strategic partnerships, especially its ties with India. What makes this shift more striking is the organisation’s prestige.
When a body made up of former senior officers adopts a more combative political posture, its statements carry weight far beyond its own membership. Bangladesh’s political environment is already strained, and RAOWA’s new activism is reshaping the civil–military conversation in ways that blur the lines between veteran advocacy and partisan agitation.
Leadership Shift: The Rise of Col Mohammad Abdul Hoque (Retd)
Much of this transformation coincides with the ascent of Colonel Mohammad Abdul Hoque, psc (Retd), who now heads the 2025–26 Executive Committee. His leadership team includes retired officers from across the services—individuals whose backgrounds lend the association a certain authority in national debates.
Although his election is formally documented, the tone and direction of RAOWA under his watch have changed considerably. Throughout 2024 and 2025, the association hosted events where speakers questioned the conduct of Bangladesh’s intelligence community, criticised the government’s foreign policy choices, and hinted at growing suspicion toward India. These were not isolated remarks; they reflected a broader shift in the organisation’s worldview.
Given RAOWA’s extensive network and the continued public standing of many of its members, this shift naturally carries consequences. A veteran’s platform of this size does not turn political without affecting national conversations.
Veterans’ Mobilisation and Anti-India Messaging
By late 2024, RAOWA’s Mohakhali premises had become more than a community space. They were a venue for political mobilisation. One event in particular—organised by the National Unity and Solidarity Council—marked a stark departure from the past. Retired officers gathered to protest what they described as “Indian hegemony,” chanting slogans such as “Delhi no Dhaka, Dhaka Dhaka.”
The optics of a respected veterans’ association providing space for such a demonstration were impossible to ignore. On the surface, it suggested a body trying to shape public opinion on foreign policy. But the deeper concern lies in what this alignment represents. The language used at these rallies mirrors narratives promoted by political groups and interests known for their adversarial stance toward India.
RAOWA’s influence rests not only on its 5,261 registered members but also on their personal networks—connections that stretch into business, advisory roles, and civil society. Once an organisation of this scale begins projecting a hostile line toward a neighbouring country, it inevitably carries those sentiments into spaces it does not directly control.
The ‘Seven Sisters’ Controversy: Allegations, Intent, and Rhetoric
The allegation that Col Hoque proposed, endorsed, or encouraged rhetoric about breaking up India’s Northeastern region—the “Seven Sisters”—has added a new layer of unease. Independent verification remains limited, but because the association has already moved into a more nationalistic, confrontational posture, the claim gains traction.
In speeches and public appearances, Col Hoque has leaned heavily on themes of sovereignty, external threats, and the need for Bangladesh to rethink its strategic environment. Within that framework, even a hint of support for separatist narratives across the border becomes highly inflammatory. The damage does not depend on proof alone; perception is enough to sow distrust.
India and Bangladesh share a delicate border relationship. Any rhetoric, even speculative, that touches on territorial fragmentation risks stirring the same anxieties that hostile actors in the region have long tried to exploit. Whether it is political showmanship or a calculated message, the effect is equally destabilising.
Indicators of Ideological Drift Inside RAOWA
Several developments over the past two years reveal an association unsettled by internal tensions and drawn increasingly toward political alignment. Public gatherings at RAOWA have adopted sharper tones on foreign policy. Leadership speeches now centre on autonomy and strategic independence in ways that seem calibrated for a political audience. Press reports suggest quiet factional disputes, with members divided over the association’s new direction. Figures associated with BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami have appeared at some RAOWA-linked events, adding another layer of complexity.
The organisation’s size and the influence its members wield magnify these shifts. When a veteran’s body begins to drift ideologically, it does not happen in isolation. It ripples outward, shaping opinions among serving officers, retired communities, and the broader public.
Strategic and Regional Implications
RAOWA’s rhetoric now intersects with several sensitive areas of Bangladesh’s national life. Retired officers hold a unique place in society, and their public positions can subtly shape attitudes within the armed forces. This is especially true when the messaging revolves around national security or foreign policy.
Its growing hostility toward India also risks feeding diplomatic friction. Bilateral relations have historically swung between cooperation and suspicion, and narratives emerging from respected institutions can harden public sentiment on either side.
Inside Bangladesh, RAOWA’s engagement with personalities linked to opposition groups hints at an emerging political configuration, one that may use veteran sentiment to bolster its own positions. At the same time, external actors—particularly those aligned with Pakistan’s interests—may see in this ideological shift an opportunity to weaken India’s regional standing. Even without direct coordination, the incentives for such exploitation are obvious.
All these elements combine to create a strategic environment far more fragile than it appears at first glance.
RAOWA at a Dangerous Crossroads
Under Col Hoque’s direction, RAOWA has drifted far from its welfare origins and now acts as one of the most assertive platforms projecting anti-India sentiment inside Bangladesh. Its events, slogans, and alliances place it in a position where external actors can easily benefit from the discontent it amplifies.
The organisation’s size and prestige mean its words are not limited to veterans’ circles. They echo across public spaces, political arenas, and even foreign capitals, trying to decipher Bangladesh’s internal trajectory. Any narrative that touches on the stability of India’s Northeast adds an additional layer of danger, given the region’s long history of insurgency and external manipulation.
Bangladesh cannot afford to let veteran institutions become instruments for political or foreign agendas. The state must take a close, serious look at the direction RAOWA is heading. If left unchecked, its politicisation threatens not just the country’s internal cohesion but also the stability of a region that remains vital for both Dhaka and New Delhi.
