The much-awaited visit of Russian President Vladimir Putin may be modest in its pronouncements, but the symbolism and optics are not lost on any, especially not the US. The US views this Russia-India rapprochement as a combination of India reasserting its strategic autonomy and a growing frustration with Washington’s recent posturing with Pakistan.
Under the current dispensation in Washington, optics matter deeply. The image of PM Modi choosing to meet Putin personally and warmly, even as he has avoided meeting Trump at various international fora since the downturn in India-US ties would not be lost on Washington.
Several agreements and promises made during the visit would be watched in the US with cautious scepticism. Defence cooperation between Russia and India is perhaps the most sensitive arena from the U.S. standpoint. Increased and sustained commitments towards joint development and enhanced defence industrial production were made by both sides, particularly during the India-Russia Inter-Governmental Commission on Military & Military Technical Cooperation (IRIGC-M&MTC) that preceded the Putin visit. These commitments stand in contrast to India’s caution and reluctance with U.S. defence frameworks, where progress is often slowed by technology-transfer limitations, stringent compliance requirements, and Washington’s unpredictable sanction regimes.
The joint statements during the visit contained several additional elements likely to cause unease in Washington. India and Russia emphasised counterterrorism cooperation anchored in the SCO and BRICS, multilateral frameworks that explicitly exclude the United States and represent non-Western security architectures. Both sides also underscored the need to resolve the Iran nuclear issue through dialogue and expressed concern over the humanitarian conditions in Gaza, parts of the world that the US has deep and historical interests in.
The US would also take note of deeper strategic cooperation that goes far beyond defence for the two nations, with Russia willing to act as a bridge for India to the Arctic, joint ventures in the Russian Far East, and revival of ambitious connectivity projects like the Chennai-Vladivostok Maritime Corridor and the International North South Transport Corridor (INSTC). Nuclear energy cooperation would also see an expansion with additional power plants being jointly developed with Russia on the lines of the Kudankulam Plant in Tamil Nadu.
As the visit progressed, it became evident that both sides were intent on broadening the partnership beyond its traditional defence-centric foundations, with economic cooperation as the principal pillar of the relationship going forward. The joint statement gave a target of bilateral trade worth $100 billion by 2030. Within the economic umbrella, various agreements may attract the ire of the US. For instance, the promise between India and Russia to conduct bilateral trade settlements in domestic currencies, could be seen in the US as an attempt towards de-dollarisation, an issue that President Trump has flagged on multiple occasions, particularly in the context of the BRICS reserve currency. Similarly, the much-touted labour mobility agreement signed during the summit, which seeks to address Russia’s labour shortage in part through Indian workers, may alter migration patterns in favour of Russia. With uncertainty surrounding the H-1B visa regime continuing to unsettle Indian skilled professionals, Washington may view this shift as a potential diversion of talent away from the US market.
The meeting was also privy to talks on critical mineral supply chains, an issue that President Trump takes personal interest in. With Russia being home to over 22% of global rare earth resources, India would seek enhanced cooperation in the sector, as critical tech forms a key component of its goal of Viksit Bharat by 2047.
The US would also be wary of the trade imbalance that this triangle imposes. India faces a huge trade deficit with Russia, thanks to the oil imports, while boasting of a significant trade surplus against the US, an aspect that has been repeatedly highlighted by the Trump administration. For Washington’s transactional policy circles, this dual reality, that is, India benefiting from the U.S. market while simultaneously expanding partnerships with a sanctioned competitor, could come under increased scrutiny.
At the multilateral level, both nations reaffirmed commitment to frameworks under the WTO and the Paris Agreement, institutions and mechanisms that the Trump administration has increasingly distanced itself from or actively opposed.
Putin also personally inaugurated the launch of Russia Today India (RT-India), signalling New Delhi’s willingness to engage more proactively in the domain of information influence, particularly in counter to the narratives of the Western media ecosystems.
Yet India’s behaviour during the visit also reflected a calibrated awareness of American sensitivities. New Delhi avoided announcing any major defence agreements or acquisitions of new Russian defence platforms, mindful of CAATSA risks and unpredictability of Trumpian tariffs. India, now on the cusp of concluding a historic trade deal with the US, particularly in a year marked by unprecedented turbulence in bilateral ties, is mindful of the balance it needs to maintain.
As for the US, it released its 2025 National Security Strategy on the very day Putin arrived in India, identifying India as a key partner in the Indo-Pacific and underscoring the intent to strengthen bilateral ties. Thus, while there may be irritation in Washington at the optics and strategic unease over defence and economic cooperation, India would hope that the US understands its need to hedge and safeguard its interests amid an increasingly fractured and volatile geopolitical landscape.
