Operation Sindoor revealed a less visible but increasingly decisive arena of contestation: Washington, D.C. As Indian strikes unfolded on the subcontinent, both New Delhi and Islamabad activated lobbying networks in the United States, turning diplomacy by arms into diplomacy by influence.
What emerges from U.S. Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) disclosures and subsequent media reporting is not merely a record of contracts and emails, but evidence of how lobbying has become an institutionalised tool of crisis management in South Asia.
For India, this highlights the imperative of approaching lobbying with the same seriousness as other instruments of state power, ensuring that attention, funding, and institutional capacity, especially within the MEA and allied agencies, keep pace with the emergence of influence warfare as a parallel domain of competition with Pakistan.
Pakistan: Lobbying as Emergency Statecraft
Pakistan’s response to Operation Sindoor was immediate and urgent, shaped by a sense of strategic vulnerability. As Indian strikes unfolded, Pakistani diplomats and hired lobbyists launched what can only be described as a high-intensity lobbying blitz in Washington. FARA records show a rapid surge of emails, calls, and meeting requests directed at U.S. lawmakers, executive branch officials, and influential media figures. In a matter of days, more than 50 communications were sent to U.S. lawmakers, executive branch officials, and media figures, repeatedly urging Washington to intervene and restrain India.
The tone of this outreach was telling. Pakistan’s messaging repeatedly warned that India might resume strikes even after announcing a pause, framing the situation as volatile and unpredictable. Kashmir featured prominently, but so did broader appeals to regional stability and global security. The objective was not subtle persuasion but pressure—creating a sense of urgency that would compel Washington to step in as a restraining force.
This effort was supported by a multi-firm lobbying ecosystem that included U.S. law firms and strategic consultancies operating on a monthly retainer basis. Reported spending on lobbying in 2025 reached approximately USD 5 million, a striking figure for a country grappling with economic distress. Yet for Islamabad, the investment made strategic sense. Lobbying became a way to compensate for military asymmetry by internationalising the crisis and drawing in a powerful third party.
Crucially, Pakistan did not disengage once the immediate crisis subsided. Instead, its lobbying effort evolved. Post-Sindoor outreach shifted toward longer-term narrative building, including pitches for economic cooperation, rare-earth partnerships, and renewed strategic relevance for the United States. The message subtly changed from “stop India now” to “Pakistan matters in the long run.” Lobbying thus became an extension of crisis diplomacy, designed not just to manage the moment, but to reshape Pakistan’s standing in Washington over time.
India: Managing Perception, Not Mediation
India’s approach to Washington during Operation Sindoor followed a very different logic. Rather than mobilising a broad network of firms, New Delhi relied on a single, high-value contract with a Washington-based strategic consultancy, worth USD 1.8 million annually. The structure of this engagement alone signalled confidence. India was not scrambling to be heard, it was curating how it was understood.
FARA disclosures suggest that India’s outreach focused squarely on narrative management. The goal was to explain the rationale, scope, and limits of Operation Sindoor to U.S. policymakers and opinion-shapers, particularly how the operation was being portrayed in American media and policy circles. Engagements around the day India paused its strikes were oriented toward clarity rather than bargaining—ensuring that Washington saw the operation as targeted, restrained, and rooted in legitimate security concerns.
Notably, India did not seek U.S. mediation. Washington was treated not as an arbiter, but as a stakeholder whose understanding mattered. This distinction is important. India’s lobbying was embedded within a broader bilateral agenda that included trade discussions, strategic alignment, and long-term partnership management. Operation Sindoor was framed not as a rupture, but as an episode within an otherwise stable and evolving relationship.
In this sense, India’s lobbying reflected a deeper confidence in its diplomatic position. Influence was exercised quietly, through access and continuity, rather than urgency and volume. Where Pakistan sought leverage, India sought legitimacy.
Lobbying as a New Instrument of Power in the Subcontinent
Taken together, these contrasting approaches reveal a structural shift in how crises in the Indian subcontinent are managed. Lobbying has emerged as a parallel instrument of statecraft and a tool of crisis management, activated almost automatically when tensions rise. Military action now triggers not only diplomatic engagement, but also professional political mobilisation in Washington: firms are hired, narratives crafted, inboxes flooded, and access leveraged.
The asymmetry between India and Pakistan is telling. Pakistan uses lobbying to compensate for material and strategic disadvantages, attempting to shape outcomes by drawing external pressure into the equation. India uses lobbying to consolidate its position, manage escalation narratives, and protect long-term partnerships from short-term shocks.
This divergence also reflects differing views of the United States. For Pakistan, Washington remains a potential crisis manager and mediator. For India, it is a consequential partner whose perceptions must be carefully managed, but not invited to referee regional disputes.
Operation Sindoor thus underscores a broader reality: South Asian conflicts no longer unfold solely along borders or battlefields. They extend into conference rooms, law firms, and congressional inboxes thousands of miles away. Influence, not just firepower, shapes how crises are interpreted, constrained, or amplified.
For India and Pakistan alike, the lesson is clear: in modern crises, the battle for legitimacy may matter as much as the battle on the ground.
Way Forward
Going forward, India must recognise lobbying and overseas influence operations as a core pillar of modern diplomacy rather than a crisis-response tool. In capitals like Washington, influence is built through continuity, relationships, and presence over time, not through ad-hoc interventions triggered by escalation. This makes a strong case for institutionalising such efforts within the Ministry of External Affairs, particularly through the Public Diplomacy and External Publicity Division (XPD), with dedicated personnel whose sole focus is sustained engagement with foreign legislators, policy communities, and opinion-shapers. The ₹22,000 plus crore allocation to the MEA in the 2026 Union Budget provides a clear opportunity to earmark a defined funding stream for sustained lobbying and narrative management, supported by multi-year planning and measurable outcomes. Crucially, this allocation should be scaled up year-on-year, reflecting the growing centrality of influence operations as an emerging domain of competition, particularly in the India–Pakistan context.
