Originally published : https://www.ndtv.com/opinion/heres-what-goes-into-the-making-of-a-terror-attack-9703234
The investigation into the Delhi car blast is ongoing, and it’s getting more complex by the day. Recently, a ‘maulvi’ was picked up from Mewar in Haryana for storing some 2,500 kg of ammonium nitrate in a room that he had rented out to the highly radicalised Dr Muzzamil Ganai. As he was being taken in, Maulvi Ishtiaq was heard pleading for his rent to be paid, so that his family could survive. An unlikely terrorist perhaps, but still a cog in the wheel of an extremely dangerous machine.
The Facilitators Are Surprising
Terrorism has a habit of pulling in all kinds of actors, not just the fiery radical. That includes criminals, the ‘fraternity’ – in this case, a religious one – or even people from within the governance system. In other words, terrorists work well in a corrupt ecosystem, where checks and balances are ignored, or set aside for a price. Consider first that the module was able to lay their hands easily on explosives sources, from Nuh and adjoining areas, like Saharanpur. In 2012, an organisation called PESO (Petroleum and Explosives Safety Organisation) laid down limitations on the sale of ammonium nitrate after it was used in 2011 in serial attacks in Mumbai by the so-called Indian Mujahideen, and in 2012 in the explosion at the German bakery in Pune. It’s a rather cumbersome form, but regulations demand that these be filled not only for sale, but also for storing or moving any of this. Posing as farmers, the group amassed 20 quintals of NPK fertiliser, which is a blend of Nitrogen, Phosphorus, and Potassium and serves to extract explosive material from Nuh and adjoining areas. Since not one of them were farmers, a mass of bureaucratic red tape on paper was apparently easily bypassed. Sellers made short shrift of such rules, and someone down the chain of government inspectors failed to spot it, or didn’t even try. In this, as in everything else, governance matters.
The Al Falah University Is Just Another One
Second, there is the issue of the Al Falah University, which allowed these doctors to not only thrive but also to plan their crimes for over two years. The founder, Jawad Ahmad Siddiqui, seemed to have a vast corporate network and an old criminal case. Siddiqui was linked to nine registered companies, all connected through the Al-Falah Charitable Trust, the same body that runs the university, and all sharing the same registered address in Okhla, New Delhi. This seems to be a classic money laundering exercise, not at all unusual among such privately owned entities. Recently, the Enforcement Directorate raided some 15 locations over money laundering charges against Monad University in Hapur when another fake degree scam was uncovered against a university in Shikohabad in Uttar Pradesh. The University Grants Commission recently released a list of 22 fake universities across India, with Delhi and Uttar Pradesh topping the list. In short, again a systemic failure that can and is being used by criminals of all kinds, much of it to do with money laundering.
Open Criminal Networks
Then there are the open criminal networks. Most of these are known to the public as ‘no-go areas’ where the police footprint lies lightly. Among these is Nuh and other parts of Faridabad, with this town becoming a focus of investigation after the blasts. Nuh itself has come to notice as a huge cyber crime node, when some 65 men were arrested. Then there’s the Alwar district, where some 26,000 cybercrime cases have been filed, many against boys in their twenties. These hotspots naturally shelter criminals and, oddly, come with a historical baggage of being the centres of the British era ‘Thuggees’.
After the Delhi attack, police launched a crackdown against organised crime groups in these and other districts, that included weapons smuggling and narcotics. In short, such centres of crime are not only gravitational points for terrorists to get their explosives and weapons but also indicate some prior knowledge of these networks. An otherwise ‘normal ‘normal’person would find it an extremely tricky matter to get a revolver, for instance, let alone an assault rifle. Many other such centres are spread across India, including in parts of Kerala, where a thriving narcotics trade combines with strong radical ideologies. Areas like Kannur and Kasargod sent many to fight in Syria and oddly are also known criminal areas with historical gold smuggling links to the Middle East dons. Today, it also includes narcotics networks that supply the Gulf.
It’s all a rather heady mix. The link between radicalism and these criminal networks may seem ephemeral, but it’s the flow of goods and ideologies that makes these places dangerous in the extreme. Such critical areas need to be identified across the country and cleaned up, learning from the Nuh episode in late 2023, where criminals used communal disharmony to burn down a police station that held their records.
And Then The Radicals ….
It is important to recognise that this ideology followed by the ‘doctor module’ is entirely foreign to India and Kashmir in particular. A calculated effort has to be made to not just bring back traditional belief systems – which in Kashmir is still predominantly the syncretic Sufism – but also encourage Islamic learning centres to adapt to a new world. This is a difficult exercise for ‘book religions’, since there is a written text which religious leaders will adhere to word for word, and no ‘interpretation’ is allowed. But the effort needs to be made nonetheless by such centres like the Darul uloom in Deoband in Uttar Pradesh. Notably, it is Uttar Pradesh that supplies Kashmir with maulvis and scholars, and there is a real need to get their support. Other schools, like the Jamia Nizamia in Hyderabad established in the 1872, and backed by such universities like Jamia Islamia and others, need to be drawn into the debate for the direction of change actually serving the Muslim community and learning from the strong modernisation drive in leading states like Saudi Arabia.
Meanwhile, keeping the strong mirror-imaging that is apparent on social media, the majority community also needs to realise that by mocking Islam and threatening other faiths, they contribute to weakening India, not strengthening it.
There Is A Wider Lesson
The whole terrorist adventure also needs to be seen in the wider context of youth rebellions in the much overused term: ‘revolutions’. There is an overall lack of faith in the ‘system’ and a perception that the ruling ‘elite’ have nothing to do with the populace, especially the youth. This malaise is growing, and needs to be recognised in governance, and specific projects to enlist the youth into community building exercises, so that everyone feels empowered.
In the final analysis, it is this disenchantment that has to be addressed on the ground. For that, the sheer lassitude at the local government levels has to be first turned on its head, so that councillors and legislators are held accountable to the people they are supposed to serve. At present, it’s like asking for the moon. But that really is the final solution, not just for radicalism and the like, but for national security as a whole in very dangerous times.
And finally, to go back to the immediate present, watch out for a woman bomber. All signs point to it.
