The Russian President Vladimir Putin arrives in New Delhi for the first time since the start of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war – a landmark event that is set to propel the Russia-India ties into its next chapter. Putin’s two-day visit will commence on the eve of 4 December 2025, following which, on 5 December 2025 he will meet Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi for the 23rd annual Russia-India summit.
Announcing the State visit, the Indian government said that it will provide an opportunity for both the leaders review progress in bilateral relations, set the vision for strengthening the Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership and exchange views on regional and global issues of mutual interest. Additionally, the President of India will be hosting a banquet in Putin’s honour. On similar lines, the Kremlin said that the talks are expected to be followed by the adoption of a joint statement covering a wide range of bilateral interdepartmental and business deals.
During the visit, both sides are expected to sign several agreements and MoUs spanning across a range of areas. While most of these are still under wraps, the most crucial one might be the defence deal with Moscow, aimed at helping New Delhi reaffirm its strategic autonomy.
Defence Partnership
Despite no definite deals having been finalised while this article goes to press, potential agreements are reported to include India’s procurement of five additional squadrons of the S-400 Triumf air defence systems, whose performance was highly lauded during Operation Sindoor in May 2025. This will include the acquisition of the surface-to-air missiles for the S-400s, with ranges of – 120 km, 200 km, 250 km, and 380 km. However, given the delays India has encountered with the delivery of two units of the S-400s under the 2018 agreement, any new arrangement for additional procurement may likely be subject to similar postponements.
Additionally, although the negotiations seem to be at their early stage, the two sides could discuss the possibility of India buying two squadrons of Su-57 fighter jets and the joint production of the S-500 air defence systems. Although the S-400 system is capable of countering aircraft, drones, cruise missiles, and certain ballistic threats, an upgrade to the S-500 would extend coverage to hypersonic missile interception, high-altitude and near-space threats, as well as anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities. However, the procurement and maintenance of the S-500 would be a costly affair, necessitating an in-depth cost–benefit analysis. Furthermore, if purchased the delivery timeline of the new systems will depend on Russia’s production status, as meeting Moscow’s own needs will be a priority in light of the ongoing war. For India, however, it would not just mean upgrading its existing systems but also strategically future-proofing its national security architecture.
Russia has also been aggressively pitching for the co-production of Su-57 to deepen ties. Offering technology and a phased production, Moscow’s proposal is to begin with Su-57 fighters produced in Russia and then shift manufacturing to India in stages. This aligns neatly with India’s desire to move from licensed assembly to genuine co-development.
Underscoring Moscow’s willingness to provide India with access to engines, sensors, stealth materials, flight-control laws, onboard computing, and the broader fifth-generation stack, Director General of the United Aircraft Corporation (UAC), Vadim Badekha affirmed that “whatever India asks for will be completely acceptable.”
What makes the offer even more dramatic is the claim that India could eventually build upgraded stealth fighters independently once the full tech transfer is complete. No other country has offered India anything remotely close to this depth.
Moreover, senior officials from Rosoboronexport at the Dubai Air Show 2025 stated that India would be granted licensed-production rights for air weapons for future-generation fighters, along with the integration of Indian systems. They emphasised comprehensive technology transfer, including engines, optics, AESA radar, AI components, low-signature materials, and new-generation weapons, highlighting Russia’s commitment to enabling India’s technological learning and development in advanced aerospace systems.
Energy and Nuclear Cooperation
Given that India has emerged as the second largest buyer of Russian oil in the last couple of months, energy cooperation is expected to be a key component of the visit. Despite Western sanctions on Russia, Moscow has continued to ship oil with Indian refineries. In November 2025, New Delhi’s purchases of Russian oil surged ahead of the 21 November wind‑down deadline, related to US sanctions on entities such as Rosneft and Lukoil. Oil imports were set to reach a five-month high of about 1.855 million bpd, up from 1.48 million bpd in October. However, reflecting the impact of the recent sanctions and ongoing trade negotiations with Washington, India appears to have reduced its purchases of Russian crude oil for December deliveries.
Nevertheless, these measures seem unlikely to shake up the Russia-India oil trade, as the former counts on India’s capacity to maintain indirect purchases through intermediaries and alternative channels. Additionally, not bowing to Western pressure, New Delhi has made it clear to prioritise its energy security as state-owned refiners maintain their willingness to import Russian crude from non-sanctioned entities.
Furthermore, it is likely that the bilateral nuclear energy cooperation would be on the agenda at the summit. As both sides review the progress of the Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant (KNPP) in Tamil Nadu, Moscow is also eager to expand its civil nuclear cooperation with India. Aligning with India’s clean-energy ambitions, the two sides could discuss cooperation in small modular reactor (SMR) cooperation.
Trade Scenario
The bilateral trade between Moscow and New Delhi reached a record high of USD 68.7 billion in financial year 2024-25, wherein exports from Russia amounted to USD 63.84 billion and India’s exports added up to USD 4.88 billion. The Kremlin has acknowledged India’s concerns over the large trade deficit and said that it is keen to increase imports from the latter.
During a Valdai Discussion session in early October this year, President Putin addressed this trade imbalance with India, signalling the need to establish an effective and trade and economic ties. He highlighted that achieving this requires tackling several key obstacles, beginning with the persistent logistics challenges that hinder efficient trade flows. A second priority involves improving financial arrangements and payment systems to ensure smooth and reliable transactions, using a range of mechanisms such as national currencies, third-country currencies, or electronic settlement platforms.
Furthermore, President Putin has held discussions with his cabinet, including the First Deputy Prime Minister and co-chair of the Russia-India intergovernmental commission Denis Manutrov to explore ways to address these concerns, such as lowering trade barriers to increase Russian purchases of Indian pharmaceuticals, agricultural produce, and greater engagement with India’s private companies. However, given the Western pressure, whether private Indian players willingly increase their engagement with Moscow is yet to be determined.
Recently, India has also reviewed the roadmap for a free trade agreement (FTA) with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), a grouping that includes Russia, emphasising diversification of exports and building supply chain resilience to help narrow the deficit. These efforts align with Putin’s directives ahead of his of the visit, aimed at boosting Russian imports from India in sectors like textiles, chemicals, and engineering goods alongside pharmaceuticals and agriculture.
Additionally, investment projects, joint ventures and co-production efforts are likely to feature prominently among the summit’s deliverables. During his visit to India, Chairman of the Russian Maritime Board Nikolay Patrushev discussed the potential of establishing shipbuilding and ship-repairing clusters in India, particularly in Chennai and Mumbai. He proposed Russian participation in these clusters, offering designs for specialised vessels like fishing, passenger, auxiliary, and ice-class ships. This would enhance the bilateral cooperation in the civil maritime sector, port infrastructure and maritime logistics.
Arctic Opportunities
Ahead of the visit, the Russian State Duma also ratified the Reciprocal Exchange of Logistics Agreement (RELOS) between the two nations. Signed in February 2025, the pact would ease several operational challenges for both countries. Under this framework, Russian warships and aircraft operating in the Indian Ocean would have seamless access to fuel, oil, spare parts, and maintenance support. The agreement, underpinned by the shared use of multiple military platforms, will allow Moscow to broaden its maritime deployments and maintain a prolonged regional presence.
Additionally, with India and Russia conducting numerous joint military exercises annually, the RELOS would facilitate efficient maintenance, particularly during humanitarian and disaster relief operations.
For India, Russian military infrastructure would support warships deployed in the Far East, while aircraft such as the Sukhoi-30MKI, which often transit Europe and the US for exercises, could rely on Russian logistical support along their routes. The agreement also gains strategic relevance with the opening of new Arctic shipping routes, enabling Indian naval footprints in the Arctic. Its ratification occurs amid evolving geopolitical dynamics, including U.S. efforts to persuade India to scale back defence ties with Russia.
Furthermore, Moscow has also signalled for New Delhi to play an active role in the Northern Sea Route (NSR). The NSR, traversing the Arctic Ocean along Russia’s northern coastline, is up to 40 per cent shorter than conventional southern maritime routes such as the Suez Canal, providing a faster, safer, and more cost-efficient option for cargo transport between Eurasia and the Asia-Pacific region. Therefore, with Himadri, India’s permanent research station in the Arctic, New Delhi should explore its opportunities in the emerging sphere of Arctic geopolitics.
Labour Mobility and People-to-People Connect
Beyond hard power, the two sides are likely to highlight education, labour mobility and cultural ties as stabilising pillars of the relationship. Faced with the shortage of qualified and skilled workers, the signing of a bilateral mobility agreement will establish a framework for legal migration, protection of workers’ rights and expansion of skilled Indian manpower in Russia. Reports suggest that the agreement will provide legal protection for existing Indian workers and open pathways for thousands of new professionals in industries such as construction, textiles, engineering and electronics.
According to news sources, by the end of this year, more than 70,000 Indian nationals are expected to be officially employed across Russia under quotas administered by the Russian Ministry of Labour. The Moscow-based Indian Business Alliance (IBA) has welcomed the forthcoming India-Russia Mobility Agreement, describing it as a strategic milestone in the further expansion of bilateral relations. The IBA has also expressed its readiness to collaborate both governments and business partners to organise orientation and language programmes for incoming Indian workers and promote fair recruitment channels and ethical employment standards. Therefore, by ensuring a smooth integration, proper safeguards and welfare of Indian citizens working in Russia, both sides will foster better people-to-people connect.
Conclusion
Amidst geopolitical impediments and Western pressures on the Russia-India relationship, the summit carries a strong symbolic value. As Moscow pushes to break its global isolation through deepening its bilateral relationship with India, for New Delhi this upcoming visit is more about their energy security, defence, trade balance and strategic autonomy. However, as the priority remains to turn shared commitments into actionable agreements, what remains to be seen is India’s ability to balance the outcomes of this visit and its relations with the United States and European Union.
Moreover, with US tariff actions and an emerging Sino-American ‘G2’ reshaping Asia’s strategic geometry, the post-Sindoor moment appears well-timed for a renewed Russia- India engagement. In essence, both countries shall focus on seeing strategic value in reinforcing each other amid the tightening Pakistan–China axis.
