Abstract
This paper, “Russia’s Twentieth Century War in the Twenty First Century,” analyses Russia’s strategic decisions in its conflict with Ukraine, arguing that the war represents a gradual escalation of events since 2003-2004, transitioning from a grey zone conflict to hybrid warfare and ultimately conventional war. The article aims to clarify relevant theories of war and apply them to historical events, examining whether Russia’s approach was a correct application of military science.
The paper posits that Russia’s actions in February 2022, initiating a ground offensive, were a calculated move to maintain minimal escalation and signal intent to NATO countries against interference. Post-2022, Russia strategically shifted to attritional warfare, leveraging its strengths to wear down Ukraine and its allies. The paper delves into the nature and character of war, discussing concepts like violence, contest of wills, and the political objectives that drive conflict. It differentiates ‘war’ from ‘warfare’, noting how technology and other factors influence the latter’s changing character.
The central theme of the article suggests Russia deliberately chose a limited war in scope, intensity, and tempo, terming it a ‘special military operation’ to achieve its objectives while at the same time maintaining sufficient military capability to deter NATO.
