In the last few years, India’s security landscape has undergone a quiet transformation. The most contested part of the battlespace is no longer high above the clouds where fighter jets duel for dominance. It is the narrow, unpredictable band of air just a few hundred metres above the ground — the “air littoral.” This low-altitude sky has become a critical zone where drones fly, helicopters manoeuvre, artillery adjusts fire, and infantry units try to stay hidden. And as India adapts to rapid changes along the borders, the question of who controls this space has begun to shape both doctrine and inter-service thinking.
The shift is driven by technology. Small drones, once dismissed as hobby gadgets, now play outsized roles in global conflict. In Ukraine, they act as artillery spotters, kamikaze platforms and reconnaissance tools. In the Middle East, they have slipped past expensive air defence systems. Even in smaller conflicts, soldiers now expect the sudden appearance of a quadcopter above a ridge or tree line. The battlefield has fundamentally changed, and India is no exception.
Along the Line of Actual Control, troops regularly observe adversary drones probing Indian positions. On the western front, drones have been used for cross-border drops, surveillance and reconnaissance. Units deployed in counter-insurgency operations face the possibility of hostile quadcopters capturing their movement. And across these environments, it is the Army that must respond instantly. For soldiers operating in valleys, forests or mountain ledges, the low sky is a zone of survival, not theory.
This is where the debate over control of the air littoral begins. Traditionally, the Indian Air Force has been responsible for the nation’s airspace. Its argument for central control is logical: fragmented command increases the risk of fratricide and weakens the unified air picture required during crises. But the Army’s perspective is shaped by everyday reality on the ground. A drone threatening an infantry post cannot wait for layered approvals. A company commander planning a night raid cannot rely on distant nodes to deconflict the airspace around him. Modern ground combat demands instant autonomy at the lowest levels.
The low-altitude battlespace behaves differently from traditional airspace. It is crowded, rapidly shifting and filled with ground-based obstacles. In a single operation, helicopters, drones, artillery trajectories, surveillance assets and infantry all share overlapping zones. The commander closest to the fight often has the clearest understanding of the risks. This is why armies around the world — from the United States to Israel — increasingly emphasise decentralised control over this space during tactical engagements.
India’s military is already adapting to this trend. In recent exercises, infantry units have deployed their own drones for reconnaissance, artillery batteries have used loitering munitions for targeting, and special forces have integrated quadcopters directly into their assault plans. Attack helicopters have flown low-altitude contour missions alongside these systems, while air defence units tracked small aerial threats invisible to traditional radars. These are not experimental events; they are becoming routine.
The rise of the air littoral has also reshaped expectations of equipment. Infantry platoons now operate with drone teams. Armoured formations rely on air cover not just from fighters but from aerial sensors that help detect ambushes. Artillery regiments demand real-time visual feeds, not satellite imagery hours later. These needs are immediate and tactical. They require command decisions within seconds. And the force most exposed to the consequences of delay is the Army.
This does not mean the Air Force is excluded. In fact, high-altitude surveillance, broader air defence architecture, and precision strike capabilities remain firmly within its domain. But the future is pointing toward layered, shared responsibility, where strategic air control stays with the Air Force and tactical control becomes more responsive to ground realities.
For India, the challenge is designing systems and procedures that balance safety with speed. Integrated digital networks, joint air defence nodes, and shared situational-awareness platforms are already emerging. What remains is a doctrinal acknowledgement that the low sky is increasingly a land-fight, not a traditional air-fight.
The air littoral will shape the next phase of India’s military modernisation. It is the zone where a drone can expose a platoon, where a helicopter pilot must react instantly, where artillery depends on real-time feeds, and where soldiers require constant protection from unseen aerial threats. Control of this airspace will determine how effectively the Indian Army can manoeuvre, conceal, and dominate.
As India prepares for a future defined by fast-moving threats and unpredictable tactical environments, the low sky is becoming the country’s newest frontier. And the force that lives every hour under that sky will naturally remain central to how India secures it.
