Around midnight on September 12, 1971, Premier Zhou Enlai was chairing a meeting at the Great Hall of the People to finalize his report for the National People’s Congress. The session was interrupted by a staggering intelligence report: Marshal Lin Biao, Mao Zedong’s anointed successor, was attempting to flee the country. Zhou immediately contacted the commander at the Shanhaiguan naval airbase, ordering that Lin’s aircraft be grounded at all costs. That single phone call triggered a frantic sequence of events, ending in the early hours of September 13 when Lin’s plane plummeted into the Mongolian wilderness. It was the desperate final act of a man who had already failed to assassinate Mao and had plotted to establish a rival regime in Canton.
As Mark Twain famously quipped, “History doesn’t repeat itself, but it often rhymes.” With the detention of Zhang Youxia, Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) on 24 January, Xi Jinping appears to be facing his own “Lin Biao moment.” While the official Party line maintains that Zhang is being investigated for “serious violations of discipline,” a flurry of unofficial narratives suggests something far more destabilising, ranging from a thwarted coup d’état to the betrayal of nuclear secrets to the United States. However, Zhang’s downfall raises two pertinent questions: Why Xi purged one of his closest compatriots and Is Xi in total control of the Party and PLA?
Why of the Purge
To understand the true gravity of Zhang’s purge, one must look beyond the official narratives. While reports from the South China Morning Post cited corruption as the primary catalyst for his detention, the PLA Daily editorial the following day outlined four far more damning accusations: “serious violations of discipline and law”; “betrayal of the Party and CMC’s trust”; “trampling on and destroying the CMC Chairman Responsibility System”; and actions that “endangered the Party’s absolute leadership of the army”.
A critical analysis of these charges suggests that corruption, given Zhang was already under scrutiny in 2023 is merely a pretext. What, then, was the immediate trigger? Of the four accusations, two stand out as particularly fatal: the destruction of the Chairman Responsibility System and the undermining of the Party’s absolute leadership over the military. Both charges imply that Zhang did not merely steal; he directly challenged, disobeyed or undermined Xi Jinping. This leaves us with a critical, unanswered question: What specific directive did Zhang refuse to follow? The most compelling explanation is that Zhang faltered in the critical arena of “force building and war preparation”, thereby endangering Xi’s strict deadline for the PLA to be capable of seizing Taiwan by 2027. This theory is substantiated by the official indictment, which explicitly accuses Zhang of inflicting “severe damage to combat capability development.”
Is Xi in Total Control of the Party and PLA
The CPC and the PLA have always been a complex web of factions and loyalties. On the surface, the high-profile purge of Zhang, with no immediate blowback, suggests Xi Jinping wields absolute power. However, a closer look reveals a precarious reality. While the 20th Party Congress in 2022 was widely interpreted as Xi’s total capture of elite politics, the subsequent three years have upended that narrative. Xi has now purged five of his six appointees to the Central Military Commission, alongside his handpicked Defence and Foreign Ministers. If corruption were the sole factor, one must ask how so many officials evaded scrutiny before their elevation to the highest posts. These removals betray a harsh truth: Xi’s authority is under fire, and with no chosen successor, time is not on his side.”
Conclusion
Two things will follow Zhang’s purge. First, identification and persecution of his supporters in the Party and loyalists in the PLA. Second, a complete overhauling of CMC that will populate it with ‘yes-man’ who will prioritise Xi’s political timelines over strategic, operational, and tactical logic.
To an ordinary observer, this might suggest that Taiwan can breathe easier or that India will face less immediate adversity on its Northern borders due to a command structure in disarray. However, this interpretation ignores the “dictator’s trap.” With the expulsion of the last voices of reason and strategic authority from the CMC, the newcomers will operate out of a desperate fear of being the next to fall. This makes for a dangerously volatile period for India and Taiwan.
When survival replaces strategy, the logic of the battlefield shifts. Instead of professional military advice based on tactical and operational realities, Xi will now receive only the reports he wants to hear. New entrants, eager to prove their loyalty and meet Xi’s 2027 deadlines, may be incentivised to manufacture crises or greenlight high-risk operations to demonstrate their “fighting spirit.” In a vacuum of professional pushback, a miscalculation or a reckless attempt to please the Chairman becomes more likely than ever. The purge of Zhang Youxia removed the brakes from an accelerating war machine, leaving the region at the mercy of a leader whose internal insecurity may soon manifest as external aggression.
