Abstract
This article critically assesses the global non-proliferation regime for weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), focusing on nuclear, chemical, and biological threats. While treaties like the NPT, CWC, and BWC have curbed the spread of WMDs, they suffer from structural flaws, enforcement weaknesses, and limited adaptability to emerging technologies and geopolitical shifts. Drawing on case studies and analysis, the article highlights major shortcomings, including the lack of verification for biological weapons, inconsistent implementation of safeguards, and limited tools to counter non-state actors and dual-use risks. It also examines India’s approach to CBRN security, underscoring the need for a unified national strategy that leverages advanced technology, inter-agency coordination, international partnerships, and public preparedness. The article recommends revitalising disarmament efforts, strengthening verification mechanisms, and building inclusive governance frameworks. It concludes that while the existing regime has constrained the use of WMDs, its future effectiveness hinges on transparent, flexible, and collaborative global responses.
