Recent conflicts show that nuclear weapons deter nuclear use and major escalation, but not limited war below the nuclear threshold. Ukraine’s strikes on Russian strategic assets, attacks on Israel despite its presumed nuclear capability, and the India-Pakistan confrontation after Operation Sindoor reveal this gap. For India, credible nuclear deterrence must be matched by resilience, layered defence, counter-drone systems, hardened infrastructure, intelligence fusion and calibrated conventional options.
In June 2025, trucks carrying concealed drones were moved close to Russian air bases. Several of these bases housed strategic bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons. Ukraine launched drones remotely by hijacking Russian telecommunications. At least ten bombers were destroyed and 41 planes, including some used for nuclear command and control were damaged. Drones costing only a few hundred dollars destroyed aircraft worth millions.
The attack, known as Operation Spider’s Web, revealed an uncomfortable truth. Russia possessed one of the world’s largest nuclear arsenals. It also had a stated policy ‘that attacks on its strategic assets could provoke a nuclear response’. Yet, Moscow did not respond with nuclear weapons. It retaliated with conventional drones and missiles.
The incident exposed a gap in the traditional logic of nuclear deterrence.
What Nuclear Weapons Can and Cannot Do
In a statement accompanying the release of SIPRI Yearbook 2026, SIPRI Director Karim Haggag warned that “world events … are challenging nuclear deterrence logic”. For decades, the destructive power of nuclear weapons was expected to deter and discourage an adversary from starting a major war.
That logic has not disappeared but only modified. Most modern conflicts do not begin as an all-out war. They remain below the nuclear threshold. They involve calibrated military strikes, missiles, drones, cyber operations, terrorism and proxy warfare.
A nuclear weapon is too destructive to be used credibly against every such attack. This creates space for adversaries to operate below the threshold. They may assume, sometimes dangerously, that a nuclear power will show restraint.
Rose Gottemoeller, a former NATO Deputy Secretary General, develops this argument in a recent Foreign Affairs essay titled The Strange Defeat of Nuclear Deterrence. Her central point is clear. Nuclear weapons remain relevant. But they do not provide an all-purpose shield.
Israel Has Learnt the Same Lesson
Israel offers another example. It is widely believed to possess nuclear weapons. Yet this capability did not prevent the Hamas attack of October 2023. Nor has it stopped missiles and drones launched by Iran and armed groups in the region.
Iran even targeted the Dimona nuclear complex during the recent conflict. The significance is that nuclear capability did not protect a sensitive nuclear-related facility from conventional attack. It may, in fact, may make that facility a more attractive target.
Israel has therefore invested heavily in layered air and missile defence. Iron Dome is designed to counter short-range threats. David’s Sling deals with more demanding missile attacks. Arrow systems provide protection against ballistic missiles.
This approach known as “deterrence by denial” make an attack less effective and therefore less attractive. But this also creates a new challenge. Drones and missiles can be produced and launched in large numbers. Sophisticated interceptors are expensive. A country can win the military exchange and still face an unfavourable cost equation.
India and Pakistan Live Beneath a Nuclear Ceiling
India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons in 1998. Yet the Kargil War followed in 1999. Several military crises came later. Nuclear weapons did not end conflict. They changed its scale and imposed limits on escalation.
The confrontation of May 2025 reinforced this lesson. India launched Operation Sindoor after the Pahalgam terror attack. The initial strikes targeted nine terror-related sites. The Indian government described the action as “focused, measured and non-escalatory”. It also stated that Pakistani military establishments had not initially been targeted.
The situation then widened. According to the Indian Ministry of Defence, Pakistan attempted to engage military targets in northern and western India using drones and missiles. India responded by targeting air-defence radars and systems in Pakistan. The exchange remained conventional. But it took place under a nuclear shadow.
The essential point is that nuclear weapons did not prevent military action. They influenced the choice of targets, the intensity of retaliation and the urgency of conflict termination. They acted as a ceiling. They did not provide a shield.
The Risk of Miscalculation Is Growing
Modern technology makes escalation harder to control. A drone may strike an airbase that serves both conventional and strategic purposes. A missile may damage a radar linked to a wider command network. A cyberattack may interrupt communications at the worst possible moment. The attacking side may see a limited operation. The other side may interpret it as the first stage of a larger offensive.
Decision time is also shrinking. Political and military leaders may be forced to act before the full picture is clear. Intelligence errors, incomplete information and public pressure can make a crisis more dangerous. This is why restraint cannot depend only on nuclear threats. It must also be supported by clear communication, reliable intelligence and stronger defences.
What India Must Do
India requires a wider deterrence architecture. While a credible nuclear deterrent remains essential, but it must be supported by robust conventional capabilities. India must retain the ability to respond to terrorism and military provocation without allowing nuclear coercion to create strategic paralysis.
Critical military infrastructure must be protected. Airbases, missile sites, command centres and communication networks require layered air defence. Counter-drone systems must be affordable, mobile and available in large numbers. Important assets must be hardened and dispersed.
Intelligence systems must also improve. Emerging threats must be detected early. Command networks must remain functional even under electronic or cyber attack. Decision-makers need a reliable operational picture during a rapidly evolving crisis.
Safeguards are equally important. India and Pakistan already exchange lists of nuclear installations every year under an agreement signed in 1988. It reduces the risk of nuclear-related facilities being targeted during a conflict.
Such measures must be strengthened for the age of precision missiles and drones.
The Real Lesson
Nuclear weapons still matter. They can deter a nuclear attack. They can discourage a major war. They can impose caution during a crisis. But they cannot prevent every form of conflict.
The battlefield below the nuclear threshold is becoming more active. Cheap drones, precision missiles and hybrid warfare have created new vulnerabilities.
The lesson is straightforward. Nuclear deterrence remains necessary. But resilience, layered defence and calibrated conventional capability have become equally important. India does not live behind a nuclear shield. It lives beneath a nuclear ceiling. The challenge is to ensure that the ceiling is never breached.
