Introduction
Shortly after the first round of US airstrikes on Iran, Ansar Allah, or the Houthis, as they are more commonly known, declared to join the conflict on Iran’s side. In reality, they largely kept themselves out of the conflict until the attack on the Houthi delegation returning from the funeral of the former supreme leader of Iran. Although the attack was carried out by the internationally recognised Yemenese government (IRG), the Houthis blamed Saudi Arabia, the government’s main backer. Since then, Houthi drones and missiles have targeted Saudi territory, particularly vital oil infrastructure. In early September, an unprecedented and swift Houthi campaign swept through the Southern territory, that has been under the government’s control till then. While the Saudi-backed government forces retreated from strategic coastal towns, the Houthi fighters ultimately took control over Yemen’s Red Sea coast and the Strait of Bab al-Mandab. This swift campaign by Houthis put Saudi Arabia on a setback, exposing its military vulnerability against a decentralised socio-political fighting force, motivated by the Iranian response in the Strait of Hormuz and equipped with Iran-backed military innovation.
Yemen’s Civil War – a Multifront Conflict
Yemen’s civil war cannot be simply classified as a conflict between the internationally recognised Yemenese government and Houthi militias. Rather, the conflict involves various factions supported by different countries fighting for different objectives.
Firstly, the Houthis or the Ansar Allah, consisting of the Zaydi Shia community of Yemen, stemmed from a socio-political movement centred around the political marginalisation of the Zaydi community. With time, in response to Saudi Arabia’s backing of Yemen’s government, Houthi militias found support from Iran in terms of training and military technology. However, Ansar Allah cannot be categorised as a typical Iranian proxy group like Hezbollah in Lebanon and Shia militias in Iraq. The relationship between Tehran and Houthis can be best described as close allies. Until recently, Ansar Allah used to control northern Yemen, including the capital Sana’a, effectively ruling over a majority of the Yemenese population.
On the other hand, the IRG, ruling through an eight-member body called the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) from the port city of Aden, comprised of several Saudi-backed militias like the National Resistance Forces led by Tareq Saleh, son of former President Ali Abduallah Saleh; the Islah Party, a Sunni faction; the Giants Brigade; and the Nation’s Shield Forces. The IRG used to control most of the Southern and Eastern Yemen, including Aden, Marib governorate, the Hadhramaut region, and almost the entire Red Sea coast line of Yemen. The recent Houthi campaign has snatched the Red Sea coast territories from the IRG.
Another major faction in this conflict is the Southern Transitional Council (STC), a group of militias backed by the UAE. Over a period, the STC has developed a demand for a separate Southern Yemen. In 2025, the STC separated itself from the IRG’s armed coalition and, in early 2026, it led a military campaign, seizing southern and eastern territories from the IRG’s control. Saudi-backed IRG forces countered the sudden invasion and recaptured all territories, dissolving the STC in the process. Since then, the STC does not exist as a single unit.
Houthi Campaign in September
Ansar Allah and Saudi Arabia had been exchanging strikes since the conflict in Iran began. However, before September, that conflict was largely sporadic, with occasional strikes from each side. In September, Ansar Allah mounted a coordinated military campaign at multiple fronts against the IRG, cutting the province of Taiz from the coast. The group simultaneously attacked the IRG in the Hodeidah and Taiz provinces, capturing the historic and strategic ports like Mocha. By September 11, Ansar Allah had effectively captured the Dhubab Island, the Greater and Lesser Hanish islands, and the Perim islands, which are strategically located at the narrow Strait of Bab al-Mandab. Thus, by mid-September, Houthis had gained control over the entire traffic that passes through the strait, jeopardising Saudi fuel exports to the world.
IRG’s loss in Yemen has been a disaster for Saudi geo-economics. On account of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz by Iran, Saudi Arabia has been using the Red Sea to export its fuel. However, to move the fuel to its Red Sea ports like Yanbu port, it had been using its 1200 Km long East-West Oil Pipeline. Just before the Houthi offensive in South Yemen, the East-West Oil Pipeline was struck by an Iranian proxy militia in Iraq. Meanwhile, the Houthis declared a blockade of the Strait, especially for Saudi exports.
Saudi Arabia’s Inability to Counter
Saudi Arabia had fought, and indecisively lost, a war with Ansar Allah from 2015 to 2022, which ended with a ceasefire in 2022. However, this time, Saudi Arabia and its allied IRG militias were too slow in responding to the Houthi advance. There were many instances of the IRG forces simply submitting and surrendering, along with severe irregularities in the number of soldiers.
Saudi Arabia’s inability to counter the Houthi offenisve came as a surprise to the region, especially when it was clear that it could have severe political and economic consequences for Saudi Arabia. However, a close observation of Saudi Arabia’s security forces reveals that the inability to counter militarily is structural. Despite having one of the most ambitious defence import budget in the world, Saudi Arabia does not have a developed military industrial complex proportionate to its defence spending.
Moreover, Saudi Arabia has placed its trust in alliances and the international community rather than building its own military to respond to any threat to its vital exports. The idea is that the international community would respond to any threat to Saudi Arabia since the fuel export from Saudi Arabia is vital to the global needs. However, the allies, like the USA, are not willing to get involved militarily against the Houthis largely because of the preoccupation with the Iran conflict. The Mecca Defence Pact allies, Turkiye and Pakistan, too, have not proposed any shared military response against the Houthis. Ansar Allah has also warned both countries not to intervene in the conflict. Besides, Pakistan is wary of Iran’s proxy networks, like Liwa Zainabiyoun (Zainabiyoun Brigade), operating inside its territory.
Another factor behind the failure of the Saudi-backed IRG forces was the breakdown of the coalition with STC. Earlier, the UAE-backed STC provided a strong position in southern Yemen on the Red Sea coast. However, with the dissolution of the STC in 2026 after the conflict with IRG forces, a power vacuum was created, eventually filled by the Houthis.
Conclusion
From territorial expansion into the historically contested regions of Aseer, Najran, and Jazan to taxing both primary oil exporting routes of Saudi Arabia – the Persian Gulf route and the Red Sea route, various possible implications of the recent Houthi offensive are mostly grim for Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia and its allies in Yemen have earlier reversed similar losses at the hands of the STC. However, it will be too early to predict whether they will be able to replicate their earlier success this time against Ansar Allah. The present situation puts Saudi Arabia in a political, economic, and security dilemma, while providing Iran with a strong negotiating position vis-à-vis the USA.
