On September 15-16, Michael Vance, the US Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, met President Min Aung Hlaing in Myanmar. They held another round of meetings in Tokyo in October. The direct talks between the United States and Myanmar indicate a policy shift by the US under the Trump administration. Myanmar has been under strict sanctions by the US government since the coup that took place in February 2021. While the immediate reason behind the meetings was the release of the US businessman Adam Castello, these talks have been about the bigger picture, i.e., resetting US-Myanmar relations. This is a significant diplomatic opening for the Myanmar government, as since his election, Aung Min Hlaing’s agenda has been to normalise its relationships with different countries and improve its image. Right after he was sworn in as President, he visited India, China, and Russia. Within ASEAN, he visited Thailand, Cambodia, and Malaysia.
The article seeks to address the changing contours of the US-Myanmar relationship: What compelled the US to conduct the meeting? And how will it impact the power politics in South and Southeast Asia? The issues of the topics discussed in the meetings are discreet, but the reports hint that the main focus of the talk was the scam issues in Myanmar and the US’s willingness to engage Myanmar for the rare earth minerals. This marks a clear shift in the Trump administration’s policy towards Myanmar. As major powers compete for emerging technologies like AI and green energy, along with related industries like semiconductors and traditional defence manufacturing capabilities, the rare earth minerals in Myanmar have become one of the most important strategic assets. In a world where AI and data centres are becoming a new geopolitical commodity, these developments should not surprise anyone.
Behind the Release of Adam Castillo: Moving Away from Biden’s Liberal Internationalism?
Pro-MAGA businessman Adam Castillo was arrested in June 2026 at the Yangon International Airport by the Burmese authorities after being “accused of financial impropriety.” After the successful talks, the businessman was deported from Myanmar. The US also lifted “sanctions on the daughter of a Myanmar businessman”, Theint Win Htet. These developments are significant as they mark a sudden shift in the Trump administration’s Myanmar policy. The previous administration of President Joe Biden imposed sanctions in 2021 on several pro-junta officials and corporations. Since then, US-Myanmar relations have stalled. In 2024, the US Treasury targeted Burmese businessman Thein Win Zaw and his family.
However, since last year, the Trump administration has been signalling that there might be a change in its Myanmar policy. In July 2025, the Trump administration eased sanctions against several high-profile business allies of the junta: “KT Services and Logistics and its founder, Jonathan Myo Kyaw Thaung; the MCM Group and its owner Aung Hlaing Oo; and Suntac Technologies and its owner Sit Taing Aung; and another individual, Tin Latt Min.”
Hence, the talk and the outcome, including the release of Castillo, are a result of changing strategic calculations as visible in the Trump administration’s signalling since last year. Trump administration’s July 2025 order came after Myanmar’s Min Aung Hlaing wrote a personal letter to Trump flattering his “strong leadership in guiding his country towards national prosperity with the spirit of a true patriot”. These talks then naturally went beyond the release of Castillo and were more about resetting the US-Myanmar ties.
Since July last year, the administration has been showing interest in Myanmar’s rare earth minerals and easing sanctions against the regime in line with Trump’s transactional approach.
Rare Earth as a ‘strategic asset’ for Myanmar
Myanmar has huge critical and rare earth mineral deposits, including around 10 per cent of the global antimony reserve and 4 per cent of the global rare earth reserve. For the US, securing the rare earth minerals is key to its competition with China. Global energy security (clean energy), AI technology, and semiconductors need rare earth and critical minerals.
In the current geopolitical landscape, where the US and China compete, critical and rare earth minerals are crucial for their security. Myanmar is also rich in dysprosium and terbium. Even emerging powers like India are seeking to strengthen their own supply chains that include these minerals. In such an environment, the huge rare earth and critical mineral deposits are a strategic asset for Myanmar. The junta knows this and aims to exploit it to not only end diplomatic isolation but also use international support to regain control over territories that were lost after the 2021 coup. This includes the rich rare earth and critical mineral areas that are under the control of Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) in the north. Huge swathes of land rich in these minerals are currently under the control of the EAOs in Kachin, Shan, Karenni and Karen States. The improvement of ties with the US and the US interest in these minerals provide a win-win situation for both parties. With the US easing pressure on the regime, henceforth, the regime can better navigate its domestic and international security challenges.
Navigating International Pressure and Survival of the Regime
After the 2021 coup, there was an attempt to isolate the regime by Western powers. ASEAN states eventually barred the junta leadership from ASEAN forums as they failed to completely comply with the Five-Point Agreement. However, Myanmar still maintains close bilateral ties with several regional and extra-regional states like China, India, Russia, and Thailand. China is Myanmar’s closest partner, and the regime’s survival depends on Chinese support. Myanmar is a significant part of the BRI and is strategically important for China as it provides access to the Bay of Bengal. China has heavily invested in infrastructure and economic projects in Myanmar. For India too, Myanmar is the gateway to Southeast Asia and a pivot in India’s Act East Policy. India has also actively engaged with Myanmar’s junta in the past. Similarly, Russians have also developed and maintained extensive defence ties with Myanmar.
Myanmar’s outreach to states like the US, India, Russia, and Thailand has two-fold objectives: Firstly, the regime wants to survive the ongoing civil war, where till last year it was losing significant ground to the anti-junta forces. International sanctions and isolation make the regime more vulnerable. Hence, successfully navigating these sanctions is essential for surviving this civil war. Secondly, the country’s elites and their nationalist supporters know that Myanmar is too dependent on China. This overdependence is problematic in the long term, and the only way of reducing Chinese influence is to diversify their bilateral and strategic ties. Currently, China is the biggest importer of Myanmar’s critical and rare earth minerals. China’s rare earth imports surged. Rare earth imports rose sharply in September to 5021 tons, up 23 per cent from August.
Way Forward
As the United States aims to improve ties with Myanmar, with an interest in its rare earth minerals in mind, this creates a special conundrum for India. American presence in India’s backyard, especially when Myanmar is crucial for the stability of India’s northeast region, will create new challenges for policymakers. Historically, India has never been comfortable with the presence of any extra-regional player in their backyard. The potential of US presence in the region will only make India more uncomfortable.
