Abstract
The escalating tensions between India and Maldives have led to a significant shift in their bilateral relations, stemming from a series of events including social media outbursts triggered by Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Lakshadweep. Despite a history of cordial relations, recent developments suggest a departure from the traditional alignment, particularly under the presidency of Mohamed Muizzu, raising concerns about a tilt towards China.
Muizzu’s strategic realignment, evidenced by his visits to Turkey and China, has led to the signing of numerous agreements, including those related to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and defence. Amidst domestic political turmoil and concerns over growing Chinese influence, India has maintained a measured response, emphasising the need for a prudent foreign policy approach. The article provides a comprehensive overview of the India-Maldives-China dynamic, and recommends potential options and suggestions for India’s response.
Key Words: Maldives, Diplomacy, India, China, Bilateral Relations, Debt.
Introduction
The recent escalation of tensions between India and Maldives has brought to light a series of events that signify a crucial rather consequential shift in the bilateral relations. The present crisis came to light on January 5, 2024, when pictures of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi enjoying a holiday in Lakshadweep caused an unanticipated outburst of anger in the Maldives (The Hindu, 2024). On social media, a number of Maldivian officials—including deputy ministers—reacted negatively, casting doubt on the purpose of the PM’s visit and charging India with trying to outcompete Maldivian tourism. Outrage in India was stoked by these remarks, which prompted demands for boycotting Maldives and promoting Lakshadweep’s local travel industry (Hindustan Times, 2024). The article aims to highlight the multifaceted factors contributing to the strained relations between the two Indian Ocean neighbours and potential implications for regional dynamics.
Brief History of India-Maldives Relations
Owing to its strategic location in the Indian Ocean, Maldives attracted the Portugues, Dutch and the French explorers in the 16 and 17th century (Chatterjee, AK. 2024). It later came under British economic and strategic influence, becoming a British protectorate until gaining independence in 1965. As an Independent state, Maldives joined the UN in 1965 and developed ties with neighbouring countries including India, Sri Lanka and Pakistan (Phadnis & Luithui, 1981)
India and Maldives share a history of mostly cordial relations building on historical ties, cultural and commercial exchanges, and strategic security collaboration. Relations between the two countries were formalised with the signing of Treaty of Friendship in 1981 (MEA, 2012). Under President Maumoon, although, Maldivian foreign policy took a lukewarm turn towards India. The shift in dynamics grew during Abdulla Yameen’s presidency, during which China’s influence in Maldives increased through Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (Mitra, R., 2022) Although ties improved significantly during President Ibrahim Mohamed Solih with an ‘India First’ foreign policy. The election of Mohamed Muizzu as president of the Maldives in 2023, however, revealed a possible shift in diplomatic priorities towards China and caused the surface of amity to begin to erode (Sharma, N. 2023).
President Muizzu’s election marked a departure from the ‘India First’ policy. Upon assuming the office, he requested India to pull back its 88 defence personnel responsible for operating the Dornier aircraft and helicopters given by India (Avas, 2021). These assets are used for surveillance of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of Maldives, as well as conducting disaster relief operations across over a thousand islands in Maldives. Additionally, they played a role in promoting maritime security within the framework of Colombo Security Conclave. This shift was evident in decisions like requesting withdrawal of India soldiers and revoking key agreements such as the 2019 water survey pact.
Strategic Realignment Under Muizzu
The strategic realignment is underscored by Dr. Muizzu’s visits to Turkey and China, hinting a break from the tradition of visiting India first (The Print, 2024). The escalation of tensions can be attributed, in part, to the perceived inclination of the Maldivian government towards China and apprehensions of its growing influence in the Indian Ocean. During Muizzu’s China visit, a joint statement established a comprehensive strategic cooperation and participation of Maldives in key Chinese initiatives (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PRC, 2024). Both parties committed to providing strong support to one another in order to protect their respective core interests, uphold national sovereignty, independence, and dignity, and vehemently oppose external intervention in Maldivian affairs. Interestingly after returning from China, Muizzu issued an ultimatum to India, demanding the withdrawal of its non-combat military personnel by March 15. Additionally, he has announced plans to host a PRC ship, Xiang Yang Hong 03, which is stated to be on a dual-purpose oceanographic mission (Reuters. 2024). Maldives decision, seemingly to appease China, has the potential of disrupting regional security. India, naturally, should be concerned about these developments, particularly in relation to the development of the blue economy jointly with China and the Chinese “research vessels” and spy ships that are scavenging the Indian Ocean and gathering private information. These actions signal a shift in the Maldives’ foreign policy towards a closer alignment with China, raising concerns about the country’s relationship with India and its broader geopolitical implications.
India’s Assistance to Maldives
It is important to highlight that India has been providing assistance and other support to Maldives. India’s timely assistance during the 1988 coup attempt in Maldives and swift withdrawal of its troops once their assistance was no longer necessary helped allay any concerns of Indian dominance or territorial ambitions (MEA, 2023). Similarly, India was the first country to aid Maldives during the devastating 2004 tsunami and the water crisis in Malé in December 2014. These instances demonstrate India’s proximity and capability to provide immediate assistance during times of crisis not only to Maldives but to all its neighbours, earning recognition and gratitude from the Maldivian government and its people. India’s rapid response to crises continued in January 2020 when it promptly dispatched 30,000 doses of measles vaccine to prevent an outbreak in the Maldives (Chaudhary, DR, 2020). Additionally, India’s comprehensive assistance during the COVID-19 pandemic further solidified its reputation as the first responder in times of need for the Maldives.
The Aspect of Domestic Politics
Interestingly, at home the things do not look very good for President Muizzu. Reports from local media suggest that he is at the risk of losing his position as the Opposition prepares to file an impeachment motion in Majlis (Sun International, 2024). This follows a dramatic episode in Parliament, and the Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP), holding parliamentary majority, has reportedly collected sufficient signatures to present the motion of impeachment of President Muizzu.
Muizzu gave his first speech to the People’s Majlis (the Maldives Parliament) on 5 February 2024 which was met with low attendance and saw only 24 parliamentarians present out of the 87 members of the House (Padmanaban, K. 2024). Their absence was attributed to their strong opposition to Muizzu’s significant shift towards an “anti-India” pivot and hold a majority in the House. For India, Amb Shyam Saran suggests, it must adopt a prudent approach in response to negative developments (Hindustan Times, 2024). He believes that foreign policy decisions should not be swayed by social media reactions. Harsh V Pant believes that New Delhi’s official reaction to Muizzu’s provocations has been sober and mature (NDTV, 2024). Even when Muizzu government ministers made disparaging remarks about the Indian Prime Minister, which sparked a social media frenzy, India remained calm. S Jaishankar, the minister of external affairs, recently underlined that “politics is politics,” acknowledging that there is not always complete support or agreement in every nation (NDTV, 2024).
President Muizzu must bear in mind that his anti-Indian stance will eventually hurt Maldives more than it helped. Maldivians, who depend on imports of necessities from India, will suffer greatly as a result of his brinkmanship. The nation will undoubtedly experience political unrest, economic debt, and civic unrest as a result of his activities. The latest example of Sri Lanka should serve as a warning to Maldives.
A Case of Reverse Bullying
Considering geopolitical dynamics between India, China, and their smaller neighbouring countries, Shiv Shankar Menon, in his seminal work ‘Choices’, argues that it is a reality that smaller neighbouring nations may engage with both India and China opportunistically, seeking to maximise their own gains (Menon, S. 2016). He argues against the notion of expecting exclusive loyalty or forming a zone where countries only deal with India, as it would not be in the best interest of these sovereign states to limit their options in such a way. He is basically emphasising the importance for India to adapt its foreign policy approach to accommodate the complex regional dynamics involving China. This essentially reflects a realpolitik understanding of international relations, where countries pursue their self-interests in a competitive environment. In contrast, P Stobdan argues that while small states may attempt to assert their sovereignty, such actions could lead to detrimental consequences, including economic hardships and political instability (Stobdan, P. 2024).
The phenomenon of smaller countries attempting to assert themselves against larger neighbours is an anomaly, something which is generally seen as the domain of powerful nations. There have been instances where bigger powers used aggressive behaviour to intimidate smaller states. For Instance, Russia’s annexation of Crimea or China’s occupation of Tibet and calling for annexation of Taiwan. China is a major bully in Asia, persistently projecting its influence deep into Southeast Asia’s maritime core and advancing its illegal claims by pressure and intimidation. China is aware of the effectiveness of bullying. On the other hand, India has not employed coercive tactics against its smaller neighbours nor does it desire to alienate them.
It is important to note that Maldives owes China US$1.3 billion, with China granting a five-year grace period for loan repayment, potentially leveraging this debt to advance its agenda (Indian Express, 2024). There are concerns that Chinese money and influence could be utilised by President Muizzu to secure political gains. It is essential to recognise China’s strategic approach to becoming a global leader, which prioritises incremental advancement through the economy, diplomacy, and military means.
Conclusion
India does not want to jeopardise its long-nurtured relationship with the Maldives. That is why, in the recently announced budget for 2023-24, the Maldives was granted Rs 770.90 crore as aid, an increase of over 300 percent from the Rs 183.16 crore granted in 2022-23 (Bhattacherjee, K. 2024). In fact, the majority of Maldivians do not wish to jeopardise their ties with India. They would rather worry about their future and not about Muizzu.
Maldives must understand that India has no issues with its interaction with China. However, if the Maldives aligns too closely with China and asks India to leave, it would not be taken positively. New Delhi must respond with reciprocity and send a strong message to Maldives. This response could take various forms, such as diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions, or other measures aimed at deterring further hostile actions from the Maldives. The underlying idea is that India should not tolerate what is perceived as unwarranted aggression from the Maldives and should take decisive action to address the situation.
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