故上兵伐谋，其次伐交，其次伐兵，其下攻城。攻城之法，为不 得已[1]
[The worst policy is to attack cities. Attack only when there is no alternative.]
Sun Tzu[i]
For the last 15 years, with the formation of the urban warfare training facility at Zhurihe[2] in 2009, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been focusing extensively on future urban warfare. Evidence points out that Taiwan is the primary driver of the PLA’s urban warfare focus. A replica airbase imitating the Taiwanese Air Force Base near Taitung was built in October 2014[ii]. The PLA also constructed replicas of Taiwan’s Presidential Office and Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Zhurihe in 2015. The facility also contains a full-size replica of a part of downtown Taipei[iii].
China wants to “(re)unify” Taiwan with the mainland but is also versed that Taiwan is 78% urban, and any urban warfare inflicts collateral damage on lives and property. The quotation above from Sun Tzu describes seizing a city as a last resort. The paper discusses four Civil War strategies that China might employ in Taiwan if it decides to unify Taiwan with the mainland forcefully[3].
PLA and Urban Warfare: Past and Present
In its current avatar, the PLA has little to no Urban Warfare experience. However, it gained a lot of Urban Warfare experience during the Chinese Civil war (1927-1949), especially after the end of the Second World War. The Communist Party’s victory in the Chinese civil war was partly due to its capability to capture and hold large cities. The PLA developed urban warfare doctrines during the civil war that still finds relevance in contemporary Chinese strategic writings.
Lin Biao and the First strategy of Urban Warfare
As the civil war raged, the PLA got introduced to reality; while they were able at guerilla warfare, they could not win critical battles on urban terrain. Lin Biao first dealt with this shortcoming. Lin Biao’s forces started practising tactics and techniques in already captured urban areas to use them in future urban battles[iv]. Lin Biao developed a strategy where he used small units to target pivotal zones in a city while simultaneously focusing on enveloping and outflanking the enemy[v]. The strategy developed by Lin Biao tasted significant success in November 1947 in the Battle of Shijiazhuang (capital of Hebei province). Shijiazhuang was the first key city that the communist party captured.
Battle of Jinan and the “Bull Knife Tactic”
Another strategy that was developed was the “Bull Knife Tactic.” The Bull knife tactic was responsible for the CCP’s victory in the Battle of Jinan. The battle of Jinan is often described as an inflexion point in the CCP’s drive to win the Northeast region. The victory at Jinan was described as a milestone that initiated the unification of large “liberated” cities[vi]. The “Bull Knife Tactic” focused on attacking a city to draw out reinforcements and attacking them in transit while they were vulnerable. The tactic included swift attacks by swarming the area with forces.
General Xu Shiyou described the “bull knife tactic” as:
“killing cattle requires a fatal blow. Jinan’s fortifications are strong, deep, and long…. In the campaign with the assault on Jinan, we must seize the enemy’s vital parts, the concentration of forces and firepower, killing open a bloody path and going in and striking like a sharp knife, piercing the enemy’s heart[vii].
The battle of Jinan has received significant attention in CCP’s references invoking this historical memory. The battle of Jinan hardly finds any place in research outside China; however, it has made a considerable space in PLA’s writings and research. This shows that the battles have contemporary relevance[viii].
People’s Warfare
The next significant urban warfare strategy came from the civil war of the Huaihai campaign in November 1948. During the campaign, the PLA focused all its might on the Nationalist headquarters at Xuzhou. The PLA strategy in Xuzhou was twofold. The first component of the strategy was to encircle Xuzhou. The encirclement was followed by targeting the Nationalist troops using artillery. The second component was what the CCP calls “people’s warfare.” (人民战争, Lùn chíjiǔ zhàn). It was called so because thousands of civilians were mobilized to provide logistical support by pushing trolleys with supplies to the frontline. The “people’s warfare” was also recognized by Xi Jinping when he visited Huaihai memorial in 2019. Speaking of the “People’s Warfare,” he said:
“[the victory] relied on the support and dedication of the people. The Battle of Huaihai was a victory achieved by launching trolleys.”[ix]
The fable of “People’s Warfare” still exists, and PLA looks to leverage a strategy of military-civil fusion and mobilizes civil and commercial assets, such as ferries, that could provide transport and logistics support in the event of an invasion of Taiwan. The People’s Warfare has also been part of China’s grey-zone tactics. The latest example of “People’s Warfare” (grey-zone tactics) was seen in South China Sea in March 2021 when more than 200 Chinese fishing vessels anchored at Whitsun Reef, claimed by the Philippines[x].
Winning the “hearts of the people.”
With the CCP consolidating its position by capturing large cities, PLA’s modern warfare strategy also got refined. The capture of Beijing and Tianjin in 1949 resulted in two distinct urban warfare strategies. After the capture of Beijing and Tianjin, Mao Zedong declared that the tactics used to conquer the two cities would serve as the template for fighting in an urban environment. The strategies were called the “Tianjin pattern” and “Beiping pattern[xi]”. The “Tianjin pattern” focused on capturing a city by brute military force, and the “Beiping pattern” focused on capturing a city through “subversion and exploitation of influence.”
The battle of Shanghai in May 1949 was another significant achievement of the PLA that marked the PLA’s evolving urban strategy. The battle of Shanghai was a political battle more than a military one.
Mao declared before the battle:
“it is necessary not only to destroy the enemy but also preserve the city and win the hearts of the people[xii].”
Marshal Chen Yi put it more subtly when they said:
“The Battle of Shanghai can be aptly compared to battling rats in a China shop; you must catch the rats and must not break the precious porcelain[xiii].”
The strategy remains relevant in the Chinese urban warfare discourse as it targets Taiwan. China wants to “reunify” Taiwan with the mainland but is also versed that Taiwan is 78% urban, and any urban warfare inflicts collateral damage on lives and property. Thus, the PLA often describes invading Taiwan as “battling rats”; in the case of invasion, in Mao’s words, PLA needs to preserve Taiwan and win the hearts of the civilians while defeating the armed forces.
The strategies discussed above have a place in PLA’s urban warfare discourse. PLA has also tested these strategies, People’s Armed Police (PAP), PLA Marine force, and Special forces in different war exercises. The PLA has also used propaganda to showcase its urban war capabilities and, in the process, has subtly pointed out Taiwan. The Taiwanese Presidential Office replica was featured in the video of the Stride exercise in 2015[xiv].
China’s recently increasing assertiveness over Taiwan in the last three years includes violating Taiwan’s Air Defence Zone numerous times, sending warplanes and bombers towards Taiwan and threatening Taiwan when the United States speaker of the House of Representatives visited Taiwan[xv]. PLA’s mockup of the Taiwanese Presidential Office, the Foreign Affairs Ministry, downtown Taipei, and the Taitung Air Base shows that China might employ the urban warfare strategies of the civil war in case it decides to reunify Taiwan with the mainland forcefully.
[1] The quotation from Sun Zu translate to “Thus the highest form of generalship is to balk at enemy’s plans; next best is to prevent the junction of the enemy’s forces; the next in order is to attack the enemy’s army in the field; and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities. The rule is not to besiege walled cities if it can possibly be avoided.”
[2] Zhurihe Training Base is a PLA base in Inner Mongolia. It was founded in 1957 and is the largest military base in China 1,066 square KM. According to their own words Zhurihe is PLA’s “most modernized training base.”
[3] Historically China has stressed upon “peaceful reunification” of Taiwan with the mainland. However, that doctrine is increasingly under stress under Xi Jinping. China under XI has repeatedly threatened Taiwan with military actions. In the 20th party congress too, XI Jinping didn’t renounce the use of force to “reunify” Taiwan.
[i] Sun Zu, The Art of War, Oxford University Press, 1963, pg. 78.
[ii] Victor Robert Lee, Satellite Imagery: China Staging Mock Invasion of Taiwan?, The Diplomat, 9 August 2015. Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2015/08/satellite-imagery-from-china-suggests-mock-invasion-of-taiwan/. Accessed on 11 October 2022.
[iii] Joseph Trevithick, “China’s Largest Base has Replicas of Taiwan’s Presidential Building, Eifel Tower”, The Warzone, 27 May 2020. Available at: https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/33591/chinas-biggest-base-has-huge-replicas-of-taiwans-presidential-building-and-the-eiffel-tower. Accessed on 11 October 2022.
[iv] Harold M. Tanner. Big Army Groups, Standardization, and Assaulting Fortified Positions: Chinese “Ways of War” and the Transition from Guerrilla to Conventional War in China’s Northeast, 1945-1948. Journal of Chinese Military History 1 (2012) 105-138. DOI: 10.1163/22127453-12341234
[v] Ibid.
[vi] News China, “Why is the Battle of Jinan the Prologue of three major battles?”, News China, 28 September 2012. Available at: http://news.china.com.cn/18da/2012-09/28/content_26668888.htm. Accessed on 12 October 2022.
[vii] Qiushi Magazine Research Group, “The Battle of Jinan Kicked off the Decisive Strategic Battle”, QSTHEORY, 24 May 2021. Available at: http://www.qstheory.cn/laigao/ycjx/2021-05/24/c_1127486431.htm. Accessed on 12 October 2022.
[viii] Xinhua, “The First Battle to Capture 100,000 Heavily Guarded Cities in e Liberation War: Jinan Campaign”, Xinhua, 7 August 2017. Available at: http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2017-08/07/c_1121442924.htm. Accessed on 12 October 2022.
[ix] Xinhua, “Xi Jinping visits the Huaihai Battle Memorial Hall: Give back to the people well”, Xinhuanet, 13 December 2017. Available at: http://www.xinhuanet.com//politics/leaders/2017-12/13/c_1122106839.htm?agt=135_1.undefined. Accessed on 12 October 2022.
[x] CNBC, “Wary Philippines says 200 Chinese vessels at disputed reef”, CNBC News, 21 March 2021. Available at: https://www.cnbc.com/2021/03/21/whitsun-reef-philippines-says-200-chinese-vessels-in-filipino-eez.html. Accessed on 12 October 2022.
[xi] Joseph K. S. Yick, Making Urban Revolution in China: The CCP-GMD Struggle for Beiping-Tianjin, 1945–1949, (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1995), pg. xvii. ISBN: 9781563246067.
[xii] Shang Wei Zhang Dahai, “Battle of Shanghai: a complete political and military battle”, QSTHEORY, 16 April 2019. Available at: http://www.qstheory.cn/defense/2019-04/16/c_1124374320.htm. Accessed on 12 October 2022.
[xiii] Ibid.
[xiv] Jeffrey Lin, “Stride 2015: China’s Best Troops Takes on a Grueling Combat Simulation”, Popular Science, 29 July 2015. Available at: https://www.popsci.com/great-stride-forward-chinas-best-troop-take-realistic-training/. Accesses on 13 October 2022
[xv] News Wire, “China threatens ‘targeted military operations’ as Pelosi arrives in Taiwan”, France 24, 2 August 2022. Available at: https://www.france24.com/en/asia-pacific/20220802-us-house-speaker-nancy-pelosi-lands-in-taiwan-despite-chinese-warnings. Accessed on 13 October 2022.
