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Home External Publications

Kargil Diwas: Decoding Pakistan’s ‘Mujahideen’ playbook

Dr Tara KarthabyDr Tara Kartha
July 26, 2025
in External Publications
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Kargil was just one episode in a long series of incursions since Partition—but its values and lessons endure Kargil Vijay Diwas must be celebrated in earnest across the world using all Indian embassies and consulates to mark bravery over deceit and honour in war as against the ugliness and crime of covert wars that is Pakistan’s forte

It is now 26 years since India won a heady victory in Kargil, pushing back Pakistani soldiers in a glacial cold in July 1999. The fight was one of sheer grit, fighting extremely treacherous terrain and an enemy sitting at the heights in sheltered bunkers. Few in the history of war have achieved such a remarkable victory, led from the front by young captains and followed literally to the death by their troops. While the anniversary deserves the homage of the whole country, it was actually just one episode, a marker perhaps, in a long line of such incursions that have plagued this country since the time of Partition.

The Regular-Irregular Mix

The patterns have been rather repetitive. A series of tribal incursions into Kashmir was followed on October 22, 1947, by a large group of trained tribals and regular Pakistan army personnel in a bid to get control over the state. The whole is detailed in a book by a decorated officer, Major General Akbar Khan, which, however, omits the rape and looting by the greedy invaders and the fierce resistance by the Kashmiris themselves. Khan was the original architect of a Pakistani strategy that continued for almost eight decades, using a mix of both irregulars and troops.

A brilliant and ambitious man, he later tried to engineer a coup in the famous Rawalpindi conspiracy case, which arose in part due to the resentment of the ceasefire with India. He was jailed but was later co-opted by Prime Minister Zulfikar Bhutto to quell the furious Baloch. A violent man with a violent history, he set the stage for the “Kashmir problem” by the eventual occupation of a part of the state of Jammu and Kashmir by Pakistan called Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). Pakistan got its pound of flesh, and instead of being satisfied with its lot, remained lusting for more.

Following the same pattern came “Operation Gibraltar”, when the Pakistanis again organised a mixed force of irregulars—not non-state actors but men trained in warfare and headed by Pakistan army regulars—which was ended with the Soviet Union bringing about a meeting between the two sides at Tashkent. That declaration promised good neighbourliness and basically sought to restore the status quo ante.

But Foreign Minister Bhutto by then had launched a fiery speech at the United Nations, appealing passionately to stop “the war of aggression” by India and demanding a ‘plebiscite’. Pakistan had started this war and all the others. Bhutto, meanwhile, was intent on sabotaging the Tashkent Agreement, and the reasons for that soon became apparent as he became the powerful and hugely popular prime minister on the back of President Ayub Khan’s humiliation.

The Pakistan Army Fights a War, and Loses

The 1971 war was a blip in Pakistan’s warfighting, though it began with another genocide, this time not in Balochistan but in then East Pakistan, which sent a stream of refugees into India. This time India chose to up the ante in the west, even as it won a resounding victory with the help of the Bangladesh resistance. That led to the Shimla Agreement, which principally called for the Kashmir issue to be resolved in a strictly bilateral fashion and talked of furthering good neighbourliness and created the ‘Line of Control’ to be respected by both sides.

Naturally nothing of the kind happened. The wily Bhutto managed to get around the then Indian prime minister, promising eternal good behaviour if the 93,000 prisoners held by India were returned and the status quo ante restored. Worst, it left even the LoC undemarcated in the north, with a vague reference to a line ending at NJ9842. Why Indira Gandhi did not use this resounding military victory to end the Kashmir issue once and for all remains a mystery, and the fact that India had to launch an ‘Operation Meghdoot’ to ensure that Siachen remained within its territory is now history. With Pakistan, the long view was clearly missing in Delhi.

And Then Regulars as Irregulars

Once Pakistan acknowledged its nuclear capability to the world in 1987 in an interview given by AQ Khan, father of Pakistan’s nuclear Programme, (in 1998, Pakistan announced it conducted nuclear tests and became a nuclear state), its wars shifted towards the use of irregulars entirely, together with a large group of terrorists of different hues. There was the Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Jaish-e-Mohammad, whose men received training from the Pakistan army or ex-Pakistan army folks, and a group of others who were cannon fodder, particularly those from Kashmir on both sides.

Reports of the Ministry of Home Affairs detail terrorism in Punjab from the 1980s, with Kashmir in flames thereafter. And then came Kargil. Excerpts from a thoroughly researched book by Nasim Zehra outlined how the Pakistanis tried thrice, at least, (not counting the 1965 war) to occupy the heights and that an ISI chief wanted to use ex-Afghanistan mujahideen and launch them into Kargil.

Another thought was to paradrop troops, which was negated by a rather sensible air force. In the event, Pakistani troops—again disguised as irregulars or tribals—simply walked into vacated posts as Indian troops withdrew during winter. Tactically brilliant but strategically short-sighted. India used its air force, signalling its willingness to escalate, and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was forced to ask the US under President Clinton—otherwise friendly to him—to stop the war.

Worse, the Pakistani army earned nothing but shame in its refusal to acknowledge the death of its own soldiers from the Northern Light Infantry. With this defeat, it went back to backing terrorism until 9/11, when an irate US president told Pakistan to shut its terror camps in a ‘with us or against us’ ultimatum. General Pervez Musharraf was smart enough to oblige. Terrorism dropped to near nothing until the Mumbai attacks. Pakistan conducted a detailed investigation, with the international watchdog, the Financial Action Task Force, looking over its shoulder. Terror dropped but never ever stopped entirely.

Irregulars as Bait

Fast forward to the present. Field Marshal Asim Munir changed tactics entirely. He used terrorists as bait in a horrific attack, fully expecting the Indian army to react. When it did, he used it to get a series of advantages, including his elevation to ‘Field Marshal’, sanction from the IMF for a huge step up in the defence budget, showered praise on the US for its ‘intervention’, and welcomed ‘mediation’.

Pakistan’s position as president of the UN Security Council has been used astutely to shield the Terrorist Resistance Front (TRF), a proxy of Lashkar-e-Taibba (LeT), and even recently a resolution at the UN Security Council, which, apart from calling for a pacific settlement of disputes, also noted ‘with appreciation’ the work of the UN’s Mediation Support Unit (MSU) and urged the Secretariat to ensure the availability of “well-trained, experienced, independent, impartial, and geographically and linguistically diverse mediation experts at all levels”.

That’s the way the wind is blowing. Expect that Pakistan will again try to pull India into a war that serves its interests in propagating mediation and projecting itself as a ‘peaceful’ power. Never has there been such hypocrisy at the global level.

Roll Out the Red Carpet

All this from a state that has not kept to a single agreement in its violent life, not even the UN Conventions on Terrorism or bilateral agreements with its neighbours, including Iran. Kargil Vijay Diwas must be celebrated in earnest across the world using all our embassies and consulates to mark bravery over deceit and honour in war as against the ugliness and crime of covert wars that is Pakistan’s forte.

Remember it was Indian troops who gave Pakistani soldiers an honourable burial when Rawalpindi refused to recognise them. It’s also time to bring out the role of irregular warfare and the costs it imposes on the global system. Fund universities and think tanks focusing on the myriad criminal, moral, and deceptive aspects of terrorism. And above all, celebrate all our victories: 1965, 1971, Kargil, and even Sri Lanka. It’s shameful that there is not even a monument to commemorate those who died in India’s peacekeeping operation in Sri Lanka. Ironically, Colombo does, but Delhi still shuffles its feet.

In Kashmir, observe in force a “Black Day” in Kashmir on October 22, the day the raiders rolled in, and publicise the sacrifices of those Kashmiris who died fighting them. In sum, roll back the legacy of Akbar Khan and the ugly principles it stood for by reminding the country and the outside world that there are values to war and peace. As wars rage across the world, these have been forgotten. Time to take the lead in bringing back value systems that once united Asia. Let the world begin to heal.

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