As tensions flare between India and Pakistan following the Pahalgam terror attack, international actors have begun urging restraint. While both countries are actively engaging diplomatic channels to garner support, the stance of Middle Eastern nations is particularly crucial for India. This is not only because of the region’s significant Muslim population, but also due to a growing convergence with India and the region on counter-terrorism concerns—a threat that many of these nations confront within their own borders as well.
Over the last few decades, India’s relations with the Middle East have deepened well beyond its traditional hydrocarbon-based ties. Today, the relations are far more mature, robust and multi-dimensional in nature. The engagements primarily marked by the 3Es – energy, economy, and expatriates – has a rising fourth “E” added to it, that is, engagement in strategic defence and security.
It is needless to mention that India and the region have found convergence of interests in terms of New Delhi’s “Look West” policy and the Middle East’s reciprocal “Look East” tilt. The Middle East, primarily, the Gulf, sees India as not just a massive market but also as a stable, secular power with a rising global clout and Global South stature. India, on the other hand, believes the region to be a critical pillar in its successful growth story heightened by energy security, economic interests and diaspora diplomacy.
The data tells a compelling story. More than 55-60 percent of India’s crude oil imports flow from the Gulf. Nearly 9-9.5 million Indian expatriates live and work in the region, and together, they send back over US$50 billion in remittances annually which is around 30 percent of the total remittances that India recieves. Trade between India and the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain) alone has doubled since 2015, reaching approximately US$160 billion in 2024.
If this is not enough, strategic cooperation is also rising. India has defence and security cooperation with as many as eight countries in the region, namely, Iran (2001), the UAE (2003), Qatar (2008), Saudi Arabia (2014), Oman (2016), Israel (2017), Jordan (2018), and Egypt (2022). India holds regular joint military exercises with the Gulf countries, such as Zayed Talwar with the UAE Navy, Ex Cyclone-I and Exercise Cyclone (with Egypt), Sada Tanseeq and Desert Knight with Saudi forces. Apart from this, post 9/11, the rise in global war on terror has brought India closer to the region in terms of Intelligence sharing and engagements on counter-terrorism aspects which once again underscores the region’s importance in India’s security calculus.
With India’s rising strategic and economic clout in the predominantly Muslim West Asian region, New Delhi no longer engages with its partners through a Pakistani prism. However, to counter Pakistan’s persistent attempts to garner religious solidarity and portray itself as a credible voice of the Muslim world on Kashmir, it is important for India to keep the regional actors informed of Islamabad’s continued provocations and proxy aggressions in the Valley. Along with ensuring transparency this also strengthens India’s narrative.
West Asian perception towards India have phenomenally changed and the regional actors who had voiced their opinions against India in the past side with it today on the Kashmir issue. The support extended by the regional players during New Delhi’s decision to remove article 370 has been exceptional. Some of the countries such as the UAE and Bahrain not only extended their verbal support for India but also decided to invest in ‘Naya Kashmir’.
This depth of engagement was palpable after the recent terror attack in Pahalgam on April 22, 2025, which took away 26 innocent lives. Early intelligence reports pinned the attack on The Resistance Front (TRF), a designated terrorist outfit by India and a proxy offshoot linked to Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba with an ideological semblance with Hamas. Along with its decisions to suspend the Indus Waters Treaty and spate of measures to isolate Pakistan, India stepped up its diplomatic offensive and decided to brief envoys of 25 key partner countries. Envoys from these countries, especially in the Middle East, were summoned within 48 hours and briefed with evidence linking the perpetrators to Pakistan.
India received a measured and meaningful wave of support from the region. While many analysts mistook the Middle East’s calculated support as a balancing act between India and Pakistan. What should not be forgotten is that given the Muslim sentiments at home, many regional players choose to extend their unwavering support not through press releases but through private calls to the decision makers. This is what happened. While Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was one of the first world leader’s to connect with Prime Minister Modi, in a telling sign of India’s growing stature and regional goodwill, at least four Middle Eastern countries reportedly contacted India before making any official outreach to Pakistan. Among them, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Jordan expressed condolences and assured support to India in its counter-terror efforts. This quiet outreach, away from generic public statements, underscores the growing strategic trust with India.
In contrast, Bahrain, which maintains close ties with Pakistan and hosts a sizable population of naturalised Sunni Pakistanis—reportedly part of a broader demographic balancing policy—chose a more cautious route, issuing a general condemnation of the attack and initiating a diplomatic call with Islamabad instead.
Notably, Prime Minister Narendra Modi was in Saudi Arabia in a pre-scheduled high-level visit when the attack occurred. During his interaction with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), cooperation on counter-terrorism aspects, need to address terror financing and regional security had already taken a centre stage. Soon after the Pahalgam news, MBS strongly condemned the killings of innocent civilians, offering India not just condolences but also strategic solidarity, underscoring the kingdom’s own fight against terrorism. This visible gesture was significant—not just for its timing, but because it underlined Riyadh’s evolving security calculus that now sees India as a responsible partner in regional stability. Even the UAE, which had openly backed India’s revocation of Article 370 in 2019, was once again among the first to communicate with Indian counterparts.
This is not the first time the Gulf has tilted toward India in moments of crisis against Pakistan. The region’s support during Uri and Pulwama attacks are noteworthy. Following the Pulwama attack in 2019, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who was on an official visit to Pakistan at the time, flew back to Riyadh before proceeding to New Delhi. This carefully calibrated move was seen as a gesture of solidarity with India and an attempt to de-hyphenate Saudi Arabia’s ties with India and Pakistan, treating both relationships on their own merit. Similarly, the UAE as seen earlier during the Balakot air strikes in 2019, had sided with India and played a key role in ensuring that Pakistan did not mobilise wider regional opposition against New Delhi’s counter-terror operation. Likewise, following the Uri attack in 2016, India received direct support—both public and behind-the-scenes—from Gulf states, many of whom had begun tightening surveillance on Pakistan-backed extremist networks operating in their own territories.
In contrast, Pakistan’s attempts to leverage Islamic solidarity appear increasingly strained. Islamabad’s Foreign Minister through his ministries official Twitter (now X) had claimed to have spoken with his Saudi counterpart following the Pahalgam attack and garnered Muslim world support against India. However, while Saudi Arabia acknowledged holding a call with Pakistan’s Foreign Minister, it notably refrained from confirming Islamabad’s claims that the Kingdom had extended explicit support or even an echo of that narrative. Though Riyadh offered to mediate between the two countries. Needless to mention, most Middle Eastern governments have grown wary of Pakistan’s persistent use of the “Muslim card,” especially as they face their own threats from radical extremism and transnational jihadist networks. This was the reason why Pakistan was snubbed by the Kingdom in August 2020 over its incessant obsession over Kashmir.
Turkiye, on the other hand, is often seen as a rhetorical supporter of Pakistan on Kashmir given its call for raising an Islamic Caliphate. However, its post-Pahalgam reaction was an unequivocal condemnation of the attack along with call for peace in the region. Under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Ankara is believed to pursue an overtly pan-Islamist and neo-Ottoman agenda, aiming to position Turkiye as the global voice of Muslim solidarity. In the past, it had expanded religious and educational outreach across South Asia through its Diyanet (Turkiye’s religious affairs ministry), often echoing Pakistan’s narrative.
However, Ankara’s official support to Pakistan has its limits this time. As a NATO member and a country with growing commercial stakes in India, Turkiye will have to be mindful of its international standing. Following the Pahalgam attack, Ankara firmly denied Pakistani claims that it had sent weapons and ammunition to Pakistan, signalling a clear effort to avoid being entangled in South Asian tensions militarily. Turkiye’s Communication Directorate’s Center for Countering Disinformation clarified on X that the cargo planes in question had merely stopped for refuelling, and categorically refuted any arms transfer to Pakistan.
However, it was also reported on 30 April, that is, only a few days after the Pahalgam attack, Turkiye had sent a top military intelligence delegation to Pakistan led by Lt Gen. Yasar Kadioglu. With Turkiye’s economy in a downward spiral and the Lira plunging to record lows against the US dollar, Ankara faces pressing domestic challenges. In such a precarious economic climate, its capacity—and strategic appetite—to actively support Pakistan remains highly questionable. Therefore, it seems while the country may offer some moral or rhetorical support to Pakistan, it is unlikely to take any substantive step that would compromise its strategic ties, growing relations with India or its multilateral obligations. Given these limitations, as of latest, Turkey has largely restricted its response to rhetorical solidarity with Pakistan, characterizing India’s Operation Sindoor as an act of unprovoked aggression.
Iran, given its closer proximity to China – which in turn is an all-weather friend of Pakistan – has chosen a middle path. It offered to mediate between India and Pakistan, citing its historical and geographical ties with both countries. However, India has long rejected any third-party involvement in the Kashmir dispute and therefore has not opted for such mediation even this time.
Additionally, hard security engagements and defence trends show another dimension of India’s growing influence in the region. While Pakistan has long been exporting small arms and provided training support to Gulf forces, especially to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, this trend is gradually shifting in India’s favour. Under the ‘Make in India’ initiative, Indian defence exports have seen a dramatic rise. In FY 2023–24, India exported INR21,083 crore (around US$2.53 billion) in defence products which was a good jump from INR15,920 crore (US$1.91 billion) in 2022–23 and INR12,815 crore (US$1.54 billion) in 2021–22.
As per the Srijan portal of the Ministry of Defence, India’s top defence buyers in the Middle East include the UAE, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. India has exported drones, thermal imaging systems, naval simulators, artillery shells, and ground surveillance equipments and surveillance radars to these countries. Israel while maintaining its robust defence relations with India has upscaled its engagements through joint ventures on loitering munitions, UAVs, and missile defence systems. Even Egypt is in advanced talks to acquire Indian-made ALH Dhruv helicopters, Tejas light combat aircraft and coastal radar systems.
While maintaining public neutrality due to domestic sensibilities, the major Middle Eastern players such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Iran and Israel have strikingly and clearly tilted in India’s favour through discreet channels and strategic alignments. This marks a clear departure from the past at the time when even symbolic gestures from Arab capitals would lean toward Pakistan. Today, most regional leaders see India as a responsible stakeholder, a rising power, and a partner in countering extremism.
On balance, the Pahalgam attack has once again displayed the shifting diplomatic sands in West Asia in India’s favour. While New Delhi no longer views the region through Pakistani prism, what is interesting to note is that even the Middle East does not look at India through Pakistan’s lens. Islamabad may continue to harbour the illusion of a pan-Islamic solidarity, but the strategic calculus in the Middle East is definitely in India’s favour. New Delhi’s steady diplomacy, backed by strong multi-dimensional approach is quietly but decisively reshaping the narrative.
