In Pursuit of Peace: India-Pakistan Relations Under Six Prime Ministers by Satinder Kumar Lambah published by Penguin Random House India Pvt. Ltd. (2023), Gurugram, Haryana, India, 373pp, Hardcover ISBN: 978-0-670-09794-4
“…no country’s destiny is immune from its relationships with neighbours.”
Satinder Kumar Lambah
Both peace and cooperation seem elusive in India-Pakistan relations. The tumultuous past filled with events like partitions (1947 and 1971), three conventional wars (1947-48, 1965 and 1971), a limited war in Kargil (1999), doctored insurgencies and state-sponsored terrorism have become perpetual shackles of mistrust between New Delhi and Islamabad. Nevertheless, despite this deep-rooted scepticism, both countries’ leadership at different junctures have tried to resolve disputes. Ambassador Satinder Kumar Lambah’s ten-chapter memoir In Pursuit of Peace: India-Pakistan Relations Under Six Prime Ministers is an attempt to unravel details of front and backchannel efforts made by Prime Ministers of India, i.e., Indira Gandhi, Rajiv Gandhi, PV Narasimha Rao, IK Gujral, Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Dr Manmohan Singh, to bring durable peace with its long-term adversary, Pakistan. While shedding light on the factors influencing bilateral relations, the author paralleled events of relevance with his personal anecdotes about the leaders of both States.
Ambassador Lambah, for most of his Foreign Service career, dealt with Pakistan. He held the position of Deputy High Commissioner of New Delhi to Islamabad. From 1992 to 1995, he held the position of High Commissioner to the country. Most importantly, from 2005 to 2014, he was New Delhi’s face of backchannel talks with Pakistan. His roots in Pakistan and proficiency in the Punjabi language made him one of the few diplomats who had access to all shades of political leaders in Islamabad.
The first chapter, “Pakistan: Evolution of Military State”, demonstrates the author’s deep understanding of Pakistan’s political landscape, particularly the imbalance of Civil-Military relations, fault lines and its “India-centric” strategic culture. The chapter highlights the fact that in India’s relationship with Pakistan, “it becomes difficult to identify and justify a particular course of action from a mere examination of the material at hand.” (p 40)
The second chapter, “Bangladesh to Siachen: Military Wins and Peace Offers”, of the book discusses the approaches of three Prime Ministers, Jawaharlal Nehru, Lal Bahadur Shastri and Indira Gandhi, to deal with Pakistan. He mentioned Prime Minister Nehru’s efforts to resolve the dispute by making the ceasefire line as the international boundary, Prime Minister Shastri’s unique invitation to a Pakistani minister to attend India’s Republic Day celebrations as a chief guest and Prime Minister Gandhi’s campaign to save Bhutto’s life following the judicial verdict against him. The chapter also discusses certain intricacies regarding the creation of Bangladesh, the hijacking of the IC 421 flight and the conflict at Siachen Glacier which impacted India and Pakistan relations.
The third chapter, “A Fresh Start Cut Short”, discusses the tenure of Rajiv Gandhi and back-channel talks with Pakistan during his tenure. For instance, the back-channel talk between R&AW and ISI on the Line of Control/ Saichen, where the parties agreed upon “the Line of Control (LoC) to run North from NJ9842 along the western ground level of Saltoro exactly North till the Chinese border” (p 79).
In the fourth chapter, “Deft Handling Amidst Surging Challenges”, Ambassador Lambah shares the details of Prime Minister Narasimha Rao’s initiatives to manage the relationship with Pakistan, which include the President of India sending a congratulatory message to Pakistan’s March 1992 victory in the cricket World Cup, inviting Pakistan’s Army Chief to India, signing of Code of Conduct (1992) at the foreign secretary-level meeting and assisting Pakistan after floods (1992). However, the efforts did not fructify into better relations as Pakistan in 1994 accused India of Human Rights violations by bringing a resolution in Geneva.
In the fifth chapter, “Professional Engagement, Personal Engagement”, Ambassador Lambah writes about his interactions with General Zia-ul-Haq, who, like him, was an alumnus of St Stephen’s College. He defined General Zia as a person whose ruthlessness, deviousness and political shrewdness were veneered in his courteous behaviour. (p 146-147) Ambassador Lambah also disclosed details of the initial dislike of Pakistan’s first female Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto, towards him because she believed that the author was closer to her political opponent, Nawaz Sharif. (p 149) The author also revealed in this chapter that it is only Nawaz Sharif from all the Pakistani politicians who had always wanted better relations with India.
The sixth chapter explores the relationship with Pakistan under the leadership of IK Gujral. The title of the chapter, “Firm Hand in a Soft Glove”, depicts how Prime Minister Gujral dealt with Islamabad. The chapter has some extracts from Prime Minister Gujral’s diary and autobiography, where he wrote about his heated discussion with Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan, who gave a nuclear threat when the Prime Minister was the Minister of External Affairs. Further in the chapter, the author provides IK Gujral’s rationale for excluding Pakistan from the famous Gujral Doctrine. According to his logic, India has two hostile neighbours in the North (China) and the West (Pakistan), so it had to be at “total peace” with all immediate neighbours to contain Pakistan and China’s influence in the region. (p 178)
The seventh chapter, “The Persistent Statesman with a Vision of Peace”, is dedicated to Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, who is recalled as ‘Always a Peacemaker’. The author argued that despite his many achievements, Prime Minister Vajpayee is most remembered for his pragmatic policy towards Pakistan. (p.182) In the chapter, he discussed the Kargil Conflict (1999), asserting that it was Prime Minister Vajpayee’s “firm policy combined with strategic restraint that led to both a military and diplomatic victory for India in Kargil.” (p 189). The chapter delves into the details of the Chenab Formula offered by Pakistan, which India outrightly rejected.
The Agra Summit is one of the key highlights of Prime Minister Vajaypee’s career. However, the author described it as “Big Expectations. Large Delegations. No Agenda. Attention to Single Issue. No Joint Communique”. The attacks on parliament proved to be the failure of the Agra Summit, which was followed by Operation Parakram and tough brinkmanship between both countries. Tensions were reduced when General Musharraf came into power in Pakistan. Following his policy towards Pakistan, Prime Minister Vajpayee did not hesitate to go ahead with his desire for improved relations. However, Ambassador Lamba asserted that it was the 2003 elections in Jammu and Kashmir that encouraged the Prime Minister to discuss Kashmir with Pakistan more confidently.
The eighth chapter has an interesting and revealing account of the Bonn Conference on Afghanistan in December 2001, in which the author led the Indian delegation as the Special Envoy of India to discuss the post-Taliban regime in Kabul. (p 217) Through this chapter, one could sense that India has built its policies on Afghanistan based on Ambassador’s contribution to expanding its economic and political presence.
In the ninth chapter, “A New Sustained Approach and a Near Solution”, Ambassador Lambah writes about Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s tenure. During Dr Manmohan Singh’s first tenure, the author became Prime Minister’s Special Envoy to Pakistan to prepare an agreement for a “Near Solution”. In the chapter, the author has listed Fourteen Guiding Principles that were laid out by India after intensive internal discussions. (p 290). These guidelines, including the “LoC has to be respected like a normal border between the two countries”, were based on negotiation and were different from various past solutions, such as the Chenab Formula. The chapter also provides details of the draft agreement or “non-paper” that the two sides had reached. Ambassador Lambah shares in his memoir that in 2014 he suggested to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh that a public statement on the backchannel agreement with Pakistan be made, to which the latter agreed and allowed the author to reveal non-confidential parts in a lecture at the University of Kashmir. (p 307) At the end of the chapter, the author lays out specifics of his interaction with Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who in 2016, consulted Ambassador Lambah and discuss the author’s assessment of India-Pakistan relations. The author also briefed the Prime Minister about his earlier experience as the Prime Minister’s Special Envoy and the backchannel talks with Pakistani counterparts. (p 314)
In the tenth and last chapter, “The Choice at the Crossroads and the Way Forward”, In providing the way forward, the author also asserted that India-Pakistan relations have become an instrument of political mobilisation. Further, he suggested that if relations are kept being used for domestic political purposes, no channel- back or front will work.
The critical aspect of the book is Ambassador Lambah’s focus on backchannel diplomacy. In the memoir, the author interestingly reveals that there has been almost no time when India and Pakistan did not have backchannel talks. The author’s involvement in high-level discussions, especially regarding Jammu and Kashmir, grants readers unprecedented access to the inner workings of diplomatic efforts. Ambassador Lambah’s book has also made some candid revelations within the bounds of confidentiality, offering valuable insights into the possibilities and constraints encountered during the peacebuilding process. He effectively showcased the achievements and limitations of successive Indian Prime Ministers in their pursuit of peace with Pakistan. The memoir has been endorsed by National Security Advisor Ajit Doval and forwarded by Dr Manmohan Singh, which declares its authenticity.
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