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Decoding Faiz Hameed’s Arrest

Namita BarthwalbyNamita Barthwal
August 29, 2024
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On 13 August 2024, the Pakistan Army took former ISI Chief Lt Gen Faiz Hameed into military custody on charges of violating the Army Act, specifically for criminal intimidation and extortion. The allegations stem from incidents in 2017, during Hameed’s tenure as Director General of Counter-Intelligence at the ISI. It is claimed that Hameed, in collaboration with his colleagues—retired Brigadier Ghaffar, a former Deputy Director General for Projects at the ISI; retired Brigadier Naeem Fakhar, a former Officer Commanding; and retired Colonel Asim—allegedly orchestrated a raid on the premises of Moeez Khan, the owner of the Top City housing scheme, with the intent to extort valuables, including gold and cash. One of Hameed’s associates, Mohsin Habib Warraich, who used to manage his business deals in Pakistan and abroad, has fled the country to evade arrest. The arrest of General Hameed and his colleagues has shattered the long-held belief that spymasters in Pakistan are untouchable.

The Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), the media wing of the Pakistan Army, has announced that actions against former ISI Chief Hameed were taken in compliance with Supreme Court orders to investigate complaints lodged against him by Moeez Khan. Following a thorough inquiry, these allegations have been confirmed. Hameed has been detained under Section 40 (Fraudulent offence in respect of property) of the Army Act. He has also been accused, under Section 31 (Mutiny and insubordination) and the latest amendment in the Army Act made in 2023 that prohibits retired army officers from participating in political activities for the first two years of their retirement. The nature of his political activities has not been disclosed. But his critics suggest this is related to his alleged involvement in the 9 May 2023 riots. Hameed is set to face a Field General Court-Martial because the offences were done while he was on operational duty. FGCM is a process designed to operate more swiftly and with fewer formalities than a regular general court-martial, reflecting the urgency of the matter. The likelihood of his imprisonment appears severe and high.

Controversial Legacy of  Faiz Hameed

Faiz Hameed is one of the most controversial figures in the Pakistan Army. He has been entangled in various high-profile incidents throughout his career. One of the most significant incidents was his involvement in the 2017 Faizabad sit-in orchestrated by Tehreek-i-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP), a far-right Islamist political party. This event, which effectively paralysed Islamabad for 20 days, concluded with Hameed playing a critical role in the negotiations. His direct engagement in these talks, however, attracted substantial criticism, particularly because such involvement strays from the traditional mandate of the ISI. This action was not only seen as an overreach by the military into civilian political affairs but was also chastised by the apex court.

It is widely believed that Hameed, alongside former Army Chief Qamar Javed Bajwa, orchestrated the downfall of Nawaz Sharif’s government in 2017 through the Panama Papers case. Accusations include manipulating the joint investigating team and judiciary to secure Sharif’s disqualification and subsequent exile, effectively clearing the path for Imran Khan’s rise to power.

His appointment as ISI Chief in June 2019, despite his involvement in the Top City Housing Scheme extortion case, further solidified his reputation as a close ally of Khan. His tenure as DG ISI was marked by active involvement in political affairs, and he was notably more public than previous ISI chiefs. His flamboyance was particularly evident when he was seen in Kabul immediately after the withdrawal of US and allied forces from Afghanistan, suggesting his role in facilitating the Taliban’s takeover. Imran Khan and Faiz Hameed shared a symbiotic relationship, with Khan benefiting from Hameed’s support within the Army.

However, soon the relationship between Khan and the Army was strained. During the appointment of Lt Gen Nadeem Anjum as the new ISI Chief, a three-week delay in the official notification led to widespread speculation about internal military discord. There were also conjectures that Khan either had wanted Hameed to ascend to the role of Army Chief or retain the role of ISI Chief.  Neither of his wishes was granted. Instead, Hameed was appointed as Corps Commander in Peshawar, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, before being transferred to serve as XXXI Corps Commander in Bahawalpur, Punjab. He eventually retired in December 2022.

Just six months after his retirement, Lt Gen Faiz Hameed’s name surfaced as a central figure in the events of May 9. Defense Minister Khawaja Asif accused Hameed of orchestrating violent protests following the arrest of Imran Khan by paramilitary Rangers at the Islamabad High Court. Supporters of Khan vandalised over 20 military installations, including the Jinnah House (the Lahore Corps Commander’s residence), the Mianwali airbase, and the ISI building in Faisalabad. For the first time, even the Army headquarters in Rawalpindi came under attack by the protestors. In retaliation, under the directive of Gen Asim Munir, the Army took decisive actions against those involved in the riots. This included the dismissal of officers and punitive measures against the relatives of former officers. The stakes are particularly high for Hameed; if his involvement in the May 9 riots is confirmed, it could mark the end of his reputation and political career he was looking forward to. Munir perceived the protests as a direct affront to his command and is likely to enforce strict measures given the backdrop of their rivalry that dates back to 2019. This tension originated when Munir, then-chief of the ISI, was abruptly replaced by Hameed. General Munir was reportedly ousted due to Prime Minister Imran Khan’s displeasure, allegedly tied to Munir’s investigations into sensitive matters concerning Khan’s wife, Bushra Bibi. Interestingly, even the imprisoned Imran Khan, who has now applied for the position of chancellor in Oxford, has voiced support for the army’s internal accountability measures under the Army Act. However, he demanded an ‘open trial’.    

Possible Reasons behind Hameed’s Arrest

The arrest of Faiz Hameed has sparked widespread speculation.

Firstly, it seems to be an effort by the military to rehabilitate its image amid public dissatisfaction with the deep state’s perceived overreach in politics, financial misappropriation, and nationwide land usurpation.

Secondly, this move is seen as a power consolidation strategy by Asim Munir, the current Army Chief, asserting his supremacy within the military hierarchy. Traditionally, the role of ISI chief, a position once held by Hameed, is tremendously influential, often overshadowing even the Army Chief.

Third, the backdrop of past rivalries adds another layer to this unfolding drama.. The ISPR’s lack of clarity on the specific violations committed by Hameed post-retirement fuels suspicions that his arrest might be driven by Munir’s vendetta.

Fourth, this incident could signify a definitive move to marginalise Imran Khan politically. By linking Khan and PTI to criminal activities involving Hameed and his network of retired military officers, the military establishment in Rawalpindi seems intent on thoroughly discrediting Khan’s political stature.

Implications

The path ahead for Faiz Hameed is fraught with challenges. He is likely to face severe punishment for actions that are paradoxically not uncommon among Pakistan’s top officials, given their entrenched power within the system. Corruption and political engineering are endemic and tolerated within Pakistan’s Army, but they resemble a double-edged sword, that could be wielded against one another to settle power dynamics. Further complicating his situation are allegations of his involvement in the Al-Qadir University Trust Case and purported efforts to revive the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan.

For Imran Khan, this development represents yet another setback to his political career, as Hameed is widely regarded as a close ally. Khan, signaling his perceived defeat, is now reportedly willing to move to London. The tables have definitely turned, with the Sharifs now seemingly benefiting from their support of Asim Munir. Munir’s actions against Hameed must be bringing satisfaction to Nawaz Sharif.

However, a massive tide is awaiting both Pakistan’s Army and its Civilian Government. The popularity of Imran Khan remains persistent, and the arrests of retired and serving officers under Munir have created a schism within the Army, suggesting turbulent times ahead for Pakistan’s political and military establishments.

Tags: Faiz Hameed'sPakistan
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