It appears to outsiders that China, an “authoritative” state ruled by one official political Party, has less tolerance toward dissent. Nevertheless, such simplistic comprehension is less informed; partly, it is true that there has been no significant national protest since 1989, but even so, tens and hundreds of local mass demonstrations occur regularly[1]. Then the question is, how does dissent function in China? The tradition of dissent in China has evolved with its unique characteristics. Notably, two distinctive features of Chinese society – class and guanxi[2] have contributed to organised and integrated social connections. Both are instrumental in expressing Chinese dissent and are increasingly valuable tools to appeal to their socioeconomic grievances. Chinese sociodemographic factors and hardships inflate mass incidents, and mobilisation occurs at the unit level and is driven by the “adapt or voice” philosophy[3].
Just ahead of the 20th Party Congress, a rare protest against the Zero-Covid policy and public denouncement of President Xi Jinping was reported in Beijing’s Haidian district. Social media posts show a worker displaying posters and shouting slogans. It is not yet known precisely what the yellow smoke is in the video, but some claim a man’ burned himself’. It is interesting to see that there is no content against the ‘Party’ in the banner.
The content of the poster being roughly translated as:
“Overthrow the dictator and thief of the country Xi Jinping”, “Students, workers, strike”, “No PCR tests but foods, no lockdown but freedom, no lies but dignity, no Cultural Revolution but reforms, no figureheads but ballots. Do not be a slave but a citizen”.
Nature and Causes
The absence of a significant national protest movement since the Tiananmen Square Incident of 1989 explains the adaptability of Chinese society to the Communist Party of China’s (CPC) restrictions. The propensity of regulations and intensified social stability measures brought deep and considerable changes in the masses’ interests, general grievances, ways of social living, and forms of social organisation. Thus, it generated a new protest culture in China. The nature, motivations, mobilisation, and frequency of “mass group incidents” [群体性事件: Qúntǐxìngshìjiàn] or local protests evolved as a targeted approach with petitioning demands to frequent demonstrations. By and large, public demands focus on improving living standards, demanding wage reforms, salary dues, work-related issues and administrative corruption regarding subsidies and relief measures. The main constituents of mass assemblies are peasants, workers, retired employees, veterans and students.
Indeed, Party and government organs see repetitive mass incidents as ‘conflicts among people’; they distinguish between the minority (who resort to violence) as unreasonable, and ‘troublemaking’ and (peaceful demonstrations) by the majority and their demands are viewed as reasonable to some extent[4].
The slowing economy and looming financial crisis, particularly in real-estate (housing), banking and farming sectors, have aggravated public reaction to Covid-19-related restrictions. Moreover, mental stress and frustration with the prolonged city-wide lockdowns and food shortages amplify public demonstrations. Due to addressing consensus and the Covid outbreak, Party has adopted similar measures to public dissent. Interestingly, China’s confidence in preserving the economy and curb Covid-19 is inherently driven by the ‘Zero-Tolerance’ approach[5]. As far as the ‘Dynamic Zero-Covid’ is concerned, the urgency, tactics and manner in which this policy is being pursued have some political backdrop[6].
Politics of Protest
Dissent in China can be observed through the prisms of political, economic, financial, event or issue-based dissent and staged or controlled protests. In the political space, serious disputes over land and water and border disputes at the county and village levels cause conflict. Ideally, disputes over natural resources should not exist in China, as the textbook rule suggests that the State has exclusive ownership of the land and resources. In reality, if we take property rights into account, the government leases land in urban, collectively owned as “private plots” or [ziliudi/shan] in rural areas, e.g., the ‘family contracting responsibility system’. As happens in every society, peasants invest and pay attention to natural resources, thus developing attachment. Dissatisfaction with relocation, compensation, specific development policies, and corruption caused peasants and local government disputes. Peasants refuse and resist taxes, sometimes violently. In addition, in their rush for short-term profits, grassroots cadres make ‘financial management is a mess’, poor transparency, disregard the burden on people, and excuse of “people handling the people’s causes”. Meanwhile, different factions seizing power in administration by influencing direct elections for village committees make mass incidents fiercer. In such a state situation, the masses tend to consider “making no trouble leads to no resolution and making big trouble leads to big resolution”; people use extreme methods and turn minor conflicts into significant mass incidents[7].
Party correlates deepening economic reforms, opening up, and ‘endangering social stability. The key drivers are the domestic market, economic prosperity and social transformation as they form a more prominent economic environment. Market reforms would mean further grievances about laid-off employees, little assured wages and beneficial treatments. China’s overall development model takes on large construction projects; as a result, conflicts are common in urban development, e.g., land “requisition”, demolition, resettlement and compensation[8]. Besides, many enterprises face severe losses, corruption, unchecked power, and non-standard structures and operations. The overall situation of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) is another source leading to a sharp increase in mass incidents.
In the financial sector, bankruptcy, frozen funds, and real-estate crises are central drivers of the sudden boom of mass incidents. Though demonstrations are scattered, the significantly more significant number of protests has been viewed as a threat to Party and its image[9]. Regarding financial issues, Party has a genuine dilemma as its intervention either adversely affects market forces or starts a new precedent of bailout culture. China’s banks, including “two funds” (rural cooperative foundations and savings funds), have a history of mass lending and investing customer deposits in commercial sectors, onshore and offshore bonds. Pertaining issues are risky investments, unsecured bonds, large-scale local debt, and delays in loan repayment are significant factors of instability, e.g., the Rural Banking crisis. Local banks and corporations are linked and controlled by city-level governments, and crises tighten local governments’ revenues.
Environmental problems, labour exploitation, sexual harassment, and failure in relief measures cause an event or issue-based dissent and are strongly linked to governance. The chain effect of these crises has become fuel for existing frustration on restrictions related to preventing the Covid-19 infection and spread. Apart from the above, China has staged or controlled protests; these are a type of dissent with the direct backing of the Party and officials. At times Party used small demonstrations on the diplomatic front. Similarly, content moderation in social media platforms is a crucial tactic used in China to reflect the Party’s interests, e.g., nationalism and boycott of Korean, Japanese and Taiwanese products.
Assessment:
Political, economic, and financial developments and associated mass incidents would embarrass central leadership during the October 2022 Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC). The rise in a variety of public incidents makes it difficult to trace, isolate and contain the infection. Though the success and failures of the “Dynamic Zero-Covid” strategy have been the question, it may or may not decide the fate of the Covid situation, but has a close association with the wide range of public grievances, discipline measures towards Party officials, and, more importantly, Xi’s position in the Party itself[10].
For Xi Jinping, the critical October CPC meeting is an occasion to showcase his achievements and governance and formally secure the third term. A rule and legitimacy on which Xi Jinping has been posturing, projecting and promoting are (good) governance, (social) stability, and (justice through) anti-corruption, which are at stake. The fear of losing citizens’ faith in local authorities is one thing the current Party’s central leadership is grappling with. For the Chinese, it is important to be presentable; the image of such a presentation determines the face. Indeed, losing face is not an option for Xi Jinping, a “core leader” who crafted the idea of the “Chinese Dream” and removed the term limit for the president.
It is unlikely that CPC would let its policies fail and lead to weaker confidence in the financial system at the end of the political cycle. Therefore, the period until the National People’s Congress 2023 is critical in shaping China’s political and economic trajectory. How this issue concerns India’s strategic interests? India’s USD 125.66 billion bilateral trade in 2021, economic interdependence, bilateral disputes and, most important Chinese way of dissent may find their way into new villages across the Line of Actual Control. All these would serve as reference points.
[1] James Tong (eds.), “Mass Protests in China (I): Provincial and Local Reports”, Chinese Law & Government, 2018, 5: 321-326.
[2] Yang Su and Shizheng Feng, “Adapt or Voice: Class, Guanxi and Protest Propensity in China”, The Journal of Asian Studies, 2013, 72(1), PP. 45-67.
[3] No: 2
[4] Ministry of Public Security General Office Research Department, “Comprehensive Research Report on China’s Current Issue of Mass Incidents Caused by Conflicts Among the People”, Chinese Law and Government, 2019, 51(1), PP. 6-27.
[5] Alex Jingwei He, Yuda Shi and Hongdou Liu, “Crisis Governance, Chinese style Distinctive Features of China’s Response to the Covid-19 Pandemic”, Policy Design and Practice, 2020, 3(3): 242-258.
[6] No: 5
[7] No: 4
[8] USC U-CI, “Looking At Protesting In China”, USC US-China Institute: University of South California, 2021, Available at: https://china.usc.edu/looking-protesting-china.
[9] Victor Cheung Yin Chan, Jeremy Backstrom, and T. David Mason, “Patterns of Protest in the People’s Republic of China: A Provincial Level Analysis”, Asian Affairs: An American Review, 2014, 41, PP. 91-107.
[10] Shaker Gupta, “President Xi Faces Growing Dissent in China Over Enforced Covid Lockdowns”, Hindustan Times, 05 August 2022, Available at: https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/president-xi-faces-growing-dissent-in-china-over-enforced-covid-lockdowns-101659664010738.html.
