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Home Articles

Four Years On: New War or Peace Deal?

Anusua GangulybyAnusua Ganguly
April 14, 2025
in Articles, CLAWS Focus
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The war in Ukraine, now in its fourth year, underscores the escalating complexities of the conflict and heightens the demand for resolute leadership from Russia, the United States of America, and Ukraine to navigate the crisis effectively. Russian President Vladimir Putin and his American counterpart have expressed a shared willingness to negotiate a peace agreement, with Putin repeatedly emphasising that a lasting resolution requires addressing the fundamental issues underlying the conflict. While the U.S. has successfully facilitated a limited ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine, significant disagreements persist over critical details, including the scope of the truce and its implementation timeline. These unresolved disputes highlight that achieving a comprehensive peace agreement will likely be an arduous and protracted process.

What does Putin want?

If ceasefire negotiations progress, a key question which remains is whether Putin would achieve all of his objectives from February 2022, when the conflict in Ukraine began. Moscow insists that any peace deal should be based on the Istanbul agreements from spring 2022, which included Ukraine’s military neutrality, limits on its army and protections for Russian-speaking citizens. Though Ukraine later rejected these terms—allegedly due to pressure from the UK and US—Russia views this framework as the foundation for a realistic peace settlement.

Three years into the war, Russia is now pushing for Ukraine to acknowledge the loss of four regions — Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson — which Moscow has formally claimed as its own, despite not having full control over them. Still, there are indications that Putin may be open to easing its firm demand that Ukraine pull out from the areas it continues to hold in those regions.

U.S. President Donald Trump and his Ukrainian counterpart Zelenskyy have indicated that discussions concerning territorial matters should include the future of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, which is currently under Russian occupation and located near the front lines. This inclusion may signal a shift toward more realistic concessions from Russia, in contrast to the implausible Western demands for NATO “peacekeepers” being pushed by the UK and France.

Putin’s “special military operation” in Ukraine appears to prioritise retribution over territorial expansion, stemming from Ukraine’s deviation from the 2015–2016 Minsk agreements. These agreements had outlined a framework in which the breakaway regions, Donetsk and Luhansk, would retain a degree of autonomy while remaining formally under Ukrainian sovereignty. Consequently, Russia’s incorporation of these regions, alongside Zaporizhzhia and Kherson, seems to serve as a punitive response to Ukraine’s derailment from the Istanbul agreements, further illustrating the retaliatory nature of Russian strategy in the ongoing conflict.

The nuclear power plant might be used as leverage for territorial or political concessions, such as rights for Russian speakers or the Moscow-linked Ukrainian Church. However, Putin remains firm that NATO must have no role or influence in Ukraine’s security.

From the outset of the war, Putin’s most frequently stated objectives were and still remains the prevention of NATO’s expansion. The alliance’s expansion into Eastern Europe since the late 1990s has been seen as their interference in the Russian sphere of influence (Figure 1). Putin has demanded an end to NATO’s expansion and prohibition on offensive weapons near Russian borders. This goal is particularly focused on preventing Ukraine’s potential NATO membership, which Putin views as a grave threat to Russia’s security, as it would mean NATO troops at one of Russia’s longest borders.

While we can’t know for certain what Vladimir Putin is thinking, what we know is that the aforementioned could be potential determinants for a peace agreement. Furthermore, with Trump’s clear indications on reaching a peace deal and his consistent efforts to mend the U.S.-Russia relations serves as a goal in themselves, believing that improving ties with Russia can be an objective in itself to end the war. Thus, as Trump’s 100-day mark comes close, there is a sense of anticipation for some kind of ceasefire deal.

Ukraine’s Loss in Kursk

Initially launched with the goal of diverting Russian attention from Ukraine’s eastern front, the seven-month-long incursion into Russia’s Kursk Oblast has now come to an end. The incursion, whose failure to sustain has highlighted critical logistical challenges, like supply constraints due to a single vulnerable route leading into Sudzha, which was heavily targeted by Russian counterattacks.

The Ukrainian operation has also drained resources, with elite units like the 80th and 82nd Air Assault Brigades being worn down over time and repurposed as regular infantry. This shift reduced their combat effectiveness and morale, further diminishing Ukraine’s fighting capabilities. The prolonged engagement also resulted in heavy losses in personnel and military equipment, which could have been better utilised elsewhere on more critical fronts.

Thus, Ukraine’s Kursk gambit may prompt the authorities to reassess its approach, potentially shifting focus to more targeted and sustainable actions or seeking diplomatic alternatives. It underscored the complexities of waging an extended operation on enemy soil and highlights the importance of logistical planning, clear strategic goals, and effective resource management in prolonged conflicts.

The Black Sea Deal or No Deal?

The U.S. – led bilateral talks with Russian and Ukrainian expert groups in Riyadh on 25 March 2025, reached a tentative agreement to stop fighting and ensure safe navigation in the Black Sea in separate talks with the two sides. In a statement, the White House confirmed that Ukraine and Russia had agreed to cease the use of force and the military use of commercial vessels in the Black Sea. Additionally, Washington issued an almost identical statement, suggesting that the U.S. and Ukraine had agreed to these terms. In turn, the U.S. is said to help “restore Russia’s access to the world market for agricultural and fertiliser exports.”

Despite the release of these statements, Kremlin has indicated that the pause on fighting in the Black Sea would be effective only once sanctions are lifted from the Russian agricultural bank, Rosselkhozbank, as well as other financial institutions involved in international food trade, including those dealing with fish products and fertilisers. It further highlighted that these institutions must be connected to the SWIFT system and any sanctions and restrictions on food, fertiliser, ships and agricultural machinery must be lifted.

While the outcomes and conditions if followed by both sides is likely to benefit Russia, the gains to Ukraine still remains unclear.

The 30-day Energy Ceasefire

Although the telephonic conversation between Putin and Trump on 18 March 2025 did not yield much results, Putin agreed to halt attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure in what seemed to be the first step towards a peace deal. Ukraine too, expressed its support for the scaled-back agreement, which called for both countries to refrain from targeting each other’s energy infrastructure for the next 30 day. However, in less than two weeks, the U.S. – brokered agreement, witnessed accusations from both Russia and Ukraine blaming each other of violating the ceasefire.

The Russian Defence Ministry has accused Ukraine of conducting two separate attacks on energy facilities in Bryansk, causing power outages in the Sevsky and Suzemsky districts. “The ongoing deliberate attacks by the Ukrainian Armed Forces on Russian energy facilities demonstrate the complete inability of the Kyiv regime to agree on any of its obligations regarding the settlement of the conflict in Ukraine,” the ministry said in a statement.

Ukrainian President Zelenskyy blamed Russia for their deliberate strikes on energy facilities that hit “a substation in the Sumy region, and in Nikopol, Dnipro region” where a power line was damaged by artillery fire and left  “nearly 4,000 consumers in the two regions” without electricity. He further said, “This systematic and constant nature of Russian strikes clearly indicates that Moscow despises the diplomatic efforts of partners. Putin does not even want to ensure a partial ceasefire.”

As both sides continue to report and blame each other for conducting the strikes, the long-term aspiration of the leadership becomes increasingly muddied up, with little clarity on how to achieve lasting peace.

Is the War Spreading to Europe?

The unreliability of the U.S. as a NATO ally has increased apprehension amongst the European partners that now seem to be preparing for a possible war with Russia. Trump has made it clear that Europe cannot assume continued U.S. military support, urging EU nations to take responsibility for their own security. This new reality has forced European countries to act decisively, building up their defense capabilities in response to the growing developments in the Eurasian region.

Countries are taking bold steps to enhance their military readiness. Norway, for example, is restoring Cold War-era military bunkers and reintroducing bomb shelter requirements for new buildings. Poland is preparing its citizens for combat, planning to train every adult male and increase its army to 500,000 troops. The country is also investing heavily in defense, with Poland’s defense spending now nearing 4.7% of its GDP. Other countries like Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are also dramatically increasing their defense budgets, with plans to hit 5% of GDP by 2026. Thus, there is a significant push to rearm Europe as defense spending boom across the continent.

While European countries are enhancing their military readiness as a precautionary measure, the ongoing dialogue between Russia and the United States provides a glimmer of optimism. Therefore, while the world watches Moscow and Washington making efforts to work towards a peace deal, Europe may find itself in a position where its preparedness is more about deterrence than actual conflict.

Tags: Global and Regional SecurityUS, EU & Russia
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Anusua Ganguly

Anusua Ganguly

Anusua Ganguly is a Research Assistant at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), where her work focuses on Russia and Central Asia. She holds a Master’s degree in Conflict Analysis and Peace Building, and her research interests include non-traditional security threats, the role of media in conflict, and the intersection of gender with conflict and peacebuilding. You can reach out to her at [email protected].

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