Abstract
In recent years, there has been a growing interest in the study of Thucydides’ History and Kautilya’s Arthasastra. Concurrently, the idea of strategic competition within the ‘Grey Zone’ has gained significant popularity. The paper endeavours to bring these two trends together. It seeks to identify the points of continuity and change from Thucydides and Kautilya from the perspective of gaining advantage in the Grey Zone. Moderation of the target state’s fear by benign narratives, legal rhetoric, and limiting the scope of challenge, with an acute attention to the target’s capacity and perception, are found to be the principal points of continuity from Thucydides. Kautilya’s observations on the supremacy of relative gains over the absolute, the efficacy of counter-action as deterrence, and considerations for fait accompli in the Grey Zone are of direct relevance for pursuing advantage below the threshold of war. However, given the specific character of war avoidance, and the coexistence of competition with cooperation in the Grey Zone, their observations on war—either as an outcome of compulsion or as an acceptable means of securing national interests—mark the points of departure. The research finds that continuities from Thucydides and Kautilya define the key constraints—breaching them risks escalating the Grey Zone competition into open war.
