Originally published: https://www.firstpost.com/opinion/how-west-is-pushing-taliban-into-china-russia-axis-13907028.html
While the ICC has issued arrest warrants against senior Taliban leaders, powers like Russia and China are actively courting the fundamentalist group
In a rather curious development, the International Criminal Court has issued arrest warrants for the Taliban’s ‘Supreme Leader’, or Emir, Haibatullah Akhundzada, and Abdul Hakim Haqqani, Chief Justice of the Taliban, citing grave violations of the rights of Afghan women and girls, as well as those who support them. Not that the Supreme Leader or his compatriots are going to get into a panic over this development. Neither of these two go anywhere, and they have no assets abroad to confiscate. But it matters in other ways. It’s driving the Taliban into the arms of other countries who refuse to sit in judgement of the Taliban and who have most recently been known for their support of Pakistan in the run-up to Operation Sindoor. Time to take notice.
The Hard Facts
First, the details of the arrest warrant. It charges both top leaders with “inducing or soliciting the crime against humanity of persecution… on gender grounds against girls, women, and other persons non-conforming with the Taliban’s policy on gender, gender identity, or expression; and on political grounds against persons perceived as ‘allies of girls and women’”. Both the Talibanis are from Panjwayi, the heartland of the Taliban, and both are known as jurists on Islamic law.
While the Emir himself, reclusive and wedded to extreme Islamic teachings, is well known, Hakim Haqqani (no relation to Sirajuddin Haqqani) is a scholar with the honorific title of ‘Sheikh’ from the Darul Uloom Haqqani, east of Peshawar, and author of numerous books of learning. He is from the elite Ishaqzai Durrani tribe, which also gives him a political standing. Both are alike in having studied and grown up in Pakistan. Another within this ‘elite’ group is Acting Minister for Vice and Virtue, Sheikh Mohammad Khalid, whose department is listed in the US Treasury for serious rights abuses. He is also from the same seminary in Peshawar and subsequently taught Islamic studies (tafsir) for 22 years at different madrassas in Pakistan, including the Darul Uloom Arabia, Darul Uloom Ahia-ul Uloom, and Jamia Farooqia in Pakistan.
There are more, but the sum of it is that the coterie around the Taliban chief are all hard-line Pakistan products. The trouble is that none of this listing or condemnation is likely to have much effect on these elements, which belong to the Kandahar clique, which has set itself up as a power centre within the larger Taliban. Most importantly, all of these are being courted by a group of other powers with their own interests at stake.
Russia Opens Its Doors
One country that has come unexpectedly to the fore is Russia, as it formally recognised the Taliban on July 4, after floating the idea for years. Russia has little economic incentive, with bilateral trade remaining a miniscule $300 million odd. But it may be that the loss of Syria and the importance of keeping neighbours on a friendly footing have increased in importance after the trauma of Ukraine. Russian plans for Afghanistan include a pipeline from Turkmenistan to Pakistan and India, as well as roads and infrastructure, including a railway to operationalise the International North-South Corridor (INSTC), which it has invited Pakistan to join, in a series of moves that seem to be aimed at drawing Pakistan into the Russia-China fold. However, the funds for such large plans are likely to prove difficult.
China as a Doorstop
China may well step in for this. Beijing not only ‘welcomed’ the Russian move to recognise the Taliban—even while it accepted an “ambassador” from the Taliban last year and sent its own envoy in September 2023—but has also backed the building of infrastructure in Afghanistan recently together with Russia and Uzbekistan.
Earlier, Beijing had linked its recognition of the Taliban to its resumption of good ties with Pakistan, which annoys Kabul, as both Beijing and Rawalpindi insist on calling any connectivity as part of the ‘China Pakistan Economic Corridor’ rather than the much larger Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
Afghanistan has signed on to the BRI and given China three blocks for oil exploration, with Kabul due to get royalties and a $10 billion lithium and other mineral extraction contract. Beijing has, in turn, promised another Salang tunnel, which connects Afghanistan to Central Asia, and is due to reopen the Aynak copper mine project. China is meanwhile awarding scholarships to Afghan students, including women, with a total of above a thousand studying there at any given time, apart from Confucius Institutes training upwards of 800 last year. All of this activity is likely to increase as Afghanistan stabilises.
Azerbaijan and Turkey into the Breach
Meanwhile, Deputy Prime Minister Mullah Baradar was recently in Baku, with requests to open up its ports and railways to exports from and through Afghanistan. Azerbaijani officials expressed their willingness to facilitate the export of Afghan industrial, agricultural, and mineral goods to Turkey and Europe, as well as to Russia via Iran’s rail network. Such connectivity is being pushed by Turkey, which has long-standing good relations with Kabul. That has improved steadily under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, with the country as its top export partner. Connectivity projects also involved Pakistan, like the TAP-500 electricity transmission project from Turkmenistan to Afghanistan’s provinces of Herat, Farah, Helmand, and Kandahar and further electricity exported to Pakistan, generating considerable annual transit revenue for Afghanistan. The most recent meeting of the working group was early this year.
In sum, there is a strong effort to ‘integrate’ these countries, with China probably the driving force. Russia is going with the flow and most recently annoyed Delhi by supporting President Donald Trump’s reiteration of his role in ending the conflict between India and Pakistan. Post Pahalgam, Kabul’s robust support led to India’s Foreign Secretary speaking to his counterpart, Acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi, just days after a senior official of the Ministry of External Affairs visited Kabul with the promise of restarting developmental aid.
This is something of a watershed in recent India-Afghanistan relations. India also abstained from a recent UN resolution condemning the Taliban, noting realistically that such moves did nothing to improve the lives of Afghans. All this is to the good. But Delhi has to move fast. It must deliver quickly on its reputation as a genuine provider of ‘aid without strings’. Immediate initiatives could tackle the terrible lack of drinking water in most parts of Afghanistan, while commercial assistance could include the provision of cold storage facilities for Afghan farmers. Most importantly, it has to hasten to deliver visas to students to study here, in Indian universities. The chequerboard of international relations is changing fast, and India’s bureaucracy and decision-making have to match this almost disconcerting speed of hostile forces. Time to think of a diplomatic version of Operation Sindoor.
