Abstract
Russia’s Military-Industrial Complex (MIC) has been the primary target of the sanctions imposed by the West, led by the United States (US) and its allies, as a response to Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine in February 2022. The sanctions include export-control restrictions of crucial Western-originating technologies and dual-use components. In this context, the article aims to explore the impact of the sanctions on Russia’s MIC; the focus is on the production of advanced weapon systems dependent upon Western technologies. Further, this article will also explore the measures adopted by Russia to mitigate the negative impact of the sanctions. And in conclusion, a brief analysis is given of the sustainability of the sanctions regime in the long run.
Background
The Military-Industrial Complex (MIC) is a term used to describe the network of individuals and institutions involved in producing weapons and military technologies (Weber, 2023). Russia inherited its MIC from the former Soviet Union. Upon its collapse, the MIC underwent privatisation, and the end of state support meant the closure of many of its production facilities. However, after a failed 1997 plan to revitalise Russia’s MIC, it was again brought back under state control in 2000 when Vladimir Putin came to power (Bowen, 2021). Today, Russia’s MIC is mostly state-owned, consisting of 1,355 companies and employs around two million people (Drozdova et al., 2022). The Rostec Corporation controls the majority of the MIC, overseeing the research and development of military technologies and owns several production facilities (Luzin, 2019).
Impact of Sanctions
According to the US Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), sanctions imposed on Russia on February 2022 represent some of the widest ever attempted against a country to date (US Department of Commerce, 2022). These sanctions have had a multitude of detrimental effects on Russia’s MIC. First, the sanctions have created a shortage of high-end electronic components, leading to halting or slowing down the production of some weapon systems. For instance, export restrictions due to these sanctions have slowed down the production of advanced aircraft units such as the Sukhoi Su-57 multirole fighter, the Tupolev PAK DA stealth bomber, and Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) system. Air-defence weapons like the 9K37 Buk and 2K22 Tunguska, missiles like Kh-101 cruise missiles, satellite-guided 30-mm Tornado missiles, Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAM) and hypersonic ballistic missiles have also seen a decrease in production. Production of wheeled platforms of several weapons systems such as the Pantsir air defence system, heavy military trailers, supply trucks and other special vehicles have also been affected (Rácz et al., 2023; US Department of Commerce, 2022; Bilousova et al., 2023).
Second, low-quality alternatives are being explored at the cost of combat effectiveness. In order to compensate the heavy battlefield losses of its advanced Main Battle Tanks (MBT) like the T-72B3, older units, including the ones built during the Soviet era are being brought back into the service as replacements (Bergmann et al., 2023). In mid-2022, 800 old T-62 tanks were ordered to modernise by adding reactive armour, protective fencing and improved sensors. Similarly, the BRDM-2 amphibious armoured reconnaissance cars are being modernised by equipping them with new engines, thermal sight and additional armour (Bergmann et al., 2023). The unavailability of imported high-end optical components like the French-made Thales Camera, Japanese Optics or the Sosna-U multi-channel thermal imaging gunner’s sights means that most of the tanks are not being fitted with the latest equipment. Or these are being equipped with low-quality domestic alternatives (Rácz et al., 2023; Bilousova et al., 2023).
Third, the shortage of Western components has led to a lack of precision and unconventional utilisation of missile systems. Russia seems to be running out of its advanced precision-guided cruise missiles. This assumption is made out of the unconventional utilisation of some missile systems, which are older and less accurate. For instance, on 14 January 2023, a Soviet-era Kh-22 anti-ship missile hit a civilian building in Dnipro (Rácz et al., 2023). Similarly, surface-to-air defence missiles like S-400 and S-300, anti-ship missiles like Oniks, and the older Kh-55 missiles otherwise meant to carry nuclear warheads are being utilised to hit ground targets (Bergmann et al., 2023).
Fourth, civilian systems are being exploited for extracting crucial components. Russian officials have permitted its manufacturers to begin “aircraft cannibalisation” by stripping spare parts of grounded airlines to be utilised for military aircraft (Bergmann et al., 2023). Production of civilian cars has fallen by three-quarters compared to 2021, indicating that advanced microchips, among other materials, are being directed to the production of military systems. Similarly, microchips are being re-used from dishwashers and refrigerators to fix military hardware (US Department of Commerce, 2022).
And fifth, there is a fall in arms sales and a rise in military expenditure. Since 2016, Russia has been the world’s largest arms exporter, just after the US. According to the latest figures from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), in 2018-22, Russia accounted for 16 per cent of the global arms export. However, the trend is a declining one between 2013-17 and 2018-22, arms sales have fallen by 31 per cent. Combat aircraft and helicopters have been among Russia’s main arms exports (Wezeman, 2023). However, the production rate might suffer due to sanctions, and there will be a further dip in arms sales. In terms of global spending in 2022, SIPRI ranks Russia at number three at 3.9 per cent. In 2022, Russian military expenditure grew by 9.2 per cent; this is equivalent to 4.1 per cent of its GDP compared to 3.7 per cent of its GDP in 2021 (Tian, 2023).
Mitigation Measures
This is not the first time Western sanctions have been imposed on Russia. In 2014, sanctions were imposed in response to Crimea’s annexation. In order to overcome its dependency over Western technology, Russia’s MIC began to prioritise import substitution and set up plants to indigenously produce the required high-end components (Gregova et al., 2021). Russia has been only partially successful in its quality and quantity and still requires decades to bridge the technological gap with the Western nations (Bergmann et al., 2023).
However, Russia is covering the shortage by importing the necessary restricted components via nations that have not joined the sanctions regimes, such as China, Kazakstan and Turkey (Rácz et al., 2023). China alone has accounted for nearly 90 per cent of global chip exports to Russia between March and December 2022. These imports involve Chinese components and products from top US companies like Intel, Advanced Micro Devices and Texas Instruments (Kot, 2023). Due to problems in ensuring compliance and maintenance issues, Western nations are still struggling to implement applied sanctions. They lack the capacity to monitor and identify sanction breaches effectively. Russia has exploited these limitations to acquire the necessary components through its vast network of procurement channels such as shell companies, obscure suppliers and alternative supply routes via Iran, Central Asia and the Balkan Peninsula nations (Bergmann et al., 2023).
Conclusion
Russia’s MIC has been depending upon crucial components manufactured in the West. Western nations have imposed sanctions to bring down Russia’s war machine once the conflict began. In the initial phase, production in the MIC faced hurdles due to the shortage of imported components. However, in the later phase, Russia has banked upon its massive stockpile of pre-war components, import substitution and access to restricted technologies via alternate channels. In the long run, Russia would be able to keep up its production rate, but at the cost of combat effectiveness and lack of precision in its weapon systems due to unsteady supply of high-end components and low-quality domestic substitutes.
References
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