The ongoing 13th edition of the bilateral ‘Ekuverin Exercise’ between India and the Maldives, which commenced on February 02, 2025, has just concluded on February 16, 2025. This seeks to improve interoperability in counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism efforts while emphasising joint Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) (Indian Defence News, 2025). The nations aim to renew their defence partnership following recent tensions through this exercise.
The recent visit of the Maldivian defence minister, Mohammed Ghassan Maumoon, on January 08, 2025, marks a significant milestone (PIB, 2025). India, underscoring the importance of its ‘Neighbourhood First’ Policy and Vision SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region), reaffirmed its commitment to assist the Maldives in mutual growth to strengthen bilateral defence capabilities, including provisioning defence platforms and assets to augment its capacities, as per its national priorities.
The delegation-level talk took place eight months after Indian troops withdrew from Maldives upon President Mohamed Muizzu’s insistence and pro-China stance after his win in November 2023. The removal of over 85 Indian military personnel manning two aviation platforms was part of a broader shift in the country’s foreign policy, which appeared to lean more towards China (Express News Service, 2025). As the “India-Maldives Comprehensive Economic and Maritime Security Partnership” progresses, both countries seem eager to direct their relationship towards stability, prioritising their mutual security interests in the Indian Ocean. (Ahmad Adil, 2024).
This comprehensive collaboration is a “people-centric, future-oriented” (PIB, 2024) endeavour that will serve as a stabilising force for both countries in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). This framework development collaboration prioritises critical infrastructure, emphasising flagship projects like the USD 500 million Greater Malé Connectivity Project, political exchanges to strengthen democratic ties through parliamentary and local government dialogues, and defence and security initiatives to bolster Maldives’ maritime capabilities, disaster preparedness, and defence infrastructure (Ibid, 2024, a).
Key discussions under this vision emphasised strengthening economic ties, particularly digital cooperation through India’s electronic infrastructure initiatives and RuPay integration (Express Web Desk, 2024). The discussion also focused on how India can improve digital security and resilience, ensuring that Maldivian financial systems are protected from cyberattacks. The introduction of India’s Unified Payments Interface (UPI) in the Maldives by TradeNet Maldives Corporation Limited has facilitated collaboration across Maldivian banks, telecom companies, state-owned enterprises, and fintech firms (PTI, 2024).
India’s collaboration with the Maldives spans multiple sectors, reinforcing economic stability, maritime security, and strategic defence. On the economic front, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has signed a currency swap agreement with the Maldives Monetary Authority (MMA) as part of the SAARC Currency Swap Framework for 2024-27. This agreement, effective until June 18, 2027, enables the MMA to obtain financing support totalling USD 400 million through the USD/Euro Swap Window and Rs 3,000 crore through the INR Swap Window. This measure offers the Maldives a temporary liquidity cushion to cope with foreign exchange or balance of payments pressures while working on long-term economic strategies (Anirban Bhaumik, 2024).
In the defence and strategic domain, India continues to support the Maldivian maritime security, including the Coast Guard Harbour at Uthuru Thila Falhu (UTF), valued at USD 186.3 million (MVR 2.9 billion). On February 21, 2021, the Maldivian Defence Ministry inked an agreement with India, which later was contractually awarded by the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) of India to the state-owned Rail Vikas Nigam Limited (RVNL) (Ahmed Naaif, 2024). Key Aspects of the UTF Agreement are (Ibid, 2024):
- Strengthening India’s influence: The UTF agreement solidifies India’s strategic position in the Maldives, addressing China’s growing naval influence. This was particularly evident in 2022 when the Maldives received an upgraded coastal radar system. Funded by a USD 15.8 million Indian grant, this system consists of 10 radar stations managed by members of the Maldives’ Coast Guard. (Rezaul H Laskar, 2022).
- Boosting regional security: UTF will serve as a vital centre for maritime monitoring, anti-piracy initiatives, and search-and-rescue missions. The collaborative management of UTF enhances India’s maritime security stance in the Indian Ocean Region, effectively countering China’s growing naval influence via commercial and military resources.
- Control of Operations: Foreign vessels will be prohibited from accessing the port without India’s consent, averting potential strategic intrusions.
Maldives’ Defence Engagements with China
Maldives continues to charm Beijing and maintains a delicate balance between its growing defence and strategic partnership with India, and its increasingly deepening ties with China. China’s distant-water fishing fleet (DWF) and state-backed maritime activities have expanded significantly in the IOR, with nearly 600 Chinese fishing vessels entering the region annually. These vessels are increasingly functioning for commercial fishing and intelligence gathering, resource exploitation, and strategic positioning (Prakhar Gupta, 2025).
The Maldives has gradually deepened its defence cooperation with China, signalling a shift in its strategic priorities. On March 4, 2024, Maldivian Defence Minister Mohamed Ghassan Maumoon signed a defence agreement with Major General Zhang Baoqun, the Deputy Director of the Office for International Military Cooperation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) (Lea Thome, 2024). This agreement includes the provision of free military assistance to the Maldives from the PRC, although the specific details have yet to be revealed by the authorities involved.
China’s DWF fleet and the China Maritime Militia (CMM) work closely together as an unofficial extension of the state. These vessels, unlike the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy, are made up of state-subsidized fishing boats and operated by former military personnel play a direct role in surveillance, intelligence gathering, and grey zone tactics (Prakhar Gupta, 2025). This allows China to maintain a visible presence in Maldives’ waters without resorting to overt military actions.
Chinese DWF vessels receive substantial state subsidies, estimated between USD 6–7 billion annually, allowing them to operate at a loss while ensuring a continuous presence in disputed waters (Ibid, 2025). This indicates that their primary aim is not fishing but to assert China’s dominance in regions where the Maldives and other neighbouring states are vital for global maritime trade and security.
In the Maldives, China’s growing maritime footprint is evident in the frequent visits of its research vessels, including the Xiang Yang Hong 3. Its first visit on February 22, 2024, at the Thilafushi harbour was described as a “port call, for the rotation of its personnel and replenishment” (Press Trust of India, NDTV, 2024).
The Xiang Yang Hong 03 is a 99.80-meter research survey vessel built by Wuchang Shipyard in January 2016 for China’s Third Institute of Oceanography (TIO) of the Ministry of Natural Resources (China Shipbuilding). It is recognised as the most sophisticated research vessel in China’s fleet, utilised for ‘distant water’ and ‘deep sea’ surveys at China’s Pilot Ocean Laboratory (Press Trust of India, NDTV, 2024).
China’s Foreign Ministry justified these actions, claiming they align with UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Business Today, 2024). The Maldivian Foreign Ministry emphasised that its ports are accessible to vessels from friendly nations, encompassing both military and civilian ships (Li Meng, 2024).
Source: https://defence.in/threads/chinese-research-vessel-returns-to-maldives-heightening-regional-tensions.5948/
The vessel made its second visit on April 25, 2024, docking once more at Thilafushi Harbour. The Maldivian Foreign Ministry indicated that the purpose of the visit was to restock supplies and rotate crew members but did not elaborate on the reasons for its return. Notably, satellite AIS tracking from the online news platform ‘Adhadhu’ disclosed that the vessel had navigated multiple times within the Maldives’ Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), even penetrating several miles into Maldivian waters to the southwest of Addu City, South Province (Adhadhu, 2024).
The vessel’s third visit occurred when it entered the Indian Ocean on July 15, 2024. According to the maritime analytics provider ‘MarineTraffic’, the ship was spotted near the Java Sea, Indonesia, on July 12, 2024 (Keshav Padmanabhan, 2024).
These research vessels are not just gathering oceanographic data—they serve as an extension of China’s broader maritime ambitions. Their presence near strategic locations in the Maldives could have implications beyond civilian research, possibly aiding submarine navigation and surveillance. The repeated docking of these vessels, combined with the Maldives’ growing defence relationship with China, points to an expanding Chinese influence in the region.
China’s investments in infrastructure in the Maldives, such as the China-Maldives Friendship Bridge and other Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects, further reinforce its strategic footprint. As China’s presence continues to grow, particularly with its expanding military and research activities, the Maldives’ pivot towards Beijing poses potential challenges to India’s long-standing influence in the region.
Conclusion
As the geopolitical landscape of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) continues to shift, the India-Maldives partnership remains crucial for regional stability. With China’s expanding influence—particularly through military agreements and strategic investments—India must reinforce its cooperation with the Maldives. Strengthening joint patrols, conducting maritime exercises, and real-time intelligence sharing with the Maldivian Coast Guard will be essential to safeguarding India’s strategic interests.
The Muizzu government’s increased engagement with China signals a strategic shift, possibly altering the balance of power and influence in the region. The recent military agreements between China and the Maldives signify more than just formal documents- they reflect the evolving geopolitical landscape in the Indian Ocean.
To address these challenges, India should accelerate key projects like the Greater Malé Connectivity Project while fostering continuous diplomatic and defence engagement. India can expand training opportunities for Maldivian military personnel, strengthening their operational readiness and fostering deeper defence cooperation in the region. By deepening collaboration and reinforcing regional cooperation, India and the Maldives can set a strategic benchmark for stability and security in the IOR, benefiting not only both nations but also the wider international community reliant on the region’s stability.
