China’s defence partnership with Pakistan has evolved from a transactional arms-supplier relationship into a multidimensional strategic alignment with significant ramifications for India’s security calculus. While Beijing often presents this engagement as benign military diplomacy, the scale, frequency, and nature of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) interactions with Pakistan point towards a deliberate strategy of indirect coercion aimed at shaping regional military dynamics and keeping India strategically encumbered. As China deepens its military linkages with Pakistan under the umbrella of an “all-weather strategic cooperative partnership,” the blurred line between diplomacy and strategic coercion becomes increasingly consequential for New Delhi.
Historically, China began supplying military hardware to Pakistan in the 1960s, motivated by a shared strategic interest in counterbalancing India’s rise. However, this partnership has now assumed a systemic form, covering conventional arms transfers, intelligence cooperation, joint military training, defence-industrial co-development, and increasingly, doctrinal alignment. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), between 2018 and 2022, China accounted for approximately 77 percent of Pakistan’s total arms imports, making it by far Islamabad’s largest arms supplier. China has not only equipped Pakistan with JF-17 fighter aircraft (jointly developed), air defence systems such as the HQ-16 (known in Pakistan as LY-80), and VT-4 main battle tanks, but also supplied critical technologies such as drones, naval frigates, and missile systems. These transfers are often designed to enhance Pakistan’s second-strike and asymmetric capabilities, effectively serving as force multipliers against India.
The maritime domain has emerged as another key pillar of China’s military engagement with Pakistan. In recent years, China has delivered advanced Type-054A/P guided missile frigates to the Pakistan Navy and is also constructing eight Hangor-class submarines under a technology-transfer agreement. These platforms are critical for Pakistan’s evolving sea denial strategy in the Arabian Sea and are meant to challenge India’s naval supremacy in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). The naval support provided by China is not merely an arms transaction, it is part of a strategic design to expand Beijing’s operational access in the region under the pretext of commercial cooperation. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), with Gwadar Port at its heart, is gradually being militarised with dual-use infrastructure that can accommodate PLA Navy logistics and potentially evolve into a forward presence node in the future. The recently operationalised Gwadar East-Bay Expressway, financed and constructed by Chinese firms, now connects the port directly to hinterland logistics arteries, a classic hallmark of PLA’s dual-use strategic logistics doctrine.
In addition to hardware, China and Pakistan are also intensifying their military training and operational coordination. The Shaheen series of joint air force exercises, which have now become a regular fixture since 2011, serve as a platform for combat interoperability and doctrinal familiarity between the Pakistan Air Force and PLA Air Force. The most recent iteration, Shaheen-X, held in 2023, featured joint air combat drills and beyond-visual-range engagement simulations, a clear indication that Beijing intends to ensure that its platforms and tactics are seamlessly absorbed into Pakistan’s operational matrix. Similar joint military exercises are taking place in land and naval domains, notably the Sea Guardians maritime drills and Warrior land exercises, further enhancing PLA’s familiarity with Pakistan’s terrain, operational environment, and force deployment patterns.
China’s involvement also extends into sensitive domains such as defence technology collaboration and emerging warfare domains. Notably, Beijing is assisting Pakistan in enhancing its cyber warfare capabilities, electronic warfare systems, and space-based ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance) assets. In 2022, China helped Pakistan launch the PRSS-1 (Pakistan Remote Sensing Satellite-1), enhancing its earth observation and surveillance capabilities. Although nominally a civilian initiative, this satellite has clear military applications, especially in target acquisition and cross-border monitoring. Further, there is growing evidence of China providing advisory support to Pakistan in the development of artificial intelligence-based military systems, unmanned aerial vehicles, and hybrid warfare doctrines.
Perhaps the most significant evolution in China’s defence engagement with Pakistan is its increasing role in shaping Islamabad’s nuclear deterrence architecture. Though not overtly acknowledged, Chinese assistance in Pakistan’s nuclear program has been widely documented in open-source literature. The design and development of the Shaheen and Babur missile series, as well as the miniaturization of warheads for deployment on cruise missiles and submarines, have benefitted from Chinese technical inputs. More recently, China has supplied nuclear power reactors (such as Chashma-3 and Chashma-4), which, although ostensibly civilian, are located in proximity to military facilities, raising questions about possible dual-use implications. The specter of a more capable sea-based deterrent, supported by Chinese submarines and platforms, directly affects India’s nuclear second-strike posture and regional stability.
It is also important to examine the broader strategic context within which this military partnership is being nurtured. China’s engagement with Pakistan is not merely a bilateral relationship; it is increasingly becoming a pillar of its two-front strategic posture against India. Beijing has carefully positioned itself to indirectly pressure India along its western borders through Islamabad, while directly engaging along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh. The 2020 Galwan clashes and subsequent PLA build-up in Eastern Ladakh occurred in parallel with increased defence collaboration between China and Pakistan, including high-level military visits, arms deliveries, and doctrinal exchanges. The timing is not coincidental; rather, it reflects a calibrated strategy of geopolitical encirclement and multi-axis pressure against India.
For India, the implications are manifold and profound. First, the increased interoperability between PLA and Pakistan Armed Forces challenges India’s ability to deter and defeat a two-front military contingency. While India has taken significant steps in integrating its armed forces and enhancing theater-level preparedness, the pace and depth of Sino-Pak military coordination demand a re-evaluation of India’s force allocation, operational doctrines, and warfighting readiness. Second, China’s military investments in Pakistan have a direct bearing on India’s strategic dominance in the Indian Ocean. The creeping presence of PLA Navy through Pakistan’s ports and naval platforms narrows India’s traditional advantage in the region and necessitates a robust counterforce and maritime domain awareness strategy.
Third, the Chinese role in enhancing Pakistan’s hybrid warfare toolkit, particularly in domains such as cyber, space, and information warfare, requires India to rethink its national security doctrine in non-contact warfare domains. Given the recent surge in disinformation campaigns, cyber intrusions, and psychological operations targeting Indian institutions, it is increasingly likely that Sino-Pak military synergy will extend to coordinated grey-zone operations.
Fourth, China’s defence engagement with Pakistan poses a long-term threat to strategic deterrence equilibrium in South Asia. The possibility of Chinese systems being deployed on Pakistani soil or platforms being operated by PLA-trained personnel raises questions about strategic ambiguity and escalation risks during crises. India must factor this into its escalation control frameworks and strategic signaling strategies.
Finally, China’s growing military role in Pakistan serves as a cautionary tale for India’s regional diplomacy. Several smaller South Asian countries may be tempted to pursue defence engagement with China under the pretext of military modernization, further diluting India’s strategic influence in the region. Therefore, India’s own military diplomacy, through defence exports, training exchanges, and regional maritime cooperation needs to be accelerated to balance the expanding strategic footprint of China. In conclusion, China’s defence engagement with Pakistan is no longer a matter of military commerce or diplomatic symbolism, it is a sophisticated tool of strategic coercion designed to complicate India’s security environment and erode its strategic autonomy. The challenge before Indian defence planners is to respond not merely through capability augmentation but through integrated strategic foresight, resilient alliances, and a multi-domain deterrence strategy. The time to interpret Chinese military diplomacy through a conventional lens is over; what lies ahead is a contest of resolve, readiness, and regional resilience.
