This article originally appeared at: https://newsable.asianetnews.com/world/pakistan-navy-strategic-autonomy-lost-price-of-dependency-on-chinese-naval-tech-articleshow-qlmp609
In the grand theatre of geopolitical posturing, the Pakistan Navy is performing a tragic play of its own making. Islamabad’s near-total reliance on Beijing for its naval hardware, a decision touted as a masterstroke of “all-weather friendship,” has proven to be a Faustian bargain.
In exchange for a fleet of seemingly modern warships and submarines, Pakistan has traded away its most valuable strategic asset: its autonomy. The navy, envisioned as a guardian of the nation’s maritime frontiers, is rapidly devolving into a tethered fleet, shackled by unreliable technology, crippling debt, and the overarching strategic designs of its northern patron.
Faulty Hulls and Failing Systems: The Illusion of Modernisation
The core of this strategic decay lies in the very platforms meant to signal a new era of naval prowess. The acquisition of Chinese vessels, from the Type 054A/P frigates to the Hangor-class submarines, has been presented as a significant modernisation effort. Yet, the illusion of strength shatters upon closer inspection. These platforms are not the formidable assets they appear to be on paper; they are floating liabilities, plagued by a litany of technical failures that render them suspect in a real combat scenario.
The earlier F-22P Zulfiquar-class frigates have become a case study in flawed dependency. The frigates have been consistently mired in chronic and dangerous defects. The FM-90N surface-to-air missile system, the ship’s primary air defence, has been plagued by faulty imaging devices, rendering it unable to reliably lock onto targets. The main SR-60 air-search radar is susceptible to electromagnetic interference, which compromises the frigate’s ability to fire both its anti-ship and anti-air missiles. Compounding these failures are persistent engine issues, defective sonars detecting “ghost” targets, and even malfunctioning main guns. These are not minor glitches; they are fundamental flaws that render the combat capability of a frontline warship ineffective.
More alarmingly, the newer and much-lauded Type 054A/P frigates, like the PNS Tughril, are already exhibiting similar, deeply troubling symptoms. Their advanced SR2410C AESA radars and diesel engines have shown signs of underperformance and degradation, limiting the vessels’ operational endurance and effectiveness. This consistent pattern of failure across multiple platforms points to a systemic issue of quality and reliability in Chinese naval exports, a problem that Pakistan has imported wholesale.
This technological rot has a direct and debilitating impact on strategic manoeuvrability. A navy’s power lies in its ability to act decisively and independently. Yet, how can Islamabad’s fleet project power when its operational readiness is perpetually in question? In any potential crisis, this unreliability breeds fatal hesitation. The need to constantly second-guess the functionality of one’s own weapon systems is a strategic paralysis that an adversary like India, with its robust and increasingly indigenous fleet, would mercilessly exploit.
Debt, Dependency, and Decline: How Beijing Holds the Keys to Pakistan’s Fleet
The dependency spirals further into the nightmare of “vendor lock-in.” By committing its naval future to a single supplier, Pakistan is entirely dependent on Chinese industry for maintenance, spares, and critical upgrades. The opaque nature of Chinese military technology, coupled with a notorious lack of adequate after-sales support, has created a logistical quagmire.
Warships are often left partially operational for extended periods, awaiting the arrival of Chinese technicians or spare parts. This gives Beijing extraordinary leverage. During times of urgent need, if maintenance and logistic support from China is stopped from reaching Pakistan, it will lead to, effectively grounding the Pakistan Navy without firing a shot. This is not a partnership; it is a stranglehold.
The financial chains are just as binding. The flagship $5 billion deal for eight Hangor-class submarines is financed through immense Chinese loans. This “debt-trap diplomacy” ensures Islamabad’s political and military alignment with Beijing’s interests. The Pakistan Navy is not just acquiring Chinese ships; it is acquiring Chinese debt, further subordinating its national security policy to the ledger book of its creditor.
The strategic folly of this path is starkly illuminated when contrasted with India’s naval strategy. While Pakistan was buying off-the-shelf, India invested decades in building a self-reliant naval-industrial complex. The successful commissioning of the indigenous aircraft carrier INS Vikrant, the construction of nuclear-powered Arihant-class submarines, and the rolling out of world-class destroyers and frigates like the Visakhapatnam and Nilgiri classes tell a tale of two divergent destinies. India is building a navy that serves Indian interests, capable of operating, upgrading, and sustaining itself. Pakistan is leasing a fleet that serves Chinese ambitions.
Ultimately, Islamabad has chosen the easy path of dependency, and it is now paying the steep price. The dream of a powerful, blue-water navy capable of holding its own in the Indian Ocean is evaporating. It is being replaced by the grim reality of a client navy, a force whose primary role is to act as a subordinate appendage to the People’s Liberation Army Navy. The sleek hulls of the Chinese-built ships may gleam in the Karachi sun, but they reflect a dark truth: the loss of strategic autonomy, a nation’s maritime sovereignty sold for a fleet of flawed and borrowed steel.
