On 3 July 2025, Russia became the first country to officially recognise the Taliban led government in Afghanistan. The Taliban took over Kabul in 2021, after the fall of the Ghani government and the dramatic exit of the United States troops from the country. Although several countries have engaged with the Taliban over the years, none had granted them official recognition until now.
Accepting the credentials of the newly appointed Afghan Ambassador, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in its statement said that the recognition of the Taliban government will help in better bilateral cooperation between the two nations. According to the press release, Russia wants to cooperate on energy, transport, agriculture and infrastructure.
Afghanistan’s Foreign Affairs Ministry in a post on X, mentioned that the Russian Ambassador to Kabul Dmitry Zhirnov meet with Afghan Foreign Minister Mawlawi Amir Khan Muttaqi, to convey Moscow’s decision of recognizing the Taliban-led government. Muttaqi also emphasised that this historic step would “set a good example for other countries.” The official recognition comes just months after Russia lifted the “terrorist” designation from Taliban on 17 April 2025.
Despite not officially recognising the Taliban government, many in the international community have gradually engaged with the Taliban authorities since the US withdrawal. At least 17 countries have established embassies in Afghanistan. While China, Türkiye, Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates and Uzbekistan have appointed ambassadors, many others have accepted Taliban-appointed diplomats at chargé d’affaires level.
Russia’s Reproachment
While Moscow’s move might be surprising to some, it is likely a part of its broader regional strategy. In 2015, the emergence of Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) in Afghanistan, combined with the declining US military presence, sparked concerns about Afghanistan becoming a hub of instability, spreading terrorism to neighbouring states in Central Asia, and through the porous borders ultimately reaching Russia. In this context, the Taliban which was once considered a hostile force, came to be seen as the lesser of two threats, sharing the common interest of countering ISKP. There were reports in 2015, that the Russian authorities were sharing intelligence about ISKP with the Taliban. However, the group denied these claims, and there was no mention of it in the Russian media either.
Why Now?
With the ISKP orchestrating the 2024 Crocus Hall massacre and expressing support towards the perpetrators of attacks on churches and synagogue in Dagestan, the Kremlin’s alignment with the ‘enemy of its enemy’ reflects a calculated move to promote regional stability. Moreover, as Moscow seeks to improve bilateral relations with the Taliban across various domains, official recognition could pave the way for deeper cooperation between the two governments in confronting their shared threat.
The ISKP have carried out cross-border rocket attacks and bombings into neighbouring Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, that contradict Taliban’s commitments to prevent the Afghan territory from being used by any individual or group terrorist activities. ISKP had also expanded its propaganda efforts, particularly in Tajik and Uzbek languages, in order to recruit Central Asian fighters and build influence beyond Afghanistan. Despite initially downplaying these threats, there was an evident shift as the attacks intensified.
In 2022, the Taliban’s General Directorate of Intelligence (GDI) began publicising its counterterrorism efforts. During one operation in Kabul, Taliban forces raided an ISKP safehouse, killing two militants and capturing three others identified as “important foreign members.” The raid also disrupted a key ISKP media outlet that produced the Tajik-language section of Voice of Khorasan magazine. Around the same time the Taliban released a video of its counter terror operation in Kunduz province near the Tajik border, where they claimed to have killed three ISKP members involved in earlier rocket attacks on Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, and detained five others. These actions signal a more proactive Taliban stance, targeting both ISKP’s fighters and its propaganda infrastructure.
In February 2025, the Afghan Ministry of Industry and Commerce, noted that the current trade between Russia and Taliban has seen a decline as compared to the previous year. Even though the trade with Russia amounted to USD 220 million, this figure had exceeded USD 322 million in the same period last year. Additionally, out of this Kabul exported goods worth $3 million to Moscow while importing $217 million worth of goods from Russia. Afghanistan exported goods such as raisins, minerals, dried apricots, and pressure cookers to Russia, while importing petroleum products, flour, industrial raw materials, and oil from Russia in return.
Afghan Agriculture Minister Ataullah Omari stated that since Taliban came to power in 2021, there have been efforts to make food production independent, however products like flour and wheat are annually supplied by Russia. Meanwhile, Kabul has recently requested increased imports of agricultural goods from Russia, amid disruptions in food supplies from Iran, one of its main providers due to recent Israeli and U.S. airstrikes. Russian agricultural export agency Agroexport, has noted that Afghanistan doubled its purchase reaching a value of nearly €73.6 million, compared to €36.8 million in 2023. Since 2022, Afghanistan has imported gas, oil and wheat from Russia. During this period, the country has become the largest buyer of Russian flour.
Furthermore, Russia views Afghanistan as a promising market for investment, particularly in the mining and agricultural sectors, and is also exploring opportunities to supply energy to Kabul. According to Afghanistan’s Chamber of Commerce and Investment, Russian companies have been invited to take part in resource extraction projects, as well as in the development of infrastructure such as roads and tunnels to enhance access in the country’s mountainous areas.
In May 2025, Afghanistan announced that Russian company Inteco had conducted geological explorations and is soon to initiate drilling for extraction of oil. Additionally, the Head of Russia’s Trade Centre in Afghanistan Rustam Khabibulin, noted that the construction of an oil refinery is planned, although there is no specific timeline on it yet. During the 16th Russia–Islamic World Forum in Kazan, a total of five agreements were signed, covering cooperation in the transport sector, the expansion of trade relations, and collaboration between private companies on oil and gas extraction.
Additionally, Kabul is also emerging as a key transit point for Russian oil. In May 2024, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Afghanistan announced the building of a logistics center in Herat province in Afghanistan. This facility will coordinate incoming Russian oil shipments from Central Asia and organise their onward movement via road and rail. The hub is expected to initially handle around one million tons of oil annually, with ambitions to expand that volume significantly. This new role for Kabul is part of the broader Kazakhstan–Turkmenistan–Afghanistan transport corridor, a proposed extension of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC). The new logistics center is also expected to function as a distribution point, where oil tanks and other goods will be transferred from trucks to trains, and then transported to seaports in Iran, Pakistan, and India for shipment to the Middle East and Asia.
In November 2024, Russian Security Secretary Sergei Shoigu met with the Afghan Deputy PM Abdul Ghani Baradar to discuss on the Trans-Afghan railway to Pakistan, which Moscow views as part of its INSTC. Also known as the Uzbekistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (UAP) rail project, the Trans-Afghan railway will be a ‘game changer’ in terms of regional trade as it aims to connect Central Asia to Pakistan via Afghanistan.
As the West sanctions against Russia are still in place, the southern transit direction of INSTC has gained traction. With Pakistan being a part of the INSTC, extending the corridor to include Afghanistan could serve Moscow’s interests, particularly in case of an escalation in West Asia. Situations like the recent Iran-Israel war that has the potential increase tensions in the Persian Gulf or the Strait of Hormuz, where Iranian ports are located, makes the Afghan-Pakistani route within the INSTC framework an appealing alternative for maintaining reliable connectivity.
In addition to Russia, the Taliban have also relied on China to break their international diplomatic isolation, in expectation of financial aid and investment in Afghanistan. In March 2022, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited Kabul, where the two sides discussed on “political, economic & transit issues, air corridor, dried fruit export, educational scholarships, visa issuance, commencing work in the mines sector, Afghanistan’s role in BRI & other matters of significance.” With Afghanistan as part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), there is a greater possibility of increased Chinese investment and economic integration in sectors like mining, trade and infrastructure. While it is uncertain if Beijing will participate in major projects by Moscow, nonetheless, a cooperative framework similar to the one seen in Central Asia could emerge, where Russia maintains its role as the primary security guarantor, while China contributes through economic assistance and development investments. This complementary arrangement could allow both powers to maintain their respective spheres of influence while jointly shaping Afghanistan’s future.
Conclusion
What was once deemed unthinkable has now become reality. Russia, a major power has formally recognised the Taliban government that is still considered illegitimate by much of the world. This marks a pivotal moment in the evolving geopolitics of Central and South Asia. Moscow’s motivations appear pragmatic where it counters regional security threats like the Islamic State, expand its economic footprint, and strengthen its influence in a rapidly shifting landscape where Western dominance has receded.
For the Taliban, this is a significant diplomatic win. It not only lends their administration a sense of legitimacy but also opens the door to deeper economic engagement, foreign investment, and regional connectivity. While Western nations remain wary, prioritising human rights and inclusive governance, the growing list of countries establishing working relationships with Kabul suggests a quiet normalisation underway.
By extending formal recognition, Russia signals its belief that the Taliban is not only here to stay but must be actively engaged with. Being the first to take this step may also offer Russia future leverage; diplomatically, economically, and strategically, especially as Afghanistan’s role in regional connectivity and security grows.
As global power centres continue to realign and traditional alliances shift, Russia’s bold step could be the beginning of a new era, where recognition is dictated less by ideology and more by interest. Whether this leads to genuine stability and prosperity for Afghanistan and the region remains uncertain, but for now, it signals a new chapter in its international relations driven by strategic calculations, regional necessity, and the realities of a post-American order.
