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Russia-Ukraine War: Lessons from an Electronic Warfare (EW) Perspective

Col J AgarkarbyCol J Agarkar
May 31, 2025
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Introduction

Battlefield has evolved over the years and the reliance on wireless communications has increased manifold be it Radios, GPS or Satellite communications and hence   Electronic Warfare (EW) has become a pivotal element in modern military operations. EW has been used to enable own forces to disrupt adversary communications, impair targeting systems while protecting own networks. The Russia-Ukraine conflict has underscored the critical role of EW in contemporary warfare and by far has been an expose of the largest use of EW resources in any war/operation/battle. Russia has employed advanced EW capabilities to gain an edge on the battlefield, on the other hand Ukraine has demonstrated resilience through adaptation and innovation in countermeasures to mitigate Russian EW advantages. This article explores the EW strategies of both nations, countermeasures implemented, equipment utilized and tries to bring out broader lessons derived from this ongoing conflict.


Utilization of EW by Russia and Ukraine

Russian Approach to EW

Russia has made huge investments in EW since the Cold War era to offset technological advantage of the US. It considers EW as integral to its military doctrine and a central theme in all its war plans. Russian forces have deployed sophisticated EW systems such as the famous Krasukha-4 for radar jamming, Leer-3 for disrupting cellular networks and Murmansk-BN for strategic electronic disruption. From the onset of the invasion, Russian forces attempted to neutralize Ukraine’s command-and-control (C2) infrastructure by jamming GPS signals and disrupting communications, destruction of EW systems and degrading Ukrainian drone operations. In the early stages of battle Russian forces utilised EW units along the front lines effectively and used its airborne and land-based assets to search and destroy Radars by the use of Anti-radiation missiles and artillery. However, as the distances became extended and the administrative lines tenuous, they started facing reverses and while withdrawing realised the bulkiness of the equipment and loss of coordination in its deployment, this also resulted in times when the equipment had to be left behind for the enemy to capture. This trend was reversed, once the forces started consolidating along the now well demarcated frontlines and with this the usage of EW resources was much more effective and coordinated. Russian forces have also innovated and started using wired drones also called as the optical fibre drones to beat the EW efforts by the Ukraine Army (Clark, 2022).

Ukraine’s Response to EW Challenges

Despite being at the forefront of electronic warfare, Russia was soon overtaken by Ukraine’s responsiveness through Western-sourced technology, inventive tactics, decentralized operation, commercial technologies, and native solutions to counter Russian electronic warfare. For instance, they employed frequency-hopping radios, encrypted communication, and terrestrial fiber-optic networks to mitigate the effect of Russian jamming. Commercial satellite communication services such as Starlink have made themselves available for rapid integration with redundant paths outside military communications; drone production has been rapidly ramping up, reaching nearly thousands in a single month by newer companies. The modified drones are then brought into service for reconnaissance and attack missions (Kofman & Kagan, 2023).

Countermeasures Taken by Both Sides

Russian Countermeasures

In the wake of Ukrainian adaptations, Russia stepped up its EW operations. This included the more aggressive deployment of mobile EW units towards the front lines refining its cyber-electronic operations, combined with the use of an AI-based spectrum analysis tool that detects and jam the Ukrainian communications. It was also reported that Russian forces adopted deception techniques to mislead the Ukrainian navigation systems, especially with the use of drone operations rendering them ineffective in areas of contention. Thus, Russian EW tactics have been on a continuous evolving tide to keep under check the further technological advancement of Ukraine to be achieved through NATO and to guarantee electromagnetic superiority (Giles, 2023).

Ukrainian Countermeasures

Ukraine’s Countermeasures have inspired Innovation and Agility, which included Some Basic Hardening of Communication Networks, Decentralized Command Structures, and Counter-Drone EW Systems. The military hacked optical fiber drones designed to use commercial off-the-shelf technologies to resiliently resist jamming. Ground robotics and AI systems that enhance battlefield capabilities also assumed a thrust. One real-time countermeasure against Russian EW was improving coordination and secure beat communication channels by means of frequency-hopping radio sets supplied by the US, which allowed Ukrainian units to operate even under heavy EW attack (Lanoszka & Hunzeker 2022).

Equipment Used and Its Utility
(List of important EW and its counter equipment used by both sides)

Russian EW Equipment

The following are the most important EW equipment that were specifically utilized by Russia:

  • Krasukha-4: A high jamming radar and airborne early warning system targeting system.
  • Leer-3: An EW complex installed on UAVs, intending to disrupt cellular communications.
  • Murmansk-BN: This is a long-range EW system for attack against high-frequency communications in vast areas.
  • Borisoglebsk-2: A multi-role EW system for jamming radio and satellite communications (O’Brien, 2022).

These systems have played a major role in the Russian strategy of electromagnetic spectrum domination through disruption in command-and-control capabilities. Effectiveness with which Ukrainian UAVs could be operated was also disrupted.


Ukrainian EW Equipment

The following EW equipment were primarily used by Ukraine:

  • Bukovel-AD: A counter-drone Electronic Warfare system designed to jam Russian drones.
  • Electronic Counter-Countermeasures (ECCM): The other jamming efforts have employed secure communications through frequency-hopping radio to avoid detection. Adaptive signal-processing techniques have been utilized for mitigation from Russian jamming.
  • Starlink Terminals: Secure resilient C2 operations, even in the presence of Russian interference.
  • Indigenous EW Innovations: Ukraine has developed low-cost, rapidly deployable solutions for electronic warfare; these include handheld jammers and local signal amplification systems (Clark, 2022). Collaboration has been engaged with Ukraine in the development of ground-based robotic platforms and AI systems to optimize effectiveness in the battlefield.
  • Commercial Drones: Modified to resist jamming, these drones were employed in reconnaissance and offensive operations.
  • Encrypted Communication Systems: Operational security against interception. To this end, Ukraine has benefitted enormously from communications equipment provided by NATO, especially the United States.

Overall, the rapid integration of available technologies and the development of inexpensive alternatives has characterized its approach in the EW area to balance Russian superiority.

Lessons Learnt

  1. The importance of the EW as a Force Multiplier: This conflict has made it clear that the capabilities of EW can play a force multiplier role in influencing battlefield dynamics through the disruption of enemy action and the establishment of friendly communications.
  2. Flexibility and Innovation in the Politics of Success: The differential acted in favour of Ukraine in its adaptation to and application of rapidly-evolving and ingeniously conceived solutions in its fight against a technologically superior foe. In fact, the adjustment made by Ukraine in countering the EW tactics employed by Russia further emphasizes agility in electronic warfare. Indications that adaptability could swing the scale towards success include Russians using the striking experience in further pushing the tide toward themselves after stabilizing borders while lowering targets and tempo of operations.
  3. Integration of Commercial Technologies and Asymmetric AU Work in C-EW: Use of simple, readily available, commercial technologies might prove a rapid and efficient means of raising military capabilities. Using these commercial technological capabilities and ad hoc tactics, Ukraine has leveled the playing field between her and Russia with regard to towed jamming systems. Much of the countering strategy that Ukraine built on the hardware supplied from the US, such as the ones supported by secure and frequency hopping radio platforms like Himera G1 Pro, had proven effective, as have SDRs, which have proven a foil against Russian jamming.
  4. Continuous Evolution of Tactics: Both sides have indicated the need for continuous development of electronic warfare tactics and evolution to counter emerging threats and countermeasures.
  5. Importance of Joint Cyber and EW Operations: Military strategists have been able to grasp the increasing void in understanding fusion between cyber and electronic warfare just as both were likely to change the battlefield dynamics (Recapping Cyber in War, 2023).
  6. Importance of Secure and Resilient Communications: Encrypt, shape and adapt communication systems crucial for operational security during the atmosphere of the EW contest. The fact that Ukraine successfully used diversified and redundant communications systems (Starlink, among others), which proved vital, would be considered invaluable to her command effectiveness.

Conclusion

This valuable learning ground provides insight into the fast-changing dynamics that EW is taking with modern warfare. It potentially shows how sophisticated EW systems could disrupt operations on either side of the conflict. At first, these systems seemed to have helped Russia in disrupting Ukrainian operations. However, Ukraine’s ability to innovate countermeasures, which eventually took away most of those advantages, proved the futility of the policy. Emerging from this conflict surely is a clear justification for investing in continual advances in EW capabilities, an understanding of asymmetric responses, and the necessity of resilient communication infrastructure and tactics that are nimble enough to adapt to the demands of conducting operations in contested electromagnetic environments. Future wars will incorporate even a greater integration of electronic warfare, cyber warfare, and artificial intelligence, making electronic dominance a deciding factor in warfare.

References

Adamsky, D. (2019). The Culture of Military Innovation: The Impact of Cultural Factors on the Revolution in Military Affairs in Russia, the US and Israel. Stanford University Press.

Clark, B. (2022). The Fall and Rise of Russian Electronic Warfare. https://spectrum.ieee.org/the-fall-and-rise-of-russian-electronic-warfare

Clark, B. (2022). “Electronic Warfare in the Russia-Ukraine War: Lessons for the Future.” Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.

Giles, K. (2017). Russian Electronic Warfare: The Role of EW in the Russian Armed Forces. NATO  defence College.

Kofman, M., & Kagan, F. (2023). “Electronic Warfare in the Modern Battlefield: Ukraine’s Experience.” Foreign Policy Research Institute.

Lanoszka, A., & Hunzeker, M. (2022). “Countering Russian Electronic Warfare: Lessons from Ukraine.” Parameters, 52(2), 5-18.

O’Brien, T. (2022). “Russia’s EW Capabilities in Ukraine: Strengths and Shortfalls.” RUSI Journal.

Recapping Cyber in War: Lessons from the Russia-Ukraine Conflict. (2023). Retrieved from https://lieber.westpoint.edu/recapping-cyber-war-lessons-russia-ukraine-conflict/

Electronic Warfare in Ukraine – Joint Air Power Competence Centre. (2023). Retrieved from https://www.japcc.org/articles/electronic-warfare-in-ukraine/

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