On 23 April 2025, the Taliban’s acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi, announced that the group would soon appoint their ambassador to Moscow. This comes soon after the Russian Federation’s decision to suspend Taliban’s ‘terrorist status’ on 17 April 2025, marks the first application of the legal provision that came into force in December 2024 – permitting the courts to suspend bans on certain groups labelled as ‘terrorist organisations’ by Moscow. The Islamist group had been designated as a ‘terrorist organisation banned in Russia’ for more than two decades. Russia is among the few countries that despite not formally recognising the Taliban-led government that seized power in Kabul in August 2021, maintains diplomatic ties with the group.
Many countries have made their recognition of the Taliban conditional on the protection of women’s rights, the formation of an inclusive government and the severing of ties with extremist groups. Demands the Taliban have consistently failed to meet. Even though as these conditions still largely remain, international diplomatic engagement with the Islamist group continues to grow steadily. Neighbouring countries like Russia and the Central Asian Republics (namely Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan), concerned with issues like security, trade, migration and drug trafficking, have thus shown a greater willingness to engage with the group.
Challenges to Russia – Post U.S. Withdrawal in 2021
The United States’ (U.S.) withdrawal after its twenty-year campaign left Afghanistan in deepening turmoil. While Al-Qaeda was quickly defeated, the Taliban emerged as the dominant force, poised to topple the U.S.-backed government. Simultaneously, the rising influence of Islamic State (IS) militants underscored Afghanistan’s importance as a geopolitical hotspot at the crossroads of Central, South, and West Asia.
Russia and Central Asian Republics’ (CARs) primary concern is the increase in terrorist activities due to an unstable Afghanistan, that can in turn alter the regional security dynamics. Groups like the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) and other militants, including those defeated in Syria and Iraq, are demonstrating a rising interest in moving to Afghanistan and Central Asia, raising the risk of cross-border terrorism and radicalisation in Russia’s southern periphery.
Moreover, adding to this concern is the influx of refugees due to the shared border with the CARs, that might result in a ‘spillover of extremism’ in the guise of refugees. In 2021, President Putin warned of this threat, citing the potential for uncontrolled refugee movement and the lack of visa restrictions. The member states of Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) have also echoed concerns over their concerns over IS presence in Afghanistan, emphasising its serious threat to regional security.
Furthermore, the departure of U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces had left behind large stockpiles of conventional weapons, raising Russian concerns about their potential selling and smuggling into Central Asia and misuse by militant groups.
Lastly, despite the U.S.’ multi-million-dollar campaign during its years of intervention, Taliban drug trafficking networks have faced little to no impact. Afghanistan emerged as a leading producer of narcotics trafficked through Central Asia to Russia, which became a key destination for these drugs. The supply of Afghan narcotics to the Russian market has intensified conflict, corruption, and regional instability. Although the Taliban’s 2021 ban on opium cultivation has proven largely effective, Afghanistan has seen a notable surge in the production of synthetic drugs, especially methamphetamine. This sharp increase in meth production suggests that trafficking networks are expanding, potentially financing terrorist organisations and exacerbating an already critical addiction crisis across the region. This flow has further worsened Russia’s own drug abuse issues, contributing to rising addiction rates and public health challenges. In 2020 alone, 18,013 individuals in Russia experienced drug overdoses, with 7,366 fatalities; thus, marking a 16 per cent increase compared to 2019.
Why is Russia Engaging with the Taliban?
The deadly terrorist attacks carried out by the ISKP, at Moscow’s Crocus City Hall in March 2024 and, on churches and a synagogue in Dagestan in June 2024, have prompted the Kremlin to intensify its collaboration with the Pashtun-dominated group and consider removing the group from its list of terrorist organisations. These attacks can be traced to be part of ISKP’s broader anti-Russia propaganda campaign. The IS’s leadership have designated Russia as a ‘top priority enemy’ alongside the U.S. and Iran, and have on various occasions criticised Russia’s policy actions. Thus, in the years following Taliban’s resurgence in Kabul, these attacks have pushed Moscow to strengthen its ties with the Taliban for practical security reasons.
This shift is also reflected in official rhetoric from senior Russian leadership. In May 2024, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov acknowledged the Taliban as the “real power” in Afghanistan. Similarly, Russian President Vladimir Putin in July 2024 declared the Taliban as an “ally” in Russia’s counterterrorism efforts, signalling a significant reorientation in Moscow’s approach to Afghan affairs. Russia and the Taliban have also seen delegation visits from both sides, signalling growing diplomatic engagement.
Moscow is also exploring energy, mining and infrastructure projects in Afghanistan, including potential investments in rare minerals and transport corridors, in turn creating employment opportunities in Afghanistan as well.
During the Kazan Forum in May 2024, the Taliban’s Acting Industry and Trade Minister Nooruddin Azizi stated that Afghanistan is open to working with Russia on the extraction of rare earth metals and expects Russian businesses to invest in the sector. Afghanistan owns significant untapped lithium reserves, that are crucial for the global shift towards renewable energy. Thus, as Moscow aims to become a significant player in electric vehicle (EV) battery production, securing reliable access to lithium is crucial for battery manufacturing in turn becoming a national priority.
In 2022, the Taliban, facing economic collapse and global isolation, signed a trade deal with Russia. The agreement stated that, “Afghanistan will get 1 million tons of gasoline, 1 million tons of diesel fuel, 500,000 tons of liquefied petroleum gas, and 2 million tons of wheat a year,” for which they would pay in Rubles. Although details of what Russia received in return remained unclear, future access to Afghan natural-resources seemed likely. Further, in July 2024, Moscow and Kabul also held talks regarding the development of a roadmap for investing in the latter’s oil and gas sector, signalling potential Russian investments.
Additionally, the Taliban delegation has since 2022 (currently till 2024) participated in the St. Petersburg Economic Forum underscoring Russia’s interest in economic collaboration, despite limited immediate gains.
Further, the war in Ukraine and subsequent Western sanctions against Russia, have prompted Moscow to increase its outreach in various areas of cooperation in South Asia. The disruption of the northern transport routes on which most Eurasian states relied, have also compelled Russia to strengthen its engagement with the Taliban government to develop transport links connecting to the South Asian market. In November 2024, during a meeting between Russian Security Secretary Sergei Shoigu and Afghan Deputy Prime Minister Abdul Ghani Baradar, both parties expressed their readiness to collaborate on construction of the Trans-Afghan Railway to Pakistan. This initiative is viewed by Moscow as a strategic component of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), particularly following Pakistan’s formal accession to the corridor in June 2024. The planned extension through Afghanistan and Pakistan offers Russia a critical alternative route for regional connectivity, especially in light of escalating instability in the Middle East, which poses increasing risks to conventional supply chains.
Conclusion
Even as Russia’s main objectives behind strengthening relations with the Taliban remains combatting terrorism and drug trafficking, the removal of Taliban’s ‘terrorist’ label paves way for serving both their interests. By deepening economic and diplomatic ties with the Taliban-led government, Moscow is positioning itself to access these mineral resources, while simultaneously countering Western influence in the region.
Furthermore, given Afghanistan’s strategic position, the country has the potential to serve as a crucial hub for the implementation of major energy and infrastructure initiatives. Afghanistan’s instability and limited foreign investment create a strategic opening for Russia to gain early control over mining rights and infrastructure projects, which further aligns with Russia’s broader geopolitical goal of expanding its influence in Central and South Asia
Thus, the recent developments between both sides underscore their commitments toward strengthening bilateral ties, advancing regional cooperation, and expanding economic partnerships. However, despite these various collaborative efforts between Moscow and the Taliban, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has highlighted that the suspension of Taliban from the list of banned organisations does not change Moscow’s international commitments regarding the United Nations Security Council sanctions.
